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preface

Ortiz was an up-and-coming banana producer from
an elite Leon family when the Sandinista revolution occurred. On
a farm his father "carved out of the jungle/' Gurdian had built up one
of Nicaragua's larger banana plantations and was moving rapidly up the
administrative ladder of Standard Fruit's Nicaragua operation. He was
skeptical of the insurrection that swept the regime of Anastasio Somoza
Debayle from power in 1979 and brought in the leaders of the f s l n , and
he remained aloof from the political imbroglio that followed. But in 1980,
Jorge Salazar, the president of his private sector association, the Nica
raguan Union of Agricultural and Livestock Producers (u pa n ic ), began
organizing a counterrevolutionary expedition and was killed by state secu
rity forces during an arms transaction. Gurdian agreed to serve as his
replacement in u pa n ic . During the next ten years, he became one of the
nation's most outspoken critics of the Sandinista regime. He was arrested,
convicted, and placed on probation for violating the censorship provisions
of the 1982 National Emergency decree; his farm was confiscated without
compensation; his family scattered, leaving him as the sole continuing
resident of Nicaragua.
Ricardo Coronel Kautz was a part-time rancher and full-time admin
istrator of the livestock enterprise owned by the region's largest sugar
mill, the Ingenio San Antonio, prior to the revolution. Son of Jose Coro
nel Urtecho, a prominent Nicaraguan intellectual who had served as a
diplomatic representative of the Somoza regime but became increasingly
disaffected, and his muse, Maria Kautz, a Nicaraguan of German descent
whose family had been dispossessed of its primary estate by the Somoza
regime during World War II, Coronel had developed an abiding antipathy
for the Somoza dynasty. As a top administrator of Nicaragua's most promi
nent agroindustrial complex, Coronel helped organize an underground
political movement among the technical staff in support of the Sandi
nista insurrection. In 1977 he was named to the prestigious Los Doce,
a group of twelve prominent business, religious, and intellectual leaders
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who lobbied for international political support for the Sandinista cause in
the final years of the insurrection. When he returned to Nicaragua after
Somoza's departure, he was appointed a vice-minister of agriculture and
agrarian reform. For eleven years, Coronel served in the Nicaraguan gov
ernment, exercising considerable influence over the state farm sector and
agricultural development policy throughout the Sandinista era.
These vignettes suggest the range of views held by Nicaraguan eco
nomic elites about the Sandinista revolution. The relationship between
the revolutionary government and most of Nicaragua's traditional busi
ness elite was generally antagonistic. Yet during the same period, some
endorsed the revolution and became active participants in the social tran
sitions it produced. Others ranged in between, reaching a tenuous accom
modation with the regime but retaining a critical distance.
Two broad questions shape this study. The first addresses the theoreti
cal debate about the composition and segmentation of the bourgeoisie.
This analysis explores the unity/division of the capitalist class as it inter
acts with other social sectors. The second focuses on the capacity of eco
nomic elites to participate in a process of social change. This discussion
evaluates the capacity of the elites to contribute to or to impede equitable
distribution and the collective development of the nation.
Structural analysis, which has provided the dominant theoretical and
methodological framework in Latin American studies for the last two de
cades, typically assumes a high degree of class cohesion. According to this
approach, "capital" has clear interests and needs defined by its structural
position in the economy. The dominant class is found to use its resources
to impose constraints on other actors, limiting the options for structural
change. The state may attain a "relative autonomy" from the business sec
tor, but this autonomy is ultimately limited by the structural dependence
of the state on capital. Capital, therefore, is understood as an increasingly
united, cohesive actor. To the extent that segmentation occurs within
the bourgeoisie, one fraction tends to emerge as the dominant force and
exercise direction over the others.
Because of the fundamental cohesion of the bourgeoisie alleged in this
model, any notions of cross-class alliances between the underclass and
elements of the bourgeoisie are seen as inherently flawed. The participa
tion of capitalist partners in a reform coalition is seen as ultimately under
mining the movement because they are expected to serve the long-run
interests of the dominant fraction of their class. For any structural trans
formation to occur, this exploitative class must be removed from power.
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Yet Popular Front struggles and many progressive electoral strategies
have been premised on the assumption that movements for social change
can draw on the energies of a range of class actors, including elements
of a "nationalist" or "progressive" bourgeoisie. Both Social Democratic
and Democratic Socialist coalitions have understood the necessity for a
continually evolving class compromise involving a component of the pri
vate sector in their movement. Latin American Populist and Third World
National Liberation movements have traditionally drawn on a multiclass
coalition that, while limiting the redistributive impact of the outcome,
also allows for the participation of economic elites who can insert them
selves into the changing economic order.
New research traditions, such as strategic choice analysis, explore more
open, less deterministic models of social change.1 These approaches as
sume that actors are not fully bound by their structural positions. Partici
pants in political negotiations are viewed as volitional agents who operate
with an element of discretion, allowing the use of analytical schemes
that are more dynamic and interactive. In these models, changing calcu
lations of costs and benefits, combined with multilevel bargaining, pro
duce highly complex and varied alliance strategies. This relatively open
approach may better capture moments of "extraordinary" politics, when
regimes undergo transitions and the social compact is subject to revision.
Attention to complex alliances and ongoing bargaining reopens ques
tions about the character and political roles of capital in Latin America.
These questions will become increasingly central in the study of Latin
American politics in the 1990s. Throughout much of this region, the fiscal
crisis of the state and the weakness of foreign financial support now move
the local business elite toward the strategic center of the development
debate. Finding a way to engage the resources and energies of business
elites and break the cycle of capital flight, while simultaneously open
ing new social and economic opportunities to nonelites, will be a central
challenge for Latin American leaders in the coming years.
My research on the relationship between the state, capitalists, and revo
lution began in 1982 when, with support from the National Endowment
for the Humanities, I started a research project on the Sandinista concept
of the "mixed economy." That year my annual trek to Nicaragua began.
Support from the University Research Council and the College of Liberal
Arts and Sciences of DePaul University allowed me to mount an ongoing
research effort on the shifting dynamics of the Nicaraguan revolution.
My attention was increasingly drawn to the anomalous role of the
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local bourgeoisie in the revolution. Much of the material on Nicaragua
during this period focused on the contra war and the conflict with the
United States. Less understood were the complex, internal relationships
that played a critical role in shaping the development of the revolution. To
analyze the way in which the revolution unfolded, I carefully examined
these internal dynamics. Given the centrality of the agricultural sector in
the national economy, I concentrated on the agricultural and agroindus
trial sectors. In 1985-87,1 began a series of interviews with leaders of the
major private sector organizations.
By the time I began my interviews, a sizable core of the prerevolution
ary economic elite had left the country. The effort to better understand
elite-state dynamics in the Somoza era and the impact of emigration on
the revolution took me to Miami, where I conducted a round of inter
views in 1988 with seventeen former and current Nicaraguan private
sector leaders. The Latin American and Caribbean Center of Florida Inter
national University generously provided housing accommodations during
my stay; Mark Rosenberg and Doug Kincaid provided intellectual and
logistical support for this phase of my work.
Most of the research for this book was completed in 1989-90 with
support from the Joint Committee on Latin American Studies of the
Social Science Research Council and American Council of Learned Soci
eties with funds provided by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and the
Ford Foundation, and with support from the Howard Heinz Foundation.
A fellowship at the Kellogg Institute of International Studies at Notre
Dame provided a congenial environment in which to begin writing this
book. I am grateful to generous and supportive colleagues at all of these
institutions for facilitating this research.
Research in Nicaragua would not have been possible without the ex
tensive assistance provided by Laura Enriquez, Amalia Chamorro, Peter
Utting, Peter Marchetti, Eduardo Baumeister, Rodolfo Delgado Caceres,
and Paul Oquist. I am also grateful for the research assistance provided
by Freddy Quesada, Carlos Molina, and Edith Munoz. Invaluable intel
lectual companionship was provided at different phases in this process
by Florence Babb, Martin Diskin, David Dye, Dennis Gilbert, Richard
Grossman, Barbara Kritt, Shelley McConnell, Alice McGrath, Jack Spence,
George Vickers, Phillip Williams, and Daniel Wolf.
Several colleagues read versions of my work as it wended its way toward
the final draft. John Booth, Laura Enriquez, Ilja Luciak, Steven Sanderson,
Richard Stahler-Sholk, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and Carlos Vilas deserve
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special thanks for their constructive criticisms, as do my colleagues Mike
Alvarez and Pat Callahan. For their useful comments on the comparative
framework and some of the theoretical constructs employed here, I want
to thank David Collier, Sandra McGee Deutch, Francisco Durand, Jeffrey
Paige, and Eduardo Silva. Lisa Milam and Veronica Diaz helped me to
polish and produce the final version of the manuscript. David Perry at
the University of North Carolina Press gently and efficiently shepherded
the manuscript to publication, and Stephanie Wenzel proved a remarkably
keen-eyed copyeditor. The usual disclaimers about responsibility for the
remaining flaws in this work apply.
I also want to thank the private producers in Nicaragua who gave gen
erously of their time to introduce an unschooled chela to the world of
Nicaraguan business and agricultural production. Ramiro Gurdian, for
many years the president of upa n ic and currently the president of c o s e p ,
and Daniel Nunez, long-term president of u n a g , provided invaluable ad
vice and suggestions,- without their help this book would not have been
possible. I am also deeply indebted to Mario Hanon and his family for their
many kindnesses over the years. While most of those producers whom
I have interviewed will take issue with different parts of my analysis, I
hope that they will see merit in it as well.
Finally, I want to thank my patient and generous husband, William
Denton, who sacrificed as much as I did to get this book written and who
wasn't able to share much of the fun; my daughter Claire, who walked
this long journey right by my side,- and my daughter Grace, who was born
just as it came to an end.
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Capitalists and Revolution
It is a complex problem, but we have not given up the search for ways
of integrating the more-or-less large individual producers who live in
Nicaragua today into a social formation in which revolutionary hege
mony prevails.
—Jaime Wheelock Roman, El gran desafio

e v e l o pm e n t a l is t s ,

social theorists, and revolutionaries have long
puzzled over the problematic role of economic elites in the process of
social change. Much of the general literature on revolution and structural
reform presents the dominant class as a homogeneous entity intransigent
in its opposition to significant change. As beneficiaries of the status quo,
economic elites are seen as a primary obstacle to social restructuring,
often in close cooperation with foreign capital.
In recent years, however, many of the standard categories used to chart
contending social forces, such as "workers," "peasants," and "bourgeoisie,"
seem increasingly inadequate to describe what are often highly differenti
ated clusters of people. Workers moving steadily into the informal sector
now lack a formal employer counterpart and become self-employed; peas
ants have weaker ties to the land and rotate annually through a series
of job categories and residences,- the bourgeoisie is divided into a series
of competing layers whose relative fortunes rise and fall. The inability of
the traditional conceptual categories to accommodate this acute diversity
calls for the use of different analytical methods and the development of
new conceptual schemes. For studies of the bourgeoisie, a closer analysis
of the social sectors that make up the elite is in order.
The search for the fissures within the dominant elite is not simply
an analytical exercise in social dissection. This task has been a central
preoccupation of proponents of social change. Underlying much of this
kind of analysis has been the desire of both academicians and political
practitioners to locate a "progressive" sector of the bourgeoisie. Academic
analysts such as Barrington Moore (1966) claimed to find such a sector,
arguing that there were circumstances under which an urban bourgeoi
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sie could break with traditional landholding elites and nudge the political
system toward democracy. Some reform-oriented political leaders also
claimed allies within the economic elite. Needing the economic capabili
ties, international credibility, and domestic leverage that such coalition
partners would provide, these politicians searched assiduously for busi
ness leaders with whom to link arms.
Leaders of populist movements were particularly inclined to seek an
alliance with a "nationalist bourgeoisie." Populism as an ideology pre
sented no barrier to the inclusion of national elites; indeed, the overriding
nationalism embedded in populism called these leaders to strengthen
local economic strongholds. Cultivation of emerging industrialists often
secured their support. Juan Peron's success in building an alliance with
small and medium-sized capitalists through the Confederacion General
Economica in Argentina has been well documented (Acuna 1991; Teichman 1981). In spite of its social base in labor, the Peronist coalition an
chored the support of emerging elites in the light industry sector, firms
that manufactured for the domestic market, and industries that were less
dependent on imports. Since these kinds of industrialists benefited from
an expanding local market, they could find common cause with union
ized labor in its bid for increased earnings. Although old, established elite
organizations moved firmly into the opposition, emerging elites included
prominent allies.
Even democratic socialist movements typically found it necessary to
court a segment of the economic elite, in spite of ideological reservations.
To locate a theoretical rationale for this compromise, the concept of a
"non-monopoly" bourgeoisie was sometimes employed. A non-monopoly
bourgeoisie was differentiated from the hegemonic, monopoly sector by
the former's unfavorable economic position and tendency to be eroded by
the monopoly sector. This alliance was reinforced in dependent nations
by the tension between subordinated local capital and hegemonic foreign
capital. Alliances between a nonhegemonic, small- and medium-sized
local capitalist faction and the peasant and worker underclass, it was ar
gued, would undercut the foreign-oriented, hegemonic bourgeoisie and
allow for a process of socialist transition.1
This form of social theory and consequent alliance strategy had its
critics. For analysts of the bourgeoisie like Nicos Poulantzas and Andre
Gunder Frank, the effort to locate a sector of the dominant class that
could accept social change was futile and self-defeating.2 In a monumental
study of agrarian, industrial, and financial factions of the Chilean hour-
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geoisie, Maurice Zeitlin and Richard Earl Ratcliff add empirical support
to this interpretation. Their detailed study of the social structure of the
top Chilean elite in the 1960s produced "a discovery of great import: an
incomparably large effective kinship unit, formed of multiply intermar
ried banking, industrial, and landowning families, erases any ostensible
social cleavages between supposedly contending landowning vs. capitalist
'upper' classes in these economic sectors" (Zeitlin and Ratcliff 1988,173).
Because of the presence of close family members who straddled sectoral
divisions, Zeitlin and Ratcliff concluded that contradictions between top
capitalists with different structural locations in the economy were muted.
Clashes and divisions between capitalist sectors in the twentieth cen
tury, they argued, "arose not between ontologically real rivals, but within
the bosom of the same class" (Zeitlin and Ratcliff 1988, 208). Divisions
that other analysts had found to segment the capitalist class—between
bankers and industrialists, owners and managers, large landowners and
urban capitalists, foreign and local capital—are minimized here, since
bonds of kinship ultimately were found to weave these sectors together.3
This discussion of the character and political predilections of the Latin
American bourgeoisie reflects two competing visions. In one view, the
bourgeoisie, in spite of some sectoral divisions, is essentially a unitary
actor. Interpenetration through family, financial, or contractual ties over
comes any tendency toward segmentation. In the other, real differences
exist within the bourgeoisie that incline different segments or clusters
toward different political projects.
This book tackles the question of the unity/division of the economic
elite by focusing on the elite's political interactions with the state during
periods of state-led reform. Episodes of structural change put enormous
pressure on both the state and the bourgeoisie. Established social hierar
chies and resource allocation patterns are called sharply into question. A
sense of peril propels the elite into direct political action. This moment
can either increase the unity of the elite, as it attempts to defend estab
lished privileges or obtain new ones, or divide it, as different segments
negotiate for an improved position relative to the others.
The way the bourgeoisie responds, I argue, depends on a series of fac
tors. Central among these are (1) the degree to which oligarchical control
over the elite has been ruptured, (2) the organizational autonomy and den
sity of private sector associations, (3) the degree of perceived class-based
threat posed by the state, (4) the extent to which the revolutionary regime
succeeds in institutionalizing a new political order, and (5) the capacity of
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the regime to consolidate a viable economic system. The first two factors
focus on the inherited character of the economic elite. The last three shift
the attention to the nature of the revolutionary state.
To explore the segmentation of the bourgeoisie, this chapter briefly
analyzes two types of outcomes: cases in which the bourgeoisie unites in
opposition to the reform movement and defeats it, and cases in which the
bourgeoisie divides and some sectors reach an accommodation with the
regime.4 Each of these subtypes will be analyzed by a review of cases in
Latin America where the central dynamics diverged. Analysis of the oppo
sitional bourgeoisie focuses on the democratic socialist regime in Chile
under Salvador Allende (1970-73) and the reform regime in El Salvador
(sputtering between 1979 and 1989). Information about the accommodationist bourgeoisie is drawn from the study of state-capitalist relation
ships under revolutionary populism in Mexico during the Lazaro Carde
nas era (1934-40) and in Peru under the Juan Velasco regime (1968-75 ).s
Not all of these experiences are conventionally regarded as revolutions,
either because they were quickly reversed or because the changes actually
introduced were not profound enough to warrant the label. Each of these
cases did, however, entail a major effort to restructure what had been core
features of the nation's social and economic order. In this sense they all
qualify as major initiatives in structural change. Lessons drawn from the
analysis of these experiences will be used to sketch an interpretation of
the variations in state-capitalist relations and devise a framework within
which to analyze state-capital relations during the Sandinista revolution.
A cautionary note is needed here before we proceed. The literature on
these cases has been compiled by hundreds of scholars, most of whom
have spent decades working on a single country. Because there have been
so few cross-national studies of revolutionary processes and none that
focus specifically on the reaction of economic elites, the task of building
up this broad comparison is both daunting and perilous. Epistemological
assumptions and methodologies vary from study to study. Concepts that
are frequently used in this literature such as "family clans" or "oligarchy"
may refer to different phenomena in different national settings. Standards
used in making judgments about the degree of economic concentration
may vary from case to case. For example, Chile's long experience with
multiparty electoral democracy allowed it to be linked analytically to the
study of Western European politics. Analysts studying the Chilean sys
tem, therefore, may be implicitly comparing the Chilean social structure
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with those found in Italy or France rather than those found in Peru or
Mexico.
Since the same set of assumptions and standards is not applied consis
tently by scholars analyzing each of these cases, similar characterizations
(for example, the claim that the economy is dominated by an oligarchy)
may reflect rather different realities. I have attempted to look beyond the
summary judgments to appraise the evidence on which those judgments
are based and to use comparative statistics when possible, but my work
is necessarily constrained by these limitations.
The Bourgeoisie in Opposition

Democratic Socialism and the Coalesced Bourgeoisie in Chile
Prior to the election of President Salvador Allende in 1970 and his
attempt to introduce "democratic socialism,"6 economic diversification
had generated some divisions in the Chilean bourgeoisie, and the deepen
ing of democratic processes had diminished its power. The experience of
the Allende era, however, reunited the economic elite and propelled their
offensive against the regime. Several characteristics of the Chilean elite
and the Allende regime contributed to this outcome.
The Chilean bourgeoisie was shaped by a centralization of resources at
the top and a norm of forceful organization that extended even into the
middle sector of the elite. At the end of the 1960s, for example, 2 percent
of all industrial establishments produced over two-thirds of all industrial
output in Chile,- the top five banks allocated over half of all credit (de
Vylder 1976, 18).7 Land concentration was marked. Prior to the adoption
of the agrarian reform law by Christian Democratic president Eduardo
Frei in 1967 there were 11,000 large, multifamily estates averaging 2,200
hectares each. These large estates represented 4.2 percent of all agricul
tural units but occupied 79 percent of the country's agricultural land (de
Vylder 1976, 166). Zeitlin and Ratcliff's (1988, 163—64) detailed analysis of
the upper reaches of the Chilean economic elite in the 1964-66 period
identified 24 "kinship groups" that were located among the top stratum of
bankers, corporate executives, and landowners of the country, including
one large "maximum kinship group" that included 56 percent of the top
bankers, 16 percent of the top corporate executives, and 30 percent of the
top landowners.
In spite of a relatively sustained tradition of political democracy and
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the dense organization of civil society in Chile,8 the business elite re
tained significant political influence. The economic elite pressured the
state directly through leadership of political parties and indirectly through
privileged access to state institutions.9 Six private sector associations
provided an organizational forge for the economic elite. The venerable
National Agricultural Society (s n a ) was formed in 1838; leaders of this
association, in turn, formed the Society for Industrial Promotion (s o f o f a
or s f f ) in 1883, after the minister of finance requested their assistance in
promoting the industrial development of the country. The National Cham
ber of Commerce (previously the Central Chamber of Commerce) dates
from 1858, and the National Mining Society, representing Chilean mine
owneis, from 1883. Of the associations representing economic strong
holds, only the Chamber of Construction and the Association of Banks
and Financial Institutions were of twentieth-century origin (Menges 1966,
344-46; Campero 1984, 312-18).10 To defend their collective interests,
the four older associations came together in 1935 to form one central
peak association, the Production and Commerce Federation (c o pr o c o ).
Chile's elite business associations tended to be very selective, drew
heavily from larger establishments, and had restricted internal democ
racy.11
Nonetheless, a large population of medium-sized producers had
emerged in Chile including small- and medium-sized industrialists, urban
professionals, a self-employed petty bourgeoisie, and small- and medium
sized agricultural producers. Reflecting the norm of political pluralism,
this medium-sized economic elite had devised its own network of asso
ciations in Chile, albeit in more recent decades. The largest of the pri
vate sector organizations serving small- and medium-sized businesses,
the Chilean Trade Federation of Retailers and Small Industry, was founded
in 1938; a host of transportation federations developed in the 1940s60s (Campero 1984, 316-19). Unlike their larger counterparts, these busi
ness associations lacked a central organizing agency that could pull them
together, and they were not given the representational prerogatives in
government agencies that the elite institutions had acquired. Compared
with most other Latin American cases, however, these small and mid
sized capitalists in Chile were relatively mobilized and autonomously
organized.
Allende s u p coalition was designed to divide the Chilean bourgeoi
sie and incorporate small- and medium-sized producers. The u p 's official
campaign Programa opens by expressing concern about the suffering "by
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workers, peasants, and other exploited classes as well as in the grow
ing difficulties which confront white collar workers, professional people,
small and medium businessmen, and in the very limited opportunities
open to women and young people/7 Against this broad coalition of the
disadvantaged are placed the interests of "imperialist nations/' "bourgeois
groups who are structurally related to foreign capital" and the "national
monopolistic bourgeoisie" ("Popular Unity's Programme" 1973, 255-56).
In practice, however, deep divisions remained within the coalition
about how to deal with this sector. The traditional Communist party
position had favored a broad "People's Front" that included "progressive
sectors" of the national bourgeoisie. The Socialist party, on the other
hand, raised doubts about the existence of any such progressive sector
and favored a more narrowly based coalition of proletarian forces. The
u p government, composed of Socialists, Communists, segments of the
old Radical party, and heretical leftists from the Christian Democratic
party, began without consensus on the role of the bourgeoisie. There was
agreement that the hegemonic faction of the bourgeoisie should be elimi
nated, both to undercut the political capabilities of the right and to secure,
through expropriation, economic resources with which to finance the new
order. But there were sharp divisions within the coalition about what to
do with the nonhegemonic faction of small- and medium-sized producers.
Allende began his presidency by avoiding that divisive issue; he sought
national consensus by focusing attention on foreign capital. In nationaliz
ing the copper mines, he fulfilled a broad, national aspiration and secured
unanimous support within the legislature. Although the subsequent deci
sion to impose a retroactive tax on the mining companies' excess profits
and not pay compensation was more controversial, the initial expropria
tion was a widely supported move that rallied even local elites against
foreign control.
The government's subsequent move to acquire control over the com
mercial banking system was more controversial and had a much deeper
impact on local elites. Financial institutions were often the linchpin that
held together large economic groups. Their expropriation undercut the
ability of these groups to assure capital flows to their affiliates. But the
government's willingness to pay handsomely for the buyout of existing
stockholders muted the opposition to this measure.
The u p 's agrarian reform initiatives were yet more controversial, and
the majority opposition in congress prevented the government from secur
ing more sweeping change. Forced to use the agrarian reform legisla

7

8

Capitalists and Revolution

tion passed previously by the Christian Democrats, the regime possessed
limited redistributive capabilities.12 Consequently, the Chilean agrarian
reform program was somewhat smaller than that which took place in
Mexico or Peru.13
The regime's most controversial property reform measures were in the
industrial sector.14 In spite of formal plans to delimit narrowly the firms
that would be expropriated, and repeated official guarantees to small- and
medium-sized producers that their properties would not be affected, the
actual expansion of the state sector proceeded according to a different
dynamic. As Peter Winn points out in his study of the expropriation of
the Yarur textile factory, the Chilean revolution was not encapsulated by
political leaders but often flowed from base-level initiatives. When union
leaders and factory workers at the Yarur plant decided to seize the factory
and called on Allende to incorporate it into the state sector, for example,
Allende's resistance was eroded by labor militancy and the defection of
his own cabinet officials, like the independent socialist Pedro Vuskovic
who ran the powerful Economic Ministry (Winn 1986, 193-95).
Unceasing pressure to expropriate led to the rapid expansion of the
state sector. Unable to get congressional authorization for these expro
priations, the government resorted to the use of a little-known piece of
legislation passed during the brief Popular Front government of the 1930s
that allowed the government to intervene in industries producing items
of "basic necessity" when labor disputes threatened to halt their opera
tion. The "requisitioning" of such factories, followed by offers to buy, al
lowed the state to expand its domain. Beginning with 46 enterprises in
1970, the state sector grew to 507 firms (plus 19 banks) by September
1973.15 This rapid expansion of the state sector to include 44 percent of
industrial production by mid-1973 (Bitar 1986, 189) in spite of congres
sional opposition led to a constitutional crisis that contributed to the
institutional breakdown of the regime.16
Initially, the private sector's reaction to the new government was am
biguous. There was a brief run on the banks, and stock values plunged, as
some of the wealthy panicked. Some of the most prominent elites, such
as key members of the Matte and Edwards families, sounded the alarm
and actively conspired with the Nixon administration against the confir
mation of Allende by the Chilean legislature.17 Other bourgeois leaders,
however, while not pro-up, adopted a "wait and see" attitude toward the
new government. Indeed, a few private sector organizations, such as the
Chilean Trade Federation of Retailers and Small Industry, even publicly
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congratulated the new president on his victory. Others, like the Central
Chamber of Commerce or the president of the National Mining Society,
expressed a willingness to work together for economic growth and devel
opment (Campero 1984, 46; Silva 1992, 3).
The private sector responded to the uncertainties surrounding the new
government with a general decrease in investment. According to calcula
tions made by Barbara Stallings (1978, 248), the private sector's portion
of fixed capital investment in industry dropped from an already low 43
percent in 1970 to only 20 percent in 1971, and declined still further to
around 10 percent of the total in 1973.18 Outside the construction sector,
private domestic investment reportedly dropped 71 percent between 1970
and 1971 (Valenzuela 1978, 56).
This reluctance to continue investment did not, in the initial phase,
signify open political rebellion. By the end of 1971, however, concerted
opposition swept through the national bourgeoisie. Both the outcome of
the April 1971 municipal elections, in which the u p vote increased to
49.8 percent of the total (Valenzuela 1978,54), and the pattern of increased
expropriations, which included the symbolically important Compania
Manufacturera de Papeles y Cartones presided over by former president
Jorge Alessandri, alarmed economic elites. In December 1971, several pri
vate sector organizations representing both large and small entrepreneurs
called the Encuentro del Area Privado attended by 5,000 affiliates. At this
meeting, Orlando Saenz, s o f o f a 's new president, denounced the gov
ernment for "breaking with Chilean tradition" and launched the Frente
Nacional de la Actividad Privada to protest government policy (Campero
1984, 56-64). Unlike in Mexico, where no united private sector opposition
to the revolution emerged, or in Peru, where such attempts repeatedly
failed, by the end of 1971 a forceful opposition business front had emerged
in Chile.
Many businesses apparently benefited economically during the 197172 period.19 Although the dramatic reduction of foreign credit affected
access to certain imports and major wage increases were decreed, many
producers oriented toward the domestic market benefited from the sharp
upsurge of domestic consumption. The economy grew rapidly at first, ex
panding 7.7 percent in 1971; industrial production, drawing on installed
capacity, jumped 13.7 percent in the first half of 1972 (Bitar 1986, 46, 93).
Nonetheless, within a short period of time, the economic elite closed
ranks against the regime and joined the effort to topple the government.
The most graphic evidence of sweeping bourgeoisie opposition came in
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October 1972 with the "bosses' strike." This movement was not con
fined to the top elite; it drew support from even small- and medium-sized
capitalists who had been courted by the Allende regime. Bolstered by
foreign financing from the CIA as well as private corporations in other
Latin American countries (Stallings 1978,142), 109 trade and professional
associations called a national lockout that lasted for three weeks and
brought the country to the point of crisis. Transportation halted, food sup
plies dwindled, and panic swelled. Six days into the strike, the National
Command Center for Gremio Defense (Comando Nacional de Defensa
Gremial) was created and charged with the task of summarizing the bour
geoisie's demands. The subsequent list of the "Demands of Chile" (Pliego
de Chile] called for a reversal of several u p measures such as the take
over of the banking sector and Alessandri's paper company, limitations
on agrarian reform, and the elimination of local price control boards. The
massive mobilization of workers to defy their employers' attempted lock
outs produced sharp class confrontation that was attenuated only when
Allende brought the military into his cabinet in November (Campero
1984, 68-73).
In spite of the u p program and Allende's commitments, the government
was unable to divide the bourgeoisie and win any appreciable segment of
business support. The political homogeneity of the elite was not simply an
ontological given.20 Marveling at the inability of the government to cor
ner some elite support, s o f o f a president Orlando Saenz, one of the u p 's
most entrenched opponents and business's more effective organizers, con
cluded, "Allende managed things so poorly, so poorly that he wasn't able
to divide the business sector" (cited in Campero 1984, 58). The coalescence
of the bourgeoisie was due to the specific historical features of the case. A
history of elite interpenetration at the top and a strong tradition of organi
zational autonomy laid the groundwork for cooperation, but the Allende
regime's pattern of concessions to more radical elements on expropriation
decisions, especially of smaller and medium-sized domestic firms, trig
gered a deepening of elite unity.21 Although the Allende government had
broadened its political base in 1971, it remained a weak, plurality govern
ment with limited penetration of the state apparatus. By 1973 the regime's
political debilities had combined with a sharp economic contraction and
the advent of hyperinflation to further undermine its capacity to govern.
The Chilean bourgeoisie fused in its opposition and actively sought to
destabilize the regime. This unity prevailed through the military coup of
September 1973 into the period of military government.

Capitalists and Revolution

Fearing that they had no future, and knowing that they could be next,
even the small- and medium-sized producers rejected the government.
This rejection was skillfully nurtured by larger business leaders and pri
vate sector associations who cultivated links to less prominent or politi
cized producers.22 Painted in simple terms and appealing to consensual
values, the bourgeois opposition deepened the political polarization of the
society and fed the military's hostility to the regime—and to the demo
cratic system that had allowed it to come to power.
This analysis suggests that democratic socialist regimes are likely to
generate sweeping private sector opposition. Although the bourgeoisie
may not be vociferously or uniformly oppositional at the beginning, it
will tend to move toward open opposition over time, with the pace and
intensity of that movement dictated in part by the pace and intensity of
the regime's reform effort. The fissures and internal differentiation of the
bourgeoisie will tend to dissipate as the "national" and "nonhegemonic"
bourgeoisie increasingly adopts the antireform stance of the more conser
vative sectors. This move is fueled by a "free" press, in which conservative
economic elites can project a virulently antireform message in the name
of protecting liberty and individual freedom.23 Fundamental features of
democratic socialism (the close alliance between the state and a powerful
working class, ideological hostility to a dominant elite, and the political
freedom of opposition groups) make successful courtship of any sector of
the business class very difficult for political reformers.
The Habit of Command and the Salvadoran Oligarchy
In the Chilean case, democratic development had withered the tradi
tional social and political power of the elite, and economic diversification
had increased the complexity of the bourgeoisie. This heterogeneity and
stratification allowed a reform regime to emerge and introduce structural
change, at least temporarily. In contrast, in the Salvadoran case the resi
due of oligarchical power remained relatively undiluted. Reform, in this
setting, faced more formidable obstacles and was more readily circum
scribed.
The concept of "oligarchy" has been much discussed and debated; it
remains somewhat ambiguous. Although the term is frequently used to
describe a traditional rentier class, oligarchies that survive into the mid
twentieth century must display some dynamism and capacity for skillful
investment. Jimenez (1986, 22-28) defines an oligarchy as an identifiable
group of families who possess concentrated economic power, social pres
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tige and authority, and either direct or indirect control over dominant
political actors. Oligarchies are typically defined by the transfer of these
powers through hereditary means, with family notability dating back at
least several generations.24
In most of Latin America's larger, economically diversified countries,
this kind of concentration of political-economic-social power tended
to dissipate in the twentieth century. Traditionally, the oligarchy was
grounded on its control of land and the preeminence of agroexport produc
tion. With economic diversification, industrial growth, and the expansion
of an industrial workforce, these rural elites tended to be displaced from
power. The creation of competitive electoral systems with extended suf
frage and mass mobilization also undercut the political and social privi
leges of traditional oligarchs. But if the oligarchical families succeeded in
diversifying into varied economic sectors, particularly nodal institutions
like the banking system, and if political pluralism was relatively weak,
then oligarchical networks could retain considerable influence.
One concrete case of continued oligarchical power can be found in El
Salvador following the collapse of the Romero government and the proc
lamation of a revolutionary junta in 1979.25 Reform efforts were blocked
largely through the work of an oligarchical, antireform elite that remained
powerful and well organized even into the 1980s.
Scholarly consensus on El Salvador holds that an oligarchy rooted in
coffee production developed in the latter half of the nineteenth century
(Baloyra 1982,- Lopez Vallecillos 1979; Jimenez 1986; de Sebastian 1986;
Colindres 1977). After the bourgeois revolution of 1870, this ascendant
elite ruled the country directly for over sixty years, with top political
positions circulating among two or three groups, including the Araujo,
Melendez, and Quinonez Molina families (Baloyra 1982, 5). This group's
direct control of government ended following the collapse of the agro
export sector during the depression and the rise of labor militancy, which
was triggered by falling wages and a rural male unemployment rate of 40
percent in 1929 (North 1985, 33). Military leaders seized control of the
state, and the incipient labor uprising was brutally repressed.26 In the years
that followed (1932—44), General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez gov
erned as a personalistic dictator. The military subsequently governed the
country as an institution from 1948 to 1979 by rotating top government
offices among ranking military officers.
The passing of direct political control from the elite families to the
military signaled a decline of the traditional oligarchy, but this economic
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elite remained a very potent economic, social, and political force. This
powerful coffee-based network was still able to dictate the rules for the
economic order and kept issues like agrarian reform off the political
agenda.27 Coffee continued to be the primary export, generating 53 per
cent of export earnings even as late as the 1975-79 period (Brockett 1990,
60). Key state institutions such as the Central Reserve Bank were run by
this elite.28
Modest economic diversification29 did not displace the coffee oligarchy;
it remained a vibrant participant in the diversification process. Beginning
in the 1880s, coffee wealth had been used to found a private banking sys
tem. The Banco Salvadoreno and the Banco Occidental emerged first in
the 1880s. In 1934 the government created an additional bank, the Banco
Hipotecario, to funnel yet more resources into the agricultural sector, and
large producer associations were brought in as major partners.30
Profits generated from coffee production were high during much of the
postwar period and allowed for the formation of a series of spinoff ventures
(Baloyra 1982, 28). In addition to the banking system, coffee oligarchs di
versified into the relatively lucrative processing and commercial export
sectors. Data from Colindres' (1977) monumental study of the Salvadoran
elite show substantial overlap between large coffee producers (those pro
ducing over 10,000 quintals in 1970/71) and large coffee exporters (those
exporting over 1 percent of total coffee crop in 1974). Furthermore, ac
cording to that analysis, the country's 36 largest landowners controlled
66 percent of the capital of the 1,429 largest firms in 1971.31 The com
mon reference to Salvador's "fourteen families" overstates the case, but
there is little debate about the claim of acute concentration of resources
in pre-1979 El Salvador.
No economic elite, even one that is fully grounded in a single sec
tor or interpenetrated through family ties, can be entirely homogeneous.
Predictably, some segmentation existed within the Salvadoran elite. Sal
vadoran analysts like Lopez Vallecillos (1979) divide the elite into two
sectors: a traditional sector based in coffee production and banking (the
"agro-financial sector"), and a sector that had also extended into indus
trial activities, including coffee processing (the "agro-industrial-financial
sector").
Baloyra takes this segmental analysis a step further by separating the
"oligarchy," which dominated export agriculture and the banking system,
from "the bourgeoisie," which was dominant in industry and commerce.
But even Baloyra sees the bourgeoisie as essentially following the lead of
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the oligarchy, not representing an independent political force. "A bour
geoisie did indeed emerge in El Salvador/' he concludes, "but it remained
bound to the traditional groups or at least dependent on them for the
finance of major projects. The bourgeoisie remained unable to secure the
resources necessary to embark on the type of economic projects that
would have made it socially and politically hegemonic" (Baloyra 1982, 30).
A sector of middle-sized industrialists, commercial establishments,
and agricultural producers did emerge, but this stratum represented a
small portion of the strategic sectors of the economy (only 8.9 percent
of coffee production, for example), and these producers were not inde
pendently organized or powerful.32 Unlike the Chilean case, where smalland medium-sized elites had long had their own organizations and were
courted by contending political parties, these mid-level elites in Salvador
were characterized by their lack of effective mobilization. The limited size
of the medium sector, the low levels of foreign investment in El Salvador
compared with the rest of the Central American region (Bulmer-Thomas
1987,103), and the organizational weakness of the middle elite meant that
established oligarchs remained the hegemonic and largely unchallenged
force in the local economy. Accustomed to power, and unaccustomed to
negotiation, this elite dominated the social order. A powerful peak asso
ciation, a n e p ,33 was formed in 1966 to further consolidate and bolster the
power of this traditional elite.34
Reform moves did come, however, in 1979, in the form of a military
putsch that abruptly embraced the reform proposals of a broad coalition of
center-left political parties and mass organizations. Jolted into action by
the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua, military reformers founded the
Junta Revolucionaria de Gobierno in October 1979 with the participation
of political party leaders, intellectuals, and a handful of business elites.35
Drawing on the recommendations emanating from the Foro Popular, a
rally of reformers in September 1979, the new junta adopted a series of
initiatives designed to revolutionize the social and economic systems.
The three reforms inaugurated by the government were (1) a major
land reform program that was designed to alter fundamentally the land
distribution patterns, (2) the nationalization of the banking system, and
(3) a state takeover of foreign trade. These reforms precisely targeted the
three legs of oligarchical economic power: land, banking, and trade. Re
curring and rapid turnover in the governing junta between October 1979
and March 1980 reflected uncertainty about the military's commitment
to reform, but by early 1980 changes had been legislated in each of these
three areas.
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By May 1980, over 300 agricultural estates had been seized, thus com
pleting what is generally known as Phase I of the land reform program.36
Land affected in this round was 70 percent pastureland; only 12 percent of
the coffee crop was produced on these large estates (Reinhardt 1989, 459).
From the standpoint of the coffee elite, the second phase of the reform,
which was designed to break up estates of 100-150 hectares (depending
on land quality) to 500 hectares where the core of coffee cultivation took
place, was more threatening. Since Phase II would most affect the tra
ditional coffee oligarchy, that segment of the plan was bitterly resisted.
Phase III was a land-to-the-tiller program that would allow peasants rent
ing small plots (up to 7 hectares) to claim that land for themselves.
The goals of this reform were exceptionally ambitious. If implemented
as designed, the program was to redistribute roughly 48 percent of agricul
tural land to approximately 50 percent of Salvador's rural poor (Reinhardt
1989, 459-60).37 Resistance and complications soon took a toll, however.
Phase II was annulled by the dominant center-right coalition in the first
legislative session of the Constituent Assembly elected in March 1982.
The following year, the constitution of 1983 provided more durable pro
tection to this sector by raising the land size threshold and delaying im
plementation for two years, during which time owners could reduce the
size of their holdings to avoid expropriation. In the end, this part of the
plan was never implemented.
The regime was slow to regularize land reform titles, and war and terror
in the countryside undermined Phases I and III of the process. Beneficia
ries of the land reform sometimes abandoned their land and their claims,
terrorized into leaving by death squads and military threats.38 Few bene
ficiaries could pay for the land they had received, so unmanageable debts
burdened the participants 39
Ultimately, the program did allocate approximately 20 percent of the
arable land to around 20 percent of the rural labor force (Strasma 1990,
5/ 14-15)- In comparative terms, the Salvadoran reform falls roughly in
the middle of Latin American agrarian reform outcomes in the portion of
land and of rural population affected, distributing more, for example, than
Ecuador but less than Mexico and Peru (Thiesenhusen 1989, 10-n). The
fact that most coffee land was sealed off from expropriation and that the
program fell far short of its initial goals, however, suggests that traditional
elites remained powerful enough to resist incursions into their domain.
From the standpoint of the traditional elite, the other two reforms were
probably more damaging. In March 1980 the banks were surrounded by
military vehicles, and eleven financial institutions were nationalized.40
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Private sector representation on the board of directors of the Central Bank
was also decreased from 3 of 8 members to 1 of 7 after the reform (Ramirez
Arango 1985, 158).
But nationalization did not mean that the old structure was trans
formed. Two issues are relevant here: the compensation paid to former
owners, and credit priorities of the bank following nationalization. First,
to placate former owners, generous compensation was provided. In almost
all banks, former owners received substantially more than the real value of
their shares as determined by the evaluation commission.41 Second, bank
control and credit distribution became, if anything, yet more concentrated
than they had been before the reform (Valdes 1989). Bank workers could
not afford to buy into the system; they acquired no more than 10 percent
of the stock, and the state retained virtually all of the remainder. Central
Reserve Bank lending went heavily to the public sector (more than 60 per
cent of the total in 1982-85), and those private operations that received
loans tended to be the large ones (Valdes 1989,795-97)42 The coffee sector
actually increased the portion of agricultural credit that it had absorbed
(from 51 percent of the total in 1979 to 65 percent in 1984) (Valdes 1989,
802). The economy still revolved heavily around coffee, and the banking
system continued to reflect that reality.
For most of the traditional economic elite, the worst blow came with
the nationalization of export trade, in c a f e was established in December
1979; this was followed in May 1980 with the creation of the Instituto
Nacional del Azucar. Between them, these two state trade monopolies
controlled 58 percent of foreign trade in the 1980-83 period (Orellana
1985, 20). Under the new rules, coffee producers were now to be paid only
in local currency at prices fixed by the state.43 Profits were still to be made
by producers with medium to high levels of efficiency, but the gap be
tween international prices and the price paid locally by in c a f e provoked
a steady denunciation by cafetaleros who felt victimized and maligned by
the regime.44 One member of the coffee elite reported to a North Ameri
can academic, "When coffee reached $200 per quintal, Duarte said that
was too much money. . . . He said we would just spend it on cars" (Paige
1993/ T9)- With producers earning less than half the FOB price in 1986,
in c a f e and the Christian Democratic government became a prime target
for elite hostility.
The disaffection of coffee producers and their unwillingness to keep up
investments contributed to the rapid spread of coffee rust and the decline
in coffee yields. By the end of the decade, this drop-off was exacerbated by
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the collapse of the international coffee organization and the subsequent
fall in coffee prices. The coffee harvest in 1988-89 had dropped to onethird what it had been a decade before (Barry 1990,80).45 The coffee decline
fed into the overall erosion of the Salvadoran economy. With stagnant
public investment, little private investment, and droning warfare, the per
capita gross domestic product declined 15.2 percent in the 1981-90 period
(c e pa l 1990b, 26).
Confronting this decline was a weak reform regime. The 1979 reform
movement was quickly curtailed by military countermoves and electoral
defeat in 1982. The private sector peak association, a n e p , mobilized to
take advantage of the frailty of the reform movement.46 By mid-1980 this
organization had not only reestablished bonds with sectors of the armed
forces but had sponsored the creation of the Alianza Productiva, a politi
cally charged private sector association composed of a n e p and several of
its affiliates, two small business associations, and two associations of pro
fessionals and managers. This new organization formed a bridge between
the private sector and a r e n a , a right-wing political party founded in 1981.
Only major pressure from the Carter and Reagan administrations, who
supported these policy changes as a means of avoiding leftist revolution,
prevented the edifice of reform from crumbling in 1982 when a r e n a and
the conservative Partido de Conciliacion Nacional secured thirty-three of
the sixty seats in the new Constituent Assembly, a r e n a leader Roberto
D'Aubuisson became president of the assembly and narrowly missed being
named the provisional president of the country.
The Christian Democrat party and its perennial leader Jose Napoleon
Duarte did not attain the presidency until 1984 or gain a legislative ma
jority until 1985. Reformers had a precarious hold over the state apparatus
and none over the military. Confronted by an economic elite that still had
considerable wealth, organizational capabilities, traditional authority, and
an enormous capacity for violence, the reform agenda could not be sus
tained. Unable to create a strong political party or to mobilize an array of
mass organizations, preempted from the left and vilified from the right,
reformers failed.
Right-wing legislative victory in 1988, in which a r e n a secured an
absolute majority in the national assembly, was a prelude to easy presiden
tial victory the following year. With a 55 percent turnout rate, a r e n a got
54 percent of the vote,- under the mantle of recent a r e n a affiliate Alfredo
Cristiani, economic elites regained center stage. Cristiani, a political nov
ice but former president of the Association of Processors and Exporters
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of Coffee, incorporated other prominent business leaders into the new
government.47 In addition to the presidency, a r e n a dominated the legis
lature, nearly 70 percent of the mayoralties, and the court system (Miles
and Ostertag 1989). Forced by the changing rules of the 1980s to play an
electoral game in order to secure political power, the traditional elites
funneled resources into the right-wing party and proved to be skillful
strategists.
A reform movement that had been deflected for several years was now
derailed. After its victory, the a r e n a government moved to reverse sev
eral key reforms. A supreme court decision in 1989 had declared in c a f e
to be an unconstitutional monopoly, and this program was replaced by a
modest supervisory board, the Salvadoran Coffee Council. Unlike its pre
decessor, the coffee council did not determine prices. Former private ex
port companies reestablished their operations, and prices were now set by
the international market. The banking system was targeted for speedy pri
vatization (although bank insolvency complicated the process); agrarian
reform was formally halted, and previous land grants were decollectivized
(Martinez 1989). a r e n a 's ideology, which combined an assertive nation
alism with a commitment to neoliberal economics, promised to counter
lingering reform sentiment. Having demonstrated its considerable skill
in playing by the rules of electoral democracy, the elite now pushed to
restrain reform through the democratic route.48
Structural change and redistribution in El Salvador during the reform
era was not as profound as in Allende's Chile. Without an organized work
ing class or ideologically coherent and highly mobilized leftist parties, the
reform movement in El Salvador remained narrowly delimited and mod
est. But the Salvadoran elite reacted with perhaps even greater ferocity
to the reform, not only conspiring with the military but financing its
own death squads to annihilate opponents. The Salvadoran opposition
was due less to the threat of unstanched expropriation of even small- and
medium-sized firms, which proved so significant in Chile, and more to
the continued clout of a relatively unreconstructed oligarchy. The reform
movement, which succeeded in electing Duarte to the presidency only in
1984 and which had lost power by 1988, was even weaker in Salvador than
in Chile, and provided little incentive for cooperation by business leaders.
Furthermore, a sharp economic erosion that began immediately after the
reform was launched in El Salvador fed further elite disdain and disillu
sionment.49 Although the combination of factors differed somewhat in
each case, in both El Salvador and Chile the bourgeoisie coalesced quickly
in opposition to reform and contributed forcefully to its overthrow.50
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Accommodation to Reform

Symbiotic Interdependence and Silent Partners in Mexico
The bourgeoisie is not always able to coordinate sweeping opposition
to reform. Indeed, in several Latin American cases, revolutionary regimes
not only deflected an elite opposition movement but won a segment of
elite backers. The ability of a revolutionary government to gain overt
bourgeois supporters, in spite of its commitment to agrarian reform, state
expansion, and redistribution, is an anomalous process that deserves close
analysis. It has been most evident in Latin America during periods of
revolutionary populism.
Populism is a rich and contradictory ideology that emphasizes con
trolled mobilization of marginal groups under the leadership of an activist
state. This dynamic is typically fostered by a multiclass coalition domi
nated by emerging middle-class forces that have a commitment to nation
alism, economic growth, and a degree of redistribution. In Latin America,
this model has generally been found to emerge during the "Bonapartist
interlude/7 a period after traditional oligarchic power has been checked
but before new industrial elites have consolidated their own power base
(lanni 1975, 53-54). During this phase, the state is said to attain a rela
tive autonomy that allows it to act independently of, and even at times
in opposition to, the preferences of economic elites. The state pursues
either the long-term interests of capitalist development, which may not
be apparent to the local bourgeoisie at the moment, or its own specific
interests (Hamilton 1982, 4-25,- Skocpol 1979).
During episodes when the traditional elite struggles with economic
collapse or the devastation of war, the populist state can mobilize new
class actors to replace it. State support is provided for priority sectors
such as manufacturing, production for the domestic market, or high em
ployment industries, and the economic elite is recomposed along those
lines. The surging nationalism of the populist project generally pushes
the state to check the power of foreign capital. The resulting nationaliza
tions or expulsions of foreign firms serve the populist cause by expanding
the resources and economic leverage of the state when the state acquires
expropriated concerns, or by strengthening domestic producers as local
businesses move into the space created by the removal of foreign opera
tions.
Populist movements are not identical; some involve much stronger
mass mobilization and higher degrees of state autonomy than others.51
Most populist projects have ended in collapse, due to fiscal crisis and
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financial dependency, internal division within the state, the inability to
consolidate a mass base, or a series of conjunctural factors (O'Donnell
1973; Stepan 1978, 282-316; Dornbusch and Edwards 1991). In some
cases, like Argentina, military coups or countercoups signaled the demise
of populism; in others, like Mexico, antipopulist forces penetrated the
state, leaving populist and antipopulist forces in an uneasy cohabitation.
In the Mexican case, the old Porfirian elite of landowners, industrial
ists, and foreigners who had come to dominate the state in the last decade
of Porfirio Diaz's presidency were thrown into decline with the depar
ture of their leader and the following seven years of civil war (1911-17).
Economic elites were not eliminated, but they lost wealth through ex
propriations, evictions, vandalism, and depreciation.52 In the wake of the
violence, a new elite emerged. The tattered remnants of the old bourgeoi
sie were joined by revolutionary chieftains who had appropriated land and
capital.53
State-sponsored change, which had sparked and fizzled in the 1920s,
began in earnest when the revolutionary coalition elected Lazaro Carde
nas to the presidency in 1934. Using legislation that limited estate size
to the equivalent of 150 irrigated hectares, Cardenas expropriated vast
tracts of land.54 Unlike many agrarian reform programs, these expropria
tions included land of good quality held by prominent local and foreign
elites. By 1940, 47.4 percent of all cultivated land and 57.3 percent of all
irrigated land had been allocated to ejidos (Hamilton 1982, 177).55 Carde
nas also undercut the urban elite by rechanneling resources to labor. Real
wages soared as the regime promoted strikes and legislative protections
for workers.56 The state-sponsored mass organizations, the Mexican Labor
Federation (Confederacion de Trabajadores de Mexico) and the National
Peasant Federation (Confederacion Nacional de Campesinos) linked the
popular sectors to the regime.57
Business elites were predictably alarmed. Producers, particularly in re
gional strongholds like Monterrey, retaliated and threatened lockouts in
protest. Going into the lion's den, Cardenas addressed the Employers'
Center of Monterrey in February 1936, chastising business leaders for their
hostility to reform. He announced: "Entrepreneurs who feel fatigued by
the social struggle can turn over their industries to the workers or the gov
ernment. That would be patriotic, the lockout would not."58 In the wake
of rising strikes and presidential criticism, capital flight accelerated.59
In spite of rhetorical clashes and state expansion, Cardenas was hardly
a simple opponent of business. The top-down developmentalists of the
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revolutionary government looked for ways to incorporate business into
their new growth strategy. The national bourgeoisie benefited repeatedly
from legislation and policy that edged out foreigners. The state itself ex
panded, as with the nationalization of the petroleum sector, but so did
Mexican capitalists. Legislation requiring insurance companies to invest
their reserve in Mexico, for example, triggered the departure of foreignowned companies that were replaced by both state insurance companies
and a rapidly mushrooming number of locally owned insurance businesses
(Hamilton 1982, 205). The revolutionary populist state undercut old, in
efficient businesses or those that seemed not to favor Mexican national
development, and warmly embraced others that contributed to national
growth.
The industrial sector was especially favored by state resources and as
sistance in the form of tax incentives and investment loans. Special at
tention was provided to small and medium industries, which flourished
during this era. Given a range of supports, including tax exemptions, sub
sidies, investments, reduced rates for rail transportation of their cargo, and
the elimination of some agricultural intermediaries, small- and medium
sized producers expanded. The number of manufacturing firms (not in
cluding artisan workshops) in the country increased from 6,916 in 1935 to
13,150 in 1940, and most of the new enterprises were small (employing on
average only ten workers) (Hamilton 1982, 201-2; Mosk 1954, 316). Dur
ing the 1934-38 period, the gross national product grew by 22 percent,
particularly in the industrial sector, which increased 33 percent (n a f in s a
1978,19, 24).
Seeking to consolidate a state-business alliance, Cardenas built bridges
into the business heartland. As long as it did not rebel, the bourgeoisie
would be showered with praise and support. By 1939, in a speech given be
fore the Camara de Comercio of Saltillo, Coahuila, Cardenas had altered
his tone. He now proclaimed, consider your cooperation very valuable;
I hold your knowledge, experience and entrepreneurial spirit in esteem,- I
conceive of you as a prominent factor in our progress and as promoters of
our homeland's culture" (quoted in Medina 1974, 278).60
To enhance its penetration of a rapidly growing business sector, the
state redefined the organizational infrastructure of business. Prior to the
revolution, business organizations tended to be fragmented and dispersed.
Reflecting the strong regional tendencies and fractured nature of the econ
omy, these organizations operated only at the local level and had not
merged into broader national federations.
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Following a series of meetings with industrialists and merchants in
1917, the Mexican state attempted to facilitate steady but controlled com
munication with the private elite by creating two new associations—the
National Federation of Chambers of Commerce (c o n c a n a c o ) and the
Federation of Chambers of Industry (c o n c a m in ). During the Cardenas
era these organizations were merged into a single unit and strengthened
through the requirement of mandatory membership.61 Another round of
institution building occurred in 1941 with the founding of the National
Chamber of Manufacturing Industry (c a n a c in t r a , sometimes referred
to as c n it ), an association explicitly designed to serve the needs of smalland medium-sized industries that were emerging under the protection of
the Mexican state.62
Given the requirement of participation in these organizations, few
business leaders went beyond them to form associations of their own cre
ation. One of the rare exceptions was the Mexican Republic Employers'
Federation (c o pa r m e x ), a forceful, antistate organization that dates back
to the divisive 1928 debate about the Labor Code. Even this independent
offshoot posed little threat to the regime. For several decades c o pa r m e x
remained essentially a regional, Monterrey-based organization; it failed
to develop a broad national base and could not compete organizationally
with the larger, state-sponsored federations.63
Through its influence over the major private sector organizations,
selective distribution of resources, state investment funds, licenses, and
tax exemptions, the state incorporated the bourgeoisie as a silent part
ner in a state-sponsored development initiative. Mexican businesspeople
were notoriously withdrawn from public political life, even to the point of
eschewing party membership.64 Because of the revolution's formal com
mitment to the masses and marginal groups, public alliances between
the regime and economic elites would have been uncomfortable for both.
Instead, linkages between the state and the bourgeoisie were generally
informal and tacit rather than highly visible and overt. Through participa
tion in state-created business associations, sectoral leaders, who tended
to be drawn heavily from the largest firms and industrial groups, obtained
representation on a host of government boards and agencies 65 In turn,
they refrained from organizing independently and implicitly supported
the line of the political leadership.
The entrepreneur who was savvy enough to cut through the socialist
rhetoric and seek contacts with political elites often flourished. Whether
the fictional Artemio Cruz of Carlos Fuentes's invention, or the pseud
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onymous Pablo Gomez described so deftly by Larissa Adler Lomnitz and
Marisol Perez-Lizaur (1987, 37-38, 61-63), entrepreneurs who energeti
cally sought investment opportunities and political alliances with the
revolutionary regime could expand rapidly during this period of historic
economic growth.66
This complex political configuration endured through the subsequent
decades. In a study of the recent relationship between the government
and business associations, Luna et al. (1987,19-21) found that the twelve
major private sector organizations in Mexico ranged along a five-point
continuum from those that gave unconditional support to the govern
ment (like the National Federation of Small Property Owners) to those
that made fundamental criticisms of both the political and economic
systems (like c o pa r m e x ). Most organizations ranked somewhere in be
tween, with some, like ca n a c in t r a , generally endorsing the government
line and pushing to have business organizations formally integrated into
the pr i party apparatus, c a n a c in t r a became a durable base of support
for government initiatives, backing legislation that recognized the state as
the regulator of the economy in 1950, the nationalization of the electrical
industry in i960, restrictions on foreign investment in 1973, the govern
ment's decision to stay out of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
in 1980, and even the nationalization of the banks in 1982 (Alcazar 1970,
120-21; Arriola 1976, 45,- Basanez 1990,124-25; Maxfield 1987, 4). Other
organizations, like c o n c a m in , called for a gradual reduction in the eco
nomic roles of the state and increased business autonomy, but generally
cooperated with the regime.
This factionalism is in part related to the overall size and complexity
of the Mexican economy. Regional economic differences were marked
and played a role in the internal differentiation of the business elite. For
example, the Monterrey group, developing prior to the revolution and,
in the case of steel, in competition with parastate enterprises, was quite
independent from and often critical of the government67 Private elites
clustered in the capital city, on the other hand, were slower to confront
the regime.
Unlike in Chile and El Salvador, where traditional elites remained
niore autonomous and mustered broad opposition to the state, business
hostility was undercut by state organizational intervention in Mexico.
Through the distribution of investment, credit, subsidies, and protection,
the state helped to create certain economic sectors and groups. These
groups were dependent on the regime and had difficulty organizing au
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tonomously around class needs or interests. Although expanded state
roles and recurring expropriations caused consternation in some sectors,
alliances and understandings forged in the aftermath of the revolution
continued to facilitate cooperation and communication with others.
The Mexican regime was also exceptional in its ability to maintain
economic growth, even during the period of most intense social trans
formation. Continually expanding economic resources made it possible
to avoid a zero-sum situation in which increased assets for the state or
popular sectors meant reduced resources for capital. Growth allowed for
multiple beneficiaries; even those who did not benefit directly could con
sole themselves with the prospect of future gain. The result was what
has been called a "symbiotic relationship" between the state and key seg
ments of the private sector (Camp 1989, 250-52). State stability since the
1940s has been premised on the prosperity of business,- business leaders in
turn have relied on the support and stability provided by pr i dominance.
In sum, the Mexican state has a complex, variegated relationship with a
fragmented bourgeoisie based on the assumption of shared benefit and the
persistence of mutual need, even as periodic conflicts have erupted.
Private Sector Alliances in Revolutionary Peru
The Peruvian experience with revolutionary populism did not produce
an enduring alliance with the bourgeoisie like that found in Mexico, but
it did drive a wedge into the elite and win support in some capitalist
quarters.68 Like the Mexican case, the reform effort in Peru signaled the
demise of the traditional oligarchy. Seizing control of the state, the Peru
vian military launched a large-scale agrarian reform program that effec
tively abolished the large landowning class. Rural estates were limited
by Supreme Decree #265-7o-AG to a maximum of 150 hectares of irri
gated land on the coast and a modest 15-55 hectares of irrigated land
(depending on the province) in the highland or high-jungle region.69 As a
result, roughly 35 percent of Peru's agricultural land was transferred into
the reformed sector by 1977, benefiting around 24 percent of Peru's rural
families (McClintock 1981, 62).70
The remainder of the bourgeoisie did not rush to defend the collaps
ing rural oligarchy, which was "a class in the process of deteriorating"
(Castillo Ochoa 1988, 195,- see also Bourricaud 1966). The economic cen
ter of gravity was already shifting toward the industrial sector in Peru,
and military president Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-75) targeted the latter
for special support. Some large landowners from the coast (what Gilbert

Capitalists and Revolution

[1980] calls the "metropolitan oligarchy") had relaxed their links to the
land and diversified assets into mining, urban real estate, banking, and
manufacturing.71 Most industrialists, however, were not from oligarchical
families but from a new class of relatively recent immigrant extraction.72
Because the traditional elite had already been displaced from the economic
center in Peru, agrarian reform did not produce the same tooth-and-nail
resistance among the bourgeoisie that it precipitated in El Salvador.
To encourage private investment in the industrial sector, the military
authorized the redemption of bonds given in payment for expropriated
land at 100 percent of their face value to ex-landowners who would in
vest those payments in new industrial enterprises. A few landowners, like
those in the Grupo Romero, used them to transfer resources into new
industrial operations.73 Tariffs on imported manufactured products also
helped stimulate industrial growth, particularly in household goods. The
primary growth areas of the economy during the Velasco era were manu
facturing and construction (FitzGerald 1976, 63, table 35; Malpica Silva
Santisteban 1989, 48).
To prevent a rupture in the relationship with emerging domestic capi
talists, Velasco attempted to shift much of the burden for financing this
transformation onto foreign-owned operations. The revolution was to be
financed through what Becker (1983, 61-71) has called the "bonanza devel
opment" approach. In this model, the state would derive resources from
the foreign-dominated large-mining sector, particularly that involved in
the extraction of copper. These funds were to be spent on large-scale state
investments including an oil pipeline, irrigation facilities, and turnkey
projects in refining, chemical fertilizer, and fish processing.74 By 1974,
the state controlled 26 percent of the GNP and over 40 percent of pro
duction in the modern sector (FitzGerald 1976, 36). To achieve this stateled growth, some sectors of foreign capital were expropriated. Those that
remained were required to adopt a profit-sharing scheme that would ulti
mately apportion 50 percent of the stock in their companies to industrial
communities representing the workforce in their firm.75
As in the Mexican case, the Peruvian regime was able to undercut the
traditional landholding elite and cultivate ties with segments of the bour
geoisie that benefited from the new, nationalist development scheme. The
National Society of Industries (s n i ) initially found common cause with
the regime and was "cautiously cooperating" (Becker 1983, 258). This co
operation reached its peak in the late 1960s and early 1970s when the s n i
Was dominated by executives from the larger, more modern firms. Contra
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dieting standard theory about the receptivity of small, domestic capital to
populist reforms, it was the larger industrialists who were relatively open
to reform in the Peruvian case. When questioned in a 1968—69 survey, for
example, industrialists in multinational subsidiaries and large Peruvian
consortia were more likely than their smaller counterparts to note the
existence of structural problems in the economy and approve of a more
dynamic role for the state (Wils 1975, 170). Building on that predisposi
tion, a complex and sputtering understanding emerged between some of
the larger industrialists and the revolutionary regime.
Bamat's (1978) close study of the Peruvian capitalist elite located sev
eral business sectors that participated in affirmative negotiations with
the state. These included the association of exporters, a d e x (founded in
1973 by the large enterprise leaders from the s n i who had sought more
active cooperation with the regime), which benefited from the govern
ment's active promotion of exports; the National Chamber of Commerce,
which benefited from an expanding internal market and was exempt from
the profit and stock sharing requirement imposed on industry; the Min
ing Society, which was buoyed by the massive foreign investment deal
arranged by the state for southern Peru's Cuajone project76; and the Peru
vian Institute of Business Administration, which sponsored an annual
conference of executives ( c a d e ) that drew together a number of managers,
executives, industrialists, and bankers who provided support for some
reforms (Bamat 1978, 212-19; see also Becker 1983, 271-72; Wils 1975,
210).77 To "reinforce the sensible elements" in the regime, private sec
tor leaders like Pedro Reiser, former president of the National Chamber
of Commerce, served as government advisers and appointees in key eco
nomic agencies and provided a selective defense of government policies
(Bamat 1978, 216).
On the other hand, many industrialists who were not in the top elite
were historically skeptical of state economic interventions and resented
the new rules. The regime dealt forcefully with these business critics.
The National Agrarian Society, an old, elite organization that had repre
sented the traditional oligarchy, was simply dissolved in 1972, and its
assets were seized by the state. It was replaced by a state-created peasant
federation, the National Agrarian Confederation, which was emphatically
pro-Velasco. After several of the larger, more modern industrialists chan
neled their energies into the formation of a d e x , small- and medium-sized
industrialists became more prominent in the s n i leadership, and the s n i
became the leading critic of the military's project (Bamat 1978, 192—219;
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Becker 1983, 258). The requirement of stock allocation to workers gener
ated some harsh disputes at both the firm and the national level, and the
s n i led the charge. In response, the military flexed its muscles and with
drew legal recognition of the association. As tensions built, the regime
forced changes in the s n i , requiring, for example, that workers be included
in its national directorate and that it change its name.78
As in Chile and Salvador, some disgruntled private sector leaders at
tempted to organize a cross-class response to the revolution. For ex
ample, two movements to create a peak association that would allow
economic elites to mount a collective front in opposition to the regime
were launched. Unlike the Chilean and Salvadoran cases, however, both
failed in Peru.79 Throughout the revolution, the private sector in Peru
continued to be divided into more than a dozen different national orga
nizations (Durand 1988b, 275). The regime's ability to divide and rule by
playing exporters, for example, against small industrialists allowed it to
prevent the consolidation of a united bourgeois front.
As in Mexico, this fragmentation is due in part to the collapse of
the traditional oligarchy and the economic and ideological weakness of
the emerging industrial-commercial elite that replaced it. Stratified into
layers that had different needs and organizational styles, divided into sec
tors with often competing interests, and played against each other by
regime policies that favored some over others, the Peruvian bourgeoi
sie was unable to form a political consensus about its relationship with
the state.80
Also as in Mexico, economic reform was accompanied by economic
growth in Peru. The gross domestic product increased by over 5 percent
per year between 1970 and 1974, and by 4 percent in 1975 (McClintock
1981, 60). Continued growth both reflected and contributed to a less ex
treme elite opposition, at least as compared with that found in Chile
and El Salvador. In spite of this success, economic and political prob
lems eventually erupted for the regime. The rapid economic growth of
the 1970-75 period subsequently dropped off, and economic performance
slowed. Growth was increasingly dependent on the state sector, and the
state sector was increasingly dependent on foreign financing (Stepan 1978,
2-84, table 7*4/ FitzGerald 1979, 164).81 Unlike in Mexico, where the ex
pansion of the state sector proceeded gradually over the course of several
decades, state enterprises expanded rapidly in Peru into industries that
needed massive investments, leaving a heavier financial burden for the
state to assume. Increased financial dependency made the regime highly
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vulnerable to external forces. By 1976 this dependency gave foreign banks
and the im f considerable influence over the model and ultimately contrib
uted to the erosion of the revolutionary project (Stallings 1979, 242—48 ).82
In contrast, during the crucial period when the Mexican revolution was
consolidated, state expansion could be managed by internal borrowing.
This buffered Mexican populism somewhat from foreign influences.
Operating in a relative institutional vacuum after the 1911—17 revolu
tion, the Mexican leadership was also freer to fill the landscape with orga
nizations of its creation. Whereas most of the private sector organizations
in Mexico were established by the state, the Peruvian military confronted
an array of existing associations, many of which became regime oppo
nents. The Peruvian regime focused its energies on taming or dissolving
relatively autonomous organizations. It failed to institutionalize a net
work of business support; it even failed to institutionalize a network of
support among peasants and labor, the purported beneficiaries of the revo
lution. For these and other reasons, the Peruvian revolutionary regime
proved less durable than that of Mexico (Stepan 1978, 304-11).
In spite of these differences, there are certain notable similarities in
these two cases. In neither did the bourgeoisie as a class publicly revolt
against the regime,- instead, segments of this elite operated in tandem with
the revolutionary project.83 Neither had, as we found in the Chilean and
Salvadoran cases, a strong, well-organized bourgeoisie capable of coordi
nating cohesive resistance to reform. Both of these regimes were capable
of targeting sectors of the economic elite that would be incorporated
into the new development model. Because of these characteristics, these
regimes could, under certain circumstances, secure a cooperative relation
ship with key sectors of the bourgeoisie and maintain growth, even as
the government attempted to restructure the social order and reallocate
resources. Ultimately, this state-bourgeoisie alliance restricted the degree
to which the society could be transformed; it also made some degree of
transformation possible.84
Conclusions

There is a strong tendency for the bourgeoisie to reject revolutionary or
strongly reformist regimes. The pattern of opposition, however, is not
uniform. It varies in two key ways. First, differences may be observed in
the breadth of private sector hostility. In some cases, like Chile and El
Salvador, this opposition was sweeping and included even nonhegemonic,

1
Capitalists and Revolution

middle-sized businesses. In others, like Mexico and Peru, opposition was
concentrated in pockets of the elite. Many business organizations stayed
out of the fray,- some even aligned with the regime.
The second variation is found in the depth or intensity of the oppo
sition. Reform regimes are likely to generate resistance from those who
benefit most from the status quo, but the degree of hostility ranges
from spirited grumbling to concerted sabotage. In Chile and El Salvador,
business organizations actively conspired with paramilitary and military
groups for the overthrow of the regime. They organized a formidable
campaign against the government in the press to mobilize hostility and
fear, rejecting the regime's feeble attempts at dialogue. Elite opposition in
Mexico and Peru never reached this level. Emphasis in the latter cases was
placed on economic measures, like an investment slowdown and capital
flight, which could in some measure be compensated for by a speedup in
government investment.
The degree of hostility evoked depends much on the character of the
bourgeoisie, the nature of the reform regime, the resources held by popu
lar sectors, and the state's ability to institutionalize its authority as a
hegemonic actor. These characteristics will be analyzed more systemati
cally in the concluding chapter of this book. Overall, however, we can
identify five kinds of variations that seem to shape the unity/division of
the bourgeoisie.
First, when a traditional oligarchy remains dominant and other busi
ness leaders are predisposed to follow its lead, economic elites tend to be
come intransigent, implacable foes of reform; conversely, when the power
of the traditional oligarchy has been ruptured, there is a greater tendency
toward political fragmentation and sectoral accommodation.
Second, business elites who have succeeded in establishing a dense net
work of elite associations prior to the reform era may be relatively forceful
critics, inured from state cooptive strategies; those that are weakly orga
nized or whose organizations depend heavily on state resources, on the
other hand, are more easily drawn into an alliance with the regime.
Third, not all of these regimes were perceived as equally threatening.
Those that expropriate widely, concentrating on domestic firms, and blast
the bourgeoisie with class-laced rhetoric tend to trigger fuller opposition
than those that focus on the nationalization of foreign holdings and em
ploy more inclusionary communication strategies.
Fourth, the regime's success in consolidating a new order also affected
state-business relations. Weakly institutionalized regimes with fragile
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electoral bases and little control over key state agencies (such as the mili
tary, the courts, the legislature) invite strident opposition in the hope of
triggering regime collapse; well-consolidated regimes, on the other hand,
elicit begrudging dialogue from business elites who see no obvious alter
native.
Finally, the performance of the economy both responds to and shapes
the response of the local elites. If the economy declines precipitously and
inflation reels out of control, this may propel the business sector into
opposition,- if the government can keep the economy from collapsing and
develop a model that is perceived as viable, if not ideal, then it may be
able to coax out private sector acquiescence to the new order.
The most recent revolution in the region, that in Nicaragua, blends
together a complex pattern of elite confrontation and accommodation.
Unlike the elite in neighboring El Salvador, the business community in
Nicaragua lacked an oligarchical center. The Nicaraguan elite developed
its political capabilities only relatively recently, and sectoral, regional,
and strata distinctions pulled it in contradictory directions. Unlike that
in Chile, the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie lacked a strong tradition of inde
pendent organization at the national level, making it more susceptible
to manipulation by the state. Although the bourgeois opposition rallied
under the c o s e p banner, this class was never well fused; both the Somoza
and the Sandinista regimes' policies and organizational efforts succeeded
in peeling off some elites and drawing others into sustained negotiation.
Threats to property and social status did promote unity within the
Nicaraguan bourgeoisie during the revolution, since domestic producers
were targeted and, as in Chile, succeeding waves of expropriations sug
gested no clear boundaries to the process. This cohesion diminished, how
ever, when the post-1988 deradicalization of the revolution opened fur
ther avenues of negotiation with the bourgeoisie. By the end of the era,
the Sandinistas were actively courting elites, using language and symbols
that paralleled those used in Mexico and Peru, to the dismay of grassroots
revolutionaries.
During the decade of the revolution, the Sandinistas were particularly
successful in the realm of political institutionalization. Much like the
Mexican regime, the f s l n 's ability to build a broad mass base, produce
sweeping electoral victories, and consolidate control over all vital state
institutions fostered elite acquiescence. However, Nicaragua's unprece
dented rate of economic decline during the 1980s seriously undermined
the credibility of the revolution from the standpoint of the business elite.
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Economic deterioration eventually even eroded the regime's mass base.
This decline encouraged elite opposition and helped bring the revolution
ary period to a close.
The next five chapters detail these shifting relations between the bour
geoisie and the state in Nicaragua, probing for underlying characteristics
that have shaped this dynamic. The concluding chapter weaves the Nica
raguan case into the discussion of the four cases described above to refocus
on the comparative dimension.

31

chapter

From Elite Quiescence to Elite
Confrontation in Prerevolutionary
Nicaragua
Up to the present time, domestic private enterprise has, with few ex
ceptions, done relatively little to develop the country’s productive
capacity. . . . Private enterprise . . . has often been unimaginative and
unduly cautious. It has been too prone to seek either the safe invest
ment or a quick return.
—ib r d , The Economic Development of Nicaragua
It was a weak agroexport bourgeoisie whose ability to put itself at the
head of the nation as a social class was brutally cut off by the years
of North American intervention. From 1912 to 1933, that intervention
not only took over the management and control of the most important
mechanisms of the emerging agricultural and mining economy, but it
took away the sense of nationhood from this mentally impoverished
and little educated class. This class lost the historic opportunity to
consolidate itself as a national bourgeoisie.
—Sergio Ramirez Mercado,
“Los sobrevivientes del naufragio”

with capitalists in the rest of Latin America, the Nicara
guan private elite was long characterized by its weak entrepreneurship, organizational fragmentation, and political incompetence. Although
this elite was small in number, its modest proportions did not ensure
political affinity or coherent organization. The Nicaraguan bourgeoisie
was both heterogeneous and regionally divided, suggesting that the politi
cal organization of the bourgeoisie may respond more to historical rival
ries and sectoral fissures than to the size of the national economy.
Unlike El Salvador or Peru, Nicaragua never experienced a long, un
relieved period of oligarchical rule, which might have sedimented the
political authority of a branch of the bourgeoisie. Unlike Chile, it lacked
a durable experience with political pluralism, which might have sparked
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the broad and spontaneous organization of private sector elites. Instead,

the private sector organizations that sprang up in Nicaragua tended to
have limited scope and little authority; they rose and fell rapidly. As

in Mexico, the more durable organizations were generally those that re
ceived the favor of the regime and were given special representational
status within state agencies. Fractured into a series of discrete organiza
tions and manipulated with discretionary rewards provided by the state,
the Nicaraguan elite remained politically ineffective through much of the
prerevolutionary era.
By the early 1970s, however, this splintering was attenuated, and the
private elite made a bid for greater political influence. Nicaraguan repre
sentatives from an array of regional and sectoral business organizations
formed their first broad, national peak association in 1972. This new orga
nization began to push for a reformulation of the character of the state
and the national development model.
In spite of its growing organizational capacity, the Nicaraguan private
sector was unable to emerge as the hegemonic force in the campaign to
overthrow the Somoza regime. It did learn, by the end of the era, to employ
collectivist strategies in high stakes confrontations with the regime, but
it was swept aside by the rising momentum of a revolutionary movement
under the f s l n .
The Development of the Nicaraguan Bourgeoisie

The Nicaraguan bourgeoisie historically was poor. Travel testimonials of
the mid-i8oos note the uncertainty of economic life in Nicaragua

and the modest standard of living of its elite. Commenting on conditions
m Nicaragua, historical chronicler Paul Levy concluded: "This society
has one fundamental problem: it is poor" (cited in Burns 1991, 83).
Local notable families emerged, some of whom traced their family his
tory to the conquistador cs (Stone 1990). The ready availability of land
in this lightly populated country, combined with the weakness of the
state, however, allowed much of the local population to continue subsis
tence production, often on communal lands, instead of serving as a labor
force on the estates of the elite (Burns 1991, 138-39, 235). The scarce and
relatively expensive labor supply, along with the constant warfare of the
Postindependence period, retarded the process of accumulation.
What surplus there was in the nineteenth century evaporated in re
gional warfare between the Conservatives of Granada and the Liberals of
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Leon. Competing for political control in interminable internecine feud
ing, the Liberals brought in U.S. filibuster William Walker, whose seizure
of the Nicaraguan presidency led to intervention by neighboring coun
tries. In the words of President Tomas Martinez, who took office in 1858
as the smoke cleared following the " Walker War": "Our fields lie bleached
by the ashes of our dead; our cities lie ruined, a reminder for many years
to come of the horrors wrought by foreign invaders; even now, agriculture
and commerce remain paralyzed as a consequence of a recent Costa Rican
invasion; the public treasury is empty,- private property is destroyed; the
schools remain closed. Such is the present picture, sad as it may be, of
Nicaragua" (cited in Burns 1991, 223).
This economic morass began to lift with the advent of coffee. In part
because of the Liberal-Conservative warfare, Nicaragua was slower to ini
tiate coffee production than neighboring countries like Costa Rica. By
the 1850s, however, the visibility of the Costa Rican success prompted
Nicaraguan state efforts to push coffee cultivation.1 President Martinez
approved a package of incentives to cafetaleros in 1858 and the Law for
Uncultivated Lands was adopted in 1859. The benefits offered to cof
fee growers included exemption from military service (for producers and
workers for twelve years as long as peace prevailed), tax exemption on
coffee earnings, exemption of import duties on agricultural machinery
the provision of inputs (seeds, plants) at cost, and subsidies for planting
new crops. A port was built at Corinto in 1859 to handle increased exports
(Burns 1991, 233).
To attract immigrants and open new lands, the government provided
500 mz. of land to those who would plant 25,000 cafetos and maintain
them until they could be harvested.2 The erosion of communal lands was
accelerated, both to provide land for the new export crop and to reduce the
economic alternatives available to peasants. The Liberal administration
of Jose Santos Zelaya (1893-1909) deepened the country's commitment
to coffee production by sharpening the antivagrancy laws passed in the
1840s and 1850s to increase the available labor supply and by expanding
the transportation infrastructure (Barahona 1989,15-18).
In spite of these trends, Nicaraguan elites were never fully entrenched
in coffee cultivation. Whereas the Salvadoran coffee elite reigned supreme
and became the direct occupants of top political positions in their country
for a half-century, coffee producers in Nicaragua remained an important
but not singularly dominant sector (Torres-Rivas 1989, 178). In 1929, on
the eve of the depression, coffee accounted for 93 percent of export earn
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ings in El Salvador and 77 percent in Guatemala. In contrast, a more
modest 54 percent of Nicaragua's export earnings were obtained from
coffee (Bulmer-Thomas 1987, 34,. Compared to its neighbors, Nicaragua's
export profile was relatively diversified, with bananas and timber each
contributing over 10 percent of export earnings at that time.
Unlike the Salvadoran coffee elite, which expanded quickly into the
banking and export trade sectors, the Nicaraguan coffee bourgeoisie con
fined its activities largely to cultivation. Lucrative finance and export
activities were monopolized in the Nicaraguan case by a partnership of
the state and foreign investors, limiting the economic terrain available to
domestic producers.3 Coffee production in Nicaragua tended to shift over
time from the more populated and historically dominant Pacific coastal
regions into the more mountainous interior, and Nicaraguan coffee pro
ducers were increasingly located away from the mainstream of national
political life in the relatively inaccessible Matagalpa and Jinotega regions.
Perhaps a more important factor explaining the Nicaragua elite's rela
tive impotence was the political role assumed by the United States. Dur
ing the 1911-33 period, the U.S. government took control of most of the
economic and military functions of the Nicaraguan state,- the U.S. col
lector general of customs took charge of the collection and dispersal of
state revenues, and the marines set up a military academy and constabu
lary national guard. Political power was subsequently commandeered by
National Guard Commander Anastasio Somoza Garcia, and a long era
fT937~79, of personalistic and familial control was launched. This mo
nopoly over political power in Nicaragua left other contenders, such as
those enriched by coffee export, scattered on the sidelines. The coffee
elite in Nicaragua was only one of several contending powers, and it vied
weakly for political authority. Its relatively modest contribution to the
national economy and inability to extend into banking and exports, com
bined with the political intrusion of the United States and the lock on
power held by the Somozas, impeded the development of a hegemonic,
coffee-based oligarchy in Nicaragua.4
The Post-World War IL Era and Economic Diversification

Economic activity in Nicaragua became more dynamic and diversified in
the period after the 1940s as the Nicaraguan economy became increasmgly integrated into an expanding international market. This trend was
reinforced by the interventions of international financial and develop
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ment authorities, particularly World Bank and id b consultants and u s a id
missions. In addition, expansion and diversification were supported by
eclectic interventions on the part of the Nicaraguan state.5 The most im
portant new sectors to emerge during this period were cotton, livestock,
and manufacturing.
The Cotton Boom
During the 1950s cotton boom, cotton was established as the dominant
crop in the fertile Pacific region around Leon and Chinandega. In 1950
the international price for cotton fiber reached a historic $57.61 per qt.
These prices were extraordinary; they were not seen again until the end
of the 1970s. Inspired by the windfall profits to be made in cotton trade,
increasing numbers of producers shifted into this sector.6
The ability of these producers to take advantage of this opportunity
was restricted by the weakness of the transportation and financial infra
structure of the country. The World Bank mission that visited Nicaragua
in 1951-52 pointed the finger at these bottlenecks and called the Somoza
regime to task. The mission praised the regime for starting a program to
build major highways on the Pacific side of the country but criticized the
limited scope of the project and called for the construction of local access
and farm-to-market roads to complement the highway system (ib r d 1953,
xxviii). The mission also criticized the country's frail credit system for
failing to rechannel savings efficiently into productive investments (ib r d
1953/ 4)/ indirectly pressuring the state to relinquish its monopoly over
the banking system.
Following this report, the road-building program in the Pacific region
was expanded (Williams 1986, 20-24). Two new private banks, b a n ic and
b a n a m e r , were founded and helped funnel private sector profits back
into other productive activities. Even the state bank responded to the new
dynamic,- the credit capacity of the state-owned b n n grew exponentially
and the bank became a hub of national economic growth. The develop
ment of this physical and financial infrastructure facilitated the rise of
a new entrepreneurial sector of the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie, particularly
in cotton production.7 In 1951-52, 1,305 producers cultivated cotton; by
1960-61, 2,015 producers did so. This figure continued to rise, reaching
5,080 in 1965-66 (Biderman 1982,182).
This emerging cotton bourgeoisie had several distinguishing charac
teristics. A large number of these producers were primarily urban profes
sionals who bought or rented land as an outlet for entrepreneurship and
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speculation (Nunez Soto 1981, 30-33).8 Their growing participation in cot
ton production sharpened the distinctions between the Nicaraguan class
structure and that found generally in Central America. Whereas the rural
oligarchy that dominated Guatemala and, to a lesser extent, El Salvador
emerged from a traditional landholding elite, cotton expansion in Nica
ragua followed the "merchant road" to capitalist development, drawing
heavily from a professional urban class that maintained multiple occu
pations. Unlike Guatemala and El Salvador, where agroexport production
was concentrated on larger estates, or Honduras, where banana production
developed in an enclave economy, Nicaraguan agricultural development
rested more fully on a foundation of locally owned middle-sized estates.9
These distinctive local characteristics gave agricultural development in
Nicaragua a less dualistic twist than that found in much of the region.
In part because of the intense regional divisions in the country and
the weakness of the transportation system, the cotton and coffee sectors
tended to evolve as distinct entities with little overlap between them.
Unlike their more traditional counterparts in coffee production, Nica
raguan cotton producers were quick to adopt technological innovations.
Whereas the yields of Nicaraguan coffee producers lagged far behind the
average rates for the region, yields for the country's cotton producers were
among the world's highest.10 Nicaraguan algodoneros experimented with
seed varieties and fertilizer use and turned readily toward mechanization
iBelli 1968, 46-48). They represented a new type of producer in Nicaragua,
one who was more dynamic, less risk averse, and more technologically
sophisticated.

Although bitter regional disputes among elites were suppressed under
the authoritarian rule of the Somoza dynasty, economic diversification
sharpened the sectoral differentiation of this class. In the 1960s, two addi
tional sectors, livestock and manufacturing, grew rapidly. As with cotton,
their development was supported by the international market and inter
national development consultants and backed by the Nicaraguan state.
Cattle Sector Development

Following its 1951-52 visit, the ib r d mission recommended the con
struction of a modern slaughterhouse with refrigerated storage to replace
the inefficient export of live animals, and it endorsed the establishment
nt several new milk processing plants capable of producing condensed or
powdered milk for export (ib r d 1953,141-45). In the years that followed,
both recommendations were implemented.
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The Nicaraguan state became increasingly interventionist in support
of livestock development. The expansion of the b n n and the creation
of in j o n a c in 1953 gave the Somoza regime conduits through which to
funnel resources into the cattle sector. When in f o n a c was founded, it
provided the only significant source of medium- and long-term loans in
Nicaragua. It served as an important conduit of foreign credits, securing
over 9 percent of all resources in the financial sector by 1964 (Vichas 1967,
81-82).11
in f o n a c signaled its vision by financing the Matadero Modelo, a beef
export facility that opened in 1957-58. This facility was the first u s d a approved packing house in Central America, giving Nicaragua a jump on
beef exportation for the region. The relatively low cost of land in Nica
ragua provided a “comparative advantage" for the production of range-fed
cattle, and the rise of hamburger chains in the United States raised the
demand for inexpensive, lower-quality hamburger that range-fed cattle
could satisfy (Williams 1986, 77-98). By the 1960s Nicaragua's cattle
industry had been largely integrated into the U.S. beef market.12
As a result of these domestic and international interventions, the live
stock sector grew rapidly. The value of beef exports rose from US$3 mil
lion in i960 to US$44.5 million in 1973- At their I9/4 peak< earnings for
Nicaragua's beef exports surpassed even those for its coffee exports and
were second in value only to cotton (Biderman 1982, 177). Land used for
pasture expanded sharply during this period, rising from 1.5 million mz.
in 1960-61 to 4.1 million mz. in 1978-79. Whereas a little over 70 per
cent of the agricultural land was used for pastureland in 1960-61, over 80
percent of the agricultural land was so used in 1978-79 (f id a 1980,1).
The Growth of Manufacturing
New primary sector activities created related opportunities in agro
industry and international trade. During the 1960s, for example, the cot
ton sector was increasingly integrated into a network of industries and
markets both inside and outside Nicaragua. Backward linkages were de
veloped with industries and commercial firms that provided inputs into
cotton production. Sales of fertilizer, pesticides, and agricultural machin
ery soared, and local firms were increasingly involved in the production
and distribution of these products. Forward linkages were also developed
for the processing of the fiber, the extraction of cottonseed oil, the export
of unprocessed cotton, and textile production.13 Not only did the agricul
tural bourgeoisie become more dynamic and diversified, new industrial
and commercial sectors also developed rapidly.
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National economic policy became more proactive and began to favor
industrialization. To stimulate industrial expansion, the Nicaraguan gov
ernment approved the 1956 Ley de Inversiones Extranjeras that encouraged
the entry of foreign capital (La Gaceta, March 10,1956). Following the as
sassination that year of Anastasio Somoza Garcia and the assumption of
the presidency by his oldest son, Luis Somoza Debayle, the regime deep
ened its commitment to industrial growth. The 1958 Ley de Proteccion y
Estimulo al Desarrollo Industrial declared industrial development to be
of "general interest" and provided an array of tax and tariff concessions to
both established and new industries (La Gaceta, March 12, 1958).14
The formation of the c a c m in i960 and the Alliance for Progress de
velopment programs further stimulated industrial and commercial ex
pansion.15 On the recommendation of the U.S. government, the Corpo
racion Nicaraguense de Inversiones was created in 1964 with financing
from u s a id .16 By 1966 three-fifths of the organization's loans had gone
to industrial enterprises (Lethander 1968, 359). Many of these projects
were joint ventures involving foreign banks, Latin American-based trans
national corporations, and local industrialists, including members of the
Somoza family (Dosal 1985, 91; Wheelock Roman 1980b, 181).
Local financing also supported industrial development. In the 1960s,
the domestic banking system shifted credit toward the secondary sector.
In i960 only 18 percent of bank loans went to the manufacturing sector,
less than half those received in agriculture. Lending to the manufactur
ing sector rose in the early 1960s, however, exceeding 24 percent in the
1962-65 period. By the mid-1970s, loans for the industrial sector often
surpassed those for agriculture. (See Table 2.1.)
Financial support from international agencies, the state, and the bank
ing system combined with changing trade policy to fuel industrial expan
sion. Nicaragua's annual GDP growth rate in the 1960-70 period was a
formidable 6.9 percent, the highest in the region (Weeks 1985, 50). The
industrial sector spearheaded this expansion, growing a phenomenal 15
percent annual average in the 1960-65 period, and a still-remarkable 8.9
percent annual average in 1965-70 (Weeks 1985, 64). At an overall average
annual growth rate of 12 percent during the 1960s, Nicaragua's industrial
sector expanded much more rapidly than that in any other Central Ameri
can country. As a result of this dramatic growth, this sector assumed a
significant role in the national economy. Whereas only 12 percent of Nica
ragua's GDP was derived from manufacturing in i960, this rose to 22
percent in 1975 (Weeks 1985,135).17
As a result of these surge areas, the Nicaraguan economy grew rapidly,
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Table 2.1

Financial System Loans to the Private Sector by Economic Activity,
1960-1979 (Percent of Total)
Year

Agriculture

Livestock

Natural
Resources

Manufacturing

Construction

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

40.3
43.6
38.6
38.2
35.7
30.3
29.9
31.0
31.1
30.5
31.3
28.7
26.1
22.8
21.9
20.2
18.1
20.5
21.9
22.6

12.6
11.8
12.8
12.2
14.4
16.2
15.7
15.1
13.9
12.1
12.1
12.0
12.5
15.7
14.0
12.4
11.3
10.7
9.7
8.2

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.4
0.9
1.2
0.9
0.7
0.8
1.1
1.0
0.6
0.6
0.3

17.8
19.1
25.0
23.7
23.7
24.4
23.0
21.7
19.7
20.4
22.0
22.1
22.7
23.1
22.7
24.3
22.4
19.9
20.7
26.2

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.5
1.6
1.5
1.3
1.8
2.0
2.2
2.1
0.9
0.8
0.8

Source:

bcn

(1979, 29).

though unevenly, during these decades. In the early 1950s the GDP growth
rate surpassed that of all other Central American nations with the ex
ception of Costa Rica; in the early 1960s it topped even the Costa Rican
rate, rising more than 10 percent per year. (See Table 2.2.) This growth
rate provided resources for the local bourgeoisie that were historically
unprecedented.
Economic Groups and the Commanding Heights

The rise of new economic sectors was intimately associated with the
rise of a series of "economic groups." These groups were composed of a
network of investors bound together in what Strachen (1976, 3) calls a
"fiduciary atmosphere" of relatively open disclosure and trust. At the apex
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Table 2.1 (continued)

Year

Housing

Commerce

Services

Other

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

6.0
5.1
6.2
6.4
6.8
8.4
7.8
8.1
10.6
11.6
13.1
14.4
14.6
12.1
14.7
16.2
18.0
20.1
20.5
18.6

12.1
11.9
10.6
13.9
12.7
13.0
11.2
9.9
8.5
8.4
10.2
10.9
11.2
12.0
12.9
11.0
13.2
16.9
14.7
15.1

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
2.1
2.7
2.4
2.8
4.1
4.7
4.9
4.8
4.2
4.5
4.7
4.1
4.0
3.3

11.3
8.4
6.8
5.7
6.7
7.6
9.3
10.7
13.1
13.3
4.8
4.4
5.7
7.1
6.8
8.1
9.2
6.3
7.2
4.9

of the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie were three rapidly expanding and highly
diversified economic groups that emerged in the 1950s (Strachen 1976;
Wheelock Roman 1980b, 148-76). Two were formed by private entrepre
neurial networks,- the third was built around the Somoza family's busi
ness operations. An important part of the innovative economic activity in
Nicaragua of the 1950s and 1960s was orchestrated by these groups.
The principal economic groups were centered on the private banking
system that emerged in the 1950s. The b a n a m e r group was organized
around the nation's largest private bank and included investments in
sugar, cattle, rum, large-scale commerce, construction, land development,
food processing, and the apparel industry.18 The b a n ic group had a less ex
tensive realm of operation but included not only the Banco Nicaragiiense
but also a notable swath of cotton and coffee production, cotton gins and
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Table 2.2

Average Annual Real GDP Growth Rates in Central America (Percent)
GDP/Capita
Dollars (1970)
Country
Costa Rica
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Nicaragua
Total Central
America

1950-55

1955-60

1960-65

1965-70

1970-78

1950

1978

8.3
4.6
2.2
2.5
8.3

6.0
4.7
5.3
4.6
2.3

6.5
6.8
5.2
5.2
10.2

7.0
4.5
5.8
4.1
4.2

6.1
5.2
5.6
4.4
4.0

322
203
255
234
223

758
347
450
297
409

4.7

4.6

6.0

5.1

5.4

242

428

Source: Rosenthal (1982, 20).

brokerages, the nation's largest brewery, and a vegetable oil processing
facility.19 Both of these groups were linked to a series of other financial
agencies, including savings and loan associations, finance companies, and
insurance agencies.20
The Somoza group was launched on a base of agricultural production in
every major subsector and expanded into commerce and industry (airline,
shipping, fishing, construction, cement, and real estate,.21 The financial
component of this group rested on its own small bank, the Banco Centroamericano, and, more importantly, its ability to influence the distribution
of resources in the state banking system. Labeled the "loaded dice" group
(Wheelock Roman 1980b, 163), this network of political and economic
allies drew heavily on its political connections and effectively parried
periodic jabs from other private sector elites.
The rise of these economic groups involved a new form of convergence
across sectors. Unlike other sectors of the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie, the
economic groups and various other "grupitos" that emerged in the 1950s
linked disparate economic activities. Private investments made before the
evolution of these groups in the 1950s tended to be narrowly sectoral; in
contrast, investment by the emerging economic groups in the 1950s and
1960s crossed categories to fuse agriculture, industry, and trade. These
groups used their respective components of the emerging banking sys
tem as a mechanism to transfer resources from waning but profitable
activities toward rising sectors that promised increased future return. The
banks were the linchpin in the system, providing credit and investment
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opportunities for group members on terms that were widely perceived as
concessionary (Strachen 1976, 70). The banks also developed connections
to foreign banks, such as the link between b a n a m e r and Wells Fargo
Bank, helping group insiders to get access to foreign credit (Wheelock
Roman 1980b, 162).
Theoretically, the development of economic groups could have led
to greater class cohesion within top bourgeoisie, and to their increased
hegemony over the society. In Nicaragua, however, these groups failed
to play that role. They remained sharply competitive among themselves
and generally eschewed political action. Although the Nicaraguan elite
was interlinked through kinship bonds (much like Zeitlin and Ratcliff
[1988] found in the Chilean case), those family bonds did not automati
cally produce economic collaboration. Competition among the groups re
mained intense. Strachen's (1976, 17) close study of the composition of
these groups in the 1970s found little overlap in the top membership.22
Not only did the competition among groups impede the fusion of this
elite, but so did the group leaders' unwillingness to assume political roles.
Unlike the Chilean elite, which figured prominently in Liberal and Con
servative party politics (Zeitlin and Ratcliff 1988, 186-214), Nicaragua's
top elite adopted a low political profile. Instead of stepping into leadership
positions or welding together private sector organizations, group leaders
avoided these commitments. More like top elites in contemporary Peru
(Durand 1991) and Brazil (Weyland 1992), the largest Nicaraguan capital
ists preferred the politics of individual bargaining in which they could
trade on their economic prominence to secure special concessions or
bureaucratic exemptions. This particularistic negotiation process under
cut the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie's ability to serve as a hegemonic force.
The economic groups evaded confrontation with the regime even as they
faced rising competition from the Somoza family group.
State Control over the Economic Elite

Three mechanisms fostered state control over the local elite: (1) quasicorporatist linkages with the bourgeoisie, (2) "sultanistic" dominance of
private sector organizations, and (3) clientelistic politics that encouraged
individual petitions and class segmentation.
Quasi-corporatist Controls
Even before the creation of the Somoza dynasty, during the period of
U.S. occupation, the Nicaraguan government was already sponsoring pri-
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vate sector associations by granting them representational monopolies
and providing state subsidies for their operations. This process created a
series of quasi-corporatist mechanisms that the state could use to control
private sector organizations.23 As early as 1923 the government granted
legal recognition and subsidies to handpicked organizations. The Asocia
cion Nacional de Ganaderos, with the prominent participation of sev
eral military generals, was recognized in that turbulent year. Labeled an
"enterprise of public usefulness" [empresa de utilidad publica], this orga
nization was given tax exemptions and discounts on tariffs [La Gaceta,
August 13, 1923 ).24
Chambers of commerce began to organize autonomously in cities like
Managua and Leon as early as 1928 (c a d in 1975; Camara de Comercio
de Leon n.d., 3), but these organizations soon fell under state sponsorship.
When the chambers of commerce, agriculture, and industry were given
legal recognition in 1934, they were designated as the legal intermediary
organizations between businesses and the regime [La Gaceta, Septem
ber 3,1934). As in Mexico and Ecuador during this era, the state mandated
participation in these organizations. In Nicaragua, all businesspeople,
agricultural producers, industrialists, and intermediaries were legally re
quired to join these chambers; those who did not were denied the right
to bring judicial proceedings or petitions before the state. This legal privi
lege secured the status of these associations but also created a bond of
dependency between these fledgling organizations and the regime.
The Somoza regime incorporated carefully selected private sector orga
nizations into government boards and was often directly involved in nam
ing their representatives. For example, a small number of private sector
organizations were given representation on the board of directors of the
b n n when it was reestablished in Nicaragua in 1940.25 Representatives
of the private sector were also named to the board of the national devel
opment bank in f o n a c when it was created in 1953 [La Gaceta, March 13,
1953).26 Trying to shore up the national economy and build elite support,27
Somoza Garcia created the Consejo Nacional de Economia in 1949 as an
advisory board for the Ministry of Economy (Walter 1993, 186-88). Rep
resentatives of several private sector organizations, including the Camara
de Comercio de Managua, the Sociedad Anonima de Cafetaleros, the Cooperativa Nacional de Agricultores, and the Asociacion Agricola de Nica
ragua, were appointed to this council.
Private sector representatives were also named to sectoral agencies and
commissions. The creation of c o n a l in 1965 by newly installed Presi-
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dent Rene Schick solidified the relationship between the state and the
cotton bourgeoisie. The legislation creating c o n a l gave five of its eleven
permanent seats to the regional cotton cooperatives that had emerged in
the 1960s [La Gaceta, Decree #1078, April 24, 1965). This assured the
medium- and large-scale producers who dominated these cooperatives
that they would have monthly meetings with political luminaries like
the minister of agriculture and livestock or the presidents of the b c n and
the b n n . Similarly the rice growers' association (Asociacion de Produc
tores de Arroz de Nicaragua) was given representation on the board of the
state grains marketing agency (the Instituto Nacional de Comercio de Exportacion e Importacion), and a coffee growers' association (the Sociedad
Cooperativa Anonima de Cafeteros) was given a position on the board of
the Instituto Nicaraguense del Cafe.
The regime also moved to channel private sector activity in the emerg
ing industrial sector. Selected business associations, like the newly
formed Asociacion de Industrials de Nicaragua, were allowed to name
members to the Comision Consultiva de Desarrollo Industrial created by
Luis Somoza in 1958.28 The Camara de Comercio and the Asociacion de
Industrials (renamed the Camara de Industrias de Nicaragua or c a d in
in 1965) enjoyed substantial state support. Import licenses, for example,
were granted only to those who could demonstrate membership in these
business chambers, and the concessions granted in the 1958 industrial
development law were available only to affiliates of c a d in . These re
strictions compelled the emerging urban bourgeoisie to join these orga
nizations. These associations gained in size and resources, and the state
developed a generally cooperative private sector affiliate.
Sultanistic Participation and Control
In some sectors, where relations with the state were complicated by
the extensive, direct participation of the Somoza family in production and
marketing, a "sultanistic" political arrangement emerged.29 The political
clan that ran the country used its public power to advance its own eco
nomic interests and those of its wealthy allies, currying favor and winning
support in these quarters. Bolstered by the family's business interests, the
state provided loans, infrastructure, and international connections that
were essential to the success of the sector. In the most extreme cases,
Somoza family members even served as top officials in private sector orga
nizations for economic sectors where family resources were concentrated.
Livestock provided an important terrain for investment and accumu
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lation by the Somozas beginning in the 1950s.30 To promote this activity,
Luis Somoza founded a new ranchers' association, a s g a n ic , in 1955 and
actively served as its president even after he became president of the coun
try. Membership was confined to a small number of elite cattle producers
and carried substantial privileges. Among other benefits, membership
enabled this elite to meet regularly with the top ministers, bank presi
dents, and directors of development projects. It provided a regular forum
in which these producers could coordinate activities and press their case
for additional resources.31 Unlike cotton growers, who suffered from the
regional fragmentation of their organizations, the cattle elite was shaped
by Somoza family powerholders into a forceful association from the mid1950s on.
The state development bank in f o n a c joined with a s g a n ic to found
a holding company, if a g a n Si Cia. Ltda., and establish the Matadero Modelo, Nicaragua's first modern beef slaughterhouse. Controlling 50-60
percent of export slaughter (Ballard 1985, 30), if a g a n became in effect the
state-sponsored beef commercialization agency, overseeing prices paid to
both producers and consumers and coordinating the export of Nicaraguan
beef.32 In 1973 if a g a n opened a new facility, the Fondo Ifagan de Desarro
llo Ganadero, providing members with low interest, subsidized, long-term
loans. These loans offered borrowers up to three grace years before any
payment was due and eliminated all bank commissions (a s g a n ic 1975,
4-5). Using profits from the Matadero Modelo, a fund of US$10 million
was set up, providing these prominent cattle ranchers with an attractive
alternative to the regular banking system.
The penetration by the Somoza family brought certain benefits to their
allies. The increased state support for cattle production in the 1960s at
tracted loans and investment into the sector, and the regime helped to
secure steady access to the U.S. beef quota. Those affiliated with the
regime reaped ample rewards. Through a s g a n ic the established cattle
elites had access to government resources, and their co-ownership of
if a g a n generated additional profits and loans. As affiliates became in
debted to the regime, their capacity for autonomous action was stifled.
Nor was this effect limited to members. Although elites who were ex
cluded from these private associations were less compromised, many of
them aspired to membership. Those aspirants became supplicants whose
ability to oppose the regime was undercut by their hope for admission
into the regime's privileged circles.
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Clientelism
To extract concessions from the regime, business elites typically re
sorted to informal, individual communication with well-placed bureau
crats. Discussing bureaucratic solicitation of that era, one prominent
cattle rancher described how he would court the regional state bank offi
cial, taking him to lunch and metaphorically "stroking his hair" in order
to get long-term credit (interview, August 6,1991). Others recalled the era
more fondly. "If we needed something," one former leader in the construc
tion sector observed, "we would just call the right minister. The ministers
were mostly our friends, anyway" (interview, August 7, 1991).
The Somoza regime limited the power of formal state economic agen
cies and concentrated decision making in the hands of family members.
The paper-thin legal and regulatory structure in Nicaragua was routinely
circumvented through skillful bargaining and deal making. Personal con
tacts and bonds were widely used by elites to secure special privileges.
Interaction between regime elites and leaders of the domestic bourgeoi
sie, consequently, had an unpredictable, ad hoc quality. Even prominent
figures in the elite had to deal with a highly personalistic authority struc
ture. Power was discretionary, not governed by formal rules. Without routinized channels of communication and a more fully institutionalized
bureaucracy, private sector leaders faced recurring uncertainty.
Since regime functionaries were susceptible to individual appeals, there
was little need to work through private sector organizations. Indeed, push
ing for a collective response invited a harsh response.33 When collective
efforts were made, the results were often disappointing; they did not pro
vide the individual capitalist with any special advantage or privilege. The
bargaining process that prevailed bound the elite to the state in the role
of individual supplicant and set up conditions that fostered intra-elite
rivalry and competition.
As a result, Nicaraguan capitalists scattered into a series of sectoral
and regional clusters. Without strong or autonomous national associa
tions, producers retreated into regionalism and infighting. Producers often
formed local "societies" or "cooperatives,"34 which were only regional
groupings without a strong national counterpart. Conflict developed be
tween and among subsectors (cotton growers battled vegetable oil proces
sors; small livestock producers competed with beef processors)35 over how
the profits generated by a sector would be divided up. Intrabourgeois con
flicts also flared over access to bank credit. Agricultural producers were
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alarmed when agricultural loans dropped from 40 percent of the total in
i960 to 30 percent in 1965, and the portion of loans allocated to industry
and livestock tended to rise. (See Table 2.1.) In the absence of autonomous
national organizations that might mediate these disputes, and in a setting
that favored particularistic bargaining, intra-elite conflict was routine.
Movement toward Private Sector Opposition

In a system where fluctuating resources are seen as the product of a neu
tral market responding to the laws of supply and demand, the impact of
political decisions on rising or declining profits may not be clear. Under
those circumstances, producers often adjust to their shifting fates with
out raising the issue in the political arena. When "political capitalism"
(Schneider 1988-89, 91) prevails, however, economic performance is regu
larly and visibly tied to political decisions. Bank credit, trade options, and
labor costs are all the product of political negotiations, and those elites
favored by the regime receive substantial benefits. Groups not favored by
economic policy understand this as unfair treatment and may become
politically alienated.
Political capitalism had long prevailed in Nicaragua. By the mid-1970s
those elites who were relatively disadvantaged turned increasingly against
the regime. Old cooptive mechanisms were failing to function as effec
tively as they had in prior decades. Expectations rose, needs changed, and
performance deteriorated. Important sectors of the bourgeoisie were be
ginning to take aim at the regime. One indicator was the 1972 formation
of c o s ip , Nicaragua's first business "peak association."36
Comparative literature on private sector organization in Latin America
points to a series of factors that contribute to or impede the formation
of peak associations (Durand 1991,- Acuna 1991,• Weyland 1992). Key fac
tors analyzed have included (1) the size, heterogeneity, and regionalistic
tendencies of the bourgeoisie (Acuna 1991; Weyland 1992); (2) the degree
of corporatist control over private sector organization (Weyland 1992);
and (3) the degree of threat that private elites face from popular groups,
especially labor (Durand 1991; Conaghan 1991).
According to this body of literature, peak associations are more likely
to form when the private sector is relatively small, homogeneous, and free
of regional fissures. This kind of national association may also be encour
aged by the absence of corporatist controls that bind the private sector
to the state. The mobilization of mass organizations that are perceived as
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threatening to the collective interests of private sector elites can trigger
the formation of peak associations. The recent democratization/redemocratization process in Latin America has also been seen as a galvanizing
force behind more cohesive private sector organization, since it fosters
mass mobilizations that can challenge business interests (Durand 1991).
Conversely, business peak associations are less likely to emerge when the
bourgeoisie is heterogeneous, fractured, and regionally divided; heavily
shaped by corporatist controls,- and free from major threats by labor or
popular organizations.
In the Nicaraguan case, the absence of a dominant economic sector
and the persistence of regional divisions contributed to delays in the for
mation of cohesive private sector organizations. Yet a peak organization
was finally formed in Nicaragua in the early 1970s, in spite of the rising
heterogeneity of the national economy in the 1950s and 1960s. The co
incidence of this organizational development and increasing economic
heterogeneity supports the argument that the socioeconomic characteris
tics of the bourgeoisie may be less important in determining their political
organization than other political and organizational considerations.37
The Nicaraguan bourgeoisie began to converge organizationally when
two developments coincided. First, as the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie devel
oped and became better linked to a competitive international economy,
it needed a state apparatus that was developmentally competent. Second,
the quasi-corporatist and clientelistic mechanisms developed by the state
to channel private sector participation deteriorated over time. The state
dipped deeper into avarice at the same time as the aspirations of producers
and their expectations regarding supportive state actions gradually rose.
As the political elite concentrated on private accumulation, its ability to
continue stoking the system was undermined.
The Somoza regime had, of course, long used public power to pursue
private gain. Dynasty founder Somoza Garcia was notorious for his use
of kickbacks, "presidential commissions," extraction of bribes, demands
to be included in lucrative enterprises, and seizure of properties held by
politically vulnerable groups (Walter 1993, 109-10,• Booth 1985a, 66-68).
Over time, however, these practices became increasingly objectionable to
other economic elites, who were adversely affected by the partial diver
sion of their surpluses and the considerable uncertainty this introduced
into the economic environment. Instead of gradually curtailing these
abuses, the regime became yet more corrupt in the 1970s during the reign
of Anastasio Somoza Debayle. Particularly in the wake of the 1972 earth-
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quake that devastated Managua, as international assistance poured into
the country, the regime proved visibly corrupt. Moving into new business
sectors (land development, construction supplies, housing), the Somoza
family jostled broader sectors of the Nicaraguan elite and violated an un
written assumption that economic gains would be more widely shared.
As the informal boundaries that had delimited the sphere of public cor
ruption widened and the sweep of the Somoza family's economic empire
expanded, elite opposition sharpened.
The regime's approach to economic policy, with its emphasis on per
sonalistic connections and its tendency toward erratic decisions, was no
longer acceptable to an increasing number of economic elites. Instead,
they began to push for a more neutral, regularized state apparatus that
would better serve the needs of modern business. Economic elites needed
wider access to improved technology, a more skilled and better-trained
labor force, a more fully developed transportation and communication
infrastructure, and social peace. What they got was an uneven and erratic
distribution of these resources accompanied by widespread popular re
pression. As the regime became more acquisitive, rewards and resources
were increasingly absorbed by its close political allies. The corporatist
and clientelistic features of the regime were gradually overwhelmed by
its sultanistic tendencies.
The political performance of the regime became more repressive and,
simultaneously, less authoritative. Private sector leaders began to develop
new points of reference, drawing on international connections that by
passed the regime. International business associates and u s a id programs
designed to support civic action may have unwittingly undermined the
Somoza regime's bonds with its business class by providing an alternative
vision of state-business linkages and by supplying the financial resources
with which to buy greater independence.
In contrast to other cases in Latin America such as Peru or Mexico, in
which business peak associations developed in response to a threat from
the left, Nicaraguan private elites converged before any leftist threat had
materialized. The f s l n in the early 1970s was still a tiny organization
that had been largely defeated during the counterinsurgency campaign of
the 1960s. Organized labor in Nicaragua barely existed, and the prospects
for a successful insurrection seemed remote. Yet business did feel increas
ingly threatened. The threat to the collective interests of business was not
posed by labor or popular groups, which were only weakly organized in
authoritarian Nicaragua, but by the regime itself. The heavy-handed use
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of public power for private gain and the fundamental corruption of the
judicial and legal systems undermined the predictability of the economic
system and cut into the resources of the private sector. Episodic forays
into different economic activities by members of the Somoza family or
close allies meant that the terrain open to private competitors was reduced
and uncertain. No business sector seemed immune to this threat, since
even those not currently menaced could become tomorrow's victims.
The simultaneous deterioration of the quasi-corporatist and clientelistic mechanisms that had linked the private sector to the state, and the
rising threat posed by a cleptocratic state elite, therefore, created circum
stances favorable for the consolidation of a business peak association,
co s ip moved timidly and uncertainly toward an increasingly oppositional
stance to the regime.
This peak association was the brainchild of in d e , a business-civic orga
nization that had been created in 1964. Reflecting the changes under way
in the economy and society, this association drew primarily from the
emerging urban bourgeoisie.38 Unlike so many private sector organiza
tions that developed at the behest of and under the protection of the state,
in d e was relatively separate from the regime. Instead of focusing exclu
sively on local issues, this organization was closely tied to international
organizations and foreign donors like u s a id and the Inter-American Foun
dation. This financial tie allowed it to obtain an element of independence
from the state (although not necessarily from its foreign donors) that had
eluded other private sector organizations.39
in d e acted as a political lobbyist for a reform sector of the bourgeoisie.
In contrast with the elite organizations established before it, in d e pro
moted a broader vision of private sector responsibilities and aspirations.
Inspired by the concept of noblesse oblige, in d e called the "most respon
sible citizens" to preserve the values of the free world while promoting
national development and social justice (in d e 1965, n.p.). This organi
zation was particularly active in promoting educational projects and a
self-help cooperative movement.40 It recruited a professional staff to sup
port its development projects and produced annual publications complete
with detailed financial accounting.
The creation of in d e and its efforts to influence the direction of
national development represented an important departure in the evo
lution of the private sector in Nicaragua. Through this organization, a
segment of the country's small bourgeoisie was shifting from narrow sec
toral activity toward broader class-based organization. Instead of focusing
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on particularistic interests of clusters of producers reacting to problems
with taxes or bank credit, this organization pushed producers toward
greater collective class awareness and broader concern about social and
economic development. Instead of fragmenting into regional groupings,
in d e functioned as the missing agglutinative, bringing economic elites
together across sectoral and regional lines. These characteristics allowed
in d e to inject an element of class coherence into the Nicaraguan political
system.41
The Uncertain Evolution of COSIP/COSEP

At the end of the 1960s, in d e headquarters began serving as an infor
mal gathering place in which leaders of private sector organizations could
discuss their collective political concerns. By 1972 the in d e leadership
moved to bring this array of sectoral leaders together in co s ip . This new
umbrella organization linked twelve established associations, including
most of the significant groups that had emerged in the previous twenty
years.42 Although the capacity of the organization to challenge the regime
was muted by the inclusion of several associations closely tied to the
Somozas, such as a s g a n ic , the Asociacion de Productores de Arroz de
Nicaragua, and the Camara Nicaraguense de la Industria Pesquera, the
most important affiliates, like in d e , were relatively independent from
the regime.43 Although functionally distinct from in d e , c o s ip operated
under in d e 's tutelage and direction.44
co s ip 's capacity to mobilize business opposition deepened appreciably
during its first year of operation. In the aftermath of the December 1972
earthquake in Managua, the Somoza regime's capacity for self-indulgence
and indifference to national needs was starkly revealed. The imposition of
a series of new emergency taxes, combined with the unrelieved suffering
resulting from the earthquake, the accelerated theft of relief assistance
by officials, and open profiteering by Somoza family members, led private
sector leaders to adopt a more critical attitude toward regime misman
agement and corruption. The rebuilding process triggered the expansion
of Somoza family businesses into growth industries—construction, real
estate, and banking—that had traditionally been the province of the domi
nant economic groups. Direct economic threat merged with a smoldering
sense of moral disdain to prompt elite intervention.
in d e /c o s ip leaders decided to organize a national conference to air
a series of their concerns. The Primera Convencion Nacional del Sec-
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tor Privado, held on March 1,1974, in the Teatro Nacional Ruben Dario,
was organized and led by some of c o s ip 's most prominent and articulate
affiliates. The keystone of the meeting was the session entitled "SocioEconomic Development Strategy in the 1970s" (in d e 1975), which cul
minated with a series of critical observations about the regime and rec
ommendations for change (Cruz 1974).
The convention's final resolution called for a political housecleaning
(cos ip 1974). This statement conceded the need for public order and rec
ognized the Somoza regime's efforts to maintain stability. It concluded,
however, that the "preservation of order" was not enough; state respon
sibilities extended beyond this. Private sector representatives proposed
"new joint efforts" (esfuerzos mancomunados) with the state to achieve
these broader objectives. They agreed to accept a new tax system that
would provide the state with increased resources if the state in turn would
undertake internal reform. The government was called on to apply the
law neutrally and use its revenues correctly (i.e., conduct public bidding
on state projects, adopt an auditing system, and document spending in
government accounts). Furthermore, the state would be required to cul
tivate a spirit of public service among its employees and eliminate the
expectation of bribery. The private sector further demanded the participa
tion of "genuinely designated" private sector representatives in state deci
sion making instead of representatives who were handpicked by Somoza.
Finally, the recommendations called for a program of effective economic
planning to address national needs in housing, public transportation, and
food and energy production. This state planning was to complement but
not interfere with private sector initiatives.
These demands were hardly visionary. As Vilas (1986,132) argues, "The
kind of state demanded by the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie was thus a modern
capitalist state that would efficiently fulfill its political-economic func
tions." In many ways, the co s ip meeting called for little more than the
rule of law and elite participation in decision making. Given the nature
of the Nicaraguan state, however, these demands would have required a
profound change in the regime.
c o s ip 's first conference was an unexpected public success. Initially,
organizers expected 500 people to attend, but attendance swelled to
around 2,000 (Ramirez Arango 1985, 253-54; La Prensa, March 1, 1974).
Observers came from the broader religious, academic, and political com
munity to listen to this unique discussion. Somoza, attending the final
session, left abruptly before the meeting concluded, signaling his distaste
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for the proceedings. No longer did the private sector present its position
wrapped in the unctuous courtesy and recurring honorifics that charac
terized its earlier communication with government officials. It was now
more direct, sharply critical, and increasingly insistent.
The formation of a national peak association, however, does not ensure
its durability or power. Durand (1991) found in the Peruvian case that the
first two business peak associations formed in the 1970s dissolved quickly
as a result of internal policy disputes. The process in which the bour
geoisie consolidates politically in spite of its divergent priorities and a
history of competition is often a gradual one that proceeds through several
phases. In the Nicaraguan case, after its initial success, co s ip faded into
the political background, in d e , which had been the prime mover behind
the formation of co s ip , stepped forward again as the direct negotiator
for the private sector. With an established institutional structure, a pro
fessional staff, and a budget that was relatively independent of the regime,
in d e became the stalwart of private sector opposition during the esca
lating conflicts of the 1970s. Public confrontation with the regime only
served to strengthen this organization, in d e 's membership rose rapidly
from 89 in 1974 to 523 in 1976 (in d e 1975,1977).
For its part, the Somoza regime grew increasingly intransigent. Losing
the political agility that had enabled Somoza Garcia to survive several
earlier challenges, the descendent regime now ignored public pressures
or responded with violence. Elections in 1974 renewed the presidency of
Anastasio Somoza Debayle, this time for a long, seven-year term. The
fledgling f s l n , then about 150 members strong, surprised the country
in December 1974 with an attack on a farewell party given by former
minister of agriculture Jose Maria "Chema" Castillo Quant for depart
ing U.S. Ambassador Turner Shelton. To get those taken hostage freed,
Somoza paid a $1 million ransom, published an f s l n communique, and
released Daniel Ortega and thirteen Sandinista supporters (Wheelock
Roman 1980a). Although initially giving the Sandinistas visibility and
new credibility, this incident led to the imposition of another round of
martial law. The dynasty's grip on the Nicaraguan state tightened, and
the prospects for institutional or structural reform dimmed further.
Conflicts between economic elites and the regime recurred through
the early 1970s. Cotton growers denounced the regime's alliance with
foreign buyers instead of Nicaraguan producers during conflicts over con
tract compliance.45 The cattle bourgeoisie challenged the exclusiveness
of a s g a n ic and the prices paid by the slaughterhouses dominated by
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the Somoza family. Although marginal adjustments were made by the
regime,46 elite dissatisfaction persisted.
Questions were increasingly raised about the basic political compe
tence of the regime as it proved unable to stem or deactivate the growing
mass insurgency. Repression was targeted at students and lower-income
groups, but relations with private sector elites also deteriorated. Rising
violence drew international attention to the repressive character of the
state, feeding a negative image of the regime and further undermining
private sector confidence. Following Somoza's heart attack in July 1977,
momentum built again for regime change. Martial law was suspended in
September upon Somoza's return to the country after a stay in a Miami
hospital, raising hopes for some political opening. Using that moment,
in d e leaders launched a public critique of the regime over the dramatic
increase in the foreign debt, continued delays in the reconstruction of
Managua, the inadequacies of the state energy agency e n a l u f , the poor
service provided by the state-run telephone company, corruption in the
Instituto Nicaraguense de Seguro Social, and the continued lack of repre
sentation of the private sector in many state agencies (ih c a 1978,1:31).
Still relying on traditional opposition tactics, in d e leaders turned again
in the fall of 1977 to the perennial notion of a dialogue. In the hope of
forming a new political accord, in d e called on Archbishop Miguel Obando
y Bravo to convene and direct a new Dialogo Nacional. At this stage, the
private sector lacked the skills and vision required for fuller innovation.
As Somoza stalled discussions, in d e was outflanked from the left by the
rise of the alternative elite group, Los Doce.47
This latter group was composed of twelve business, religious, and intel
lectual leaders who commanded considerable prestige both within Nica
ragua and internationally48 Organized by Sergio Ramirez, a novelist and
intellectual leader who had secretly joined the f s l n , this group repre
sented a more confrontational elite. Los Doce publicly expressed oppo
sition to another dialogue, noting that previous pacts had only served
to consolidate the dictatorship. With this opposition, momentum for a
dialogue dissipated by the year's end. The private sector became more
confrontational. The regime became increasingly isolated.
This isolation deepened profoundly with the assassination of Pedro
Joaquin Chamorro Cardenal. Chamorro came from an old elite family that
had placed four of its members in the Nicaraguan presidency before the
Somoza family took over Nicaraguan politics. The family was one of the
foremost representatives of the Conservative party in the country, and
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young Pedro Joaquin had inherited the role of opposition leader. In that
capacity he had endured periods of imprisonment, torture, and banish
ment under Somoza. Chamorro's family legacy, plus his position as editor
of the opposition daily La Prensa and leadership of u d e l , a multiparty
opposition movement, made him one of the most visible and intractable
opponents to the Somoza regime.49 His murder outraged many in the
business elite who regarded him as one of their own.
Private sector leaders moved now to make a forceful statement of
protest and directly confront the regime. Workers in several establish
ments had gone on strike after word of the assassination spread; the strike
momentum built when business leaders endorsed a walkout. On Janu
ary 26, sixteen days after Chamorro's death, seven major private sector
organizations formally endorsed a general strike and called on their mem
bers to close down (in d e 1980).
This action received broad support from employers and workers alike.
Although La Prensa's January 30, 1978, report of 80 percent participation
in the work stoppage (paro) may be influenced by the paper's position on
the issue, widespread participation is generally acknowledged. Business
activities in the Centro Comercial de Managua with its 200 shops came
to a standstill, and many factories on the industrial strip on the Carretera
Norte closed their doors. Most private banks closed, the workers at the
San Antonio sugar mill supported the strike, several cotton gins ceased
activity, a number of livestock and dairy producers in Boaco stopped de
livering their goods, and some members of the rice growers' Cooperativa
del Oriente slowed production (ih c a 1978,1:44-48).
When the government announced that employers supporting the
bosses' strike would have to pay their workers for missed days, the main
business associations issued communiques accepting this obligation and
insisting that the stoppage would last until Somoza left the presidency
(La Prensa, January 25,1978). The government then threatened retaliation.
The customs agency announced that it would suspend the import licenses
of all striking businesses. A few days later, in an effort to break the cohe
sion of the Camara de Comercio and the Camara de Industrias, the minis
ter of economy declared that businesses no longer needed to be members
of these organizations in order to obtain import licenses. Permission to
import would now be granted on a case-by-case basis following a careful
scrutiny of the activities of the firm (Novedades, January 26, 1978).
The minister of labor reported that any workers striking voluntarily
would be dismissed. The b c n mandated that all banks, public and pri
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vate, must stay open. State employees who honored the strike were to be
summarily fired (Novedades, January 26,1978). In spite of these pressures,
the stoppage continued. Finally breaking their historical pattern of nego
tiation with the state, the Camara de Comercio representatives refused
Somoza's invitation to meet with him at his retreat in Montelimar (La
Prensa, January 24,1978).
The number of private sector organizations endorsing the closedown
grew steadily to sixteen at the beginning of February. The strike helped to
sift out and reorganize the private sector, clarifying the lines of political
cleavage. In spite of the defection of several private sector groups that were
too closely tied to the regime or too detached from the political arena to
accept the risks, a series of other, small associations now joined with the
major groups in a deepening expression of private sector opposition to the
regime.50
The strike was not an immediate success. Somoza reportedly re
sponded: "As my father said, 'I'm not leaving, nor can they make me go'"
(Nj me voyni me van) (Novedades, January 28,1978). In the face of regime
intransigence, the private sector strike slowly fizzled. Leaders of the pri
vate sector then shifted gears. Former in d e president and agroindustrialist
Alfonso Robelo shepherded business affiliates into a new business-led
political party, the m d n . This organization was founded in March 1978
to unite Nicaragua's fractious traditional political parties behind private
sector leadership.
In their years of interaction with the regime, the private sector organi
zations had never developed a political organ of their own. Nor had they
much affinity for established political parties. In times of crisis they had
used their sectoral associations to represent their case before the regime;
more typically, they had simply drawn on personal contacts with regime
leaders. This absence of a business-backed political party gave the pri
vate sector leaders an appearance of political detachment and neutrality.
In some ways this appearance served their interests, immunizing them
against retaliation by the regime. In other ways, the absence of a rep
resentative party made it difficult for them to present a sustained and
coordinated response to regime initiatives. By 1978 these limitations were
increasingly clear.
By the time private sector leaders realized this need, however, the
leadership of the opposition was shifting away from them. Spontaneous
uprisings in places like Monimbo, military skirmishes, and mass-based
movements were gaining political ground. These mass movements took
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even the f s l n by surprise, and it rushed to organize the growing insur
gency. Repression by the national guard and populist promises by Somoza
restored a veneer of order by March 1978, but opposition groups operating
at the community level were beginning to gain momentum.
Encouraged by the popular uprising, the Sandinistas attempted to gain
leadership of the rebellion by boldly attacking the presidential palace in
August 1978, and another round of mass insurgency began. Five days after
this attack, a second general strike was called. This time the strike was
sponsored by the emerging political wing of the bourgeoisie, the f a o .51
The f a o had been created in May as a broad coalition of u d e l , Lo s Doce,
and the newly formed m d n . Seventy-five percent of Managua's business
establishments were reported to have joined the August strike (Booth
1985a, 165).
Again, the government responded with its own forms of pressure. On
the economic front, Roberto Incer Barquero, president of the b c n , issued
an advisory statement to the Consejo Nacional de Planificacion denounc
ing the private sector for "surrendering itself unconditionally" to political
groups that repudiated private property, for eroding the financial base of
the country, and for undermining the country's economic capacity. He rec
ommended that both foreign and domestic bank loans be made available
only to those firms that ignored the strike call and remained open; those
that closed were to be denied new credit and their old loans were to be
called in (memo, August 28,1978, published in Ogliastri-Uribe 1986, 1922). On the political front, hundreds of opposition leaders were arrested,
including leaders of the f a o .
In spite of this, the strike continued for almost a month. Business
leaders were increasingly inclined to make use of their economic powers
in opposing the regime. When a series of new taxes was passed in August
to increase the revenues for the war, both in d e and the Camara de Comer
cio urged a policy of nonpayment by their members (Booth 1985a, 165).
Business leaders also attempted to destabilize the regime by urging inter
national lenders to suspend further credits for the Somoza government
(in d e 1980).
This hostility spilled over into the bourgeoisie's investment and pro
duction decisions. After years of overall growth broken only by the 1972
earthquake, the Nicaraguan economy contracted by 7.2 percent in 1978
(c e pa l 1984). Among the numerous forces leading to this sharp decline
was the increasing economic withdrawal of the private sector. Production
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in the urban areas declined even more quickly than the national aver
age; in the secondary and tertiary sectors, output dropped by 12 percent
in 1978 (Spoor 1987, 3). The growing destruction unleashed by the war
caused business confidence to decline. Capital flight soared, reaching by
one account US$i .5 billion, at least $600 million of which was withdrawn
by private elites (Vilas 1986,137).
Somoza finally agreed to o a s mediation of the conflict in the fall of
1978. Predictably, OAS-sponsored mediation by the United States, Guate
mala, and the Dominican Republic of the talks between the government
and the f a o soon faltered and collapsed. Acting on cues from the f s l n ,
Los Doce representative Sergio Ramirez withdrew from the f a o on Octo
ber 25 and sought asylum in the Mexican embassy. Somoza's subsequent
rejection of a plebiscite ground the proceedings to a halt, and by the end
of the year, the mediation had completely broken down (Pastor 1987,10121). Several Latin American governments moved publicly into opposition
to Somoza, and even Carter administration officials cut back support
(Schoultz 1981, 62-63, 344-45; Pastor 1987,120-24).
By this point, however, the f s l n had taken clear leadership of the oppo
sition movement. Internal divisions among the Sandinistas, which had
fractured the f s l n into three hostile camps, were overcome in March
1979, and a coordinated military campaign to defeat the dictator advanced.
Having been tainted by their prolonged participation in the doomed me
diation efforts, established elites lost their claim to moral or political
leadership of the opposition. The private sector's role in the final phases
of the insurrection, while still important, became secondary to the main
action of the war.
Nonetheless, the last six months of the dictatorship were a time of
tremendous growth and political development for private sector organiza
tions. Confrontations with the dictatorship deepened, and new organiza
tions emerged. Cotton growers, who threatened not to plant in the coming
agricultural cycle when credit shortfalls at the banks disrupted their work,
were threatened with confiscation by the president of the b c n . Pressed to
address this problem, Somoza threatened to take over their land and "rent
it to the peasants" if the current producers left it idle (Navas Mendoza
et al. n.d.[b], 65-66.) Neither profits nor property were fully secure, and
the war continued to escalate.
Independent organizing among producers culminated in the creation
of u pa n ic in March 1979. At the outset, this organization drew together
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three core sectors: the cotton bourgeoisie, livestock sector dissidents, and
coffee producers. Representatives of these three groups formed the first
governing council of u pa n ic . Marcos Antonio Castillo Ortiz, a young
cotton producer from one of Leon's wealthier families, was elected to
the presidency (Minutes of the founding meetings, March 22, 1979 and
March 28, 1979). In the next several months, u pa n ic gradually incorpo
rated more associations and became an umbrella organization that united
a growing segment of the country's large- and medium-sized agricultural
producers. Affiliates came from the cotton, coffee, cattle, dairy products,
rice, sorghum, banana, and sugarcane subsectors.52 In May 1979 the brood
ing division in a s g a n ic came to a head, and the Somoza regime's last
major private sector affiliate split in two.53 In addition to the broad opposi
tion from industry and commerce, Somoza now faced a wall of opposition
in the crucial agricultural bourgeoisie.
By 1979 dozens of associations and their regional affiliates were moving
into the opposition, and the peak association formed in 1972 was reacti
vated. To facilitate coordination, co s ip leaders organized all participating
associations into one of seven sectoral chambers: in d e , c a d in , Camara
Nicaraguense de la Construccion, c o n a pr o , Confederation de Camaras
de Comercio de Nicaragua, u pa n ic , and Asociacion de Banqueros (which
was dissolved following bank nationalization in July 1979). c o s ip , now
renamed the Consejo Superior de la Empresa Privada (c o s e p ), was stream
lined and centralized. When the regime revoked the legal status of in d e
and the Camara de Comercio, c o s e p , which had never sought legal status,
continued to function. It now rejected Somoza's requests for dialogue and
joined the f s l n 's call for a national strike. The third and final strike began
on June 4, 1979, and lasted until the dynasty was overthrown.
On June 6, c o s e p issued a communique calling for the immediate
resignation of Somoza and the creation of a new government of national
unity. Eleven days after the j g r n was formed in Costa Rica, c o s e p issued
a statement formally recognizing it as the new government. Two repre
sentatives were sent to Costa Rica to make contact with the junta and
discuss its plan for governing (in d e 1979). After years of battles and con
frontations, organized economic elites finally broke with the regime and,
at the last hour, formally threw their support behind the new government.
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Conclusions

By the end of the 1970s the relationship that the Somoza regime had
fashioned with the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie was no longer acceptable to
growing portions of the elite. A policy of promoting growth, fragmenting
the private sector, and parceling out favors failed to satisfy an economic
elite that wanted a more predictable and efficient government. The eco
nomic model of the prerevolutionary era was out of sync with the needs
not only of the poor but even of relatively prosperous sectors. Increasingly,
emerging middle elites aspired to rule directly.
After five years of recurring confrontations with the regime, the private
sector in Nicaragua had gradually become more politically competent.
c o s e p was resuscitated and invigorated by the proliferation of new private
sector affiliates. In July 1979 private elites papered over their segmenta
tion with shared political purpose to endorse the ouster of the old regime.
With a hubris born of wealth, an exaggerated faith in the power and atten
tiveness of the United States, and failed imagination, these elites viewed
themselves as the natural heirs of the dynasty. As one business leader of
that era concluded, "The businessmen thought of the Sandinistas as their
peons. They thought they could put [the Sandinistas] in the field to take
care of the guard. Then they would step in and take over when Somoza
fell. If there was a problem, the United States would stop the Sandinistas
from taking power" (interview, August 6,1991).
Drawing on their new organizational strength, private sector leaders
began the task of developing a relationship with the incoming revolution
ary government. The Nicaraguan private sector entered the revolution
ary period better organized and more politically capable than it had ever
been. The years of private sector division and individualistic bargaining,
however, had a lingering effect. Fissures still lurked beneath the surface,
and the revolutionary regime drew on them. Some private elites, such
as u pa n ic 's first president, threw their lot with the Sandinistas. After
the ouster of Somoza, these businesspeople took positions in the Sandi
nista government. Other private elites took a contingent position, aligning
with the government at the beginning but soon moving to the opposition.
Private sector representatives in the governing junta—Alfonso Robelo,
former president of in d e , c o s ip , and the m d n , and Violeta Barrios de
Chamorro, widow of slain La Prensa editor Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, for
example—joined the government but resigned after only nine months.
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Finally, many private elites viewed the new regime with suspicion. Sev
eral of the most prominent elites emigrated, following their capital to the
United States. Those who stayed soon secured the leadership of c o s e p and
its attendant associations and turned those organizations into the leading
opponents of the revolutionary government.

chapter

Revolutionary Transition and the
Bourgeoisie (1979-1986)
One has to raise theoretically the question of whether the bourgeoisie
could just simply produce, without power; if it can limit itself as a class
to a productive role. That is, can the bourgeoisie limit itself to making
use of the means of production and using these in order to live, not as
instruments of power, not to impose itself on others. I believe that this
is possible in Nicaragua.
—Jaime Wheelock Roman, El gran desafio
The Sandinistas needed private enterprise like a zoo needs a gorilla.
—Large cattle rancher, August 6,1991
The Nicaraguan bourgeoisie, like all bourgeoisies, are pigs. They are
interested only in their own well-being. All they want is to take money
out of the country, change it into dollars, send their sons and daughters
abroad. They are rootless. They have no ties to the country.
—Former m id in r a vice-minister, November 2,1990

Vision, Views, and Deeds

In the years after the f s l n came to power, the relationship between
the revolutionary government and most of the traditional economic elite
was punctuated with hostility. Expropriations undercut the elite's hold
on resources. Those producers who avoided expropriation faced a maze
of bureaucratic controls that, many claimed, turned them into an "ad
ministrative bourgeoisie." Private investment plummeted, and produc
tion levels followed suit, c o s e p became the regime's prime domestic
adversary.
Yet during the same period, many private producers started new eco
nomic ventures. Throughout the country, businesspeople benefited from
heavily subsidized credit from the state-owned banks. The state provided
agricultural inputs ranging from fertilizer to tractors at prices that were
only a fraction of their international costs. Staples producers sharply in63
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creased output in response to state subsidies for domestic consumption.
The Sandinista-sponsored u n a g launched a membership drive that re
cruited even medium- and large-sized producers. An array of joint ven
tures and service contracts were negotiated between the state and more
audacious private elites.
Competing images of the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie—as a beleaguered
class on the threshold of extinction at the hands of orthodox MarxistLeninists, and as a protected class that benefited disproportionately from
state development initiatives—continue to complicate the interpretation
of the Nicaraguan revolution. For analysts like Nolan (1984) and Bugajski (1990), the f s l n 's early links with Marxism profoundly shaped the
ideology and practice of the revolution. Says Bugajski (1990, 1), "Sandi
nista domestic policies provide a valuable laboratory and a largely acces
sible case study of how a Marxist-Leninist system is imposed and adapted
in a developing country." Careful analysis by country specialists (Vilas
1986; Booth 1985a; T. Walker 1985; Conroy and Pastor 1988), on the other
hand, casts doubt on the appropriateness of the Marxist-Leninist label.
Arguing that the Nicaraguan revolution was "more anti-oligarchic than
anticapitalist," Vilas (1986, 265, 268) defines the experience as a "popular,
agrarian, and national liberation revolution, more than a proletarian or
socialist one."
Close observation of the revolution reveals an array of concessions for
the bourgeoisie interspersed with punitive batterings that defy simplis
tic interpretation. One productive way to integrate different threads of
the experience is to unpack the concepts of ideology and behavior and to
approach both in dynamic terms. Andres Perez (1992) suggests a useful
analytical framework by differentiating between "pure ideology," which
emphasizes a coherent worldview, and "ideology in use," which serves as
a more direct guide to action. We might pursue the distinction by further
differentiating between the ontology or broad philosophical moorings of
revolutionary ideologues (vision), the more specific views and predilec
tions of the leadership rooted in their concrete experiences (views), and
the actual behavior of state elites in which such factors as resource re
straints, established alliances, and habits play a role (deeds).
This chapter explores the interplay between the vision, views, and
deeds of Sandinista leaders during the revolutionary transition in the
opening years of the revolution (1979-86). It charts the rise of a statist
model that centered the economy in the state sector, the inroads made
into the resources of the traditional economic elite, and the regime's
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efforts to differentiate among sectors of the capitalist class in its quest for
intersectoral allies and control.
Revolutionary Transition and State Expansion

The f s l n came to power in 1979 committed to the development of a
mixed economy in which a private sector would continue to play a role.
What that role would be was a matter of sustained dispute. For much of
the f s l n leadership, the private sector's role was initially conceived as
a limited one that would become less important over time. Yet several
forces pushed the regime to retain a substantial private elite in spite of
its reservations. Grudging recognition of the role some economic elites
had played in the ouster of Somoza slowed the new regime's opposition.
The extensive economic losses associated with the insurrection and con
cern about further erosion of national production also contributed to the
decision to leave much of the bourgeoisie in place. The desire to avoid
and, subsequently, blunt U.S. opposition, and to maintain political and
material support from Western Europe, Canada, and Japan, served as a
deterrent to precipitous antibourgeoisie action. The class extraction and
family ties of some f s l n leaders may have also made them reluctant to
move against the bourgeoisie.1 A whole series of historical and political
factors that were closely tied to the Nicaraguan context contributed to
the Sandinista revolution's curious and fluctuating economic amalgam.
Although unwilling to move definitively against private sector elites,
the f s l n leadership was ideologically committed to blunting their eco
nomic and social power. In the emerging revolutionary vision, the stateowned Area of People's Property displaced the private sector as the centerpiece of the national economy. The new government's first economic plan
concluded: "The new State which is being constructed will be converted
into the axis of the reactivation process and the transition toward the
New Economy that our Fatherland needs" (m ipl a n 1980, 22). f s l n leader
and minister of planning Henry Ruiz concluded that the a pp "is the cen
tral axis, the most dynamic mechanism in the revolution's economic and
social transformations" (Ruiz 1980,15). In the emerging economic model,
the state now became the "centre of accumulation" (Irvin 1983).
The newly formed state enterprises would not only absorb a growing
proportion of the nation's workforce but would generate the surplus with
which to finance the transformation of the country. The private sector, on
the other hand, would play a subordinate role. As junta member and sub-
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sequent f s l n vice-president Sergio Ramirez Mercado (1982, 83) explained:
"The mixed economy should take as its starting point the harmonious
and delimited insertion of the private economy within the great strategic
flow of the Area of People's Property."
The initial expropriations allowed the government to begin pursuing
this set of goals. The day after the j g r n assembled to replace the collaps
ing dynasty all of the property of the Somoza family military officers, and
high-ranking functionaries who had left the country was confiscated (De
cree #3, July 20, 1979).2 The result was a distinctive nationalization pro
cess. Unlike the Mexican case, in which the revolutionary regime slowly
constructed a parastate sector over several decades and transferred expro
priated land to ejidos, the Sandinistas moved quickly to develop a large
public sector under direct state control. Unlike the Chilean case, where
the state sector expanded rapidly but each nationalization was the sub
ject of intense contestation, the Sandinistas began their revolution with
consensual support for sweeping expropriations. As a result, the Sandi
nista state quickly acquired a considerable chunk of the economy without
extreme polarization, as least at the outset.
Confiscations in the first years provided the state with 1.6 million mz.
of farmland, roughly 20 percent of the nation's total, 78 percent of which
was in estates larger than 500 mz. (c ie r a 1989,1:293). In addition to the
roughly 1,200 estates that were acquired, the regime also took over five of
the nation's six sugar mills, three of its four slaughterhouses, the whole
tobacco industry, dairy plants, rice mills, cotton gins, coffee processing
facilities, and a host of other agroindustrial activities owned by former
Somoza affiliates (Mayorga 1990, 8). Foreign-owned mines were appropri
ated, as were a welter of other businesses and industries owned by Somoza
allies. Following the transfer of these and other resources to the state, pub
lic sector production expanded from around 15 percent of GDP in 1978 to
36 percent in 1980 (Ruccio 1987, 64-65).
The Sandinista state also gained control of the nation's financial appa
ratus (Enriquez and Spalding 1987). The large private banks that had
evolved since the 1950s had been bankrupted during the insurrection.
Bank managers and major depositors had spirited their capital out of the
country as the fighting heated up; borrowers who had taken out loans in
the relative calm of early 1979 were either unable or unwilling to repay
them. Only a handful of the smaller financial institutions in the country
had avoided complete collapse. When the state took over the devastated
financial system and assumed responsibility for its operations, there were
few initial complaints.

Revolutionary Transition

The most controversial of the early reforms was the establishment of
a string of state trading monopolies.3 These operations were designed to
replace the open trading system that had roused controversy in the late
Somoza era. In the cotton sector, for example, the local and international
export houses that had bought and sold Nicaraguan cotton in the pre-1979
period were replaced by a new state monopoly, e n a l (Nunez Soto 1981,
47; Biondi-Morra 1990, 329). Although this new restraint on free trade was
controversial, especially with larger private producers, it garnered sup
port from some producers who welcomed its price stabilization aspects
(Sequeira 1981,124-33). The commitment of these firms to use surpluses
that were generated when export prices were high in order to bolster pay
ments when export prices dropped made some producers who had been
battered by wild price fluctuations in the 1970s initially sympathetic to
this project.
These first steps delivered a heavy blow to the traditional bastions of
economic power in Nicaragua. The disarticulation of the top economic
groups through the takeover of the financial and export sectors left the
remnant of the bourgeoisie yet more dispersed and directionless. The
leadership of the bourgeoisie was initially seized by the sector of the eco
nomic elite that had been most steadfastly anti-Somoza and had forged
tenuous ties to the f s l n . Several prominent business elites who had en
dorsed the insurrection were given highly visible positions in the revolu
tionary government. Not only was Alfonso Robelo, the young manager of
a foreign-owned cooking oil company and former c o s e p president, named
to the first j g r n , but c o s e p was given a quota of seats (five of the original
thirty-three) in the newly formed legislative body, the Consejo de Estado
(Booth 1985a, 191-93). At all levels, prominent members of the business
community were inserted into the government, from corporate lawyers
in the cabinet to major landholders in the municipal councils. Business
leaders also took on jobs in the rapidly expanding bureaucracy, working
side-by-side with both Sandinista militants and lower- to mid-level offi
cials from the Somoza government who remained in the country.
This visible presence of local and national economic elites in the gov
ernment was a source of consolation to fearful producers. Assurances by
people like Robelo that the Sandinistas were not communists held down
the exodus of elites after the revolution. Some business leaders who had
fled the country during the fighting even returned to sniff the air.
Soon, however, tensions began to rise. A scant nine months after the
ouster of Somoza, Robelo and Violeta Barrios de Chamorro resigned from
the junta. As the locus of political power shifted increasingly toward
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the nine-man national directorate of the f s l n and away from the more
broadly based j g r n , these representatives of the bourgeoisie were steadily
marginalized. Sectors of the elite, who had expected to direct the revolu
tionary government, now saw the regime taking a decidedly more radical
direction than they had anticipated, and they were powerless to stop it.
Chamorro resigned first, in April 1980, ostensibly for health reasons; her
subsequent criticisms of the regime revealed an underlying political oppo
sition. Robelo, who had weathered several skirmishes with the f s l n over
the political content of the literacy campaign and the electoral calendar,
resigned four days later, denouncing the planned expansion of the Con
sejo de Estado to include additional Sandinista-sponsored organizations.
These defections signaled the fraying of the relationship with the reform
bourgeoisie as they began to recognize the subordinate position they had
been assigned in the revolution.
Seven months later, u pa n ic president Jorge Salazar, who had entered
into a counterrevolutionary conspiracy to divide the military and topple
the regime, was killed by Sandinista state security amid allegations of gun
running. Salazar became a martyr for the business elite, and the relation
ship deteriorated further. The alliance between the private sector and the
government did not unravel completely at this time, however, due in part
to the intervention of U.S. Ambassador Lawrence Pezullo. U.S. officials
still hoped to moderate the revolution by keeping some of the bourgeoisie
on board (Pastor 1987, 211-12).
Tightening the Vise: The Critique of the Bourgeoisie

Revolutions are commonly shaped by internal conflicts between feud
ing camps. Radicals are suspicious of moderates, and both wrangle with
the revolution's conservative wing.4 These divisions may be held in
check through the efforts of a strong, dominant leader or an ideologically
grounded and cohesive revolutionary political party. At the outset both
were missing in Nicaragua.
Since at least the mid-1970s the f s l n has been an internally variegated,
factionalized organization (Hodges 1986, 218-55 ).5 Although reunification
agreements and military victory in 1979 helped the organization to con
geal, internal tensions remained. Furthermore, the f s l n did not have a
monopoly over the Nicaraguan government; it governed in coalition with
non-Sandinista reformers. The government papered over these differences
in typical Nicaraguan style with agreements that gave something to all
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sides. The presence in the f s l n leadership of people who had differing
priorities, combined with the vagueness of the principles endorsed by the
revolution and the inclusion of non-Sandinista reformers in high-level
positions, undermined the cohesiveness of the revolutionary government.
Pushing for greater coherence, the Sandinista government moved dur
ing the first year to replace conciliation figures in the cabinet with mem
bers of the f s l n national directorate and to fill the Consejo de Estado
with representatives of the newly formed, pro-Sandinista mass organiza
tions.6 Tensions, however, remained, both within the f s l n and within
the government apparatus. Top and mid-level Sandinistas understood the
revolution in different ways, as did many of those in government who
were not Sandinistas. Most of the lower-level positions in the government
were occupied by holdovers from the Somoza period who could not be
replaced because of the scarcity of trained professionals in the country.
In spite of these obfuscating features, the dominant trends in the emerg
ing ideology soon became clear. Analysis of internal documents, speeches,
and policies indicates that, from the beginning, the f s l n leadership re
garded the bourgeoisie as an adversary. In the first national meeting of
the national directorate and the Assembly of the Cadre on September 2125, *979, only two months after the new government was formed, the
"sell-out bourgeoisie" (burguesia vendepatria] was at the top of the list
of groups that threatened the revolution.7 Not all members of the eco
nomic elite were included under this rubric, but the concept had a broad
sweep. From the standpoint of the f s l n , threats were posed not only by
the residue of the Somoza dynasty or the traditional financial oligarchy
of the b a n a m e r and b a n ic groups but by "the reactionary commercial
and industrial sector which has not entered the financial oligarchy but
which has played a leadership role in the private sector" and "the layer
of the agricultural bourgeoisie that tries to establish alliances with the
peasantry intending to create a counterrevolutioary social base" (f s l n
1990b, 91).
The election of Ronald Reagan to the U.S. presidency in November
1980, followed less than two weeks later by the Salazar incident, exacer
bated the growing tensions. The steady hostility that Reagan displayed
toward the Sandinistas in his campaign rhetoric, and the historical lessons
learned from observing how the United States undermined revolution in
Guatemala and Chile, fueled the fear of an impending military interven
tion. Whatever tendency the f s l n leaders had toward "verticalism" or
centralization of power8 left over from their experience as guerrilla leaders
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or their political training in socialist countries was quickly reinforced by
the threat of a U.S.-backed counterrevolution. The results were tightened
internal controls, even in the midst of gestures of moderation.
In spite of the Forum for Dialogue held with private sector leaders in
early 1981, the relationship with the economic elite generally deteriorated
(Winson 1985; Sholk 1984; Gilbert 1985). A series of developments at
tested to the rift. First, recruitment efforts by u pa n ic , the newly formed
organization of agricultural producers, were undermined with the forma
tion of an FSLN-backed competitor. The establishment of u n a g in April
1981, under the leadership of f s l n militants, usurped the position of
u pa n ic as the sole national producer organization in the countryside.
Affiliates in cooperatives and small-scale producers, who had been in
corporated into u pa n ic associations through the organizational work of
leaders like Jorge Salazar, were now drawn into a competitor organization
closely linked to the f s l n .9
Second, the government began a series of urban and rural confiscations
that went beyond the original Somoza holdings. On the second anniver
sary of the revolution, junta leader Daniel Ortega announced the confis
cation of fifteen major urban enterprises on the charge of "decapitaliza
tion." 10 After months of tightening up on sharecropping and land rental
by large landowners, the government also decreed an agrarian reform law
(Decreto #782, July 19, 1981). This new measure gave the government
legal authorization to expropriate idle, underutilized, or rented land on
estates larger than 500 mz. in the Pacific region of the country and 1,000
mz. elsewhere.11
Finally, a testy Sandinista leadership, put on edge by deepening U.S.
involvement in the contra war and growing private sector hostility, esca
lated a war of words with bourgeois leaders. Defense Minister Humberto
Ortega, from the moderate Tercerista wing of the f s l n , bristled: "If they
[those who consciously or unconsciously assist the plans of imperialism]
do not mature, if they do not join the defense effort, when aggression
comes they will be the first to be hanged along the roads and highways
of the nation" (Nuevo Diario, October 10,1981). Taking this as a personal
threat against dissenters like themselves, c o s e p leaders issued a commu
nique distributed to the international press. They warned of the prepara
tion of a "new genocide" in Nicaragua targeted against those who exercise
the "right to dissent" and concluded, "We identify an unmistakable ideo
logical line of a Marxist-Leninist tendency [corte] that is confirmed in the
discourse of members of the national directorate" (c o s e p letter to Daniel
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Ortega Saavedra, October 19, 1981). Charged with threatening national
security, signatories to the document were arrested and imprisoned, and
c o s e p became the political archrival of the Sandinista revolution.12 By the
end of 1981 the bourgeoisie's role in the revolution was widely understood
to be limited. The campaign against the bourgeoisie was not narrowly tar
geted against specific opponents but broadened to raise tough questions
about the class as a whole.
In capitalist countries, business elites are often accorded a certain ideo
logical or even moral authority. This occurs because economic elites have
been successful in promulgating the belief that the general prosperity of
the society results from their entrepreneurial activities. The perceived
ability of the private sector to create jobs, growth, and prosperity affords it
considerable political authority and ideological clout. In the Nicaraguan
case, however, the bourgeoisie had failed historically to provide for gen
eralized prosperity or even a clear future promise of it. Pervasive poverty
made it difficult for the local elite to claim that they had played a socially
constructive role or that their economic freedom was a prerequisite for
rapid national development. From the standpoint of the f s l n leadership,
the bourgeoisie had been given the opportunity to develop the country
under the Somoza regime, and they had failed in this historic mission.
Speaking at the second anniversary celebration, f s l n national directorate
member Tomas Borge (1982, 134) pursued the point with rhetorical flare:
"What have [the unpatriotic businessmen] done for Nicaragua? They made
it into a rubbish heap, into a lake of blood, into a valley of tears. Because
they didn't teach the people to read and write. Because they did noth
ing for the health of the people. Because they took this country, which
because of its natural resources should have been a paradise, and kept it
backward and miserably poor."
The f s l n 's concept of national unity, which had initially embraced
the local bourgeoisie, underwent gradual modification. The 1981 strate
gic planning document of c ie r a , m id in r a 's research arm, describes the
narrowing of this concept over three stages (c ie r a 1989, 1:45-154). Dur
ing the insurrection (1977—79), national unity was defined broadly to in
clude all except that sliver of the bourgeoisie that was directly linked to
Somoza or the nation's key financial institutions. Agricultural and indus
trial elites, including even large landowners [terratenientes], were culti
vated by the f s l n in order to isolate and defeat the dictatorship (c ie r a
1989,1:47). In the second phase (1979-81), an effort was still made to win
over the local bourgeoisie in order to reconstruct the country and have

71

^1fcj

Table 3.1

Projected Participation of Property Sectors in Agricultural Production (Percent)
Total Agricultural Area
Property Sector
APP
CAS
CCS

Large estates
Small and
medium estates
Total
Area (mzs.)
Source:

me d a

Irrigated Area

Production Value

1981-82

1990

2000

1982

1990

2000

1980-82

1990

2000

18.30
1.30
13.60
12.00

22.29
11.75
17.85
9.36

27.40
25.10
23.30
6.00

40.60
—
—
54.00

54.90
10.30
9.00
24.00

57.70
10.90
9.90
18.50

16.00
2.60
18.00
14.00

23.00
11.00
16.00
10.00

30.00
20.00
20.00
5.00

54.80
100.00
7,953,861

37.75
99.00
9,124,280

18.20
100.00
10,777,856

5.40
100.00
76,492

1.80
100.00
262,461

3.00
100.00
409,774

49.40
100.00

(1983), from c ie r a (1989,1:157,161).

40.00 25.00
100.00 100.00
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the time to build up key revolutionary institutions like the armed forces
and the state farm sector (c ie r a 1989,1:50-51).
The third phase, which was to begin in 1982, would introduce a "new
policy of national unity" that would "neutralize the bourgeoisie." "Neu
tralize," according to the new strategy, "does not mean eliminating the
bourgeoisie but to differentiate it, divide it and weaken it as a class." Five
strata of the bourgeoisie were now identified, ranging from the "decapi
talizing" and "counterrevolutionary" sectors to a sector that "invests and
risks its own capital" (c ie r a 1989,1:75,76). If private elites could accom
modate themselves to the new logic of revolution, those who continued
producing without draining state resources or increasing their profit mar
gins could fit into the scheme as subordinate partners; the others, pre
sumably, would not.
Perhaps the most important policy planning statement issued in the
early years was m id in r a 's Marco Estrategico del Desarrollo Agropecuario
or m e d a , which was completed in 1983 (m id in r a 1989, 155-230). After
years of debate and ideological tussling, the members of m id in r a 's frac
tious directing team (Equipo de Conduction) came together and drafted a
program of strategies and priorities that, it was envisioned, would guide
policy development to the year 2000. This document was embraced by
m id in r a Minister Jaime Wheelock, who lobbied for and secured its en
dorsement by the f s l n 's national directorate. In the absence of any com
peting, long-term national development plan, this m id in r a document
served as the main expression of the regime's economic vision.
According to this plan, the large landowners were destined to play an
increasingly marginal role in the national economy. The portion of agri
cultural land held in private estates larger than 500 mz. was projected to
drop from 12 percent in 1981—82 to only 6 percent in the year 2000; this
sector's contribution to the value of agricultural production would drop
still more, from an average of 14 percent in 1980-82 to only 5 percent at
the end of the century. (See Table 3.1.) Even small- and medium-sized indi
vidual producers would experience an erosion as they were nudged into
cooperatives. The landholdings of small- and medium-sized producers
were projected to decline from an estimated 55 percent of the farmland in
1981—82 to 18 percent in the year 2000, with their contribution to national
production falling by almost half.
Private owners were to be gradually replaced by new sectors nurtured
by the revolutionary regime. Determining who, exactly, would replace
the declining private elite was a matter of some controversy.
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The New Economic Model: APPistas versus Campesinistas

To design the new economic approach, models of other socialist states
were scrutinized to see how the land and ownership questions had been
variously resolved (see, for example, c ie r a 1989,1: 110-22). The two com
peting models were those that emphasized either the centrality of state
farms, favored by the APPistas, or the preeminence of agricultural coopera
tives, pushed by early campesinistas13 Sandinista planning documents re
viewed cases in each camp, and the internal debate within Nicaragua mir
rored the debate that had taken place more broadly in the socialist world.
The line of argument that took an early and sustained lead emphasized
the centrality of state enterprises. The pro-statist camp passed through
two phases in the first years of the revolution. Initially, emphasis was
placed on reactivating and increasing production in the factories, firms,
and farms that had been confiscated from the Somozas and their allies.
By 1983, attention shifted from building on extant infrastructure to con
structing new state agricultural and agroindustrial projects using long
term planning and sophisticated technologies.
Ironically, three normally divergent groups (socialist technocrats,
ardent fans of advanced capitalist technology, and nationalist develop
mentalists of the e c l a school) converged in their support for a central
ized, high-tech state model. For some policymakers, the experience and
apparent success of the economic model in revolutionary Cuba argued
for an emphasis on modern, state-run farms. As a former m id in r a viceminister explained, "Cuba was our closest reference point" (interview,
August 17, 1991). Through a powerful demonstration effect and direct
planning support, the Cuban model had a significant influence on the
economic vision that emerged in Nicaragua. Cuba's impressive accom
plishments in both the development of advanced technologies and the
eradication of grinding poverty made a forceful impact on Sandinista
policymakers. At the invitation of the Sandinistas, Cuban planners played
important advisory roles in the development of pivotal agroindustrial
projects like the t im a l sugar mill/energy project and the Chiltepe dairy
project.14
The inspiration for large state enterprises was not, however, purely
socialist. Managerial centralism and large-scale operations were forceful
trends in capitalist economies as well. Several Sandinista policymakers
were heavily influenced by their experience with advanced Western tech
nology and their role in managing sophisticated, large-scale private busi-
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nesses in Nicaragua. At the vice-ministerial level of m id in r a , for ex
ample, several Sandinista functionaries had cut their administrative teeth
at is a in the prerevolutionary period.15 is a was not only, at that time, the
largest sugar mill in Central America, but it was also at the center of a net
work of related industrial and commercial operations.16 Convinced that
the weak entrepreneurial impulse in much of the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie
made it a poor candidate for major development initiatives, these highlevel functionaries moved to fill the gap with state entrepreneurs who
would oversee the development of a vast network of state firms. Intense
lobbying efforts for this kind of state capitalist model found sympathetic
support within both m id in r a and, eventually, other ministries involved
in making economic policy.
Not only in Nicaragua but throughout much of Latin America the
image of the state firm as the centerpiece in the industrialization process
was well established through the dissemination of the e c l a model in the
1960s and i 97o s (e c l a 195i ,- Furtado 1976).The intervention of an activist
state that fosters increased production and rapid industrialization through
various policies, including, in some circumstances, the creation of state
enterprises, was generally consistent with e c l a prescriptions. Variants
of this model were employed in the Latin American countries, such as
Mexico and Brazil, that had grown rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s, ac
counting for much of the appeal of the model. According to some analysts,
therefore, the e c l a model, rather than Cuban socialism or managerial
capitalism, provided the central conceptual inspiration for the Sandinista
transformation (Conroy 1984; Conroy and Pastor 1988). The Nicaraguan
model in this early period differed from other structuralist programs in its
more emphatic hostility to pure market forces and its deeper ambivalence
toward its own private sector. For some analysts and policymakers, how
ever, this difference was largely one of degree. The parallels between the
state-centered approach being developed in Nicaragua and that endorsed
elsewhere in the region lent further intellectual and theoretical support
to the experience.
To summarize, the development of large-scale state enterprises, at first
justified by the infrastructure and technological integration of the proper
ties inherited from the Somoza family, was subsequently supported with
an array of economic rationales. Although not entirely in agreement about
the role of the private sector, most economic policymakers endorsed an
economic model that centered on high-tech, state-owned corporations.
This vision of the state emerged clearly from program statements of
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the era. According to the 1983 m e d a , where the long-range structural
vision of the revolution was most clearly sketched, the state sector was
to continue expanding through the year 2000, when it was projected to
control 27 percent of the farmland in Nicaragua, up from 18 percent in
1981-82. (See Table 3.1.) Furthermore, the state sector was projected to
dominate the country's most productive land, with its control over the
country's irrigated land rising from 41 percent of the total in 1982 to 58
percent in the year 2000 (m id in r a 1989,161). Its contribution to agricul
tural production was expected to almost double, rising from 16 percent in
1980-82 to 30 percent of the production value at the end of the century.
Indeed, in the first two years after the revolution, the a pp property
did continue to expand, even without the benefit of new agrarian reform
legislation, through continued land invasions and a program of compactacion or land takeovers to smooth the geographical boundaries of state
farms. Following the agrarian reform decree in 1981, the portion of agri
cultural land under a pp control increased from an estimated 20 percent
of the total farmland in 1980 to 24 percent in 1981 (Deere et al. 1985, 79).
Land expropriated under this law was initially retained by the state sector,
as m id in r a waited for evidence that the emerging cooperatives would
consolidate into stable organizations.17
The state's financial and organizational resources were funneled
heavily into the a pp enterprises. Agricultural credit, for example, went
disproportionately to this sector. Whereas it held only 20 percent of the
farmland in 1983 (Deere et al. 1985, 79), the a pp received 43 percent of
all agricultural credit that year (c ie r a 1989,1:318). Agricultural machin
ery was also heavily concentrated in the state sector. Data for 1984, for
example, indicate that the state sector had acquired 62 percent of the
country's tractors and 71 percent of the harvesters (c ie r a 1989,1:353).
Some of the initial enthusiasm for the state farms was dampened as
evidence mounted of their weak economic performance. By 1982 the state
farms were experiencing clear difficulties; 47 percent of their bank obli
gations were already more than ninety days overdue. This delinquency
prompted the first debt clearing (saneamiento] for the a pp in 1983, in
which around one-third of the debt was forgiven and the rest was re
structured as long-term loans (Biondi-Morra 1990, 282, 283). According
to Biondi-Morra (1990, 103, 136-41), between 1982 and 1985, two-thirds
of the a pp enterprises had losses, with deficits continuing in most plants
even after the 1983 saneamiento.
Multiple factors contributed to the inability of the state enterprises to
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generate surpluses, ranging from the "historic vacation" taken by workers
who reduced their workday to as little as three hours a day,18 to the over
valued cordoba that, in spite of low-cost imports and subsidized credit,
ultimately eroded the profitability of the agroexport products that most
state farms were cultivating (Biondi-Morra 1990,136-41,, to the extreme
pressures placed on the state farms to raise production and participate
in state development projects, regardless of the costs involved (BiondiMorra 1990, 295-304), to the priority given to the political objectives of
the state farm sector over the objectives of production and profitability
(Colburn 1990,130). These problems helped Sandinista activists in the op
posing camp to push for a shift from the state farm emphasis toward more
attention for the peasantry.
Campesinistas, located primarily in c ie r a , m id in r a 's agrarian re
form research arm, advocated more accelerated land redistribution and the
more equitable parceling out of state resources. Initially, the campesinista
camp was most enthused about the development of the fully collectivized
cooperatives (c a s ). The formation of credit and service cooperatives (ccs)
among current small- and medium-sized landowners was envisioned pri
marily as an interim step in the development of collectivized holdings. By
1983 the pro-peasant camp was able to secure a planning commitment for
the allocation of 25 percent of the farmland to the c a s and 23 percent to
the ccs by the year 2000. (See Table 3.1.) Nor was this simply a planning
projection,- the area organized into cooperatives actually did increase over
time. The c a s sprang from nothing to occupy almost 9 percent of the agri
cultural land, and the ccs reorganized private holdings into cooperatives
on over n percent of the land by 1988. (See Table 3.2.) m id in r a pushed
its regional directors hard to locate land for redistribution and sent teams
into each region to sustain the pressure on regional officials. The number
of cooperatives rose, reportedly reaching 3,160 with 71,539 members in
1988, up from 2,849 with 65,820 members in 1982 (Mayorga 1990,15 )•
These cooperatives were extremely fragile, however, and tended to dis
integrate quickly. As the contra war heated up, pressure for increased
allocation of credit to these cooperatives, in order to make participation
more attractive and bolster these frail institutions, resulted in some shift
of bank credit. By 1986, 44 percent of agricultural credit was channeled to
the coops and small producers affiliated with the credito rural program
(c ie r a 1989,1:318).
This relative increase in attention to the peasant sector, however, failed
to dislodge the state sector from its preeminent position. The land held
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Table 3.2

Land Distribution by Strata and Tenancy (Mz. and Percent)
Sector
Private
Farms

>500 mz.
200-500 mz.
50-200 mz.
10-50 mz.
<10 mz.
Credit and service coops (ccs)

1988

1984

1978

Area

%

Area

%

8,073.0 100.0
2,920.0 36.2
1,311.0 16.2
2,431.0 30.1
1,241.0 15.4
2.1
170.0
0.0
0.0

5,929.5
1,025.7
1,021.0
2,391.0
560.5
127.0
804.3

73.4
12.7
12.6
29.6
6.9
1.6
10.0

6,419.8
604.8
1,090.2
2,295.6
1,323.1
188.6
917.5

79.5
7.5
13.5
28.4
16.4
2.3
11.4

Area

%

Production coops (c a s )

0.0

0.0

626.6

7.8

705.0

8.7

State farms (a pp )

0.0

0.0

1,516.9

18.8

948.2

11.7

8,073.0 100.0

8,073.0

99.9

Total

8,073.0 100.0

Source: Wheelock Roman (1990,115, table 7).

in the a pp sector did decline after 1983 when the state began to pare
down the size of the state sector and reallocate some a pp properties to
cooperatives and small producers. As Table 3.2 indicates, the portion of
the nation's farmland in the a pp sector declined from 18.8 percent in
1984 to 11.7 percent in 1988. In spite of these trends, the state sector re
mained central and, in some ways, was enhanced during this phase of the
revolution.
Care was exercised to retain the core of the state farm system. A
m id in r a study of the area ceded between 1984 and 1986 concluded that
71 percent of the land divested by state farms had not been under cultiva
tion.19 According to one former m id in r a director who had been in charge
of m id in r a operations in three different regions, the state farms gener
ally trimmed off land that was less valuable due to its distance from the
road system or its lack of infrastructure (interview, October 30, 1990).20
Commenting on the a pp divestment process, one mid-level m id in r a
employee concluded that regional directors were "giving the coops land
around the periphery of the a pp farms in order to have a readily available
labor force for the a pp harvest" (interview, August 6,1991 ).21 Not only did
the a pp retain the best of its lands, but it also tended to siphon off many
of the best-trained ministry personnel, complicating the development and
implementation of programs for the peasantry.
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APP and the Grandes Proyectos

In addition to giving continued attention to the existing state farms,
the regime launched a whole new series of state investment projects.22
The initial plan in the m e d a for the grandes proyectos13 envisioned the
creation of thirteen large-scale agroindustrial projects (m id in r a 1989,
227). Included were projects like lumber mills, a sugar mill, a cotton gin,
and milk and fruit processing facilities. This agroindustrial development
scheme was projected to cost, in the heady days of the early 1980s, US$1.5
billion by the year 2000, with two-fifths of the funding coming from
abroad (m id in r a 1989, 226). As this program was developed and refined,
it grew to encompass thirty-eight agricultural and agroindustrial projects
(Wheelock Roman 1985,128-29).
Because of its aggressive developmentalism, m id in r a became the cen
ter of investment planning in Nicaragua. This ministry was the only sec
tor to produce a long-term development plan, and it quickly assumed
center stage.24 In a 1985 study of state investment activities by the f n i , an
affiliate of the b c n , 71 percent of investment spending in the forty autho
rized projects then under way was targeted to the agricultural and agro
industrial sector (Arguello Huper and Kleiterp 1985, 85). m id in r a 's goals
were ambitious: to meet national nutritional needs and make the country
self-sufficient in food production while also increasing and diversifying
export crop production.
The biggest projects were major agroindustrial schemes designed to
dramatically increase exports. According to the f n i study, the new exportoriented sugar mill t im a l (subsequently renamed Victoria de Julio) was
to absorb 24 percent of the state's investments in the agricultural projects,
and the export-oriented burley tobacco project another 14 percent (Ar
guello Huper and Kleiterp 1985, 83). Even in production for the domestic
market, investment focused on the introduction of advanced technology
on state farms. The cattle industry was to be dramatically transformed
with the introduction of new breeding and dairy production techniques in
the Muy-Muy Matiguas, Chiltepe, and Leon Viejo-La Paz projects. Most
remarkably, even maize production was to be shifted from the traditional
low technology, peasant sector into high-tech production. The govern
ment planned to transfer food production out of the mountainous interior
where it was found to exacerbate soil erosion and relocate it in the fertile
flatlands of the Pacific (Wheelock Roman 1985, 42-43).
This heavy emphasis on large-scale, modern production technologies
was designed to overcome the social and economic problems that had tra-
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ditionally plagued the Nicaraguan economy. Production fluctuations that
are the bane of agricultural economies, for example, were to be attenuated
with the introduction of irrigation. Seasonal unemployment, a major lia
bility of agroexport economies, would be addressed through a system of
double cropping, in which cotton and maize would be produced in alter
nate cycles (see Wheelock Roman 1984, 12-14; M. Coronel Kautz 1984,
12-13). This new grains production program in the Pacific region, called
the Plan Contingente, would also protect the country against the loss of
staples production as the contra war heated up in the interior. A new
vision, which emphasized the "development of production forces through
the application of science and technology" (M. Coronel Kautz 1984, 12),
was expected to raise the skills and productivity of the workforce, allow
ing them to command better and more stable incomes.
The general policy of conserving the best of the a pp operations and in
vesting heavily in building new production and processing facilities was
defended as laying the foundation for the long-run development of the
country. The standard Latin American practice of import-substituting in
dustrialization and the newer injunctions about using "appropriate tech
nology" were both rejected in favor of a state-of-the-art industrialization
strategy that would allow Nicaragua not only to fill its own consumer
needs but also to export competitively. As Wheelock Roman (1984, 14)
concluded, "We're not a country of 'appropriate technology', which has as
its philosophy the institutionalization of underdevelopment. Even though
we do sympathize with the appropriate technology approach, we don't
regard it as the fundamental solution for the country, but as a comple
mentary effort that must also be made. We still have, as a major goal, the
task of producing fertilizers, for example, and agricultural machinery. . . .
We are already doing the studies in order to move in this direction." To
transcend dependency and underdevelopment and become competitors in
the world market, highly sophisticated technology was required. Longrun schemes envisioned energy self-sufficiency through the development
of alternative energy sources such as hydroelectric and geothermal power.
Eventually Nicaragua would even produce its own inputs and machinery
for agricultural and industrial use.
In spite of growing economic difficulties, state investment continued
to rise in real terms, reaching a peak in 1986 when investments equaled
a remarkable 24 percent of the GDP. The investment rate in the agricul
tural sector was particularly high and equaled 58 percent of the value of
agricultural production in 1987 (c ie r a 1989, 1:341). Although the por-
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tion of long-term bank credit allocated to a pp declined after 1983, project
development continued through the pip , a program of direct state invest
ment. According to plans for the 1983-90 period, 71 percent of projected
investment was to go to a pp enterprises, whereas only 25 percent was tar
geted to the coops,- the medium- and large-sized private producers were
projected to receive only 4 percent of the total (c ie r a 1989,1:350).25
The Bourgeoisie at the Margins: Adversarial Confrontation
and Neglect

In the internal debate about sectoral priorities, the big loser was the local
bourgeoisie. For much of this long first phase of the revolution, private
economic elites were squeezed between the state sector, which sucked
up many of the available financial and human resources of the society,
and the peasantry, which pressed for increased attention and occasionally
received it. The large- and medium-sized private producers experienced
an erosion of land, credit, and political voice as state farms grew and
monopolized resources.
The government's early approach to the private sector was generally
one of adversarial neglect. Traditional economic elites were regarded with
suspicion and disdain, and the official rhetoric about the bourgeoisie was
often tinged with implicit threat. In terms of the government's mediumand long-range plans, the private sector's role was that of a minor ad
junct. Evidence of the decline of the bourgeoisie is found in the patterns
of land expropriation, land sales, credit allocation, and the distribution of
agricultural technology.
Land Expropriation
To consolidate the state sector and respond to peasant land demands,
private estates were taken over. Whereas the first phase of the land reform
program (1979-80) concentrated on the Somoza properties, the second
(1981-84) and third (1985-88) targeted non-somocista landowners, par
ticularly the terratenientes or latifundistas who owned more than 500
mz. of land. Marxist theoreticians and developmentalists converged in
their intention to remove valuable national resources from the hands of a
lackluster, nondevelopmental private elite. Large landowners, estimated
to number around 1,700 in 1978 (Deere et al. 1985,78), experienced a major
erosion. The portion of agricultural land in large estates declined from
36.2 percent in 1978 to 12.7 percent in 1984 and dropped still further to
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Table 3.3

Number of Properties and Area (in mz.) Affected in Agrarian Reform, 1981-1988
1982

1981
Region

No.

Area

I
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII
IX
Other b

13

16,412

20

11,369

Total

33

1983

No.

Area

No.

Area

84
73

24,231
72,582

70
44

43,202
35,271

16
61
29
2

8,539
82,097
26,744
825

85
13
32

51,111
28,601
18,780

1
2

1,948
163

4
3

11,116
817

No.

Area

No.

29 7,047 41
70 58,451 114
2
93 12,052 168
13 7,722 71
30 5,570 52

51,275
47,084
205
33,581
38,807
19,324

28
30

1

2,050

Area No.

17 4,937
36 39,941
440
2
7 4,305
19 13,547
25 13,687

2
2

Area No.

2,555
58

1988

1987

1986

1985

1984

Area No.
7,483
4,872

3
18
1
4 2,320 2
2
57 27,851
23 12,142 3
1

Total

Area No.

Area

272
385
5
388
236
214
2
1
8
6,000
7

140,045
259,463
1,024
128,420
227,140
109,063
825
2,050
21,619
1,038

1,870
l,262a
379
100
28,515
1,447

27,781 268 217,129 251 188,898 106 76,857 239 93,455 449 192,326 142 54,668 30 39,573 1,518 890,687

Source: c ie r a (1989, 9:40, table 2).
aDoes not include 28,500 mz. that were expropriated with the Ingenio San Antonio in June 1988.
^Includes properties that cross regional boundaries.
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7.5 percent in 1988. (See Table 3.2.) Indeed, the contraction of these large
estates proceeded even more rapidly than planned; the m e d a had pro
jected that private estates over 500 mz. would still control 9.36 percent of
the agricultural land in 1990 (see Table 3.1 ).26
The major instruments for the reduction of these estates were the 1981
and 1986 agrarian reform laws. Data on the land acquisition process pre
sented in Table 3.3 reveal the patterns of expropriation during the second
two phases.27 (See Table 3.3.) In the 1981-84 period, reform began cau
tiously but soon accelerated. The pace of expropriation was particularly
rapid in Region I, the area where Sandino's army had historically pros
pered and which remained a Sandinista stronghold. Over a quarter (171
of 658) of the 1981-84 expropriations were carried out in Region I alone.
Nationally, the average size of the estates expropriated during this phase
was 776 mz., although the size of the estates taken varied from region to
region.
The pace of land reform slackened in 1984, as land demands were met
by the state farms shedding their less productive territories. By 1985, how
ever, land reform accelerated again, now pressured by the wartime need
to secure a stronger peasant constituency for the regime. As the contra
war heated up, the Sandinistas were faced with a double problem. Land
less and small peasant producers in the interior of the country, who had
been a low priority for the regime and had received few concrete benefits,
were being increasingly drawn into the contra army, often through ma
terial rewards and promises (Bendana 1991). At the same time, the f s l n
was having increased difficulty recruiting for its own army as draft eva
sion became rampant. To undercut contra recruitment efforts and bolster
its own, the f s l n moved to step up land reform and land titling programs.
By signaling a deeper commitment to the redistribution of resources, the
Sandinistas hoped to secure an elusive peasant base.28
Large- and medium-sized landowners bore the brunt of this campaign.
Faced with increased land needs, and unwilling to give up the statecentered model, m id in r a quickened the pace of private sector expropria
tions in 1985. After a year of controversial land seizures, particularly in
the densely populated Region IV where traditional land pressures were
now exacerbated by the influx of refugees from the war zone, the agrarian
reform law was altered to give the regime more legal latitude. The 1986
version of the law allowed the government to expropriate idle lands re
gardless of the size of the property and legalized the practice of expropri
ating lands for use in "national development zones."
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In 1986 the land reform movement exploded, particularly in Regions IV
and II. In that year alone, 30 percent of all agrarian reform expropriations
took place. Ironically, the contra war that was fought, from the Reagan
administration's point of view, to stymie the expansion of communism
now hastened the erosion of the Nicaraguan landed elite. Although the
government claimed that "efficient" producers were still protected from
expropriation, hundreds of private producers who had escaped the chop
ping block in the preceding seven years now fell to the war-induced land
reform push.29
Land Sales: Voluntary and Involuntary
In addition to land that was expropriated, m id in r a also acquired
land through donations and purchases. Indeed, around 200,000 mz., or
roughly 8 percent of all "reformed" land, was obtained through sales,
negotiations, or donations (interview, Mireya Molina Torres, October 1,
1990). Sandinista partisans who were large landowners frequently donated
family lands to the state, particularly after they were given positions in
the government. Unable, because of constraints on their time, to attend
to their private holdings, and uncomfortable about their status as large
landowners, these officials commonly turned their lands over to the a pp
sector.
In other cases, the transfer was less voluntary. The line between a prop
erty sale and an expropriation was often fuzzy. Although some owners
were willing to part with properties and reached a satisfactory agreement
about the terms of the sale with the local m id in r a representative, many
agreed to a sale only to forestall an expropriation that was already under
way. Faced with a land invasion or an expropriation notice, some producers
moved quickly to negotiate a sale in order to secure a cash payment rather
than receive the "worthless" agrarian bonds that accompanied many ex
propriations.
In the early years, when the state still had some financial resources
and could offer quick cash payments, these arrangements were often ac
ceptable to the owners. Eighty percent of the land acquired in this fashion
was obtained in the 1984-85 period, however, when the state's financial
resources were becoming seriously strained (interview, Mireya Molina
Torres, October 1, 1990).30 With the deepening of the war and the slide
in production, land sales to the state became more problematic. Sellers
received payments only after long delays during which inflation ate up
most of their earnings. In some cases, the sellers then refused to accept
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the payment and attempted to reopen the negotiation, alleging that they
had, in effect, been expropriated without cause.31
By 1986 the state's financial disarray made it increasingly difficult to
make credible purchase offers to landowners or to have those offers ac
cepted. The government reverted back to expropriations in order to ac
quire land needed for redistribution.
Control over Credit
Land loss was accompanied by other reductions that attested to the
eroding position of the agricultural bourgeoisie. One important area of de
cline was in control over bank credit. Following the nationalization of the
banking system in 1979, there was an explosion of bank credit.32 Most of
the credit increase was absorbed by the expanding a pp sector and, second
arily, by the growing cooperative and small peasant sector. The portion of
bank credit received by medium- and large-sized producers declined from
96 percent of the total in 1978 to only 43 percent after the dust had cleared
in 1981 (c ie r a 1989,1:318).
In part, this reduction resulted from the shift of the somocista proper
ties out of the credito bancario program over to the a pp sector. Further
more, the rapid expansion of credit meant that even a declining percent of
the total could adequately cover most of the private sector's credit needs.
The decline in the regular private sector credit continued until 1984, how
ever, when medium- and large-sized private producers held 55 percent of
the farmland33 but received only 24 percent of the bank credit (c ie r a
1989,1:318). This gap suggests the marginalization and mutual withdrawal
taking place between the state and the private sector.
More of an issue was the limited access to long-term credit. The mush
rooming state sector absorbed almost half of this credit in 1983, leaving
only a quarter of it apiece for the still-considerable medium- and largesized producers, on the one hand, and coops and small producers on the
other. After 1983 the shift of a pp investment financing from the bank
credit system to the pip reduced the state stranglehold on long-term
credit. The state farms, however, were immediately replaced by the small
producers and coops, who came to absorb 63 percent of the long-term
credit in 1986. In contrast, the medium- and large-sized private producers
were allocated only 24—27 percent of this credit in the 1983-86 period
(c ie r a 1989, 1:319). Long-term credit was still available to private pro
ducers, but it was highly competitive and relatively difficult to secure.34
Bank credit was heavily subsidized. In this sense the private producers
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who got bank funding received considerable benefits from the new regime
along with other producers.35 Nonetheless, the credit patterns reflect the
lower priority given to the eroding private sector as the regime consoli
dated its new development scheme. This declining access occurred in
spite of the fact that this sector's repayment rates were higher than those
of the others.36 Indeed, the backlog of unpaid debts in both the peasant
sector and the a pp was such that the bank system resorted to periodic
saneamientos to reduce and restructure their outstanding debts. As the
nationalized bank system shifted away from the profit logic and began to
emphasize new developmental and social objectives, the traditional link
between finance capital and economic elites unraveled.
Agricultural Technology
As with the credit system, the priority given to other sectors also
reduced the agricultural bourgeoisie's access to new technologies. Even
by regional standards, Nicaragua had acquired little modern agricultural
technology at the time of the revolution. A readily available labor supply
and very low wages led the country to import only modest levels of ad
vanced agricultural machinery. In 1979, for example, Nicaragua had only
2,850 tractors (c ie r a 1989,1:352). The Sandinistas' commitment to rapid
development led to the quick expansion of this paltry fleet. An additional
997 tractors were imported in 1983-84.
Most of the new agricultural machinery went directly to the state sec
tor, again reflecting the regime's commitment to a state-centered model
of accumulation. In 1984, 62 percent of the nation's 4,051 tractors were
located in the state sector; only 30 percent were owned by private indi
vidual producers (c ie r a 1989, 1:353). The coops were least favored in
terms of access to advanced technologies, receiving only 8 percent of the
tractors in 1984.
Constraints to Ideology: Elite Fragments and Strategic Alliances

Shaped by vaguely socialist aspirations and a forceful commitment to
rapid national development, the Sandinista regime pushed for a statecentered economy that alternately confronted and neglected the local
bourgeoisie. But its ability to realize a social transformation was con
strained by a range of domestic and international forces. In spite of the
new statist model, the regime remained economically dependent on the
private elite. Not only was the presence of a stable bourgeoisie neces

Revolutionary Transition

sary to hold down Cold War aggression, but the production of both con
sumer staples and essential export income still depended heavily upon
this sector. One study of sectoral production patterns found that as late as
1986-87, large- and medium-sized producers generated 41 percent of total
agricultural production. Their contribution to export production was a
slightly more pronounced 45 percent of the total (Baumeister 1988, 30).37
Furthermore, much of the labor force still depended on employment in
the private sector.
The Sandinista leadership recognized that many of the particular char
acteristics of Nicaraguan society impeded full centralization. Wheelock
(1983, 101-2), noting the importance of small producers in the Nicara
guan economy, concluded, "We cannot resolve the transformation of our
society via the expropriation of all the means of production. This would
not lead us to socialism; on the contrary, this could even lead to the
destruction and disarticulation of society." For both pragmatic and tacti
cal reasons, the Sandinistas attempted to accommodate more variation in
their model than was common in socialist states.
Instead of adopting a rigid, ideological opposition to the bourgeoisie
as a whole, the Sandinista regime ultimately opted for an approach in
which the "rules of the game would be defined in the process itself, to
identify, not theoretically but historically an original role that private
enterprise can play in the construction of the new Nicaraguan economy"
(m ipl a n 1980, 14). Sectors that played a useful role or made a contribu
tion would receive rewards,- those that did not would not. Although the
bourgeoisie as a whole eroded in Nicaragua during this period, some sec
tors survived and even flourished. In spite of the generally adversarial re
lationship that emerged between the Sandinista state and the bourgeoisie,
the complexity of both the state and the local elite impeded the impulse
to unwavering opposition. The result was an often sharp differentiation
between the vision and views of state leaders, on one hand, and their be
havior or deeds on the other. Although a pattern of adversarial neglect
characterized the overall relationship with the elite, more positive link
ages emerged with specific subcategories, reflecting practical political and
economic considerations.
In practice, the Sandinista model identified several axes along which
the economic elite could be divided during the first years of the revo
lution. An effort was made to differentiate between the productive and
the unproductive economic elites, to favor medium-sized over large pro
ducers, to provide special support for those who produced essential prod
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ucts for the domestic market over the traditionally dominant agroexport
ers, and to build alliances with the “homegrown" bourgeoisie instead
of its more cosmopolitan counterpart. Producers who employed efficient
production practices, who refrained from egregious forms of decapitaliza
tion, who had strong links in their local communities, who produced in
priority sectors, and who were not conspicuously wealthy or hostile to
the regime were identified as patriotic and generally given a protected
position within the revolution. Large capitalists, with sharply declining
production levels or in low priority areas, who were denounced locally
for decapitalization or abuse of their workers and who had extensive ties
abroad, on the other hand, were viewed negatively and became targets for
expropriation.
Productive/Unproductive
The first cut made in the economic elite divided those who were pro
ductive from those who were not. As c ie r a 's 1981 planning document
indicated, the bourgeoisie was first differentiated by dividing those who
could produce without draining the nation's resources from those who
produced little or did so only by drawing heavily on the state's coffers
(c ie r a 1989, 1:73-79). Using this criterion, the commercial sector and
"non-priority urban services" fell into disfavor relative to the agricultural
sector (c ie r a 1989, 1:85). The industrial sector, which was quite import
dependent and tied to the collapsing Central American market, also be
came a lower priority for the government. The agricultural sector, which
not only supplied most of the country's food needs but also generated
needed foreign exchange, quickly became the national priority.
Within the agricultural sector, further differentiation took place. Un
like many Latin American agrarian reform programs, including those in
Mexico and pre-1973 Chile, the Nicaraguan variant did not use size as
the primary criterion for determining which properties would be expro
priated. Productive use of the land by its owners was the key legal factor
employed in Nicaragua. Although this provision was not always honored,
in most cases where productivity was high and maintained, the land was
not expropriated.
Middle- versus Large-sized Producers
Like the revolutionary regimes in Mexico and Chile, the Sandinista
regime sought to build an alliance with small- and medium-sized pro
ducers. Producers with extensive holdings were expected to be closely tied
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to the traditional regional oligarchies. In contrast, small- and medium
sized producers were thought to be less wedded to the status quo and
more open to economic and political change; these producers could serve
as a battering ram to challenge traditional rural social structures. Further,
promotion of the middle sector was consistent with a growth model that
dispersed wealth more widely through the population.
Middle-sized producers had long been economically significant in
Nicaragua. As Baumeister's (1984b) work on the stratification of produc
tion in the 1952-76 period indicated, middle-sized producers were gen
erally responsible for a larger percentage of national production of key
exports than were large producers. In 1971, for example, middle-sized pro
ducers generated 53 percent of the cotton crop (vs. 42 percent for large
producers), 44 percent of the coffee (vs. 30 percent for large producers)
and owned 29 percent of the cattle (vs. 19 percent for large ranchers) (Baumeister 1984b, 12).38 Polarization of production and landholding in Nica
ragua was much less acute than that found in regional neighbors like El
Salvador and Guatemala.
The prominence of this middle-sized sector encouraged the Sandinista
regime to assume that the contraction of large private estates would not
seriously damage the economy, and that a development model which
allowed private ownership for small- and medium-sized producers could
be viable in Nicaragua. Initially, the middle-sized producers were not
legally subject to expropriation, and property held in medium-sized
estates remained relatively stable over time.39 Whereas the portion of
farmland held in large estates had declined from 36 percent of the total in
1978 to 7.5 percent in 1988, the portion in medium-sized estates dropped
only from 46 percent to 42 percent. (See Table 3.2.) Private farms of 200500 mz. held 16.2 percent of the farmland in 1978; this sector retained
13.5 percent of the farmland in 1988, and had actually expanded modestly
in the 1984—88 period. The 50—200 mz. sector, which had 30.1 percent
of the farmland in 1978, eroded only modestly, dropping to 28.4 percent
in 1988.
The fact that this interim stratum remained roughly the same size in
the 1978—88 period does not mean that medium-sized producers were
completely untouched by the agrarian reform. Indeed, following the pas
sage of the 1986 agrarian reform law, which allowed the expropriation
of idle, inefficiently used, or abandoned land regardless of the size of the
estate, hundreds of medium-sized properties were also expropriated. Ac
cording to case-by-case data compiled by the Direccion de Tenencia de la
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Tierra of m id in r a (1987), properties expropriated in 1986 ranged in size
from 1.5 to 7,159 mz. Seventy-nine percent of the 357 expropriated proper
ties analyzed in that document were smaller than 500 mz. In that year, for
example, 37 percent of the properties expropriated were smaller than 100
mz. and 55 percent were smaller than 200 mz.40 As data in Table 3.3 dem
onstrate, the average size of the properties expropriated in the 1985-88
period was 442 mz., down from 776 mz. in the 1982-84 phase.
The agricultural elites in Nicaragua often owned several properties;
these properties were sometimes in different parts of the country. Expro
priation of one property generally left others intact. Some of the large
property owners, therefore, dropped into the middle-sized bracket follow
ing an expropriation but continued to live and work in Nicaragua on the
reduced properties that they retained. One large coffee producer, for ex
ample, lost a mountainous, underdeveloped woodland but held on to all
of the land he had planted in coffee trees. Another lost the plots he and
his family had historically allocated to peasants who participated in his
cotton harvest but retained the larger portion that he managed directly.
The relatively stable percent of the nation's farmland found in the middle
strata is due, therefore, not simply to the infrequency of expropriations in
that category but also to the shifting of some large property owners into
the middle-sized category following land sales or expropriations.
Nonetheless, a much smaller portion of medium-sized property owners
underwent expropriation than those who held more extensive proper
ties. According to Baumeister (1988, 29), even after size restrictions were
eliminated in the 1986 agrarian reform law, only 8 percent of the land
redistributed in the 1986-87 period came from private estates that were
smaller than 500 mz.41 This suggests that the regime tried to avoid under
mining the middle-sized producers that it wanted to include as part of
its base.
Domestic Market versus Agroexport Producers
The government also pursued a less confrontational relationship with
sectors of the bourgeoisie who produced basic staples for domestic con
sumption (Spoor and Mendoza 1988; Utting 1991). The Sandinistas' com
mitment to improve the urban diet by subsidizing prices for staples had
quickly led to increased food demands. As the per capita consumption
of rice, vegetable oil, chicken, pork, and eggs rose sharply following the
revolution (Utting 1991, 45), pressure built for increased domestic produc
tion. Unable, at least in the short run, to fulfill this increased demand on
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state farms, the regime was forced to rely on private producers, including
even large-scale capitalist producers of these strategic products. To secure
increased production of basic products, the government developed a series
of supports and incentives targeted toward producers in the Pacific region,
particularly rice and sorghum producers, but benefiting large-scale maize
and even cotton producers (who provided raw ingredients for cottonseed
oil) as well.
After the revolution, almost half of domestic rice production was sup
plied by a small number of large-scale private rice producers (c ie r a 1989,
9:92). Developmental support from the Somoza regime had allowed these
large producers to install irrigation systems and achieve relatively high
levels of production. With the national rice consumption now substan
tially dependent on the continued production of this sector, private rice
producers were able to acquire a series of special concessions from the
state. The guaranteed price paid to rice producers, for example, rose rapidly
in the 1979-80 to 1981-82 period, more than tripling in two years.42
More importantly, the regime used international financing from Western
European governments in 1982 to purchase harvesters and other essen
tial agricultural machinery, which it allocated to large rice growers on
highly concessionary terms (interview, Mario Hanon, president of a n a r ,
August 23,1986).
Nor was this sector targeted for expropriation, even though most of
the private rice growers held large properties. According to the president
of a n a r for this whole period, not a single a n a r member was expro
priated (interview, Mario Hanon, May 3, 1990).43 Although this sector
faced numerous problems (erratic electricity disrupted the irrigation sys
tems and burned out pumps, inadequate storage systems caused spoilage,
etc.), private producers were able to increase their production through
1982-83. According to official government statistics, even as late as 198788 private rice producers had production levels that were as good as or
only slightly below the levels that they had obtained in 1980-81 (c ie r a
1989, 9:92). This output stability in large-scale private rice production was
achieved at a time when private production levels of many other crops
had plummeted. It facilitated major increases in total rice production in
the 1979-80 to 1983-84 period.44 (See Appendix 2, Table A.i.)
Other large growers producing for the domestic market also received
favorable treatment. The animal feed industry grew rapidly as the San
dinista government attempted to increase consumption of protein-rich
foods like eggs and chicken. This feed expansion boosted sorghum pro
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duction and favored the generally large- and medium-sized producers who
cultivated this crop. As with other crops, the government's price-fixing
policy guaranteed producers a price that would cover costs plus provide a
profit margin that was negotiated annually, m id in r a 's cost assessments
generally assumed that producers used an intermediate level of tech
nology. For producers who had access to modern technology and whose
yields were higher than average, as was the case for most larger sorghum
producers, costs were lower than those used in m id in r a calculations, and
the return was substantially higher (Spoor and Mendoza 1988, 30-31,.45
For this stratum, the government's guaranteed price and guaranteed mar
ket eliminated two of the chronic problems that had traditionally plagued
the animal feed sector.
The same was true for many large-scale, modernized maize producers.
For peasant producers, prices of manufactured goods rose more rapidly
in the first half of the decade than guaranteed maize prices, leading to
production disincentives and a decline in marketed output. For larger,
better-capitalized producers, however, production costs were much lower
and the guaranteed prices provided a substantial return. Utting's (1991, 28)
index of maize production costs for 1983-84 found that for highly mecha
nized maize producers, the production costs per qt. were only 57 percent
of the producer price. For peasant producers using traditional technolo
gies, on the other hand, production costs surpassed producer prices by 18
percent, leading to net losses.
Large-scale staples producers benefited from subsidized credit, cheap
electricity for irrigation and energy supplies, low cost inputs, and in some
cases, access to inexpensive agricultural machinery. Perhaps even more
than peasant producers, agrarian capitalists producing for the domestic
market were able to take advantage of the supports provided for staples
production.46
Chapiolla versus Comprador Bourgeoisie
The categories used to differentiate among sectors of the bourgeoisie
were not all economic. A final distinction made by the regime focused
on political and cultural differences found within the elite. In an effort to
make inroads into the medium- and large-sized producers' strata, u n a g ,
the Sandinista-sponsored producer association, attempted to differentiate
between a homegrown and an urban-based, internationally linked bour
geoisie. u n a g leaders posited the existence of a distinctively Nicaraguan,
newly emergent bourgeoisie that could accommodate itself to the revo
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lution. This sector, colloquially labeled the burguesia chapiolla, was de
fended as a legitimate participant in the revolutionary process and was
actively courted by the regime.47
u n a g was initially designed in 1981 as an organization of prorevo
lutionary peasant producers who had already formed, or could be shep
herded into, cooperatives. In 1984 this association began to undergo a
transformation and gradual reorganization, signaled by the selection of
new u n a g national president Daniel Nunez.48 At the u n a g national as
sembly meeting in which Nunez was selected, a number of large- and
medium-sized private producers were highly visible participants and drew
praise from the new leadership 49 Under Nunez's direction, larger-scale
producers were actively recruited through the recognition of preexisting
local producer associations and the creation of new specialized commis
sions. By 1986-87, for example, u n a g reported that 151 organizations of
private producers had been incorporated into its network (Luciak forth
coming, 62; see also Luciak 1988, 9-10). In 1987 the number of these asso
ciate members claimed by u n a g climbed to 2,807, and members who had
joined as individuals totaled 26,618. (See Appendix 2, Table A.2.) These
figures represented 24 percent of the total u n a g membership. Looser
forms of affiliation that allowed local autonomy, along with un a g 's grow
ing commitment to the protection of property rights, made u n a g more
attractive to agrarian elites.
In the search for large- and medium-sized members, u n a g leaders dif
ferentiated between "unpatriotic producers affiliated with c o s e p ," who
for political and cultural reasons were outside the pale, and "patriotic pro
ducers," who were actively courted. The former were not just politically
objectionable,- they also were characterized by a style of life that sepa
rated them from the u n a g mainstream. These included large producers
who "run their farms from afar. They are people who live in the cities.
They have managers on the farms, but they only go on weekends or every
two weeks." These producers had little direct involvement in the produc
tion process. From the standpoint of u n a g organizers, these producers
functioned much like absentee landowners whose social and economic
contribution to society was suspect. According to Nunez, "These people
who live in Managua had more access to culture, to society, to the clubs,
to all the comforts or deformations that life carries with it" (Nunez 1985a,
367-68).
In addition to their objectionable lifestyle, these sectors were more
closely tied to the international market. They were more fully involved
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in the processing and marketing activities where exorbitant profits were
concentrated. In Nunez's words, "They used to own slaughterhouses; they
had everything. They used to buy coffee. They used to buy cattle. They
used to buy everything to export. They themselves were the exporters of
what the peasantry produced in this country." This cosmopolitan bour
geoisie, "who traveled outside the country and who received a different
education" (Nunez 1985a, 369, 368) formed the core of the c o s e p organi
zations and was seen as closely tied to the U.S. Embassy and the counter
revolutionary war. To effectively challenge the old power structure and
batter down the forces of imperialism, this elite had to be displaced.
"Patriotic producers," on the other hand, were more fully rooted in rural
life and were more directly involved in the productive process. According
to Nunez, even though some of these producers were large landowners,
"their dynamic of work in the countryside makes them rich peasants.
That is to say, they have not become declassed [sic], separated from pro
duction, by moving to the cities" (Nunez 1985a, 367). This chapiollo sector
was composed of medium- and large-sized producers who were of "peas
ant origin" (Baumeister 1988, 31). They were "normally a first generation
bourgeoisie that opened space for itself by challenging the power of the
large landowners" (Ortega and Marchetti 1986, 26).
The u n a g strategy of courting these medium- and large-sized pro
ducers who might be more susceptible to the appeals of the revolution
was difficult and controversial. Ortega and Marchetti (1986, 38-39), for
example, equated this sector with a "kulak" class and argued that the
u n a g 's efforts on its behalf reaffirmed the old power structure of the ham
let (comar ca) and "weakened the poorest of the poor." Concerns about
this new direction led to conflict with segments of the f s l n (Haugaard
1991, 22), as some revolutionaries decried the enbourgeoisment of their
rural affiliate. Nonetheless, u n a g continued its recruitment campaign
and found many of its most active regional and national leaders within
this sector of the bourgeoisie.
Conclusions

The relationship between the Sandinista regime and the national bour
geoisie during the first seven years of the revolution was fraught with
tension. Departing from pro-statist assumptions that rippled between
populist and socialist poles, the Sandinista leadership adopted an atti
tude toward the private producers that generally shifted between hostility
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and neglect. Not only was the bourgeoisie's behavior in the early years
of the revolution found to be counterproductive to economic recovery
and the political consolidation of the new regime, but its activities in
the decades prior to 1979 were judged to be nondevelopmental and con
trary to national interests. Its claim to resources and legitimacy, conse
quently, was found to be feeble. In the new development model embraced
by the revolutionary government, traditional economic elites were dis
placed from the economic center,- the state assumed direct responsibility
for the transformation of the Nicaraguan social and economic order.
In practice, however, the regime moved quickly to pragmatic adapta
tions. An ever-shifting concept of national unity pushed the government
to identify sectors and subsectors of the traditional elite with which to
seek an accommodation. Even under the most optimistic projections, the
state could hardly hope to replace the extensive private sector that re
mained after 1979, and speedy reactivation of production required the
participation of a wide swath of producers. The inclusion of private elites
in the new model was also a response to geopolitical objectives; charges
of Marxist-Leninism and communism could be held at bay and the Cold
War rhetoric more successfully challenged if a substantial private sector
was retained. Finally, the personal linkages between revolutionaries and
local capitalists, forged by family ties, school experiences, or shared risk
during the insurrection made mutual vilification more difficult. In this
small, fractured society, class-based labels did not stick.
The regime began to differentiate among strata and sectors within
the traditional elite. Those who were able to maintain or even increase
their production were to be preferred over those whose production eroded
rapidly,- the middle-sized bourgeoisie was to be protected even as the
large-scale elite was targeted for extinction; those who contributed to
increased domestic consumption and improvements in the national diet
were to be favored over the traditional agroexport elite,- the homegrown,
provincial bourgeoisie that was rooted in the land was to be preferred over
denationalized, cosmopolitan capitalists who had suspiciously warm ties
to the United States.
These distinctions gave shape to the Sandinista variant of the mixed
economy. Each of these divisions gave rise to some controversy within
the f s l n , and commitments made to favored groups were not always
honored. Further complicating the debate about alliances was the fact that
sectors that were favored according to one criterion were sometimes out
of favor according to another. Some very large landowners, for example,

95

96

Revolutionary Transition

were also highly productive; some important staples producers were also
those cosmopolitan elites that u n a g derided. On the other hand, some
mid-sized grains producers experienced declining productivity and de
capitalized briskly, hardly meriting their privileged status. Complications
arising from this intricate categorization scheme made the development
of consistent policies very difficult. As a result, conflicting signals were
sent even to potential allies. The consolidation of a new relationship
was elusive, even as tactical understandings emerged between individual
political and economic elites.

chapter

The Recrudescence of the Economic
Elite (1987-1990)
I take off my hat to the private producers who stayed in Nicaragua. In
spite of all the problems, they continued to produce. . . . The bourgeoi
sie that stayed was the most progressive in Central America.
—Former Sandinista secretary of programming
and the budget, August 1991
The Revolution ended some time ago.
—Economic adviser to the Sandinista
government, August 1989

r o k e,

battered, and under pressure from foreign enemies and allies
alike, the Sandinistas moved, toward the end of the decade, to pro
mote a fuller economic alliance with the local bourgeoisie. Leadership
of the government's economic team changed, and U.S.-trained economist
Alejandro Martinez Cuenca was named to head the s pp . According to
Martinez Cuenca (1990,137), the new economic program "was not a pro
gram to realize some economic doctrine, but simply a practical response
to a no-win situation (situation sin salida}”

B

Situacitin sin Salida

Revolutionary regimes often follow an established economic pattern.
After an initial downturn when the regime comes to power, the new gov
ernment consolidates itself and some economic reactivation occurs. This
surge is followed by an economic falloff as the regime attempts to push
through structural changes. Economic contraction strains the cohesion
of the revolution, erodes its base of political support, and contributes to
further polarization. Internal and external pressures mount. The revolu
tionary regime then typically either moderates its course, as in the case
of Peru, or is ousted, as in the Chilean case. Nicaragua was no exception
to this general pattern.
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In Nicaragua, the economic nosedive associated with the insurrection
was followed in 1980 and 1981 by a brief period of economic reactivation.
(See Appendix 2, Table A.3.) Sustained economic recovery proved elusive,
however, and by 1984 a long economic,slide began. According to c e pa l
data, Nicaragua's GDP declined 9.6 percent in the 1981-89 period, com
pared with the regional total for that time period, which rose n .7 percent.
On a per capita basis, the contraction was even worse: whereas the re
gional GDP per capita dropped 8.3 percent between 1981 and 1989, that
for Nicaragua plummeted 33 percent (c e pa l 1989, 18, 19). Nicaragua's
GDP per capita, which had fallen to 1950s levels during the 1978-79 in
surrection (Gibson 1987, 24), continued its descent under the Sandinistas
to levels of the 1940s. By 1990, the GDP per capita was only 42 percent of
what it had been in the 1975-1979 period (Gibson 1991, 25).
Because the revolutionary transition in Nicaragua involved the mili
tary defeat of Somoza's national guard and the creation of a new, guerrillabased military, economic decline did not immediately threaten the sur
vival of the regime. Unlike the Chilean experience, or even the plight of
the Christian Democratic government in El Salvador, the reforms intro
duced by the Sandinista regime were forcefully defended by its armed
forces.
The ensuing contra war, however, took a tremendous economic toll and
set in motion forces that would later lead to electoral defeat. According to
calculations by the Sandinista government, the war costs for the 1980-88
period totaled $17.8 billion (Wheelock Roman 1990,126). Economic costs
included losses associated with the direct destruction of infrastructure
and production, the loss of international credits, the costs linked to the
U.S. economic embargo launched in 1985, and the budgetary distortions
caused by increased defense spending. By 1987 the costs of the war soared
to 62 percent of the government's budget, or 30 percent of GDP (Conroy
1990,16).
The state-led development model the Sandinistas had adopted was slow
to generate production increases and probably contributed, at least in the
short run, to the production decline. The twenty investment projects in
the agricultural sector that had been approved and launched by 1985 had
an average lead time of four years before they were expected to be com
pleted, and some, such as the Victoria de Julio sugar mill and the African
palm development projects were expected to take yet longer (six and nine
years, respectively) (Arguello Huper and Kleiterp 1985, 83). Poor planning,
financing shortages, and an inadequate supply of trained administrators,
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skilled workers, and construction materials meant continual cost over
runs and operational delays. Furthermore, the emphasis placed on the
rapid expansion of these agroindustrial projects robbed other sectors of
needed resources. As Arguello Huper and Kleiterp (1985, 60) concluded,
"This form of investment supports a structural change in the Nicaraguan
economy, but the rhythm of its implementation, in view of the scarce
resources that the country has, is detrimental to the productive sectors
(state, private and cooperative that have installed capacity and mainte
nance and modernization needs), draining them of the minimal resources
needed for their on-going production."1
The resulting economic slowdown generated two major deficits in the
national economy. The first gap was in the internal government accounts.
Initially, tax pressure was increased by the Sandinista government to help
provide resources needed to finance the transformations it envisioned.2
Even when the tax pressure was rising, however, the fiscal deficit reached
destabilizing levels. In 1983 the fiscal deficit equaled 49 percent of govern
ment expenditures and 30 percent of GDP. (See Appendix 2, Table A.3.)
The rising costs of defense, combined with the political inability of the
government to cut social and economic projects deemed integral to the
revolution, triggered a growing gap in the government accounts. This gap
was covered by inorganic emissions from the central bank that generated
inflationary pressures.
Other government policies also contributed to a soaring inflation rate.
The use of multiple exchange rates to make essential imports available
at low cost led to massive exchange rate losses that were covered by the
central bank.3 According to Arana Sevilla (1990, 46), exchange rate losses
equaled 9.5 percent of GDP in 1986. Bank losses from heavily subsidized
credit were also monetized by the central bank. These losses became even
more significant after inflation accelerated and the government failed to
index interest rates. According to calculations by Spoor (1989, n-12),
the banks recovered only 8 percent of the real value of the loans they
issued in 1987, given the low, fixed interest rate and the soaring infla
tion levels. The combination of a large fiscal deficit, extensive exchange
rate losses, and massive credit subsidies, all of which were covered by
inorganic emissions, fueled an inflationary spiral (Taylor et al. 1989, 17;
Gutierrez 1989, 167). The inflation rate became a major problem by 1985
and then skyrocketed, reaching record levels of over 33,000 percent in
1988. (See Appendix 2, Table A.3.)
These economic imbalances contributed to the second gap, that in the
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external sector. Throughout the period of the revolution, Nicaragua ran
a negative trade balance. International prices declined for several of the
country's traditional exports, and production levels tended to sag. Har
vested area for agroexport products, which had averaged 455,000 mz. in
the 1974-78 period, declined to an average of 361,000 mz. in the 198084 period and fell further to 268,000 mz. in the 1985-88 period (c ie r a
1989, 9:73). In 1987-88, cotton production was only 27 percent what it had
been in 1974-78, having fallen off sharply following a brief recovery. (See
Appendix 2, Table A.i.) Coffee production also began to fall after 198283, reaching only 75 percent of its 1974-78 average in 1987-88. The drop
in agroexport production contributed to a collapse in export earnings. The
value of exported goods, which totaled $646 million in 1978, had fallen
to only $290 million in 1989. (See Appendix 2, Table A.3.)
The overvalued cordoba and restrictions on foreign exchange created
an "anti-export bias" (Mayorga 1991, 35) in economic policy that deterred
private investments in agroexport production. Ad hoc efforts to stimu
late increased export production through the proliferation of multiple
exchange rates for different categories of exports and through the use of
subsidies were "too little, too late, and unevenly applied" (Gibson 1991,
29). Even when producers wanted to increase production, other problems
emerged, such as an inadequate harvest labor supply or delays in the de
livery of fertilizers and pesticides (Enriquez 1991b). For some coffee pro
ducers and cattle ranchers, the spread of the contra war into their zones
further impeded production. These difficulties led to an erosion of export
earnings.
Import levels, on the other hand, rose rapidly after the revolution and
continued to be high throughout the decade. For most years, the value
of imports was more than double export earnings. Nicaragua was able to
continue acquiring essential imports even as its economy ground down.4
It did so through foreign borrowing, with loans increasingly coming from
socialist countries responding to appeals for socialist solidarity or to the
Cold War overtones of the U.S.-backed attack.5 Nicaragua's foreign debt
rose from US$1.6 billion in 1980 to an extraordinary $9.7 billion in 1989.
(See Appendix 2, Table A.3.)
As export earnings declined and foreign borrowing increased, Nicara
gua's ability to meet its external obligations diminished. In a region and
an era afflicted with debt crisis, Nicaragua's situation was unparalleled.
By 1990 the total foreign debt was five times the nation's GDP (Gibson
1991, 28). Whereas the interest payment on the foreign debt as a percent
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of exports for Latin America as a region was 29 percent in 1989, the ratio
for Nicaragua was 61 percent. As a consequence of this extraordinary
indebtedness, Nicaraguan external debt paper traded on the secondary
market at 1 percent of face value by the end of 1989 (c e pa l 1990a, 34, 35).
By 1988, economic contraction, now in its fifth year, deepened sharply,
and the economy spun out of control. Although the revolutionary govern
ment, in a military sense, had turned the corner in the contra war, it was
losing the economic war. Uncontrollable budgets, rampaging inflation,
soaring foreign debt, and declining production created an untenable situa
tion. On almost every economic indicator, Nicaragua's problems were un
paralleled in Latin America. No other revolutionary regime had survived
as long in the face of such sweeping economic collapse.
The Push for Economic Reform

As economic imbalances became apparent in the mid-1980s, some sec
tors within the government began pushing to reorient economic policy.
A tense competition to define the national economic direction flared.
Moderates like Martinez Cuenca conflicted with those whose views
were more fully Marxist, like Minister of Planning Henry Ruiz.6 Others,
loosely labeled as monetarists, clashed with ambitious developmentalists
in m id in r a (Biondi-Morra 1990, 299-306). The result was a series of fal
tering economic adjustment programs. The first, in early 1985, included
a devaluation, new production incentives, and an effort to trim the fiscal
deficit. It was a halfhearted measure, however, and it produced minimal
results. Economic imbalances worsened.7
As the economic crisis deepened and the contra war waned, a policy
shuffle in the government again focused on these problems. Between Feb
ruary 1988 and January 1989 the government lurched through three eco
nomic adjustment programs that were designed to stabilize the economy.
Though the initial reforms had several "heterodox" features (Conroy 1990,
20), the adjustments became progressively more "orthodox" over time
(Gibson 1991; Stahler-Sholk, 1990). By the end, the Sandinista government
had moved forcefully toward a more conventional economic approach.
The first round of attack, announced February 14,1988, included a com
plete remonetization. The government introduced a new cordoba equal to
1,000 of the old units, unified the exchange rates, and executed a major de
valuation, with the official value of the cordoba relative to the U.S. dollar
dropping from 70 to 10,000 in the old currency. These financial adjust
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ments were accompanied with a downsizing (compactacion) of the state
through the reorganization of more than forty government agencies, a io
percent cut in the government budget, and a layoff of more than 8,000
state workers (c ie r a 1988; Gibson 1991; Conroy 1990).
To offset the burden these reforms would place on the low-income
groups, two unorthodox provisions were included in the first round of
adjustments. Minimum wages were to be increased an average of 225
percent, and price controls were to be retained on forty-six basic prod
ucts.8 Four months later, however, most of these palliatives were removed.
In spite of price increases associated with a new round of devaluations,
most of the remaining subsidies were eliminated, and price controls were
lifted.9 Galloping inflation eroded wage increases,- wages continued their
precipitous descent.
Recognizing problems with the political palatability of the new pro
gram, government officials pointed to the features that would boost the
earnings of low-income groups (Martinez Cuenca 1988, 19-23,- Conroy
1990, 22). The removal of price controls on basic food products, for ex
ample, was expected to benefit peasant producers who, because they used
traditional technologies, were not expected to be negatively affected by
the reintroduction of "real" prices for capital goods, electricity, petroleum,
fertilizer, and other commodities.10 Deregulation of wages was also ex
pected to produce wage increases among more productive workers.11 Most
wage workers suffered a continual, catastrophic erosion in their earnings,
however, making on average in 1988 only 3.7 percent what they had in
1980 (Arana Sevilla 1990, 48).
Natural disaster, so common in Nicaragua, compounded the problem.
The cleanup and rebuilding efforts after hurricane Joan imposed an unex
pected financial burden on the government at the end of 1988. In spite of
the 1988 reforms, the fiscal deficit soared again to 26.6 percent of GDP.
(See Appendix 2, Table A.3.) Inflation now reached astronomical propor
tions; even sharper adjustment was attempted. The third round of adjust
ments, launched in January 1989, included more drastic budget cuts and
massive layoffs of state workers, now affecting even troops. This compac
tacion resulted in the dismissal of 8,314 civil servants and a reduction of
13,000 army troops (b c n 1990, 5). Even though the government failed to
raise the tax pressure, the fiscal deficit was now slashed to 6.7 percent of
GDP in 1989, suggesting the depth of the spending cuts.
These measures were presented and defended by the newly named min
ister of the s pp , Martinez Cuenca. A moderate insider who, as minister
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of foreign trade, had criticized the statist direction in economic planning,
Martinez Cuenca now became the government's economic point man.
Models and Alternatives Reconsidered

In attempting to restructure its development model, the Sandinista state
had three basic options. It could push ahead with the emphasis on statecentered development, expanding the scope of state control. Alternatively,
it could abandon the statist model and make a fuller commitment to the
radical redistribution of resources, including those held by the state, with
the creation of a new form of grassroots socialism. Finally, it could mend
the fences with the private sector elite and attempt to restart the national
economy by triggering private entrepreneurial investment.
The first of these approaches continued to have defenders, even through
the end of the revolutionary period. According to Martinez Cuenca (1990,
139), the debate within the f s l n national directorate about the 1989 round
of adjustments lasted for a full month, including weekends. One proposal
still on the table was to abandon the mixed economy model and assume
direct state control of the economy.
In the end, that route was not taken. Critics charged that many care
fully forged external alliances would be lost if the regime were to move
against the private sector. The government would forfeit not only crucial
assistance from Western Europe but even support from the socialist states
that were struggling through their own identity crises. The changing char
acter of world politics ran counter to a state socialism option. Nicaragua's
small, poor, and trade dependent economy made regime leaders reluctant
to ponder the acute isolation that would result. Instead of embracing fuller
state control, investment in state enterprises was finally slowed, and the
state sector began a grinding shift toward stricter financial accountability.
The 1988 reorganization of the state sector into a series of corporations
attempted to put a pp operations on a profit footing. Market forces were
making headway.
The second argument, which favored a more radical redistribution of
resources, including resources of the state, had been forcefully made by
campesinistas since the early years of the revolution. Represented by
c ie r a and the ih c a , this group criticized the state-centered model. Some
campesinista arguments implied that the m id in r a development model
and the methods used to advance it in the countryside were philosophi
cally and economically akin to the Stalinist forced collectivization experi
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ence (Marchetti 1989, 35-45). This group called for more attention to the
peasantry, initially emphasizing those who were organized into collective
cooperatives, but coming over time to a more sweeping pro-peasant posi
tion. Campesinistas favored not only a more extensive agrarian reform
program that would incorporate the perhaps 50,000 peasants who still
remained landless at the end of the revolution, but also give more atten
tion to the needs of small-scale producers and land reform beneficiaries.
Instead of channeling millions of dollars into large-scale investments and
assigning the best-prepared technicians to the a pp sector, the government
was called to invest in the development and dissemination of small-scale
technologies that would raise peasant production.12
After 1985, as the contra war heated up and the evidence of economic
difficulties began to mount, the campesinistas did win some ground. The
pace of land reform accelerated, individual peasant land claimants were
responded to more favorably,13 and agroindustrial development projects
were modified to integrate cooperatives more fully into their production
process.14 Still, although the government attempted to redress the imbal
ances that had resulted in few gains for the peasantry, it was unwilling to
pursue a radically pro-peasant course. The historically low levels of pro
ductivity of the Nicaraguan peasantry and the recurring need to pardon
its unpaid bank loans, combined with the modernizing, high-tech predi
lections of much of the m id in r a leadership, militated against any such
departure. Instead, the government began to reconsider its relationship
with the bourgeoisie.
With the state sector being slow to take off and the peasant sector
plagued by low production levels, the bourgeoisie was regarded as the last
remaining option. The economic behavior of this sector was also prob
lematic, but its performance in the first years of the revolution made
some analysts optimistic that its productivity levels could be restored at
relatively low cost. Furthermore, strengthening this sector would address
the concerns and perhaps win the approval of foreign donors in capitalist
countries.
The redefinition of the role of the bourgeoisie in the revolution in
volved a conceptual sleight of hand. Whereas in the previous period the
government had taken pains to differentiate between sectors and strata of
the bourgeoisie, these distinctions now became muted. The old distinc
tions between the "sellout" and "patriotic" bourgeoisie or the mediumand large-sized producers, for example, became less acute. Prominent eco
nomic policymakers like s pp head Martinez Cuenca began to insist that
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the producers who had stayed in the country during these long years of
war and decline all deserved to be participants in the new economy (inter
view, Martinez Cuenca, August 16,1991). The terratenientes and financial
speculators were gone now; those who remained were the patriots.
This transition was based in part on real changes in the capitalist class.
Many of the leading economic elites who were most opposed to the revo
lution had indeed left the country; others who stayed had gone through a
hard process of learning to accept the revolution and even embracing some
of its objectives. Yet some of those now being courted by the regime had
been the objects of its scorn during the opening years of the revolution.
To pursue an alliance with this group, the f s l n had to reconceptualize its
development model.
After years of continuing economic crisis, and almost a decade of politi
cal control, the Sandinista leadership began to actively court the bour
geoisie. This transition did not materialize out of the blue. As we have
seen in Chapter 3, the Sandinista government had already moved to iden
tify specific fragments of the elite as potential alliance partners. Build
ing on relationships established with those elite fragments previously
identified as patriotic, and on interpersonal connections with strategi
cally located businesspeople developed before or during the revolution,
the Sandinistas now pursued a fuller rapprochement with the bourgeoi
sie. Although laboring under the burden of the economic adjustment, the
traditional bourgeoisie generally regarded these overtures with approval.15
State-Elite Rapprochement

By 1988 the government had moved to give higher priority to private pro
ducers. In addition to the reestablishment of most market forces, realistic
prices, very low wages, and reduced regulations, the regime responded to
private sector complaints about the lack of security and the poor invest
ment climate. It began to channel more resources to this sector and to
reopen the formal communication channels with this group.
Rechanneling Economic Resources
Perhaps the most sensitive issue dividing the bourgeoisie and the gov
ernment was the question of land ownership. The vulnerability of pro
ducers to expropriation on any of a series of often ill-defined charges led
even those who had been favored by the regime to be wary of its leaders. At
the end of the 1980s, however, the pace of expropriation dropped sharply.

105

io6

The Recrudescence of the Economic Elite
Table 4.1

Sectoral Distribution of Long-Term Agricultural Credit, 1983-1988
(Percent)
Sector
Medium and large producers
State farms
Small individual producers
and cooperatives
Source:

c ie r a

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

26
48

24
38

27
27

26
11

31
16

70
10

26

38

46

63

53

20

(1989,1:319).

In 1988 only 30 properties were expropriated, down from 449 in 1986.16
(See Table 3.3.) Only three cases occurred in 1989.17
The general pattern of declining expropriations suggests the increased
willingness of the regime to accept established land tenure arrangements,
which favored current owners over the landless and the state farm sector.
The changing patterns of credit allocation reinforce this assessment. After
years of playing the third and last role in the credit system, the mediumand large-sized private producers now moved center stage. Whereas from
1981 to 1984 the portion of agricultural bank credit for these producers de
clined from 43 percent to 26 percent, by 1985 the pattern began to reverse
slowly. In 1988 economic elites received 47 percent of all agricultural
bank credit, compared with 26 percent for the state sector and 27 percent
for coops and small producers (c ie r a 1989,1:318).
The new ascendance was even more marked in long-term agricultural
investment credits. After declining in 1984 to the point where it received
only 24 percent of long-term credit, compared with 38 percent for the state
farms and 38 percent for the peasant sector, the private enterprise sec
tor suddenly regained much of its historic control over investment credit.
(See Table 4.1.) According to c ie r a data, in 1988 a remarkable 70 percent
of all long-term agricultural credit went to medium- and large-sized pro
ducers, up from 31 percent the year before. The a pp now absorbed only
10 percent of this credit, and the rural credit program for coops and small
producers received only 20 percent of the total, falling from 63 percent
two years before. The bank system was undergoing a full restructuring
along more conventional, less revolutionary, lines.
The shift in credit clients was the product of a new emphasis on bank
solvency adopted in 1988. As the bank sought clients with demonstrated
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ability to repay their loans, it also inaugurated a new program that would
index the cost of that credit, pegging it to the rate of inflation. In fact,
however, the monthly increases in the interest rates still fell behind the
galloping inflation rate, and even the revised program continued to provide
subsidies to borrowers (Spoor 1989). Now those borrowers were heavily
concentrated in the private elite.
New Organizational Openings
One way in which economic elites gain power is by having easy ac
cess to political leaders. The existence of regular channels of formal and
informal communication allows business leaders to keep their needs and
wants highly visible to policymakers and to monitor closely the state re
sponse. When business elites themselves rotate in and out of public office
or when close family ties link the political and economic leaderships, this
kind of access is most complete. Even without that personal or familial
identification, however, friendship and school networks can still facilitate
the development of communication channels that enhance the political
position of the wealthy class.
In Nicaragua, as the expropriations decreased, the number of formal
and informal contacts between top government officials and private pro
ducers increased. The government initiated a new round of consultations
that culminated in the creation of new policymaking boards. It also
launched a concertacion process that blunted private sector opposition
to the regime and heightened the internal political division of the bour
geoisie.
The Breakdown of Communication: 1979-1986. In the early years of the
revolution, the private sector's access to the political power centers was
restricted. Communication between traditional elites and the Sandinista
state became erratic and highly charged. The government wanted private
producers to learn to produce without making demands about "extrane
ous" matters like the content of the national ideology, the educational
system, press freedom, or election procedures.
In its effort to redefine the political roles of the private sector and avoid
confrontations, the government adopted a series of strategies. One was
to divide the private sector by level, deflecting attention from the top
umbrella organizations like c o s e p and u pa n ic and focusing instead on
gremio or sectoral organizations. Instead of meeting with u pa n ic leaders,
who focused on the need for systemic change, for example, the govern
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ment representatives met with rice or cotton growers about technical
issues such as access to inputs or marginal price increases.
During this phase, the main channel of communication with the bour
geoisie was a network of consultative commissions. These commissions
had been created by decree in February 1980 and placed under the aus
pices of the then Ministerio de Desarrollo Agropecuario.18 They brought
together producers and labor representatives with officials from govern
ment ministries involved in production and distribution. Their work
focused on technical production issues including labor rates, technologi
cal packages, bank credit, costs of inputs, and final prices.19 The creation
of these committees allowed government agencies to work with actual
producers on a narrow, predefined agenda rather than meet with the politi
cally ambitious leaders of the national private sector organizations.
Even for these production-oriented groups, however, the top f s l n
leadership was inaccessible. Requests for meetings with key ministers
were often denied or, more routinely, not answered. Representatives of the
sorghum producers, for example, reported waiting for over a year during
this period for an audience with m id in r a minister Jaime Wheelock (inter
view, a n pr o s o r , August 22, 1986). One leader of c a d in reported that
friends in the government would meet him now only as a private citizen
and requested that he not use official c a d in stationary in his correspon
dence with them (interview, c a d in , August n, 1987). The f s l n , to one
prominent cattle breeder, was a "masonic group . . . like the mafia. Those
who didn't belong to it were outside" (interview, a c b n , June 28,1990).
This separation was particularly important in the Nicaraguan context.
As we saw in Chapter 2, the personalism of the Somoza dictatorship and
the weakness of the legal system had produced a process in which business
leaders were required to negotiate arrangements with political leaders
on almost a case-by-case basis. These clientelistic negotiations were rou
tinely done through face-to-face communication in which personal bonds
carried great weight. Key business and public policy discussions took
place in the homes of the elite, over drinks, in a convivial atmosphere.
Friendships, often laced around extended family ties, sealed deals. Little
information was publicly available about such matters as trade negotia
tions, investment opportunities, contracts, and bids. The country had no
stock market, nor did it require public reporting of corporate earnings.
The few corporations that issued stock generally sold it to a handful of in
siders, often of an extended family. The system revolved around personal
contacts.
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After 1979 the old system was collapsing, and the new institutions
were relatively inaccessible to the bourgeoisie. Comparing the Somoza
and Sandinista eras, one large sorghum producer explained, "Somoza and
his ministers would at least talk to us. They might tell us 'no' but at
least they would talk" (interview, a n pr o s o r , August 22,1986). Although
some economic elites had family ties to Sandinista leaders, particularly
Luis Carrion Cruz and Jaime Wheelock, personal connections at that level
were infrequent and often strained.20
This distance from the bourgeoisie buffered Sandinista leaders from
private sector demands and allowed them to focus on their priority con
stituencies. But it had a political and, ultimately, economic cost. The
sudden ostracism, combined with several spates of antibourgeois rheto
ric, pushed many of these producers further into the opposition. Even
gremio leaders began to suspend their attendance at consultative commis
sion meetings. Arguing that they were only tokens at meetings otherwise
stacked by pro-Sandinista representatives, these gremio representatives
boycotted meetings or were suddenly unavailable for appointments with
state bureaucrats.21 Following the 1985 expropriation of s a im s a , the large
corporation managed and largely owned by c o s e p president Enrique Bola
nos, u pa n ic affiliates formally renounced any further participation in
these or any other gatherings called by the government (u pa n ic 1985).
Renewal of Communication: 1987-1988. Beginning in 1987 a new phase
in state-capital relations got under way.22 After two years of very lim
ited contact with private producers, m id in r a minister Jaime Wheelock
moved to break the ice. m id in r a now called a series of direct, large-scale
meetings that Wheelock himself presided over. An acrimonious meet
ing with cattle ranchers, in which government programs were roundly
criticized by representatives of both f a g a n ic and u n a g , was followed
by meetings with dairy farmers in f o n d il a c and rice growers in a n a r
(c o s e p 1987a). As continuing complaints were lodged by cotton and coffee
producers, the government moved to formalize high-level communication
with those producers as well.
In April 1988 four national agricultural commissions were created.23
These organizations became high-profile policy boards that replaced the
defunct consultative commissions. The presidents of the new commis
sions approached their task as "ambassadors," representing the govern
ment but with greater attention to the views and beliefs of those private
producers in whose terrain they tread.24 The attendance of u pa n ic rep
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resentatives at meetings soon normalized. Ironically, after years of verbal
sparring, u pa n ic leaders now found common cause with u n a g represen
tatives who took an increasingly entrepreneurial line on issues of property
and prices.
Concertacion: 1989. Throughout much of Latin America the economic
crisis of the 1980s prompted governments to seek a new social pact with
business and labor. A search began for new forms of agreement about how
the economic costs of recovery would be allocated and what the future
rules governing economic negotiations would be. This search typically
brought together an array of established adversaries for tough negotia
tions about the economic model that would be adopted. Concertacion, or
the process of striking a new social contract, required competing parties
to make a series of calculations estimating short-term losses and long
term gains under different scenarios (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 4547).25 Knotty topics that had often divided business and labor, including
ownership, wages, profits, strikes, subsidies, taxes, trade priorities, and
regulation, were back on the agenda.
Drawing on imperfect information, areas of mutual benefit or inverse
gain had to be reassessed throughout the region, now under the pall
of economic decline. Workers, themselves often stratified and disorga
nized, struggled to determine how best to reduce their losses and increase
their opportunities in the face of economic collapse. Labor representa
tives weighed the costs of accepting current wage reductions or job loss
against the uncertain prospects of future benefit following from a round
of increased investments. Employers, often torn between their desire for
state support and the appeal of the market, maneuvered to maximize their
access to resources. They faced complex pressures for the return of flight
capital and increased investment in a risky environment in return for the
prospect of enhanced social legitimacy and possible future gain. The state,
now shorn of the financial resources that fueled state activism in prior
decades, struggled to retain essential powers even as it underwent deep
retrenchment. The political leadership was forced to search for new meth
ods to secure growth and promote national development. For all parties,
the way in which the society's resources were to be divided was at stake.
Plagued by deeper economic crisis and social division than most, the
Nicaraguan government opened a highly publicized economic concerta
cion process in 1989. The Nicaraguan variant of concertacion focused on
the relationship between the state and private producers. Representatives
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of labor either did not participate in Sandinista concertacion consulta
tions or had only a minor presence. Consequently, concertacion under
this kind of government had a lopsided quality due to the absorption of
much of organized labor under the Sandinista banner. Unionization had
been extremely limited under the Somoza government; most labor orga
nizations in Nicaragua emerged under the protection of the revolutionary
regime.26 The political and ideological dependence of organized labor on
the Sandinista regime made it difficult for unions to exercise an indepen
dent voice.
Beginning in January 1989 intense meetings were held by top govern
ment officials with a small group of the country's most important cotton
producers and processors to discuss the needs of that crucial sector.27 In
the weeks that followed, various u pa n ic leaders were consulted about the
1989 economic adjustment plan before the measures were announced.28
In April 1989 the government called for a fuller, open consultation with
private producers in a two-day meeting. This Proceso de Concertacion
Nacional brought together Daniel Ortega, all of the leading economic
ministers, and over 600 private producers in an event monitored by the
diplomatic community.29
Including representatives from both u n a g and u pa n ic , this session
formally committed the regime to providing more resources for private
producers. In a desperate move to restart the production process, mul
tiple concessions were made.30 The government agreed to reduce and fix
the interest rates (at no more than 20 percent monthly rates for regu
lar agricultural loans); reduce import taxes and port charges,- lower other
taxes by 50 percent for producers making investments to benefit their
workers (better housing, potable water, etc.),- extend the grace period for
loan repayment for coffee producers and cattle ranchers,- offer special price
incentives for coffee producers who exceeded by 25 percent their produc
tion levels for the last three years,- reduce long-term interest rates for the
cattle sector,- and forgive 50 percent of unpaid loans of irrigated rice, sor
ghum, basic grains, perishables, and sesame growers and restructure the
remaining 50 percent. A special subsidy program was created for cotton
producers, reducing costs, increasing the price, and suspending/renego
tiating past debts on soft terms (five-year repayment period, one year of
grace, 5 percent monthly interest) for those who agreed to plant again in
the coming year.31
Perhaps most important was the government's renewed affirmation of
established property rights. When Daniel Ortega presented the 1989 eco
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nomic plan to the national assembly and called for a beginning of the
concertacion, he noted that there were still landless peasants in Nicaragua
whose demands for land were just. Their demands would be met, however,
by reassigning land held in those cooperatives with large, unused tracts
of land. Private sector participants in the concertacion process need not
fear further expropriations (Barricada, January 31,1989). Five weeks later,
Wheelock announced that the government was preparing draft legislation
to halt any future land expropriations (Chicago Tribune, March 6,1989).
Respect for property rights was again affirmed in the April concertacion
meeting.32 Concerning past expropriations, the government responded
to producers' hostility to the highly politicized Tribunal Agrario, which
decided legal appeals of expropriation decisions. Ortega proposed that
the tribunal be placed under the jurisdiction of the Nicaraguan Supreme
Court, which had, in previous years, periodically reviewed expropriation
cases and found against the government (Nuevo Diario, April 21, 1989).
In the words of u pa n ic leader Ramiro Gurdian, the government was now
using a "new language" in its conversations with the private sector (Nuevo
Diario, April 22,1989).
The following month, Ortega invited prominent private sector rep
resentatives to accompany government officials on their approaching
sojourn to Stockholm, Sweden. The May 1989 Stockholm meeting was to
allow the new economic officials in Nicaragua to meet with representa
tives of sixteen countries and three international organizations that were
potential foreign donors. The government representatives, supported, it
was hoped, by private producers, would describe the economic adjust
ments already under way and seek new foreign loans with which to
finance economic reactivation and stabilization of the economy. Although
most private sector leaders declined, several accepted the invitation, in
cluding two who held leadership positions in u pa n ic .33
Deepening Fragmentation: A Cunning Invitation to Division

The concertacion process was denounced in the opposition newspaper, La
Prensa, as a "cunning invitation to division."34 For private sector elites,
the regime's newfound support for local capitalists muddied the politi
cal waters. Entrenched opponents remained skeptical, fearing a cynical
plot. More moderate elements, however, moved to seize the opportuni
ties opened by the negotiation process and to abandon the confrontational
c o s e p stance. A handful of private sector leaders were even drawn into the
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camp and came to serve as its close allies. The fragmentation process
initiated in the 1979-86 period now intensified as both the government
and the private sector wearied of prolonged conflict.
f sl n

Entrenched Opposition
For those who continued their strident opposition to the regime, the
reforms of 1988-89 fell short of the mark. Although some of their eco
nomic concerns were being addressed, their behavior was never based
solely on calculations of profits and growth. The bourgeoisie was not just
an economic class,- it was also a social elite. As Conaghan (1988) argues
in her study of the Ecuadorean elite, interpretations of the behavior of
the bourgeoisie that fail to consider the "moral culture" of the class may
produce seriously misguided analysis. Just as Scott (1976) advanced the
understanding of peasant behavior with an inquiry into their moral vision,
so too must the analysis of the bourgeoisie be alert to the conception of a
morally correct social order that pervades this class.
From the standpoint of economic elites, the Sandinista revolution had
not only reduced their ability to accumulate but also undercut their social
status and the respect with which they were viewed in their community.
The trappings of wealth and bourgeois tastes, such as luxury cars or suits
and ties, were now regarded with derision in the state-controlled mass
media. Throughout the country, the private clubs, which had anchored the
bourgeoisie as a social class, had been turned into public "cultural cen
ters" and meeting places for the revolutionary government. Newspapers
no longer carried a society section. Not only did formal titles like Licenciado and Ingeniero cease to be used, but even honorifics such as Don
and Dona became less common. Workers sent former patrones into fits of
apoplexy by using the informal form of address with them. The respect
ful, even affectionate attitude employers had taken for granted in their
employees was replaced with detachment and hostility. Many employers
now feared their workers. Several younger producers I interviewed in 1990
described the outrage and indignation these changing social relations had
sparked in their fathers7 generation. Some who had come of age in the
prerevolutionary period now hesitated to visit their own farms and firms
because of concern about a possible confrontation; many of them turned
direct management of their enterprises over to their offspring.
Opponents also blamed the government for the dissolution of their
families. Fearful of the regime's ideological appeals to their children and
the impact of revolutionary propaganda on the beliefs their children would
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adopt, many of those with economic resources sent their children to live
abroad.35 The military draft provided another reason for sending their sons
out of the country 36 The diaspora of the new generation contributed to the
further denationalization of the Nicaraguan elite as well as its brooding
resentment against a government that would make family dislocations
necessary. These and other objections to the Sandinista revolution were
hardly dissolved by a few economic guarantees. Even if the Sandinistas
responded positively to the bourgeoisie's economic demands for market
prices and property assurances, the hostility of many was unwavering.
Furthermore, the emerging political aspirations of the economic elite
were frustrated by the sweeping dominance of the f s l n . Elections were
initially postponed until 1984 and then were won overwhelmingly by the
f s l n . For private producers from the old Conservative party aristocracy in
Granada, whose grandfathers and great-grandfathers had been presidents
and ministers in the pre-Somoza era, or from the pl i , the oppositional
offshoot of the Somoza family's party whose members viewed themselves
as Somoza's rightful heirs, the prospects of realizing established political
ambitions were made more remote by the consolidation of the Sandi
nista revolution in 1984. For other producers, who had not previously had
political ambitions, the experiences of the revolution and their roles as
leaders of the private sector organizations created aspirations that were
steadily frustrated, c o s e p and u pa n ic leaders who carried the banners of
the opposition for almost a decade and who became the political counter
point to the government began to see themselves as natural successors to
the Sandinista regime.
Inconsistency in actual government behavior only deepened this
group's skepticism. Although the number of expropriations declined in
1988 and 1989, those that occurred were among the most highly publi
cized and politically controversial of the decade. In 1988, for example, the
Sandinistas expropriated the is a , historically Central America's largest
sugar mill, from the powerful Pellas family37 The three expropriations
that took place in 1989 involved the takeover of properties of some of
the regime's most vociferous critics. These three producers were not only
prominent figures in u pa n ic and leaders of their respective coffee pro
ducer associations; they were also prominent members of the right-wing
opposition party, the pl c 38
The regime made hurried efforts to control the damage done by these
expropriations. For example, it succeeded in converting the is a expropria
tion into a purchase after some months of negotiations 39 It also attempted
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to return the three coffee estates expropriated in 1989 and offered compen
sation for the owners' losses.40 This pattern of inconsistent signaling, how
ever, undermined the Sandinista government's coalition-building efforts.
The inability of the government to develop consistent policy hinted at
the internal tensions at play within the regime. Disbelief and skepticism
on the part of bourgeois opponents about the depth and durability of the
new line were a natural result.
Private Sector Conciliators
For some private sector leaders, however, the general package of re
forms and concessions made by the regime suggested that it was pursuing
a new direction. This sense of possibility appealed to these entrepreneurs,
and two new cleavages emerged. The first was a deepening fissure within
c o s e p itself. The second was the creation of a new organization that
offered an alternative to cosEP-style confrontation.
First, schismatic tendencies erupted in u pa n ic . c o s e p had ruled
against the participation of its members in the private sector delegation
to the May 1989 Donors' Conference in Stockholm, c o s e p leaders argued
that this delegation would serve the partisan purposes of the Sandinista
regime by helping it secure foreign financing. When one of the members
of u pa n ic 's directorate, Juan Diego Lopez, president of f o n d il a c , de
cided to join the delegation in spite of this admonition, u pa n ic president
Ramiro Gurdian publicly urged his ouster, f o n d il a c 's officers rejected
the move and reaffirmed their leader's status as president [Barricada,
May 12, 1989; Nuevo Diario, May 13, 1989) 41 This episode highlighted
the division within the organization between the central core and its af
filiate associations. Whereas the c o s e p/u pa n ic leadership emphasized
confrontational tactics and a desire to centralize decision making, some
of the affiliate associations preferred to negotiate.
u pa n ic affiliates also split over continued participation in the national
agricultural commissions after the expropriation of the three coffee
leaders. In spite of the national coffee leadership's call for producers to
withdraw from the commissions, regional leaders in the affiliate in Jino
tega, the country's most important coffee growing region, refused to co
operate.42 u pa n ic representatives on other commissions also rejected the
boycott.43 Again, u pa n ic representatives and affiliates were unwilling to
follow the lead of their more confrontational leaders when they judged
their group interests to be better furthered through cooperation.
At the same time, cos e p 's ideological and tactical leadership was being
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challenged by the creation of a new private sector think tank. As part of
the process of dialogue, eight of Nicaragua's top business leaders and aca
demics formed a new organization, c o r d e n ic . c o r d e n ic was the brain
child of two of the Nicaraguan representatives on the Comision Internacional para la Recuperacion y el Desarrollo de Centroamerica, colloquially
known as the Sanford Commission after commission founder U.S. Sena
tor Terry Sanford. Five months after the Sanford Commission initiated its
operations, former c o s e p president Enrique Dreyfus and in c a e econo
mist Francisco Mayorga brought together six other moderate leaders of
the Nicaraguan business community to form a local spinoff.
The Sanford Commission was an international, privately funded task
force established in the wake of the Esquipulas II peace accords to promote
reconciliation and development in Central America.44 It was composed
of forty-seven members from twenty different countries, including four
from Nicaragua.45 This commission sponsored twenty-five meetings be
tween 1987 and 1989 to promote dialogue among key representatives in
different camps. Emphasis was placed on addressing the urgent problems
of those displaced by war and suffering extreme poverty, but the long-term
analysis focused on development needs and democratization processes.46
Inspired by the Sanford Commission model, Dreyfus and Mayorga
pulled together a committee of private sector leaders to break through the
polarization that had characterized political and economic discussion in
Nicaragua.47 c o r d e n ic emphasized the need for open dialogue and nego
tiation instead of isolation and confrontation and called for a change of
style in state-private sector communication. New "attitudes of coopera
tion" had to be cultivated "in all sectors of the community" (c o r d e n ic
1988). To this end, it organized a series of dialogues in which previously
antagonistic groups, such as competing unions or the wide spectrum of
political party leaders, were brought together to discuss common prob
lems (c o r d e n ic 1990). Although c o r d e n ic seminars were wryly criti
cized by the newly established weekly newspaper La Cronica (August 2430, 1989) as a "dialogue of the deaf," they did foster the first of a series of
exchanges among divergent, antagonistic groups.
Since it was not a mass-based organization, c o r d e n ic did not compete
directly with c o s e p . Many c o s e p leaders, however, saw it as an implicit
critic and rival.48 Instead of the stale condemnations laced with Cold War
rhetoric that characterized much of cos e p 's communication, c o r d e n ic
used a reformist rhetoric that even included positive references to the
revolution. "The task is not to find who is guilty," concluded c o r d e n ic
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member Antonio Lacayo at a fractious session in December 1988. Instead,
he urged the country to "relaunch the Revolution" (Barricada, Decem
ber 14, 1988).
coRDENic represented a stratum of Nicaragua's urban-based, mana
gerial bourgeoisie. This group of entrepreneurs was distinctly non-Sandinista. Two had been jailed by the Sandinistas, and one member's firm
had been expropriated. They did, however, have various complex links
to the revolution. Among them were two entrepreneurs who had partici
pated in joint business ventures with the Sandinista state, one who had
been given a lucrative import monopoly by the government, and one who
had been a consultant in the Ministry of Planning for three years during
the revolution. Another member had even held a leadership position in
the f s l n during the 1970s. Generally young, with strong academic prepa
ration, continued links to Nicaraguan universities, and diversified entre
preneurial investments that extended to other Central American nations,
these private producers responded less personally to the government's at
tack on the bourgeoisie.49 Their pattern of interaction with the Sandinistas
separated this moderate, entrepreneurial cluster from the mainstream of
c o s e p leadership. Unlike c o s e p leaders, c o r d e n ic members accepted
the Sandinista revolution as an established fact.
c o r d e n ic 's development in 1988 began to fill a gap in the spectrum
of views and tactics that had polarized during the 1979-85 period. As
the Esquipulas peace process brought Sandinista and contra leaders to the
conference table and the prospects for peace increased, a new round of
discussions about the definition and future of the revolution became pos
sible. Some segments of the bourgeoisie, less inclined to ideological purity
and more willing to accept the social goals of the revolution, now began to
enter into that discussion. Weary of war and economic erosion and backed
by the reform initiatives of the Sanford Commission, this group looked
for compromise.
As a result of these developments, new forms of communication were
opened between sectors of the elite and the regime. Social networks,
underdeveloped and brittle during the earlier phase of the revolution, were
now cultivated by some participants on both sides. Pivotal figures, like
f o n d il a c president Lopez, worked to bridge the gap, bringing together
some intrepid business colleagues and top f s l n leaders for social en
gagements. A handful of family or school connections between economic
elites and government officials, most of which had ruptured during pre
vious years, were now tentatively reestablished. Given the traditional
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importance, in a small society, of face-to-face interactions and social con
tact to sediment relationships, these developments were symbolically and
psychologically important.50
The 1990 Elections and the Search for New Allies

The 1990 elections would determine the fate of the revolution. Under
the terms of the 1987 constitution, officials at all levels of government
were to be selected simultaneously. The presidency and vice-presidency,
all national assembly seats, and all municipal/regional council slots were
to be contested on February 25,1990.
The elections of 1984 had given the f s l n sweeping control over the
government, in spite of cosEP-led opposition efforts.51 Against six party
competitors from the left and the right, the Sandinistas won handily in
what were generally judged by observers to be relatively fair elections.52
With 67 percent of the valid vote, Daniel Ortega was chosen to be presi
dent, and the Sandinista legislative bench (composed of Sandinista party
members along with a number of close sympathizers) won sixty-one of
the ninety-six seats in the national assembly.
As the 1990 election approached, the Sandinistas worked hard to con
vey the electoral message that they had won the war and were now ready,
with the help of the private sector and foreign allies, to rebuild the econ
omy. With parts of the country still an armed camp and the economy badly
tattered, however, it was difficult in 1990 for the Sandinistas to convince
the war-torn nation. Furthermore, unlike in the elections in 1984, the
opposition to the Sandinistas was now both committed to participating in
the election and largely united in its effort. The Group of 14, composed of
fourteen political parties that opposed the f s l n , successfully negotiated
a series of agreements with the government over campaign rules, media
access, advertising, financing, and international observation. This group
formed a coalition called u n o to challenge the regime.
Ranging from parties generally associated with the left, like the Partido
Socialista Nicaragiiense, and parties on the right, like the pl c , this coali
tion was fraught with tensions. The weak miniparties that made up the
bulk of the coalition could not produce strong contenders for the execu
tive positions; the business leadership again stepped in. In the first major
decision made by the u n o coalition, the selection of presidential and
vice-presidential candidates, the two leading factions of the bourgeoisie
battled for ascendance.
On one hand, Enrique Bolanos, former president of c o s e p who had led
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the charge against the Sandinistas for years and whose property had been
expropriated in 1985, was supported by conservative elements who wanted
a full confrontation with the regime. On the other, Violeta Barrios de Cha
morro, as the widow of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro and former member of
the j g r n in its first year of operation, was regarded as less antagonistic to
the reform process and more committed to national reconciliation. After
two days of repeated balloting, Chamorro narrowly defeated Bolanos in
the closed selection process through which the candidate was chosen. She
headed a ticket that included Virgilio Godoy, longtime leader of the pl i ,
as the vice-presidential nominee.53
Although she was relatively inexperienced politically, Chamorro had
a series of assets that made her an attractive candidate. The sentimental
appeal of her late husband, her commitment to the revolution in the early
years when it was most widely supported, her prominent opposition after
ward through La Prensa, and the inclusion in her family of members who
were in opposing political camps made her appear less objectionable to
those who had earlier supported the revolution but now wanted a change.
Bolanos, on other hand, suffered both the stigma of wealth and the repu
tation of uncompromising hostility to the revolution. Chamorro seemed
more electable; her relative lack of experience may have made her seem
more malleable to others who hoped to influence her future development.
Once nominated, she named her son-in-law, c o r d e n ic member Antonio
Lacayo, to head her campaign.54
The f s l n labored hard to win, using sophisticated campaign tactics,
massive campaign spending, and the powers of incumbency to appeal to
voters. Recognizing that the economy was its Achilles' heel, the govern
ment held down prices for basic public services, such as gas and water,
and tried to convey the image that they had now won the confidence of
business leaders and local producers. The idea that the Sandinistas were
rebuilding their relationship with the private sector was conveyed in three
ways. First, producers were included prominently as candidates on the
f s l n slate. Second, the government offered a blizzard of new concessions
to traditional elites. Third, the government staged a series of last-minute
meetings with producers to demonstrate the access and ongoing dialogue
that now marked their interactions.
The f s l n as a political party began to undergo a redefinition during the
campaign. As the Central American peace process produced results and
the contra war abated, the f s l n began to shift away from the "vanguard"
structure to seek broader representativeness. Apparently recognizing that
their core support group had thinned over the years, the leadership sought
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to build linkages with outside groups by including the leaders of those
groups on the f s l n slate of candidates. According to then vice-president
Sergio Ramirez, the f s l n consciously adopted the strategy of recruiting
representatives of an array of large social groups, even if those representa
tives were not closely aligned with or ideologically linked to the f s l n .55
The f s l n leaders decided to accept wide diversity within the party bench
in order to maximize their chance to win the election.
One group courted by the party, somewhat incongruously, was the
business sector. Several prominent business leaders and agricultural pro
ducers were included on the slate of candidates to be ratified at the party
convention, and others were added from the convention floor.56 The f s l n
publicized prominently, in full-page newspaper ads, a list of twenty-four
producers who were legislative candidates on the f s l n slate.57 It built on
the division that had emerged in the u pa n ic leadership and successfully
recruited the president of f o n d il a c to run on the f s l n ticket. Other
prominent business leaders, like Andres Franceries, owner of Sandy's, a
popular fast-food restaurant, joined the Managua municipal-level ticket
and became outspoken campaigners.
At the same time, the regime announced a series of policy changes
that further responded to private sector demands. Private non-somocista
stockholders in companies that had been partially owned by Somoza allies
and, therefore, confiscated under Decrees #3 and #38 had, in most cases,
continued to hold their stock in these companies but were unable to exer
cise voting rights and received no dividends. Beginning in 1988 the reorga
nization of coiP, the state holding company that administered more than
eighty of these industrial firms, allowed private stockholders to resume
participation in the administration of these companies (Pasos 1990,• Barri
cada, February 7,1990,• see also Fonseca 1989). The government expressed
a willingness to take on private sector partners in selected state firms,
and some state enterprises were reportedly offered for privatization.58 The
government attempted to rescind selected expropriations, including those
of the three coffee-producing political leaders who lost their property in
June 1989.59 The unpopular reliquidation program, under which coffee
producers were paid for their crops in a series of installments spread over
the year instead of receiving the full amount at the time of the sale, was
suspended [Barricada, August 10, 1989).60 In meetings with private pro
ducers in December 1989, Wheelock reportedly proclaimed the failure of
the Sandinista economic model and asked these elites to help the San
dinistas formulate a new economic strategy (interviews, a n a r , June 23,
July 14,1990). Just weeks before the election, Wheelock again proclaimed
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an end to expropriations, announcing, "As of 1990, there will no longer be
confiscations or expropriations" [Barricada, February 14,1990).
Finally, Sandinista leaders had a series of public and private meetings
with agricultural producers in the final weeks of the campaign. New con
cessions were offered and public pledges made, including the prospect
of producer participation in the administration of state trade monopolies
(Barricada, February 16,1990). Long interviews with national and regional
leaders of c o s e p and its affiliates were a staple of Sandinista media cov
erage in the days before the vote, u pa n ic president Ramiro Gurdian was
now quoted in Barricada (February 19,1990) as saying, "There's space for
us to work together." Barricada headlines blazed: "Mutual Confidence
between Government and Producers" (February 16,1990).
The f s l n strategists probably did not expect to win over many private
elites with these tactics. Indeed, according to one study, only 10 percent of
those who classified themselves as owners and proprietors voted in favor
of the f s l n in 1990 (Oquist 1992, 14). The f s l n 's goals were more vital.
Rather than persuading the small number of private elites in the country
to vote for the f s l n , the government hoped to persuade the large num
bers of peasants, workers, and unemployed Nicaraguans that the economy
could be reactivated under their leadership through a renewal of private
sector investment. Demonstrating the private elite's willingness to co
operate with the f s l n , it was hoped, would restore the confidence of the
larger population.
In fact, for a series of different reasons, this approach failed. The heavy
emphasis on an alliance with private producers may have even undercut
support from the f s l n 's social base. The f s l n 's newfound affinity for the
bourgeoisie surely perplexed and antagonized some former supporters.61
The Sandinistas lost the election, gaining only 41 percent of the presi
dential vote to u n o 's 55 percent. They lost not only the executive branch
but at every level of the election. At the assembly level, u n o received 54
percent of the vote and won 51 seats, whereas the f s l n got 41 percent of
the vote and won 39 seats.62 u n o also swept the municipal council races,
winning a majority of the seats in 99 of 131 municipalities (see l a s a 1990,
34-39). The Sandinista era had now passed.
Conclusions

Like revolutions elsewhere, the Nicaraguan revolution went first through
an ambitious phase, in which important structural transformations were
attempted, and then followed with a more difficult phase of retrenchment,
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as international pressure and domestic problems mounted. In the Nicara
guan case, this second phase entailed repeated overtures to local business
elites. The early economic model, which incorporated selected, strategic
sectors of the bourgeoisie, was now revised to admit business as a whole.
Jinotega coffee growers and f o n d il a c officers now being approached by
the regime were hardly the medium-sized or chapiollo producers identi
fied as potential allies in the earlier phase. Indeed, c o r d e n ic members
were among the most wealthy and prominent business leaders in the
country. Convinced that the bourgeoisie that remained in Nicaragua was
the most progressive in Central America, and caught in a no-win situation,
the regime reconceptualized the role of private elites in the revolution,
now in a more favorable light.
As foreign loans dried up and state development projects continued to
absorb rather than generate resources, local capital from the private sector
was thought to provide the only remaining hope for economic revitaliza
tion, both as a source of investment and a force that could mobilize new
foreign support. Some in the elite, convinced that the Sandinistas had per
manently altered the nature of their society, accepted negotiations with
the regime. This approach succeeded in further fragmenting the Nicara
guan private sector into entrenched opponents and those who were open
to dialogue. It failed, however, to renew economic growth or persuade
the Nicaraguan population that the country was on the road to economic
recovery. Ultimately, the Sandinistas were expelled from office.
Debate continues about the wisdom of this strategy. For some, this shift
to the right undermined the Sandinistas' popular base (ih c a 1988c, 1989).
For others, the overtures to the bourgeoisie revealed a fundamental, long
term interpenetration of the Sandinista leadership and old-line economic
elites, particularly from the Granadan oligarchical families (Vilas 1992).
Certainly the return to market principles during the economic restruc
turing and the indiscriminate courtship of the bourgeoisie challenged the
Sandinistas' alliance with the Nicaraguan poor.
But the range of options available to the f s l n leadership contracted
sharply with the economic crisis. Unwilling, because of geopolitical rea
sons and their own understanding of Nicaragua's needs, to tread new
ground and radically redistribute the nation's wealth, the f s l n went a
more conventional route. This strategy, in turn, helped f s l n leaders build
a relationship with the segment of the reform bourgeoisie that succeeded
them, laying the groundwork for a postrevolution negotiation process in
which they could preserve some of their interests and some of their re
forms.

chapter

A Profile of the Elite Leadership
The Sandinistas were enriching themselves. They were not MarxistLeninists; they were just grabbing up things. They were giving Marx a
bad name. They never had a firm ideology.
—u n c a f e n ic leader, July 23,1990
The Sandinistas did an important thing teaching workers their rights,
teaching people how to read. ... The Sandinistas were able to raise,
in a way that could be felt, the people’s sense of worth. In this sense,
Nicaragua has a better future than Guatemala, which has a very high
level of inequality.
—a n a r leader, June 23,1990

The Political Segmentation of the Economic Elite

To go beyond structural analysis and glimpse the inner workings of the
economic elite, we must consult the bourgeoisie itself. This chapter draws
on almost two hundred interviews conducted with leaders of the Nica
raguan private sector between 1982 and 1991. It focuses on 143 semi
structured interviews with 91 private sector leaders that were conducted
between January 1990 and August 1991. These respondents were chosen
from a targeted group of business elites who played leadership roles during
the f s l n era. Participants in this study were selected using a positional/
reputational methodology. (See the discussion of methodology in Appen
dix 1.) Interviews were conducted with top-ranking officials of the major
private sector organizations, private sector representatives on national
boards and commissions, and others that respondents in the first two
groups specifically recommended for inclusion in the study based on their
informal leadership roles.
Politically, these respondents can be divided into five groups: (1) the
moral-political opponents who waged ideological warfare against the San
dinistas; (2) the technical opponents who focused more narrowly and
less rancorously on the pragmatic failings of the Sandinista government;
(3) those in the middle, for whom the accomplishments and gains of the
period were balanced against the problems and losses; (4) advocates of the
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Sandinista reforms who tempered their support for the revolution with a
critical assessment of specific policies or leaders; and (5) enthusiasts who
took on the role of regime defenders.1
The first sector, composed of the moral-political opposition, was locked
in a fundamental conflict with the Sandinista government. Actions of
the regime that purportedly served the national interest or the concerns
of the poor were interpreted as a cynical ruse designed to cover up the
self-serving ambitions of the political leaders. For example, agrarian re
form was understood not as an effort to empower the landless or increase
resources available for national development but simply as a device to
extend the dominance of the f s l n in the countryside and to centralize
power and wealth in the hands of Sandinista leaders.
Although some of those most opposed to the f s l n saw the Sandinistas
as diehard, orthodox Marxist-Leninists who were out to eliminate any
vestige of private ownership, others did not credit them with any ideo
logical convictions. "They weren't ideologues, they were bandits," said
one adversary. "They didn't have consciences,- they were prepared to kill,"
said another. Moral-ideological opponents frequently drew comparisons
between the Sandinistas and the Somoza government. For this group, the
Sandinistas represented a deteriorated variant of somocismo. "Both were
dictatorships," said one interviewee, "but the Sandinistas were more re
pressive." Another alleged, "Somoza never robbed like the Sandinistas."
For this group, the losses of the era were not narrowly economic but
also social and moral. Several respondents focused on the destruction of
basic social institutions, like the family, and on the loss of traditional
religious and cultural values. "Sandinista policy was bad in all senses. It
divided the family, delinked the society," said one man who had moved his
whole family to Guatemala in 1986. Traditional respect for older people,
religious leaders, and employers was said to be gone, replaced by "shame
lessness," "militarism," and "admiration for those who could steal the
most." One leader of the u pa n ic sorghum growers association concluded,
"Sandinista policy was not bad, it was nefarious." Bitterness about this
assault on the traditional social order gave this group's denunciations a
strong emotional twist. In several cases, this hostility was deepened by
the grueling experience of having been detained or imprisoned on various
security charges by the Sandinista regime.
For this group, the policy shifts that took place at the end of the decade
did not reflect any substantive adjustment on the part of the regime. As
one large coffee producer said, "If you think that the Sandinistas moder-
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ated their course after 1988, you are mistaken. Any apparent change they
made was just a tactic to get Western aid." The Sandinistas' belated com
mitment to end land expropriation also lacked credibility for this group.
Several Masatepe coffee producers claimed in 1990, for example, that the
Sandinista government had simply suspended these takeovers for electoral
purposes and had targeted their lands for immediate expropriation right
after the February 1990 election. A Matagalpan coffee producer echoed the
charge: "If they had won in February [1990], they would have eliminated
the rest of the bourgeoisie. The Sandinistas became the new bourgeoisie,
and they wanted to take what remained from the old bourgeoisie."
There was a strong tendency in this group to assign responsibility for
all of Nicaragua's problems, even those that predated the revolution, to
the Sandinista government. The contra war as well was regarded purely
as the product of Sandinista aggression. Some of these opponents con
cluded that the Sandinistas actively sought the conflict. As one sorghum
producer put it, "The Sandinistas wanted the contra rebels, the war. They
were begging on their knees for the U.S. to invade. That was the way to
get more foreign assistance."
While the moral-political opponents had a prominent place in the oppo
sition, a second voice was also heard. Leaders of the private sector who
opposed the regime did not all concur on the nature of the problem or
the best approach to take in interactions with the government. A second
group, composed of technical-policy opponents, offered a more moderate
critique. They too opposed the government but did not argue that the
revolution was fundamentally corrupt, socially deviant, or driven by mali
cious intent. Rather, this group emphasized that the Sandinistas' vision
was "impractical" and their programs "badly run" and "mismanaged." The
emphasis here was on concrete policies, particularly those directed toward
the business sector. For example, technical-policy opponents objected to
land expropriations, not by arguing that private property was sacred, but
by claiming that many of those expropriated were productive and that
their expropriation was a violation of the Sandinistas' own agrarian reform
policies. When asked to describe the main problems they had during the
Sandinista era, these respondents focused on technical issues like prices,
the poor quality of inputs, delays in the dispersal of credit and supplies,
an insufficient or poorly trained labor force, and excessive bureaucracy.
These critics argued that prices paid by the regime were too low to cover
production costs. Producers were surviving, one coffee grower claimed,
"by eating up their capital."
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As with the first group, these producers were also unwilling to read
Sandinista policy in a positive way. Even policies that favored private
producers, like subsidized interest rates, were interpreted as miscalcula
tions made by incompetent government officials rather than conscious
efforts to stimulate production. Price supports and other nonmarket fea
tures adopted by the government to stabilize production and woo pro
ducer endorsement were not well regarded by this group, which favored
a market-based approach. One of the nation's largest cotton growers, for
example, derided the "artificial economy" and "fictitious currency" of the
era. "Everything here was subsidized. That's the reason for the economic
failure," said a former supporter turned opponent. A leader of a n a r con
cluded, "In the Sandinista period, we didn't have to work very hard. We
knew we'd always get by. But I was pulled down by gravity. I've been
deteriorating."
Accustomed to market forces, and skeptical of any other model, these
private sector leaders viewed the unorthodox features of the Sandinista
model with disdain. The government was viewed by these opponents as a
"nine-headed monster" whose collective leadership style under the ninemember national directorate was found to create inconsistent or con
stantly changing policy. A medium-sized rice grower concluded, "Every
thing was the reverse of what an economy should be. Expensive things
were cheap. Plans changed every day. . . . [The Sandinistas] said there
would be no more confiscations, then they did it again the next day. Things
that were 'good' one day were prohibited the next. . . . This showed the
immaturity of the system, the lack of seriousness. You could only work
for today, never make plans for tomorrow."
Unlike their more extreme counterparts, the second group did not re
gard the government as a diabolical force with which they refused to
consort. Members of this group were relatively open to dialogue with
government officials. For them, these interactions at least provided the
opportunity to continually put forward an alternative program and "make
some noise" (hacer la bulla}. One large finotega coffee producer explained:
"I'm one of those who believes that the fight is made within, that if you
stay on the outside, you don't have any influence." This group gener
ally responded more favorably to the post-1987 reforms, seeing them as a
genuine move in the right direction.
Nicaraguan society became highly polarized during the revolution, and
few private producers took the middle ground. A third group of mixed
mediators did, however, detach themselves somewhat from the political
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debate and pointedly pursue a careful balancing act. One cotton grower
concluded, "It's like you're standing in a rocking boat. Not too much to
this side; not too much to that. ... We must be moderate. There are two
sides in the country. Neither can do away with the other." When asked
about their opinion of the Sandinista government, favored descriptions
in this small group included "I'm of the intermediate line, without poli
tics" and "I'm of the center, unaligned." One prominent producer, whose
family included both Sandinistas and their opponents, concluded that "in
politics, one must be ambiguous. . . . Ideology makes everything fail. You
have to be pragmatic."
Weary of acrimony and war, those in this middle group sometimes tried
to function as mediators. They would describe achievements or positive
aspirations of the revolution, such as agrarian reform or labor union nego
tiation, but they followed quickly with criticisms of the expropriations of
non-somocistas or misuse of government power. Several members of this
group saw the f s l n both as a victim of an aggressive U.S. foreign policy
and as a provocateur, actively baiting the Reagan-Bush administration in
self-defeating ways.
Perhaps most intriguing were those in the fourth and fifth groups:
private sector leaders who supported the revolution. These leaders were
anomalous, since they acted in ways that were not consistent with most
standard theories of elite behavior. New approaches to social theory, how
ever, sketch a conceptual model that may be of use here. Traditional expla
nations of economic and, indeed, even political behavior generally draw
on a "rational actor" model that assumes that behavior is a calculated re
sponse to perceptions of self-interest, narrowly construed.2 Some recent
theory, however, rejects these assumptions and argues that "pro-social
motivations" such as duty, love, and malevolence (Mansbridge 1990, ix)
or sympathy and commitment (Sen 1990, 31) also shape political and eco
nomic choices. Decisions of economic elites to refrain from opposition
to a revolutionary movement and, indeed, even provide political support,
may respond to more complex motivations than those conventionally
employed.3
Most members of the elite who came to support the revolution linked
up with the f s l n during the period of the insurrection, when they were
deeply frustrated by the abuses associated with the Somoza dynasty. Sev
eral of those who stayed with the revolution had been colab oradores historicos, directly involved in supporting the military effort of the f s l n in
1978—79. Unlike other private sector leaders, their opposition to Somoza
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included a fuller critique of the prerevolutionary social order and its
underlying development model. They focused on the resources siphoned
off not only by Somoza but by the "collateral economic structures—cot
ton gins, pesticide manufacturers, export houses," the "big ranchers who
owned the slaughterhouses," or the animal feed industry.
This resentment was not limited to those who monopolized economic
power; arrogant denizens of the Somoza-era social hierarchy also drew
criticism. Those who were not admitted into social clubs dominated by
the upper elite were sometimes embittered by their exclusion. Even some
members of the elite who were admitted into these chambers responded
negatively to the social arrogance of their peers. The concentration of
wealth and social power in the hands of agroindustrialists or local oli
garchs was a source of dissatisfaction for many producers who looked to
the revolution for an alternative.
A range of forces served as catalysts to link these producers to the San
dinista cause, including religious conviction, intellectual persuasion, and
family tragedy. Several mentioned the powerful pull of liberation theology
espoused by radical teachers at prestigious prep schools, like the Colegio
Centroamerica, that were favored by this class. The humiliating taunt by
classmates at a U.S. university that his nation was a banana republic under
Somoza led another into the protest movement. Age-old feuds going back
generations between their families and that of Somoza propelled some
into the opposition. In several cases, the loss of a beloved child to a ram
paging national guard led elite leaders to repudiate the regime. The pro
found failures of the Somoza regime drew even economic elites into the
making of the revolution.4 Some subsequently dropped away, but those
who took on leadership roles in the insurrection generally developed a
long-term commitment to the cause.
Support for the Sandinista government required more than just a re
pudiation of Somoza-era institutions. Regime supporters shared a belief
that "an active state role in the economy was necessary in developing
countries." One supporter concluded, "The mixed economy is valid. State
enterprises should exist in order to promote development, as an axis of
development to generate resources that can be used for the whole society.
They can help provide technical assistance to private producers and im
prove social conditions for workers." A common view in this segment of
the bourgeoisie was that production, in the long run, must be built on a
corporatist-style acceptance of the rights of workers. "Workers," said one
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former u pa n ic leader, "are an integral part of production." Marginalized,
illiterate, and abused workers would impede the collective development
of the nation; literate and well-cared-for workers would advance its long
term development.
A few of the regime supporters entered the movement only after the
Sandinistas came to power. For them, the contra war and the prominent
role played in it by the United States often served as a catalyst. Said one,
"My sympathy for the Sandinistas accelerated with the war. I am proud
of Nicaragua; I didn't want it pressured from the outside." Ironically, a
war that the Reagan administration defended as necessary to impede the
advance of communism led some Nicaraguan business leaders to befriend
the Sandinista regime.
Although the bourgeoisie as a class experienced a sharp economic ero
sion during the revolution, two considerations weighed against uniform
elite opposition. First, ideology is not purely a reflection of objective ma
terial calculations. Even among elites, ideology is a refraction of various
forces, including social ideals, a sense of historical junctures, and previ
ous political frustrations. Second, although the bourgeoisie as a class lost
resources under the Sandinistas, not all lost equally. Some lost massively;
others actually gained. Interclass hostilities and the prospect of personal
economic gain also helped to elicit the support of some prorevolution
elites.
Not all of those who supported the regime were equally enthusias
tic about the government, however; many had reservations. Supporters
tended to divide into two groups: one that endorsed the regime, but with
significant reservations, and another that identified more completely with
the f s l n . The moderate reformers who had some reservations constitute
the fourth group in this study; regime apologists were the fifth and final
segment.
Several developments prompted most moderate reformers to retain a
certain critical independence from the regime. In spite of the regime's
affirmation of the "patriotic" producers, the Sandinista leadership's dis
course against the bourgeoisie as a class and the waves of expropriation
that occurred presented a major challenge to private sector supporters. As
a result, many producers who endorsed the revolution had reservations
about some of its central programs. One coffee producer who became an
f s l n assembly candidate explained: "I am a private producer, and I repre
sent private producers. I can't go along with the expropriation of other
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private producers." A dairy and rice producer explained his decision to
run on the f s l n ticket as an effort to "moderate the f s l n " and weigh in
against the "extremists."
Some large producers who supported the revolution noted that they
were viewed with suspicion by regime leaders because of their "white
skin" or "style of dress" and were often not consulted even in their
areas of expertise. This contributed to mistaken economic measures. One
problem described by many elites was what they called yoquepierdismo
("Me, what-do-I-lose-ism"), that is, a loss of personal incentive among
producers.
Unlike regime apologists, moderate reformers included f s l n policy
mistakes and excessive state control in their explanations of the crisis
that engulfed their country. The support these producers gave to the f s l n
in spite of these reservations was linked both to their ability to interpret
their interests in a way that was consistent with a rising standard of living
for the majority and to the revolution's own porousness and policy vacil
lation. The increasing pluralism of the f s l n , especially toward the end of
the decade, allowed the regime to pull in and retain reformist elements
of the bourgeoisie who found enough similarity between their own views
and the diffuse goals of the revolution to warrant their participation. For
those in this group, their relative position in society was less central than
the prospect of collective advancement.
The fifth and final group of private sector leaders was composed of those
who remained unambiguous regime apologists to the end. For members of
this group, the problems faced by the Sandinista government were wholly
rooted in the U.S.-backed contra war. When asked to list the factors that
caused the economic crisis in Nicaragua, these leaders focused solely on
"the war," "the economic blockade," and "North American imperialism."
Much like the Sandinista leadership during this period, these private sec
tor defenders were slow to reflect on any responsibility the government
itself might have for the problems it faced. They took a fundamentally
uncritical position on f s l n government decisions, including even those
that were widely unpopular and contributed in 1990 to the electoral de
feat. Arguing, for example, that the military draft policy was necessary,
one coffee producer concluded, "If the government had done away with
the draft, the president of Nicaragua in 1990 would not have been Violeta
Barrios [de Chamorro] but [the former national guard colonel and general
commander of the Nicaraguan resistance] Enrique Bermudez." The deci
sions and policies of the government were presented as uniformly correct
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in the context of the times. One defining trait of this group was its failure
to identify any negative characteristics of the Sandinista government.
As with the moral-political opponents to the regime, the regime apolo
gists were often disconnected from their roots as producers. Although
occupying positions as leaders of private sector organizations, many of
those respondents in the first and fifth categories were defined primarily
by their political roles and less by their activities in direct agricultural
production. In some cases, those in the last group had left production and
spent years working in high-level government positions, only returning
to agricultural production in the final years of the Sandinista government.
Although still serving as spokespersons for private producers in their asso
ciations and in the press, their direct connection with the production
process had been weakened.
Most of those interviewed in this study were opponents of the regime.
It is not possible to say with precision how representative they are of the
bourgeoisie as a whole since no comparable study of a random sample
of private producers has been done. As leaders of organizations, they are
likely to be more politicized than those who have not been placed in
leadership positions,- this study may also contain a larger percent of sup
porters than was found generally in this class.5 These respondents did,
however, represent the bourgeoisie in the sense that they were the pri
mary elected, appointed, or nominated spokespeople for the main private
sector organizations during the Sandinista decade. The purposive nature
of the selection process used here resulted in the inclusion of most of the
top private sector leaders at the national level and those who were most
prominent in the five regions included in this study (Regions II, III, IV, V,
and VI). Respondents included, for example, seventeen (61 percent) mem
bers of u pa n ic 's twenty-eight-person diiectorio from the 1988-89 period.
In all, a considerable portion of the universe of private sector leaders par
ticipated in this study, particularly at the national level, making the issue
of the randomness of the sample less relevant.6
When given the opportunity to provide their own evaluation and assess
ment of the Sandinistas, 38 percent of the participants in this particular
study were moral-political opponents whose statements will be catego
rized in the following tables as reflecting strong opposition. Thirty-three
percent of the respondents were technical-policy opponents who gave a
more muted critique of the f s l n and are classified here as expressing mod
erate opposition. A third, small group, composed of 8 percent of the re
spondents, offered a mixed assessment of the f s l n government. Balancing
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criticism of the regime against positive observations, these producers have
been placed in the mixed category. A fourth group composed of moder
ate reformers, representing n percent of the respondents, provided what
will be labeled moderate support for the Sandinista government. Finally,
regime apologists who, when asked about the failures of the government,
found none, composed io percent of the respondents. Their responses will
fall under the label of strong support in this study.
If private sector leaders were not uniform in their condemnation of the
Sandinista government, how might we explain the range of variation in
their views? In particular, two patterns of attitudinal variation are rele
vant. The first is the differences in degrees of opposition between those
registering strong opposition to the regime and those expressing moder
ate opposition. Why did some producers adopt an adamantly ideological
position that admitted no negotiations or compromise with the regime,
whereas others who opposed the regime adopted a more flexible approach
that was more attuned to shifts in the behavior of the government? The
latter group is especially interesting in a political sense because of its
capacity to enter negotiation about the reform process instead of simply
rejecting dialogue out of hand.
The second pattern focuses more generally on the differentiation be
tween those who opposed the regime and those who supported it. Why,
when most of the bourgeoisie was opposed to the Sandinistas, did some
come to support the regime and even, in some cases, to become candidates
for political office on the Sandinista ticket?7 What sectors of elite society
were most likely to lend support to a revolutionary regime? Which were
its most likely opponents?
To explain these variations, several factors are worth exploring, in
cluding (i) differences in the economic and social characteristics of these
elites, (2) the kind of organizational nexus in which they were embedded,
and (3) the type of concrete experiences that they had with the reforms
of the revolution. These issues will be analyzed in turn in the next three
sections of this chapter. The final section explores the implications of
this attitudinal variation for the elite's production behavior.
Wealth, Social Authority, and Politics

As the opening chapter of this book demonstrates, the bourgeoisie is not
a uniform, homogeneous entity. It is often riven by subclass tensions and
rivalries as elites compete fiercely among themselves. Some of the prop-
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ertied are more prosperous than others and may be highly protective of
their privileged position. Some enjoy tremendous social prestige among
their peers and use this power to check the social advance of potential
challengers. Some have wealth that was inherited and may be in decline;
others have only recently obtained these resources and are in economic
ascent. These variations in economic and social characteristics may con
tribute to differences in political orientation and behavior within the elite.
In an attempt to understand the political segmentation of the bourgeoi
sie, several hypotheses about the impact of economic and social variations
might be offered. One might expect the most privileged members of the
society, who have the most to lose from redistributive social policy, for ex
ample, to be most resistant to revolutionary change. This study explores
the political consequences of two dimensions of class: access to economic
resources, like land, and access to prestigious social goods, like advanced
education.
Economic Resources and Political Views
In the agricultural sector, capitalists who are large landowners might be
expected to be more hostile to revolution than their medium- and small
sized counterparts, particularly a revolution that is centered on agrarian
reform. Members of the economic elite who have access to scarce social
goods such as prestige educations obtained in institutions that confer
social status on their graduates might also be expected to resent the level
ing, or at least reshuffling, impact of revolution. We might hypothesize,
therefore, that land size and educational attainments would be related to
bourgeois leaders' views on the Sandinista government.
In the Nicaraguan case, views on the government did vary modestly
with property size. The agricultural leaders with the largest landholdings
and production levels at the end of the 1970s were indeed among the
most vociferous opponents to the regime. In this study, 42 percent of the
leaders who were large producers in their activity in the period before
1979 were among the most intense, ideological critics of the revolution
and were classified as registering strong opposition.8 (See Table 5.1.) A
slightly smaller proportion of the leaders with medium-sized holdings (37
percent) were in this extreme category. A sharper difference yet was found
with the few leaders who had been small producers before the revolution.
Among this handful of private sector leaders, only 20 percent registered
strong opposition to the Sandinistas at the end.
The Sandinistas' thesis that small- and medium-sized producers had
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Table 5.1

Views on f s l n Government by Producer Strata (Percent)
Strata

Strong opposition
Moderate opposition
Mixed
Moderate support
Strong support

Small
(n=5)

Medium
(n=19)

Large
(n=60)

All
(n=84)

20
40
—
20
20

37
32
10
16
5

42
32
7
10
10

39
32
7
12
10

a protected place within the revolution was designed to drive a wedge
between those groups and the large producers. This study suggests that
this strategy had a modest effect, most visibly with leaders who had been
small producers. Overall, the more privileged among the private sector
leaders were the more adamant in their opposition to the regime. This
superelite's opposition may have deepened, both to protect its extensive
resources and as a response to Sandinista hostility. If they were not oppo
nents of the regime at the outset, years of hostile Sandinista discourse
against the terratenientes and an agrarian reform program that targeted
large landowners tended to elicit that opposition over time. Conversely,
among the handful of private sector leaders who had been small producers
in the late 1970s, 40 percent endorsed the revolution, either moderately
or strongly. (See Table 5.1.) Not targeted for special repudiation, the latter
were less fully drawn into the opposition.
The relationship between prior landholdings and subsequent political
views was, however, far from absolute.9 Even those leaders who had been
small producers tended overall to oppose the regime. A full 60 percent
registered some degree of opposition, suggesting that this group shared
the general disgruntlement of its class. Moreover, 20 percent of those who
had been large producers before the revolution actually offered a positive
evaluation of the f s l n government. These large landowners were equally
divided between those who expressed moderate support for the regime
(10 percent) and unmitigated enthusiasts who expressed strong support
(10 percent). Most of those in the latter category had taken positions in
the Sandinista government, in some cases as vice-ministers, and became
fully identified with the regime. The ambiguous character of the revolu
tion allowed for the incorporation of a sector of even highly privileged
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members of the society into its ranks; the participation of these elites
in the revolution in turn muted its class content and, over time, moder
ated its course. The failure of the revolution to crystallize its class base
contributed to the somewhat amorphous relationships found in Table 5.1.
Social Class and Political Views
Class is not just an economic category. This concept also has a social
dimension involving issues like status, influence, and authority. Although
there is obviously an interrelationship between the economic and social
aspects of the concept, each has its own distinctive features. Access to
property or high production levels provides elites with wealth and eco
nomic clout as employers or generators of growth; social status confers
respectability and authority, allowing elites to exercise influence over
others and assert a form of cultural hegemony.
Social status in Nicaragua was not just the product of individual hold
ings but was also linked to the kind of familial and social networks in
which elites were enmeshed. For example, a small subset of the elite from
prominent families, like the Chamorros and Cuadras, whose ancestors
had held or vied for political power in the previous century, was the bed
rock of the vaunted aristocracy of Granada, Nicaragua's premier social
class (Stone 1990; Vilas 1992). Living in prescribed neighborhoods or even
on certain streets, like Calle Atravesada in Granada, gave their residents
a social patina much cherished by the elite. A network of society heavy
weights controlled admission to prestigious clubs that anchored elite
social life in Nicaragua's larger cities.
The social hierarchy in Nicaragua was not, however, entirely static.
The elite structure had been particularly receptive to entrepreneurial for
eigners during the Somoza years. Among the private sector leaders in
this study, for example, 22 percent mentioned having either parents or
grandparents who were immigrants. Some immigrants had scampered
quickly up the economic and social ladders. Beginning typically in some
commercial activity, these entrepreneurs soon joined other elites in the
acquisition of land and became agricultural producers and ranchers. Those
respondents with immigrant backgrounds were even more likely than
those from nonimmigrant families to be strongly opposed to the San
dinista regime.10 This increased opposition may be linked to their rela
tively greater prosperity before the revolution or to the greater importance
they gave to the social prominence that their families had only recently
achieved.
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Table 5.2

Views on

f sl n

Government by Educational Attainment (Percent)
Level of Education

Strong opposition
Moderate opposition
Mixed
Moderate support
Strong support

Secondary
School or
Less
(n = ll)

Post-Secondary
Technical School
or Some
University
(n = 25)

University
Graduate or
More
(n=53)

All
(n = 89)

27
18
9
18
27

36
28
8
16
12

41
38
7
7
6

38
33
8
11
10

Mobility within the elite was influenced by education, and Nicaragua's
economic leadership had acquired considerable educational credentials.
Eighty-eight percent of the respondents in this study had gone beyond the
secondary school level, and 77 percent had at least begun university train
ing. A full 60 percent of the respondents had completed their university
degrees or gone beyond.
In general, those who had the privilege of pursuing an education tended
to be more opposed to the Sandinista regime than their less privileged
counterparts in this study. Forty-one percent of those who had completed
their university degrees were strongly opposed to the regime, serving as
moral-political opponents. (See Table 5.2.) On the other hand, only 27
percent of those who had completed secondary school or less were so
forcefully opposed to the regime. Indeed, the strongest support levels for
the Sandinista government were found among those in this elite who had
lower educational attainments. Whereas only 6 percent of those with uni
versity degrees offered strong support for the regime, a full 27 percent of
those who completed only high school or less were in this category.
The greater opposition to the regime on the part of the more highly
educated private sector leaders may be partly the result of the more rigor
ous intellectual training they received. A university education may bol
ster mainstream (nonrevolutionary) ideologies and provide the intellec
tual self-confidence needed to resist popular pressure. At the same time,
the preexisting social class characteristics of better-educated individuals
almost certainly had an impact on their views. In a society in which over
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Table 5.3

Views on f s l n Government by Where Educated
(University Graduates, Percent)

Strong opposition
Moderate opposition
Mixed
Moderate support
Strong support

Nicaragua
(n=27)

Foreign
(n=26)

All
(n=53)

30
48
11
7
4

54
27
4
8
8

41
38
7
7
6

half of the adult population was illiterate, this credential conferred con
siderable social status on the graduates. Having farther to fall and less to
receive from the revolution, this privileged sector tended to move force
fully into the opposition.
Social prestige in Nicaragua was enhanced by receiving an education
abroad.11 For many Nicaraguan elites, local universities did not offer either
the technical sophistication or the social prominence that accompanied a
foreign degree. As one social analyst who moved in and out of elite circles
wryly observed, "If you were educated abroad, spoke another language flu
ently, and knew how to dress and eat well, then the elite families would
accept you." One suggestion of the allure of a foreign education is found
in the educational experiences of the elite. A full forty percent of the par
ticipants in this study completed their educations outside Nicaragua; half
of them did so in the United States.12
The experience of living abroad, and particularly being educated there,
apparently had political repercussions.13 Among the respondents in this
study, those who received a prestigious, foreign education were more
likely to oppose the Sandinista regime virulently. If we control for varia
tion in educational levels and look just at those who completed a univer
sity degree, 54 percent of respondents educated abroad registered strong
opposition to the regime. (See Table 5.3.) Only 30 percent of the university
graduates who were educated in Nicaragua were so profoundly opposed
to the regime. For the latter group, the most common position was one of
moderate opposition, a response that permitted ongoing negotiation with
the Sandinista government.
The reasons for the association between a foreign education and in
creased political opposition are probably complex. Acquiring a university
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degree in a foreign country had several implications. Producers educated
in the United States, for example, were among the larger landowners, and
their opposition to the Sandinistas was probably influenced by their rela
tively privileged economic status.14 In addition, the formal and informal
content of a university education in the United States or in Franco's Spain
may also have had an independent impact through the transmission of an
anticommunist, promarket ideology that clashed sharply with the San
dinista model.15 Certainly one of the lobbying strategies used to support
U.S. educational exchange programs during the Cold War era was to em
phasize how foreign participants would then come to affirm the American
way of life. Evidence from this study suggests that this connection may
have been made.
Conversely, the formal and informal content of a Nicaraguan educa
tion may also have played a role in reducing the extent of opposition
to the revolution among those who remained at home. The argument
that the Sandinistas were controlled by the Soviets, for example, may
have held less sway among those who attended the Jesuit-run Universidad
Centroamerica or the public university in UNAN-Leon. These Nicaraguan
universities were hotbeds of student radicalism and f s l n organizational
activities in the 1970s. Attendance at these institutions gave their alumni
a relatively fuller familiarity with the actors and issues that shaped the
f s l n . This exposure probably helped to clarify the domestic roots of the
revolution for this subset of the elite and may have reduced their propen
sity to adopt the most extreme forms of opposition.
The relationship between educational privilege and regime opposition
should not, however, be overstated.16 Regardless of where they were edu
cated, most university graduates in this study were opposed to the regime.
Although there were differences in the level of opposition, 78 percent of
private sector leaders who graduated from Nicaraguan universities regis
tered some degree of opposition, compared to a very similar 81 percent of
those who were foreign graduates. (See Table 5.3.) Furthermore, graduates
of Nicaraguan universities were no more likely than those who graduated
abroad to register support for the revolution. Indeed, among the small
number of university graduates who supported the regime, the percent
educated in universities abroad was slightly higher than the percent who
graduated from Nicaraguan universities. The small number of respondents
in this category makes it impossible to generalize, but these data again
illustrate the ambiguities in the subclass base for regime support.
In all, data in this study suggest a modest relationship between the
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economic and social class characteristics of these private sector leaders
and their views of the revolution. The association, however, between large
landholdings or university education and extreme political opposition, on
the one hand, or between small landholdings or high school education and
strong political support, on the other, was far from uniform. The presence
of subclass mavericks in the opposing camps weakened the statistical re
lationship between these variables and hinted at the often complex class
alliances that characterized the Nicaraguan revolution.
The Organizational Nexus and Politics

In contrast to the measures of class, the relationship between organiza
tional affiliation and political attitudes in the Nicaraguan private sector
leadership was quite sharp. The findings in this section suggest the utility
of separating the analysis of organizational characteristics from the dis
cussion of class background. Class and subclass tendencies get filtered
through organizations, which may then add their own distinctive influ
ence to the formation of political ideology.
The two major private sector organizations in Nicaragua, c o s e p and
u n a g , supported markedly different political orientations and were em
broiled in tense rivalry.17 The political views of private sector leaders
varied sharply depending on the association with which they were af
filiated. In this case, the differences in views were absolute, not simply
relative variations. In all, 91 percent of those who were affiliated with
c o s e p 's agricultural branch, u pa n ic , registered either strong or moderate
opposition to the regime. In contrast, 75 percent of those who were u n a g
affiliates expressed either strong or moderate support for the Sandinista
government. Those who were independent divided roughly in the middle,
with a total of 37.5 percent expressing some degree of opposition and an
equal percent indicating some degree of support. (See Table 5.4.)18
The highly politicized and polarized orientations of both organizations
reduced the possibility for free-ranging pluralism within their leadership.
u pa n ic had made an effort in the early years of the revolution to expand
its base, recognizing the limitations confronting an elite organization
in a society undergoing social revolution, u pa n ic 's attempt to recruit
small producers, particularly among cafetaleros in the Matagalpa region,
however, disintegrated when u pa n ic leader Jorge Salazar was killed in
T98o. The effort of a d a c h , the uPANic-affiliated cotton growers' asso
ciation in Chinandega, to recruit a large number of small- and medium-
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Table 5.4

Views on f s l n Government by Private Sector Organization
(Percent)
UPANIC

(n=65)

Strong opposition
Moderate opposition
Mixed
Moderate support
Strong support

49
42
3
5
2

Independent
(n=8)

25
12.5
25
25
12.5

(n=16)

All
(n=89)

—
6
19
31
44

38
33
8
11
10

UNAG

sized members also ended disastrously, from its leaders' point of view.
The newcomers soon denounced the u pa n ic orientation, and a reform
leadership took control, splitting a d a c h in two in 1984. This division dis
suaded u pa n ic leaders from further recruitment of political unknowns
and potential defectors (interview, former president of a d a c h -u n a g ,
July 4,1990; interview, former president of a d a c h -u pa n ic , May 28,1990;
"Algodoneros de Chinandega censuran actitud de u pa n ic ," Barricada,
July 16, 1984). By 1984 the traditional elite circled in and abandoned its
expansion effort.19
The few u pa n ic leaders who were not anti-Sandinista, such as
u pa n ic 's first president, soon withdrew from the association. Growing
tensions between the government and c o s e p after 1980-81 made it dif
ficult for producer-revolutionaries to comfortably remain active in that
association. Furthermore, several of these leaders took positions in the
government and turned their properties over to the state. Since they were
no longer actively involved in production, their participation in these
associations ceased. Purged of their participation, u pa n ic became vocif
erously anti-Sandinista.
u n a g , meanwhile, recruited vigorously. Following a major reorgani
zation in 1984, this association "widened what had been up to then a
small opening" and began to recruit even large producers (Nunez 1985a,
369). As u n a g moved into the organizational terrain traditionally held by
u pa n ic groups, middle-sized producers especially were pulled between
the two. Even some prominent producers with elite family backgrounds
left u pa n ic affiliates and came to serve as u n a g leaders and spokes
people.20
u n a g 's history as an FSLN-sponsored mass organization and its leader
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ship by f s l n militants, even under its new president, Daniel Nunez,
bound it closely to the cause of the revolution. Until the organization's
dramatic embrace of demobilized contras in the post-1990 period, the
range of views reflected by its leadership was also limited, u n a g leaders
did become more independent of the f s l n over time (Haugaard 1991 ■
Luciak forthcoming), but always remained prorevolution.
To some degree, the differences in the political orientations of u pa n ic
and u n a g reflect variations in the class fragment from which these leaders
were derived. Although both organizations had leaders who were quite
prosperous, large landowners were more likely to affiliate with u pa n ic .
Among those interviewed in this study, 76 percent of the u pa n ic leaders
who were landowners in the late 1970s were large producers during that
era; in contrast, only 43 percent of the u n a g leaders fell into this cate
gory. The bulk of the u n a g leaders interviewed (57 percent) who owned
property during that time were medium or small producers in the 1970s;
only 24 percent of the u pa n ic leaders were from these strata.
Not only did u n a g leaders tend to own less property, they were also
less likely to be among the social elite of the country. Unlike their u pa n ic
counterparts, 47 percent of whom had lived in the United States at some
point, only 25 percent of the u n a g leaders had this kind of experience.21
The u n a g leaders were also less likely to have completed a college educa
tion (25 percent vs. 70 percent for u pa n ic leaders), and only 12.5 percent
of the u n a g leaders had been educated abroad (vs. 45 percent for u pa n ic
leaders).
Among private sector leaders, therefore, those in u n a g were substan
tially less prosperous and socially prominent than those of u pa n ic . u n a g
leaders matched more closely the chapiolla bourgeoisie concept devel
oped by ci e r a 's theoreticians to differentiate the locally grounded pro
ducers from those with strong international connections (Nunez 1985a,
367-69; Baumeister and Neira Cuadra 1986, 181-82). Lacking the social
cachet to, in some cases, even be admitted to elitist producer associations
in their hometowns, these highly motivated leaders rose quickly within
the ranks of u n a g soon after the new organization was founded.22
These organizations did not just reflect differences in the perspectives
that their members brought into the associations. Both c o s e p and u n a g
made a concerted effort to disseminate a political viewpoint within the
organization's circle of influence. For the c o s e p national organization,
oppositional politics was its raison d'etre. Using periodic speaking tours,
generous access to the pages of the anti-Sandinista daily La Prensa and,
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when La Prensa was closed by Sandinista censors, its own Memorandum
de la Presidencia, c o s e p leaders conveyed their views and positions to
their constituents, u n a g leaders also attempted to forge a certain men
tality among their affiliates, using inserts in the Sandinista newspaper
Barricada and their own magazine, Productores, for these purposes. These
efforts did not always succeed.23 This practice suggests, however, that
the organizational affiliation of bourgeois leaders may have had its own,
additional impact on their views, reinforcing or deepening the political
tendencies that they and other members already had.
National versus Regional Leaders
Of course, not all leaders of these associations were equally committed
to their organization's political line. As Table 5.4 indicates, there was
some range of variation in the leaders' perspectives in both organizations.
Differences between national leaders and those at the sectoral or regional
level of their organizations, for example, were striking. Among u pa n ic
affiliates, 63 percent of the respondents at the national level expressed
strong opposition to the f s l n government, denouncing it on moral and
ideological grounds. (See Table 5.5.) In contrast, only 41 percent of the
regional level leaders registered this kind of strong opposition. The latter
group was somewhat more inclined to express moderate opposition, criti
cizing the regime on more narrow, technical grounds (46 percent vs. 33
percent for national leaders).
These differences in outlook penetrated to the level of economic phi
losophy. When asked to describe the economic model they most preferred
for their country, 50 percent of u pa n ic 's national-level leaders affirmed a
commitment to pure market capitalism, whereas only 29 percent of those
at the regional level took that position. The majority (53 percent) of the
regional leaders preferred moderate capitalism, with some regulation of
the market, whereas only 31 percent of u pa n ic national leaders preferred
that model. Indeed, some regional u pa n ic affiliates actually came to sup
port the Sandinista regime, even running as f s l n candidates in the 199°
election.24
To some degree, differences in political behavior among c o s e p leaders
reflect a tactical decision to recruit strong, ideological opponents into the
national leadership, where they would repeatedly confront the f s l n on
political grounds, and to leave the sectoral and local leadership in a rela
tively protected position, where the emphasis in the discussion would be
more technical, u pa n ic national leaders, then, would routinely denounce
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Table 5.5

Views on

f sl n

Government by Leadership Level (Percent)
UPANIC

Strong opposition
Moderate opposition
Mixed
Moderate support
Strong support

UNAG

National
(n=27)

Regional/
Sectoral
(n = 37)

63
33
—
—
4

41
46
5
8
—

National
(n = 7)
—
—
14
29
57

Regional/
Sectoral
(n = 10)
—
10
30
30
30

transgressions and reject any attempt at dialogue, while leaders of
sectoral associations like that for rice growers (a n a r ) or regional organi
zations like that for Leon cotton growers (a d a l ) would continue to meet
with m id in r a personnel to press for improved prices or easier access to
productive inputs.
These differences were not, however, simply tactical. They also re
flected variations in the social backgrounds that prevailed at these two
levels. Regional and sectoral leaders of u pa n ic tended to be drawn from a
more modest background than their national counterparts. For example,
78 percent of the u pa n ic national leaders had completed a university edu
cation,- only 60 percent of the regional and sectoral leaders had done so.
National leaders were almost twice as likely to have been educated abroad
(59 percent vs. 32 percent for regional leaders) and had more commonly
been large producers in the 1970s (81 percent vs. 72 percent).
Parallel divisions were found among u n a g leaders, although the
smaller number of respondents involved makes it more difficult to draw
clear conclusions. In this study, 57 percent of the national-level leaders in
u n a g expressed strong support for the Sandinista government, whereas
only 30 percent of the regional leaders were as enthusiastic. (See Table 5.5.)
In contrast, 40 percent of the regional leaders offered either a mixed
appraisal or indicated moderate opposition to the regime. None of the
national leaders indicated opposition to the regime, and only 14 percent
offered a mixed evaluation.25
Whereas the top leadership of u n a g was composed of members of the
f s l n or those who were very closely identified with the cause, the re
gional u n a g leaders were more diverse. Most u n a g regional leaders were
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not overtly partisan, and several were quite critical of the Sandinista gov
ernment. One was even a party activist in the opposition pl i and a close
relative of a Somoza-era puppet president. These regional leaders endorsed
social change in Nicaragua, but they were less willing to serve as political
mobilizers for the f s l n . They explained their association with u n a g in
a variety of other ways: as a rejection of the hyperpoliticized hostility of
the u pa n ic associations, a response to the insularity and snootiness of a
closed local elite, a nationalistic response to the contra war, or a response
to economic opportunities that u n a g offered agricultural producers.
Often operating in regions where the contra forces were strong and
the f s l n 's popularity was low (Boaco, Chontales, Matagalpa, Jinotega),
these local leaders generally played down their links with the Sandinista
government. As the president of the Boaco u n a g association explained,
"Producers here won't even talk to you if they think you're from the
Frente Sandinista. Leaders of producers here can't have political lives."
These leaders attempted to build their organizations by emphasizing the
openness of meetings to anyone who wanted to participate; their ability to
bring in technical assistance and financing, particularly from Scandina
vian countries; and their effectiveness in navigating a complex and some
times menacing government bureaucracy. Recognizing that many u n a g
members joined for instrumental reasons rather than from revolutionary
conviction, these local leaders attempted to respond to concrete needs.26
As with u pa n ic , the political differentiation within u n a g was asso
ciated with subclass variation among its leaders. In contrast with u pa n ic ,
u n a g 's national leaders tended to have less extensive landholdings and
lower educational attainments. Whereas only 33 percent of u n a g 's
national leadership was among the large producers in the 1970s, 56 per
cent of the regional leaders interviewed were in this category. The percent
of regional u n a g private sector leaders with university degrees was 30
percent, more than twice the 14 percent found among the national leader
ship. For both u pa n ic and u n a g , therefore, the positions taken by the
national leadership differed measurably from the preferences and views
of mid-level leaders. These differences suggest both the polarizing quality
of the national debate, which divided its participants more emphatically
than did deliberations at the regional and sectoral level, and the varia
tion in subclass composition of the leadership in different levels of these
powerful organizations.
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Experiential Factors and Political Views

The Sandinista government expected that the concrete experiences dif
ferent producers had with government policies would also influence the
ways in which those producers responded to the regime. Although some
benefits and burdens were generalized, many government actions and
policies tended to favor one set of producers over others. As we saw in
Chapter 3, the f s l n government initially adopted a segmented view of
the bourgeoisie. During the period in which this model prevailed, the gov
ernment attempted to devise policy that favored those who fit into the
revolutionary model while draining resources from those who did not.
Two kinds of experiences with the regime might be expected to have
a pronounced impact. The first is whether or not the producer underwent
land expropriation by the Sandinista government. The second experience
concerns the principal crop the producer cultivated and the priority it was
given in the national economic policy. Being allowed to retain ownership
rights and being given subsidies and financial supports should logically
encourage producers to adopt a less oppositional view of the state; pro
ducers in low priority areas who underwent expropriation, on the other
hand, should be good candidates for the opposition.
Expropriation and Political Views
Agrarian reform legislation under the Sandinistas authorized the ex
propriation of land that was not being used productively. This frame
work gave m id in r a officials considerable latitude for action. Stipula
tions against decapitalization, for example, could refer to a wide range of
common practices, in a country where wartime dislocations and gener
alized economic decline led to low investment levels and deterioration
of infrastructure. Regulations governing expropriations were not applied
uniformly throughout the country. A deteriorated farm in one part of the
country might be expropriated, while a similar property in another part
might be passed over. Much depended on the land pressure in the re
gion, development projects on nearby state farms, the status of the war,
and the convictions of local authorities. This variation, along with the
much-publicized expropriations of top c o s e p officials, led to the percep
tion among producers that expropriation was a political tool used by the
Sandinistas against their enemies. To a degree, this view was accurate.
Over one-third (36 percent) of the private sector leaders interviewed had
experienced one or more expropriations. (See Table 5.6.) As expected, the
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Table 5.6

Views on f s l n Government by Expropriation Experience (Percent)

Strong opposition
Moderate opposition
Mixed
Moderate support
Strong support

Hard
Expropriation
(n —17)

Soft
Expropriation
(n = 15)

47
41
6
—
6

47
27
—
13
13

Never
Expropriated
(n = 57)
33
32
10.5
14
10.5

All
(n = 89)
38
33
8
11
10

experience of being expropriated was associated with a negative evalua
tion of the regime. The link was particularly pronounced for those who
underwent a "hard expropriation," in which they received little or no
compensation. For that group, 47 percent of the respondents provided a
strongly opposed assessment of the regime, and another 41 percent of that
group was moderately opposed. In all, 88 percent of those who underwent
a full-scale expropriation wound up the decade with a negative view of
the regime.
Almost half of those who were expropriated experienced what might
be labeled a soft expropriation, in which they were subsequently able to
recover some property.27 Some of those in this group eventually had the
most valuable part of their property returned; others received comparable
property in a land or machinery swap (permuta}. Those who underwent
a soft expropriation also registered substantial opposition to the regime
(also 47 percent strongly opposed), suggesting that expropriation triggered
moral outrage and fierce hostility, even when it was subsequently soft
ened by retraction or compensation. Overall, however, those who under
went a soft expropriation were slightly less hostile than those in the first
category (74 percent expressing some form of opposition, vs. 88 percent).
Indeed, over a quarter (26 percent) of those in this group offered a positive
evaluation of the regime.
Most of those whose holdings were not expropriated were opposed to
the regime as well. Almost two-thirds (65 percent) of those who had es
caped expropriation were nonetheless opponents of the regime. This find
ing suggests that personal experiences with expropriation may have had
less impact on the political views of private sector leaders than the San
dinista government expected. Indeed, in discussing expropriation, many
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private sector leaders noted that although they had not been expropriated
themselves, close relatives or neighbors had been. One popular refrain
in these interviews ran, "Every pig has its Saturday [market day)." Many
of those not expropriated labored under the expectation that their turn
would come, sooner or later. The fact that they had not yet undergone this
experience provided little sense of permanent security or protection for
this group. Their opposition may be explained, therefore, as an anticipa
tory or affiliational response.
The level of opposition for this third group was, however, somewhat
lower than that for those who were personally expropriated. Sixty-five
percent of those in this group registered some degree of opposition, for ex
ample, versus 88 percent for those who underwent a hard expropriation.
Again, and less surprisingly, a segment (25 percent) of those in this group
expressed some degree of support for the Sandinista government. The fact
that they themselves did not lose land in this fashion probably contrib
uted to their lessened hostility to the regime. Although the government's
expectation that those who were not expropriated would respond posi
tively was naive, some modest differences in the degree of opposition may
be associated with this experience.28 The breadth of the opposition re
gardless of personal expropriation, however, suggests that this particular
experience was generally not a crucial determinant of the political views
of private sector elites.29
Sectoral Favoritism and Political Views
For some producers, Sandinista production and price policy actually
brought economic benefits. Not only did they escape expropriation, they
received hefty subsidies and ready access to production inputs. Theoreti
cally, as was demonstrated in Chapter 3, Sandinista production policy in
the early years was designed to favor those producing for the domestic
market and to extract the surplus from the previously favored agroexport
elite. This approach was roughly analogous to the strategy adopted else
where in Latin America by populist regimes (Cardoso 1972; Conaghan
1988). Those strategies emphasized the formation of an alliance between
the state and the segment of the bourgeoisie that produced for the local
market and would benefit from an improvement in the purchasing power
of labor. Elsewhere in Latin America, this approach had elicited the sup
port of local industrialists in the state's confrontation with traditional
agrarian oligarchs or export-oriented industrialists whose prosperity was
dependent on low labor costs and foreign sales.
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In theory, the early redistribution of resources in Nicaragua and the
increase in food consumption, combined with staples subsidies, could
have consolidated a link between staples producers and the revolutionary
state. In practice, although these producers did respond by decreasing pro
duction less than others, their leaders did not typically become political
allies of the regime. In fact, of the private sector leaders interviewed in
this study, staples producers overwhelmingly registered strong opposition
to the regime, more so than any other single sector. Fifty-four percent of
private sector leaders whose primary activity was staples production (rice,
sorghum, and maize) were strongly opposed to the Sandinista regime. In
contrast, only 18 percent of cotton growers, 29 percent of those in live
stock (cattle and dairy), and 46 percent of coffee producers registered such
extreme opposition. Unlike what the theory would predict, government
policy did not succeed in generating a show of support among staples
sector leaders in Nicaragua. This may be because policy was so inconsis
tently applied and signals were so confused, or because other policies at
the end of the era were so counterproductive that early positive results
were undermined.30
On the other hand, some government programs probably did elicit elite
support. Perhaps the clearest example of government favoritism that may
have diluted opposition was found in the cotton sector. As a major export
crop, cotton should not have been particularly benefited by a pro-food
policy. Since cottonseed oil was a staple in the Nicaraguan diet, however,
this crop crossed the boundaries between export and domestic market,
suggesting the porousness of these conceptual categories. Cotton produc
tion also dominated the regional economy of northwestern Nicaragua and
was the main source of employment for that region. For several reasons,
therefore, the Sandinista government worked to salvage cotton produc
tion, at least on the most productive lands. One independent study of the
Nicaraguan cotton sector indicated that both the profits and the costs of
production were financed by a transfer of resources from the state through
inorganic emissions from the b c n (Evans 1987, 19). Although interna
tional prices were tumbling and cotton producers elsewhere in Central
America were shifting out of production during the 1980s, cotton produc
tion fell less sharply in Nicaragua.
Cotton growers did not always perceive that they were being subsi
dized by the state. The welter of controls and artificial prices set by the
government made such calculations extremely difficult. But many algodoneros did observe that cotton production in neighboring Guatemala had
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declined sharply due to falling international prices, while the decline in
Nicaragua had been arrested by government production policy. Recogni
tion that the Sandinistas' cotton policy had preserved the cotton sector in
Nicaragua led several cotton association leaders to offer positive assess
ments of Sandinista production policy. Indeed, 30 percent of the cotton
producers expressed some level of support for the regime, surpassing the
support levels in any other sector.31 Cotton growers were, therefore, much
less likely to join the moral-political opposition to the regime than were
those whose livelihoods centered on livestock, coffee, or basic grains.
These observations suggest that the Sandinista government was able,
to some degree, to adjust the level and location of bourgeois opposition
through its own sectoral development programs. Elite opposition was not
simply a given, uniformly preordained by the revolution. Private sector
perspectives were probably influenced by at least some concrete state
actions. To the extent that the revolution could identify and cushion pro
ducers in strategic subsectors, like cotton producers, it could blunt elite
opposition. Lower priority sectors or those that were dealt with in an in
consistent manner, in contrast, were more likely to become centers of
opposition politics.
The government's power to orchestrate elite responses was limited,
however, because private elites were not just affected by their particu
lar production experiences. They also responded to the general social and
economic climate and to the experiences of others in their class. Even if
they were not personally targeted for hostile action or unfavorable poli
cies, they often responded as if they had been. Furthermore, one response
of producers to the uncertainties of the 1980s was to diversify production.
Policies that favored them in one area might have negative consequences
for them in their other activities. These considerations made the impact
of government policy on elite perspectives less straightforward than it
might have been. Finally, as state resources dried up, the regime's ability
to provide selected supports to favored fragments of the elite was steadily
reduced. By the end of the era, it had little room in which to maneuver for
political favor.
So What? Politics, Production, and Investment

It is not theoretically adventurous to note that political perceptions af
fect economic behavior. Political views, of course, are not the sole de
terminant of economic decisions. Projections of probable costs, potential
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markets, expected competition, and, ultimately, future returns are obvi
ously crucial variables. In bad economic times, such as those prevailing
in Nicaragua (and indeed much of Latin America) during the 1980s, one
would expect production and investment to decline generally, regardless
of political perceptions. But acrimonious interactions and hostile politi
cal evaluations might logically be expected to provoke further economic
withdrawal on the part of the economic elite.
When producers are convinced that the government under which they
operate is corrupt or led by moral degenerates and ideological fanatics
who intend to destroy them, this perception obviously takes a toll on
their willingness to engage in entrepreneurial activities. On the other
hand, if producers believe that the government is visionary, committed to
national development, and principled, then this belief may inspire them
to participate in the emerging economy in spite of the risks.
In the Nicaraguan case, the interview data suggest a clear, statisti
cally significant association between the political views of private sector
leaders and their economic behaviors. The concluding section of this chap
ter looks at two ways in which political views and economic behavior
were connected. The first explores the link between political appraisals
and investment behavior. The second focuses on the relationship between
assessments of the regime and production outcomes.
Political Views and Investment
Private sector leaders in this study who evaluated the regime positively
were much more likely than opponents to have made major investments
in their operations during the decade. Whereas 58 percent of supporters
indicated that they had made major investments,32 only 29 percent of the
opponents had done so. (See Table 5.7.) More telling, 43 percent of those
opposed to the regime indicated that they had made no new investments
in production during this period. In contrast, only 16 percent of those who
supported the regime reported no new investments, and those were pro
ducers whose political and bureaucratic workload had drawn them away
from their agricultural activities.33
Of various kinds of major investments, the most significant was the
acquisition of land. Surprisingly, in an era of large-scale land expropria
tion, some elites did buy land. Since land purchases in Nicaragua were
not financed by the bank (either before or after the revolution), these in
vestments required the buyer to risk his or her own capital—in spite of
the possibility of subsequent expropriation.34 Offsetting this risk was the
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Table 5.7

Investment Level by Views on f s l n Government
(Percent)

Major investment
Minor investment
No investment

Oppose
(n=63)

Mixed

29
29
43

29
57
14

(n=7)

Support

All

(n=19)

(n=89)

58
26
16

35
30
35

lure of very low land prices. The price of land was severely depressed
due to expropriations and general economic conditions. Many landowners
were willing to sell cheaply as they prepared to emigrate.35 For those who
were bold enough to take the risk of acquiring new land, the Sandinista
era provided a golden opportunity. One large cattle rancher affiliated with
f a g a n ic reported buying seven farms during this period, acquiring land
biannually between 1982 and 1986 and annually between 1987 and 1990.
His landholdings swelled from 8,000 mz. in 1977 to 18,000 mz. in 1990,
making him one of the country's larger landowners.
Although a handful of producers who were adamantly opposed to the
regime took the risk of buying land, supporters were more likely to engage
in this behavior, particularly in the turbulent 1982-88 period. Overall, 37
percent of supporters bought land during this period, and a full 50 percent
of the moderate supporters did so.36 Of opponents, only 17 percent took
that risk.37
Some producers went beyond land purchases to make investments in
agroindustrial operations, g r a c s a , Nicaragua's largest oilseed production
facility, provides a notable example. At the recommendation of General
Manager Antonio Lacayo, the majority shareholding group of g r a c s a
established a series of spinoff corporations (Spalding 1991). Most remark
ably, this group's investment rose briskly even during a long period (198288) when g r a c s a was "intervened" by the Sandinista government. To
bolster its legal appeal challenging this takeover and to take advantage
of investment opportunities, this group founded seven new corporations
during the six year period when the company was intervened. As its stock
holders awaited the (successful) outcome of their appeal to the Nicara
guan Supreme Court, this group linked both forward and backward from
g r a c s a 's initial operations.38 g r a c s a 's owners continued making invest
ments in the years that followed, founding three new enterprises in 1989
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alone. One of the most entrepreneurial investment groups in the coun
try, the g r a c s a group not only launched spinoff corporations,- it also
entered into joint ventures with the government for the development of
nontraditional products and the introduction of new technologies.39
Business leaders who bought land, took on new investments, partici
pated in government development projects, or joined joint ventures were
generally less vehemently opposed to the regime than those who did not.
They were not necessarily supporters of the revolution; as we have seen,
even opponents undertook major investments in some cases. However,
a less oppositional perspective facilitated negotiations in the complex
political and economic environment that prevailed during the Sandinista
period.
Political Views and Production
Like investment decisions, production levels depend on many factors,
including the expansion or contraction of the market, the availability
of inexpensive inputs, the labor supply, climate, and expropriation ex
periences. In addition to these economic variables, however, producers'
perceptions of the regime can also have an impact. Political support can
animate the production process by encouraging producers to take bold ini
tiatives, make long-term investments, and plan for the future. A negative
assessment, on the other hand, makes long-range thinking more difficult
and can undermine the producers' contribution to national growth. In a
revolutionary setting, in which the economy is highly politicized, politi
cal attitudes may have a particularly important impact on production.
Evidence from this study suggests a close relationship between politi
cal views and production levels in the Nicaraguan case. Overall produc
tion levels during the revolution fell disastrously, but the pattern again
varied across producers. Over two-thirds (69 percent) of those opposed
to the regime reported a decrease in production between the late 1970s
and the late 1980s.40 (See Table 5.8.) In contrast, a relatively modest 37
percent of the supporters had this experience, and many in this group
reduced production voluntarily as the result of donating properties to
the state or devoting attention to their government jobs instead of their
estates.41 Among private sector leaders interviewed in this study, those
who viewed the regime positively reported more success in maintaining
or even increasing their production levels. Thirty-seven percent of those
who favored the regime reported an increase in production. In contrast,
only 10 percent of those registering opposition expanded at that rate.
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Table 5.8

Level of Production Change by Views on f s l n
Government (Percent)

Decrease
Stable
Increase

Oppose
(n = 61)

Mixed
(n=7)

Support
(n=19)

All
(n = 87)

69
21
10

43
43
14

37
26
37

60
24
16

Assessing the link between politics and production is particularly dif
ficult, however, because of the complex interrelationships among these
variables. Political attitudes may shape production behavior, but the
causal relationship may also operate in the opposite direction: changing
production outcomes may influence political views. A sharp decrease in
production, for example, could trigger political opposition if the decline
was attributed to unfavorable regime decisions (price policy, expropria
tion, supply breakdowns) rather than neutral or uncontrollable forces.
Political opposition could then in turn feed further economic withdrawal.
Without more detailed information on production and attitude shifts bro
ken down over time, the exact sequence of these connections cannot be
clearly unraveled.
Conclusions

In this chapter, various factors shaping the political views of Nicaraguan
economic elites come into focus. The bourgeoisie, which had been his
torically fragmented and lacking in political authority in the prerevolu
tionary period, continued to suffer from these characteristics under the
Sandinistas. Although this factionalism was reduced when the Somoza
dynasty collapsed and the Sandinista revolution presented a broad threat
to the economic elite, divisions remained. The increasing amorphousness
of the Sandinista model, the regime's policy inconsistency, and the San
dinistas' own "divide and rule" strategy all helped to further fragment the
bourgeoisie.
Interview data suggest that the views of leaders of producer associa
tions in the agricultural sector were divided by subclass strata. Those who
were large producers in the period before the revolution were dispropor
tionately among the virulent opponents to the regime. Furthermore, those
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with greater access to education, particularly prestige educations obtained
abroad, were also more likely to strongly oppose the Sandinistas than
were those less privileged. Opposition among leaders who were mediumand small-sized producers, less well educated, and educated at home was
generally less pronounced.
This link, however, was weakened by the presence of some large-sized,
foreign-educated business leaders among the regime supporters and by
the fierce opposition to the regime manifested by some private sector
leaders who were less privileged (small- and medium-sized producers,
those who completed only high school). As a result of these anomalous
cases, the association between subclass characteristics of elite leaders and
their political views was not strong enough to demonstrate a clear, con
sistent relationship. This information points, instead, to the somewhat
amorphous class alliances of the Nicaraguan revolution.
Other factors, such as the organizational affiliations of these leaders,
were more closely linked with their political views. Divisions within
the elite were reinforced by the organizational segmentation of the Nica
raguan private sector. Involvement in competing associations tended to
further polarize these producers, particularly those who operated at the
national level, u pa n ic functioned as a rallying point for those agricul
tural producers who launched a moral-political critique of the regime.
u n a g , on the other hand, clustered together private sector defenders of
the revolution. Even within these organizations, however, some varia
tion in political ideology was found, particularly between those leaders at
the national and the sectoral/regional levels. National leaders tended to
adopt more extreme positions (either strong opposition or strong support)
whereas those at the sectoral or regional level had more moderate views.
The producers' concrete experiences and interactions with government
officials during the revolution probably also had some impact on their
views, though less than the Sandinista leadership expected. The experi
ence of having land expropriated did prove politically alienating. But oppo
sition was generalized even among those leaders whose landholdings were
not expropriated, suggesting that individual experiences may have been
less important in forming elite views than their assessments of overall
class relations.
On the other hand, opposition was apparently blunted when the regime
buffered producers in particular subsectors, such as cotton, from inter
national downturns. In some instances, the regime may have been able
to elicit an element of elite support through particularly favorable treat-
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ment. In general, however, private sector opposition was not closely tied
to government actions.
Interview data compiled for this study indicate that the elites7 political
views had marked consequences for their economic behavior. Investment
and production patterns varied sharply with the level of political opposi
tion or support expressed by these leaders. Regime supporters were more
inclined to take on new investments, buy land and machinery, expand
housing for their workers, and try out new technologies. They were also
more likely to keep their production levels stable or even increase their
output during this period. Opponents, on the other hand, were more re
luctant to buy new land, even though prices were rock-bottom, or to
undertake extensive new investments, even when credit was available.
Over time, their production levels dropped, in many cases by over half.
In conclusion, information from these interviews suggests consider
able variation among the private sector leaders in Nicaragua on a series of
issues. This kind of fragmentation prevented the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie
from functioning as a united bloc or pursuing a clear, common agenda. For
many reasons, including its own internal cleavages, the bourgeoisie con
tinued to have difficulty asserting political authority. It did not, as in the
Chilean case under the Allende government, convoke a series of general
strikes that ground the economy to a halt. Nor did it, as in the Salvadoran
case, mobilize a paramilitary force to terrorize opponents. It could not
form a strong political party of its own or orchestrate a mass movement
that could divide the Sandinista military and drive the f s l n from power.
On the other hand, this elite did tilt heavily into the opposition. The
Sandinistas failed to restructure the private producers into a patriotic
bourgeoisie. Even after the regime's multiple concessions in the post-1987
era, its toehold in the bourgeoisie remained modest. The regime never
won enough support to counter the economic impact of the contra war
and its own problematic policy choices. Having concentrated too heavily
on the development of state enterprises, failed to win a large enough seg
ment of the bourgeoisie to the cause of moderate reform, and given too
little attention to the sustained organization and training of small pro
ducers and cooperatives, the regime was unable to create a solid economic
base on which to consolidate the revolution.
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From Revolution to Neoliberalism
Private Sector Ambivalence in
Postrevolutionary Nicaragua
(1990-1993)
We will give back to the producer what he should have: the right to
make the decisions and take the risks.
—Silvio de Franco, minister of economy
and development, May 19,1990
Neoliberalism? Fine, let it come. We accept neoliberalism as long as the
economy is democratized.
—Jaime Wheelock Roman, National
Directorate, f s l n , June 27,1992
Last year [1991], we prepared the terrain to wage economic battle. . . .
We confronted the traditional bourgeoisie in [agroindustry, commerce,
and banking], as well as the Sandinistas. They’re definitely the same
thing but with different ideological colors.
—Sinforiano Caceres, vice-president
of FENACOOP-UNAG

Apr il 1990 Violeta Barrios de Chamorro was inaugurated as presi
dent of Nicaragua, and the f s l n leadership relinquished official power.
Given the close ties between Chamorro's electoral coalition and the
United States, it was widely assumed that the new government would at
tempt to undo the revolution and move the country in a classically liberal
direction.1
The dynamics of economic change are complex, however, and the con
figuration of political forces weighs heavily in this process. The intricacies
of political negotiation are even more delicate for a government coming
out of a revolutionary experience than for one attempting economic tran
sition in less turbulent times. A revolution, if it merits the name, should
reweave the nation's social fabric in a way that leaves a long-term trace.
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It should restructure options, forge durable new alliances, mobilize pre
viously powerless groups, and create a new political panorama. Social
revolution should build strong buffers against the neoliberal tide.
The next three sections of this chapter explore (1) the configuration
of forces that generally supports the adoption of a neoliberal economic
model, (2) the actors and processes that emerged in the postrevolution
ary period in Nicaragua, and (3) the brisk move toward neoliberalism that
ensued in Nicaragua in 1990-92. The Nicaraguan transition, however,
varied in notable respects from the more classical shift toward neoliber
alism. These crucial differences are described in section four. The fifth
section analyzes the reaction to this amalgam by four different sectors
of the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie. As it had in prior periods, the Nicara
guan elite responded in varied ways, ranging from sharp rejection to eager
participation.
The Politics of Neoliberal Economics

Comparative research on structural adjustment and the transition toward
a neoliberal economic model suggests that the successful implementation
of the model depends on a series of propitious conditions (Haggard and
Kaufman 1992a; Nelson 1990). Key elements include (1) strong backing
from international financial actors, (2) the development of a technocratic
policy team to oversee the program, (3) forceful executive support, (4) the
debility and/or cooptation of popular sectors, and (5) the active coopera
tion of an influential sector of the local elite.
Although an analysis that presents neoliberal reform solely as the prod
uct of im f or U.S. government intrusion ignores the complex dynamics
of economic change, international financial actors typically play a pivotal
role in the process. The im f and the World Bank facilitate the movement
toward economic reform both by disseminating the classical liberal ideol
ogy and by providing partial financing of the structural adjustment process
(Stallings 1992). The U.S. government directly supports this transition
through u s a id programs and the zealous promotion of free trade.2 Using
billions of dollars' worth of targeted assistance, the im f stabilization and
adjustment programs and the Bush administration's Enterprise for the
Americas had an unprecedented impact on regional economic policy in
the 1980s and early 1990s.
But the U.S. government and international financial institutions can
not simply dictate policy reform. A crucial mechanism through which
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external actors wield influence is the training of a domestic technocratic
elite that links local and international economic actors (Nelson 1990, 33031; Kahler 1992, 124-27). This insular elite, labeled the "reformist cadre"
by Haggard and Kaufman (1992a, 13) and the "change team" by Waterbury
(1992,191), mediates the transfer of the economic ideology and associated
policy prescriptions as it oversees the local initiation and implementation
of the policy reform.
To implement its neoliberal program, for example, the Belaunde gov
ernment in Peru reabsorbed Peruvian technocrats who had been dispersed
abroad in international lending institutions and who had few ties to local
politics (Conaghan et al. 1990,15). The infamous "Chicago boys" who de
veloped Chile's new economic program during the military dictatorship
(Foxley 1986), and officials from the s pp and the Banco de Mexico who led
the move toward a free trade regime in Mexico in the 1980s (Heredia 1991),
were foreign-trained technocrats distinctly separated from the bargain
ing process of party politics. International linkages and local detachment
allowed them to pursue a radically new economic model that redefined
the role of the state in the economic order.
To succeed in this effort, the economic team needs firm support from
the president and a political system weighted heavily toward executive
control. If the executive branch is too weak, the dispersal of power through
a series of institutions that compete for control can give opponents of
the neoliberal project an instrument through which to block the reform.
When the legislature serves as an effective check on presidential domi
nance, powerful groups may succeed in diverting the economic program
by riddling it with exemptions and loopholes, if not derailing the project
altogether. Centralization of political authority in the hands of the execu
tive, on the other hand, allows a president committed to the new agenda
to pursue it with fewer impediments. The ability of the president to rule
in effect by decree, in spite of any formal divisions of power or constitu
tional constraints, fosters the implementation of economic restructuring.
Neoliberal reform is also promoted when executive power extends deep
into the bureaucracy, which otherwise could undermine the effort.3
Various groups in civil society, including both popular sectors and
privileged elites, will have reason to object to the new economic model.
The immediate, and often longer-term, impact of the neoliberal project is
the withdrawal of economic supports that have buffered important seg
ments of the popular classes. Subsidies on basic goods and services are
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terminated, causing price hikes; wage indexation is eliminated, allowing
real wages to tumble; agrarian reform land may be returned to former
owners or made available for sale, fostering reconcentration of the land;
public sector employment is cut, leading to a ripple of job loss in adjacent
sectors; and import competition increases, resulting in a loss of industrial
jobs. There is a strong tendency for popular groups to resist paying the
high social costs of the transition to free market capitalism.4
Neoliberal reform can be implemented in spite of these social costs if
mass organizations are weak and the antistatist ideology is successfully
disseminated. For much of the region, the long experience of authoritarian
rule followed by a decade of debt-induced economic crisis left unions and
mass organizations weakened and unable to challenge the new economic
orientation effectively (Buchanan and Putnam 1992). The repression of
politics in Chile and its circumscription in Mexico, for example, allowed
these governments to proceed with the neoliberal approach without sus
tained popular upheaval.5
In the long run, however, the consolidation of the new model requires
the construction of a support network that endorses the reform. Antistatism triggered by many years of authoritarian government, combined with
a rejection of the e c l a development model following a decade of eco
nomic crisis, may create an environment in which the neoliberal ideology
can take root. But the cultivation of durable support, particularly in the
strategic sectors of the business elite who must back the new project with
their own investments, poses a challenge.
Not only the popular sectors but important segments of the local eco
nomic elite are negatively affected by the neoliberal reform. When much
of the local elite is "historically wedded to an intricate scheme of rentseeking behavior" (Glade 1991, 8), the transition from a development
model in which the state plays a central role to one in which its in
volvement is relatively modest can undercut the position of traditional
powerholders. Evidence from the Chilean case suggests that small- and
medium-sized business operations, which were not bolstered by ties to
international capital or the major financial groups, were disproportion
ately injured by the withdrawal of state supports after 1973.6 In Peru, in
dustrialists, shaken by the infusion of foreign imports when tariff barriers
were reduced, and nontraditional exporters, who lost export subsidies, be
came major opponents of the Belaunde reforms (Conaghan et al. 1990,19).
Credit restrictions and increased foreign competition drew industrialists,
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agroindustrialists, and exporters into the opposition in Bolivia during the
economic shock treatment of the Victor Paz Estenssoro administration
(Conaghan et al. 1990, 20).
When the "change team" is effectively insulated from even business
pressure, neoliberal reforms may be imposed in spite of business oppo
sition. Effective consolidation of the new model, however, requires the
construction of a new state-capital alliance around the emerging accumu
lation pattern. Efforts by the Pinochet regime to reinforce linkages with
the reconstituted agroexport elite, for example, helped to stabilize the
Chilean transition to neoliberalism in the 1980s (Stallings 1989,190-93).
Without the cooperation of strategic producers, the regime will be unable
to generate the investment needed to refound the national economy.
Many elements supporting neoliberal reform were present in Nica
ragua following the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas. Extensive sup
port for transition was provided by the Bush administration and inter
national financial institutions. U.S.-trained technocrats were prominent
in the economic team, and political power was concentrated in the ex
ecutive branch. There were, however, several important obstacles to re
form. Prominent among them was the counterforce of relatively mobi
lized popular sectors. The factionalized politics of the bourgeoisie also
made it difficult to line up private sector support for the neoliberal
package, although pockets of support emerged (ironically including even
Sandinistas-cum-entrepreneurs). The result was a modification in the
model that reflected the political conjuncture of the postrevolutionary
moment.
The Framework for Neoliberal Politics in
Postrevolutionary Nicaragua

Years of economic crisis had already prompted the Sandinista govern
ment to begin the shift away from a state-centered development strategy;
electoral defeat of the f s l n now catapulted Nicaragua into the neoliberal
camp. International financial organizations and the U.S. government re
sponded heartily to the new government. For the Bush administration,
the election of Violeta Chamorro represented the successful conclusion
of the divisive contra aid policy and a hallmark of the U.S. commitment
to democratization of the region. The White House maneuvered a foreign
aid package through Congress that supported neoliberal reform, restoring
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trade and the sugar quota that had been terminated by the Reagan admin
istration and forgiving bilateral loans lingering from the Somoza era.7
The u s a id mission in Nicaragua was a central agent in this pro
cess (Saldomando 1992). Of the $614 million in the u s a id program for
Nicaragua in the 1990-92 period, two-thirds was assigned for balance of
payments support to maintain the flow of imports like petroleum and
food staples. The local currency generated by the sale of this foreign ex
change provided the Nicaraguan government with funds to cover its defi
cits and support its programs, u s a id funds allowed the government to
cover bank losses associated with the March 1991 devaluation of the cur
rency, the deficits of state enterprises such as the sugar trade monopoly
c o n a z u c a r that was being prepared for privatization, severance pay for
state workers taking early retirement, the government's failed plan to
resuscitate the cotton sector, and the clearing of the arrears with the
World Bank and the id b . Smaller amounts of u s a id support covered the
costs of setting up the new superintendency of banks, which monitored
the state bank system and oversaw the creation of private banks; of de
signing a privatization program; of creating an export promotion center,and of covering the operating expenses of private sector organizations
like c o s e p , u pa n ic , and the newly formed association of producers of
nontraditional exports, a pe n n (u s a id 1992; interview, Janet Ballantyne,
director, usAiD-Nicaragua, July 1,1992).
With U.S. backing, the Chamorro government was able to swing foreign
loans and donations amounting to a total of US$356 million in 1990, $1.3
billion in 1991, and another $800 million programmed for 1992 (Ministe
rio de Cooperacion Externa 1992; Larson with Nitlapan-ucA 1993, 7, 9)-8
By 1991 crucial support for economic reform was being provided by the
multilateral lenders. Reforms launched in March 1991, which eliminated
domestic financing of the government deficit, were designed with staff
support from the im f , the World Bank and the id b (Stahler-Sholk 1992,
26). The World Bank subsequently approved a structural adjustment loan,
and in September 1991 the im f issued its first standby loan for Nicaragua
since 1979. By 1992 the Nicaraguan government had normalized its re
lationship with these multilateral lenders and had secured new loans from
the im f , World Bank, and id b totaling US$450 million through 1994 (U.S.
g a o 1992, 3). Multilateral sources were expected to provide a growing
portion of Nicaragua's foreign loans.9
External support, however, was both politically and economically con-
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ditioned, most visibly on the part of the U.S. government. The pace of the
Chamorro government's land devolution and its refusal to remove San
dinista leaders from key posts raised eyebrows in conservative quarters
of the U.S. Congress. In June 1992, U.S. aid flows of $104 million were
temporarily halted by Congress when Republican Senator Jesse Helms,
member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Democratic Rep
resentative David Obey, chair of the House Appropriations subcommittee
on foreign operations, requested the suspension pending a review of aid
policy.10 After several months of negotiation, the Nicaraguan government
responded with a shake-up in the police force and a series of presidential
decrees renewing the regime's policy on property claims and establishing
indemnization procedures.11 Aid was eventually released following the
electoral defeat of President Bush, but was temporarily suspended again in
mid-1993 pending investigation of Nicaraguan linkages with international
"terrorist" groups.12
Powerful as these external forces were, they would have been unable
to reconstruct the Nicaraguan economy without the active cooperation
of local actors. In Nicaragua the team of advisers brought in to guide
the economic policy of the rookie politician who formally headed the
u n o government was drawn heavily from three sectors: c o r d e n ic , a
business-academic coordinating body,- in c a e , the Harvard-affiliated busi
ness school; and returning expatriates who had acquired technical train
ing abroad. Most significant were the members of c o r d e n ic , the moder
ate economic think tank inspired by the Sanford Commission. Four mem
bers of the new cabinet were drawn from its ranks. Foremost among them
was Antonio Lacayo, the president's son-in-law and campaign director,
who became the minister of the presidency.13
c o r d e n ic members were joined by a network of academics from
in c a e , the Central American business school on the outskirts of Mana
gua.14 The initial ministers of finance and of economy and development
hailed from in c a e , as did a series of vice-ministers, program directors,
and consultants. According to a U.S. g a o report (1991, 21) 16 top tech
nical advisers in the b c n , the newly formed Ministry of Economy and
Development (m e d e ), and other economic agencies were drawn from this
institute. With $3.3 million in contracts from u s a id , in c a e provided 28
consultants for government and private sector groups and organized 80
seminars for 3,000 public and private sector participants by April 1993
(u s a id 1993, 2).
Finally, these two sectors were joined by a network of "Miami boys," as
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they were colloquially known. These former expatriates, some of whom
had worked in the f s l n government during the early, more optimistic
years, had subsequently left the country and taken up residence in the
United States, where they continued their educations and began new
careers. A handful of these returnees had affiliated themselves with vari
ous contra organizations during the 1980s.15 Others held business or aca
demic positions. Miami boys now returned to staff the Chamorro govern
ment's major economic ministries.
These three groups formed the core advisory network that represented
the Chamorro administration. Notable for their absence in administrative
positions were the leaders of the political parties that made up the u n o
coalition and c o s e p leaders. The transition teams appointed immediately
after the February election by Chamorro to suggest nominees for cabinet
positions systematically included figures from both the political parties
and c o s e p . When final appointments were made, however, few were ex
tended beyond the inner circle of Chamorro advisers. What effort there
was to include prominent c o s e p leaders ultimately backfired. Two c o s e p
leaders, the organization's President Gilberto Cuadra and Matagalpan cof
fee association leader Jaime Cuadra, were named to the first cabinet but
resigned immediately when Chamorro announced that Sandinista defense
minister General Humberto Ortega would be retained as the head of the
armed forces.16
Compared with other top political actors, the economic team that took
over from the Sandinistas was relatively removed from the local political
context and had a strong commitment to market criteria. The economic
cabinet members were trained, with few exceptions, in the United States
and in technical fields like economics and engineering. Several had spent
much of the Sandinista era outside Nicaragua removed from the debates
and daily conflicts of the period. Supported intellectually by the business
program at in c a e , these professionals moved quickly toward a neoliberal
formula.17
At the outset, the commitment of the new president and her coalition
to an orthodox, neoliberal program was not entirely clear. In selecting
Chamorro over c o s e p leader Enrique Bolanos and incorporating only a
modified version of Bolanos's plan of action into the u n o platform, the
u n o coalition eschewed a clear embrace of classical liberalism.18 The plat
form's commitment to a "social market" economy, for example, split the
difference between those who favored the restoration of the market and
those who endorsed a model that was attentive to the needs of the poor.
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Land policy was also contradictory, embracing, on one hand, the norm of
returning expropriated properties and, on the other, the consolidation of
the cooperatives and land grants issued under the Sandinista regime (u n o
1989). Recognizing the broad-based popularity of the revolution in its early
days, and sharing some of its social goals, the Chamorro government was
unwilling to discard all aspects of the Sandinista economic model.
On the other hand, the years of expropriations, press censorship, war,
and state controls fed an antistatist sentiment that was quite widespread
in the society. The move toward the market was in part a rebellion against
the expanded state controls of the 1980s and a bid to close the breach
that had been opened between Nicaragua and its traditional regional allies
in the United States and Central America. These considerations, com
bined with the general enthusiasm for private enterprise in the economic
"change team" members like b c n president Francisco Mayorga,19 drew
the new government toward a neoliberal formula.
In addition to foreign economic support and the backing of a techno
cratic elite, structural characteristics of the executive branch also bol
stered economic reform in Nicaragua. As a legacy of both the Somoza and
the Sandinista eras, political power in Nicaragua was quite concentrated
in the presidency. The legislature, which had been fully dominated by
Somoza and his allies in the prerevolutionary era, was generally compli
ant in the Sandinista era as well.20 The Chamorro government inherited a
strong executive branch and a weak legislative tradition.
Initially, Chamorro's administration secured a foothold in the legis
lature by having erstwhile ally Alfredo Cesar elected president of the
national assembly through a path-breaking coalition of moderates in the
u n o ranks and f s l n supporters. When Cesar later defected from the ranks
of the moderates and threw his weight behind the more conservative sec
tors, Chamorro maneuvered around him, often by securing f s l n votes
to get her proposals approved. When necessary, she used veto powers to
prevent the legislature from circumventing executive initiatives. Faced
over time with a deepening schism in the u n o ranks and boycotts of the
legislature by both the f s l n and u n o groups, Chamorro used executive
powers to bypass the assembly and governed frequently by decree.21
The extensive centralization of political authority in Nicaragua allowed
the president considerable institutional leeway in charting the nation's
economic course. But she faced a notable challenge from the popular sec
tors that had been mobilized by the f s l n during the insurrection and early
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Sandinista period. Organizations like the c s t and the a t c were poised to
impede the restoration of the status quo ante.
These organizations had not, historically, been highly autonomous
entities or been forcefully directed from their base. Instead, they had been
closely tied to the institutional interests of the f s l n and often served to
advance the cause of the revolution over their particular sectoral inter
ests.22 Once the f s l n was defeated and forced to hand over government
power, however, the relationship became much more complex. When the
f s l n leadership attempted to restrain labor activism as part of ongoing
negotiations with the Chamorro government, Sandinista mass organiza
tions began to resist control and assert a growing degree of autonomy. To
prevent the full erosion of their base and collapse of their organizations,
union and mass organization leaders now had to commit themselves
more fully to protecting the specific material interests of their mem
bers. Although still linked ideologically to the f s l n and attentive to its
preferences, mass organizations emerged as an increasingly independent
impediment to the full implementation of a neoliberal model (StahlerSholk 1992). Sandinista leaders now awkwardly scrambled to position
themselves at the helm of wildcat labor movements or, in some cases, to
appeal to workers to desist in confrontational mobilizations. Unlike many
other cases in Latin America, where the neoliberal model was imposed in
the wake of a long authoritarian period in which unions were suppressed
or coopted, the introduction of neoliberalism in the Nicaraguan case oc
curred when mass organizations were still relatively mobilized and as
they were beginning to free themselves from the constraints imposed by
the revolutionary government.
The Chamorro government faced not just political opposition from
f s l n organizations but from local business elites as well. The govern
ment was unable to secure the endorsement of traditional elites, in spite
of the personal and organizational connections that existed between key
ministers and the major private sector associations.23 Nicaragua's factionalized, fragmented bourgeoisie was incapable of rallying behind any
program. Most economic elites backed the u n o coalition during the elec
tion, but many were simultaneously wary of the new government that
they themselves had promoted24 This issue will be discussed more fully
below, but in general both c o s e p leaders and many individual producers
who were negatively affected by neoliberal policies quickly moved into
the opposition. The government did have important allies in the bour-
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geoisie, including both entrepreneurial producers who had weathered the
Sandinista era and some prominent business leaders who had returned
from exile. But the Chamorro government failed to win the full backing
of the private sector in spite of the generally antistatist, promarket thrust
of its economic policy.
Implementing the Model

Between 1990 and 1992 the Chamorro government gradually introduced
a series of changes that dramatically altered the economic course of the
nation. According to the Government of Nicaragua's (1992, 1) 1992-96
development plan,
The Government's medium-term development strategy . . . implies
moving away from dependence on a paternalistic, all-powerful State
to self-reliance and spontaneous forms of solidarity; from pervasive
Government control and intervention in economic activity to a free
market economy; from rent-seeking behaviour at all levels of society
to productive hard work; from a high degree of conflict and militari
zation to a peaceful civil society; from large, inefficient public sector
bureaucracies to smaller, more efficient organizations focused on
those few areas where the role of Government is indispensable; and
from inflationary monetary and credit policies to a solid monetary
stability that encourages long-term saving and financial planning.
The government moved quickly to begin (1) the return of expropriated
property held by the state, leading to a large-scale privatization process;
(2) a reduction in the numbers of both military and civilian personnel;
(3) deregulation of the economy, ceding control of foreign trade and bank
ing to the private sector; (4) trade liberalization; and (5) fiscal and mone
tary reform.
One of the government's first acts (Decree #11-90) was to set up a
formal appeal and review process under which expropriated land would
be legally returned to former owners. In theory, land that had been titled
to cooperatives would not be returned; claimants would instead receive
some other form of compensation. In practice, however, the new land
policy put pressure on cooperatives as well, since the Sandinista govern
ment had been slow to provide final legal title to many of the cooperatives
it established.25 Without legal, registered titles, or with titles handed out
under controversial circumstances during the sixty-day lame duck period
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at the end of the f s l n era,26 these cooperatives were vulnerable to having
the land they occupied classified as state lands and returned to former
owners.
In all, 5,384 claimants reportedly filed for the return of over 15,000
expropriated urban and rural properties (Roberto Larios, "Devuelven 50
propiedades a confiscados," Barricada, February 12,1993, interview with
Uriel Soto, Procurador de la Propiedad). Approximately 1,000 certificates
of devolution were issued in the first year by the five-person review com
mission chaired by the procurador general before the review process was
suspended amid charges of mismanagement and corruption [La Prensa,
April 30,1991)27 A new Comision Nacional de Revision de Confiscaciones
was named in October 1992 to renew the property return/compensation
process. Although problems continued for economic elites when workers
occupied enterprises that had legally been returned to former owners,
the u n o regime's commitment to privatization was clear. "We've made
a 100 percent shift away from statism," proclaimed Antonio Lacayo to an
assembled group of private producers [Barricada, June 27,1991).
Not only were former owners regaining their properties but the re
maining state enterprises that had been confiscated from Somoza allies
or built by the Sandinista regime were also being privatized. State sec
tor operations were reorganized under c o r n a p , which pulled together
an array of farms, agroindustries, factories, and commercial, transporta
tion, and tourist facilities that had become state property during the f s l n
era. When it was formed in May 1990, c o r n a p controlled 351 companies
that were responsible for 31 percent of national production and employed
78,000 workers, or 9 percent of the workforce (c o r n a p 1991, 6). The new
regime moved quickly to divest itself of these operations, returning sugar
mills like the is a to the Pellas family, slaughterhouses like San Martin
to former stockholders, and s a im s a to former c o s e p president Enrique
Bolanos. By March 1993 c o r n a p had released 237 of these companies (68
percent of the total) with 158 of them either being returned to former
owners or sold (or, in a few cases, rented) to new private owners.28 (See
Table 6.1.) Procedures initiating the privatization of the remainder were
to have begun by the end of 1993. Even operations that had often escaped
the privatization ax elsewhere, such as gold mines, were put up for sale.
Although some of the firms transferred out of c o r n a p 's control were
handed on to other state agencies, the total participation of state enter
prises in the economy was targeted to fall to less than 10 percent of GDP
when the privatization process was completed (U.S. g a o 1992, 22).
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Table 6.1

Privatization of State Enterprises, May 1990-March 1993
Total number of state enterprises
State enterprises privatized
State farm enterprises returned/sold
Other enterprises returned
Other enterprises sold/rented
Enterprises transferred to other state agency
Enterprises liquidated
Total privatized
Remaining state enterprises

351
43
66
49
28
51
237
114

Source: c o r n a p .

Unlike the Mexican case, where the antinationalist sting of privatiza
tion could be assuaged by the promise that new revenues coming in would
support social programs (Dresser 1991), the Nicaraguan government did
not expect to generate much revenue from privatization. Deteriorated
machinery and antiquated technologies made most of these operations
unattractive, as did their sometimes truculent workforce and the weak
internal market. According to Minister of Finance Emilio Pereira, the gov
ernment hoped only to recover enough from their sale to pay off their past
bank debts and cover unpaid taxes (interview published in ih c a 199id,
23). The gain in privatization, from the state's point of view, would be that
the facility would be in the hands of private entrepreneurs, who would
then be responsible for reactivating production. The rapid pace of priva
tization would also, presumably, persuade foreign creditors and investors
of the seriousness of the government's commitment to a market-based
economic model and encourage new investment.
To restart the economy on a neoliberal foundation, the size and realm
of the state needed to be reduced. Of particular concern to the Chamo
rro government was the size of the public sector workforce. The armed
forces, already reduced following the approval of the Esquipulas accords
from 96,000 in July 1989 to 40,000 at the time of the 1990 election, were
targeted for further reductions. By the end of 1990 only 28,000 troops
and officers remained. This number was lowered further to 15,250 by
early 1993.29
In addition to the reduction in the size and budget of the armed forces,
the government cut the number of its civilian employees. State workers
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were offered a series of financial inducements to leave public service. Ac
cording to u s a id , 28,000 state workers left the public sector under this
agreement, including both those directly employed in the central govern
ment and workers in the state enterprises undergoing privatization (u s a id
1993, i).30 This represented approximately 19 percent of the civilian, pub
lic sector workforce 31
Those state workers who remained were put on a more market-based
footing. Key government services, such as education and health programs,
which had been free during the Sandinista era, now began to employ user's
fees. Other services, such as water, light, electricity, public transporta
tion, and telephones, which had been heavily subsidized, now began to
charge market rates.
At the same time, the government deregulated whole sectors of the
national economy and eliminated the government monopoly over key eco
nomic activities. In 1991, for example, new banking legislation allowed
the return of private banks,- by 1993 seven private banks had been autho
rized. These banks opened with limited capital and few branch offices,
but they had captured approximately 32 percent of all bank deposits by
September 1992 (u s a id 1993, 2,- u n a g n.d., 4).32
Private firms also returned in the export sector. Initially there were
delays in allowing the reestablishment of private intermediaries due to
competing interpretations of constitutional provisions designating ex
ports as a state monopoly and as a result of prior contracts signed by state
firms for the advance sale of the 1990-91 harvest (Pryor 1991, 105-6).
These constraints slowly dissolved. By the end of 1991 105 export firms
had received five-year licenses from the government (E. Perez 1992, 4).
Old distributors like Calley Dagnall and c is a renewed their operations,
and new marketing links were started by organizations like e c o d e pa ,
the farmer's store affiliate of u n a g . The state export firms retreated, be
coming purchasing agents for marginal producers (ih c a i992d, 33).
In foreign trade, the government moved forcefully toward liberaliza
tion. Maximum import duties, which had been 350 percent for some
low-priority items at the end of the Sandinista period (b c n , Nicaragua
Economic Report, November-December 1991, 7), were reduced to 1060 percent in November 1991 and dropped further to 10-40 percent in
April 1992. The government's goal was to reduce the maximum import
duty to 10—20 percent by 1993, at which time all import tariffs within
the newly established Central America Free Trade Area would be elimi
nated (Government of Nicaragua 1992, 10—11). Under the terms of the
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Export Promotion Law, exports were to be promoted through a series of
incentives, including a ioo percent exemption on import tariffs for export
producers and an initial 80 percent income tax reduction for exporters of
non traditional products.33 The return of flight capital and an increase in
foreign investment were to be promoted under a new foreign investment
law that allowed ioo percent profit remittances, capital remittances after
three years, and a three- to five-year tax holiday 34
Finally, after years of battling inflation, monetary stability was
achieved. The elimination of multiple exchange rates and the establish
ment of free convertibility of the new cordoba, followed by a 400 percent
devaluation in March 1991, did away with exchange rate losses that had
plagued the Sandinista financial system. The b c n also cut off the credit
valve to the state banking system and issued a requirement that new
credit authorizations be based on deposits and the recovery of past loans.
The result was a credit squeeze that dramatically curtailed state bank
activities.
The 1991-92 transition was marked by a sharp reduction in govern
ment spending. The fiscal deficit, which had widened to 19.7 percent of
GDP in 1990 as a result of the electoral campaign and the public sector
strikes following the transition, began to close in 1991, when it declined
to 8.0 percent of GDP. (See Appendix 2, Table A.3.) Under the new mone
tary policy, the deficit could no longer be covered by central bank emis
sions. The relatively modest deficit that remained was covered by U.S.
donations, and the inflation rate fell sharply in 1991, with almost all of
the increase coming in the first three months of the year. In the twelve
months between October 1991 and October 1992 the inflation rate fell to
2.2 percent, a level not seen in Nicaragua since before 1978. The fiscal
deficit was reduced in spite of the introduction of a tax reform package in
February 1992 that continued the general downward trend in tax rates.35
The government's revenues were now drawn heavily from indirect taxes
(76 percent of the total in 1992), particularly from excise taxes on the "fis
cal industries"—beer, rum, soft drinks, and cigarettes—that tend to have
a regressive impact.36
In all, there was a notable shift away from the development model of
the Sandinista era, even the modified one of the 1988-90 era, and an em
phatic commitment to the neoliberal guidelines. The shift, however, was
not absolute; the revolutionary era had a continuing influence.
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Postrevolutionary Political Bargaining

Polarized politics and unstable governing coalitions are significant ob
stacles to the consolidation of neoliberalism, tending instead to support
the adoption of populism (Kaufman and Stallings 1991; Haggard and Kauf
man 1992b). Sharp divisions in Nicaraguan society and government, there
fore, served to undermine the neoliberal shift. The Chamorro government,
in spite of its impressive political victory, had a weak political base. It had
no strong links to a powerful political party or to mass organizations,- even
its ties to elite associations were weak. Only a thin thread connected the
new government to the social order it presided over. The f s l n , still reel
ing over its electoral defeat, mobilized for multiple confrontations with
the regime in the early months of the transition.
Repeated batterings in the May-August 1990 period, complete with
two major national strikes, lockouts of top ministers, land and industry
takeovers, and episodes of spontaneous civilian violence, pushed the gov
ernment to search for new forms of dialogue and consultation. The Cha
morro administration, which had campaigned on a platform of national
reconciliation, looked for ways to avoid a showdown with the stillpowerful f s l n and to restart an economy anchored on a new national
consensus.
Twice in 1990-91 the government called the warring parties to the
table for a socioeconomic concertacion process. The locus of economic
deliberation was shifted from the weak, fractious legislature and handed
to direct economic actors. The assembly, filled with erstwhile allies and
intractable foes often representing newborn miniparties, lacked the politi
cal authority to legislate definitively in the area of economic policy. To put
together a meaningful accord, the government needed to get the principal
actors themselves to agree about the rules of the game. Tough discussions
were opened about fundamental economic and social issues, including
property rights, resource distribution, and investment and economic pri
orities.
Building on the concertacion process the Sandinista government had
initiated in 1989, but now with a fuller range of issues in play, the Cha
morro government opened the first round of negotiations from Septem
ber 20 to October 26,1990. The government called together the representa
tives of thirty-five organizations divided between employers and workers.
Eighteen producer associations, including affiliates of both c o s e p and
u n a g , met with representatives of seventeen employee associations that
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included both organizations like the c s t and the a t c , which had been
linked historically to the f s l n , and unions like the Confederacion de
Union Sindical and Central de Accion de Unidad Sindical, which were
allied with the u n o coalition.37 After fifteen full days of discussions that
were broadcast almost nonstop on the nation's one major TV channel,
and periodic walkouts on both sides, an accord was finalized (Republica
de Nicaragua, 1990a).
The agreement gave something to everyone and extracted some con
cessions all around. After initially encountering forceful opposition, em
ployers got Sandinista unions on record accepting the return of or com
pensation for expropriated properties.38 Workers also were persuaded to
accept the return of private enterprises in the banking and export sectors.
In turn, labor succeeded in inserting statements calling on employers to
increase investment, moderate profit levels, generate new employment,
and maintain labor protections established under the f s l n government.
Employee representatives also got the government to agree to establish
reduced tariffs on basic services for low-income groups and maintain at
least the prevailing spending levels for health and education.
The government, in turn, got an agreement that the fiscal deficit had to
be reduced through a decrease in military spending and the rationalization
of public expenditures. Making a case for a reduction in the size of the
state apparatus, the government presented its early retirement program
for state workers. Although at the final moment the representatives of
cosEP-affiliated organizations refused to sign the document, this pact ini
tiated an unprecedented form of dialogue between political and economic
adversaries.
Formal acceptance of general principles did not, however, translate into
agreement about specific cases. Whereas Sandinista labor organizations
signed off on provisions for the return of expropriated land, for example,
a t c leaders often organized standoffs and lockouts of former owners at
tempting to enter their properties. The a t c not only took over properties
of those attempting to reclaim their estates, it also launched invasions of
the properties of unrelated private producers. This new form of triangularized bargaining attempted to pressure powerful private producers, who
presumably had privileged access to the new government, to use their
influence with the government to avert the full privatization of stateowned farms.
The concertacion efforts might have gone further toward reestablishing
a social agreement if the economic crisis had been less severe. In peri
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ods of growth, when all parties can simultaneously receive some benefits,
the costs of adjustment are easier to bear. In a zero-sum context, on the
other hand, increased resources for capitalists mean reduced resources
for their workers. After a long, lagging decade of decline, the continued
economic erosion of labor's resources in Nicaragua triggered combustible
confrontations.
In a postrevolutionary setting, where consensus on fundamental issues
was missing and the society's resources were up for grabs, parties on all
sides insisted, along with Hobbes, that clubs were trumps. The renewed
fall in the standard of living of the majority after the March 1991 de
valuation fed deepening unrest and periodic outbursts of violence. Terms
of the initial pacts were not fulfilled; crucial issues like worker owner
ship had not been addressed precisely. Obfuscation had allowed all parties
to claim victory at first, but tensions soon flared. In the hope of build
ing a new social consensus, the government called for a second round of
concertacion discussions.
Concertacion II ran intermittently from May to August 1991, bringing
together much the same lineup of employer and labor groups in a more
sluggish consultation. Discussion again focused on the pivotal question
of property ownership and how the resources of the society would be div
vied up. Workers in state enterprises wanted to protect their quota of state
resources, arguing that it was their labor that kept these operations afloat
during the hard days of economic embargo and war. c o s e p representa
tives, on the other hand, wanted to minimize worker ownership in order
to give maximum latitude to prospective buyers. In the end, Concerta
cion II concluded with an agreement that workers in state firms would
be allowed to acquire 25 percent of the stock in the operations being
transferred to the private sector.39
This combination of agreements, while failing to provide workers with
other supports such as job protection, guarantees about retraining, or any
minority veto power in managerial decisions, did parcel out some of the
resources of the state to workers. The government was able to come to this
decision in part because there had been no rush of private investors will
ing to snatch up these state resources. State properties, therefore, were
available for use in responding to popular pressures. The weak response
of capital to the first phase of transition fostered further deviations from
the neoliberal model.
The concertacion process reduced, but did not eliminate, social ten
sion.40 Strikes continued throughout 1991 and reached significant pro
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portions in the banking, health, education, sugar processing, port, air
port, customs, hotel, and mining sectors.41 With the active support of top
f s l n leaders, however, there were no major uprisings, even in the face
of ongoing economic restructuring. This relative political containment
suggests a certain success in the concertacion process.
The Nicaraguan economic reform was not, however, simply a conven
tional neoliberal package. Although much of the public rhetoric on the left
would characterize it in these terms, the economic program that emerged
contained several unconventional features. Compared with neoliberal ex
periences elsewhere in the region, the Nicaraguan variant differed in sev
eral notable respects.
Neoliberalism with a Twist

The neoliberal model entails more than just a checklist of discreet eco
nomic policy reforms. It also involves a restructuring of the sociopolitical
arena. Although central economic policies were altered in postrevolution
ary Nicaragua, the social and political configuration proved more resistant
to change. The broader contours of the neoliberal shift were subject to
tough negotiation. As a result of this complex and ongoing political bar
gaining, the neoliberal formula was modified in the Nicaraguan case in
four interrelated areas.42 These areas were (i) worker ownership, (2) re
straints on the forces of repression, (3) eased contraction of the public
sector workforce, and (4) ongoing consultation and conciliation with the
political opposition.
Worker Ownership
The Nicaraguan version of privatization had several distinctive fea
tures. Soon after the first concertacion accord, the government set up a
special commission to oversee the privatization of the state farm system.
This commission finished its work quickly. By mid-1991, the Chamorro
government had disposed of most of its agricultural property, divesting
itself of HATONic, the state cattle corporation that owned almost onethird of the state farmland, as well as the cotton corporation a g r o e x c o
and the coffee corporation c a f e n ic , which together administered the
most valuable state-owned land and most advanced processing facilities.
In privatizing these properties, the state attempted to respond to mul
tiple demands, including those of workers. Pulling together the claims
filed by former owners, the demands made by the a t c , and the promises
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Table 6.2

State Farm Land Distribution Program, 1991
Area
Mz.

%

Cattle Sector (h a t o n ic )
Returned to former owners
Cattle sector farmworkers
Discharged from armed forces
Demobilized resistance
Total

80,455
99,319
59,034
70,619
309,427

26
32
19
23
100

Cotton Sector (a g r o e x c o )
Returned to former owners
Cotton sector farmworkers
Discharged from armed forces
Demobilized resistance
Total

17,221
11,396
4,482
2,299
35,398

49
32
13
6
100

Coffee Sector (c a f e n ic )
Returned to former owners
Coffee sector farmworkers
Discharged from armed forces
Demobilized resistance
Total

26,890
24,942
10,250
14,542
76,624

35
33
13
19
100

Total state farm land distribution
Returned to former owners
State farmworkers
Discharged from armed forces
Demobilized resistance
Total

124,566
135,657
73,766
87,460
421,449

30
32
17
21
100

Source:

c o r n a p.

the government made to demobilized contra and e ps forces, the govern
ment divided up resources among these four competitors. The former
owners reacquired 49 percent of the state cotton land, 26 percent of the
state ranch land, and 35 percent of the state coffee territory. (See Table 6.2.)
But the group receiving the largest portion of this land was made up of
former state farmworkers, which secured the right to acquire 32-33 per
cent of the area of each of these corporations. Once the properties to be
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returned to former owners were identified, agricultural workers were con
sulted by the a t c leadership about which of the remaining properties
should be claimed for the workers. By December 1992,17,148 workers be
came stockholders (socios) in 131 agricultural enterprises (f id e g 1993, 23).
The remainder of this land was divided between discharged soldiers and
demobilized contra troops. Contra soldiers received somewhat more of
the ranch and coffee land in the mountainous interior, where these forces
had been concentrated. On the other hand, the e ps soldiers received some
what more of the cotton land on the Pacific side of the country than their
resistance counterparts. Overall, discharged soldiers received 17 percent
of the divested land, and demobilized rebels received 21 percent.
This agrarian privatization process was followed by divestment in the
industrial sector. According to the terms of the second concertacion
agreement, state workers in the industrial sector were to receive 25 per
cent participation in these better-capitalized and technologically complex
operations. Negotiations about how the allocation of these shares was to
proceed were more difficult and time consuming than negotiations about
agricultural properties. In some cases, the enterprise was not financially
viable, and workers did not want to assume responsibility for its debts.
In others, the former owners insisted on complete control and refused to
sell partial ownership to the workers. So complex was the situation that
negotiations proceeded sector by sector and even company by company. In
February 1993 the government announced an agreement with c s t under
which nine state enterprises were to be sold in their entirety to workers,
partial control was accepted in another eighteen, and three were to be
returned in their entirety to former owners (Gobierno de Nicaragua-c s t ,
Acuerdo, February 2,1993).43
The redistributive impact of this privatization process had several limi
tations. The workers' ability to acquire these resources was reduced by the
requirement that they purchase their shares rather than receiving them
outright, c o r n a p 's policy of giving concessionary terms (access to credit,
low interest rates, grace periods) to "social groups" that acquired state
property was expected to allow workers to participate in the process.44 In
all probability, however, at least some of these new owners will be unable
to complete these payments, and the whole negotiation process will enter
another phase after the grace period elapses. If the power configuration in
Nicaragua shifts, workers and former combatants could wind up losing
the properties they obtained during the opening phase of the privatization
process.
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Furthermore, formal ownership does not automatically mean worker
empowerment and administrative control. In order to preserve as much of
the a pp framework as possible and to reduce divisive tendencies among
the workers, former state farmworkers were encouraged by Sandinista
leaders to form holding companies run by professional administrators,
some of whom had played similar roles during the Sandinista govern
ment. If the old patterns of top-down management continue unabated,
the workers7 formal ownership of these enterprises may not, therefore,
give them meaningful control over their property. Finally, these new prop
erty arrangements divide the working class by differentiating those state
workers who can buy into their firms from those who do not have this
opportunity.
On the other hand, these kinds of privatization arrangements, which
fostered worker participation and decentralized ownership, highlight the
sustained political capacity of groups mobilized by the f s l n and the in
clusionary efforts of the postrevolutionary government. In this sense,
privatization in Nicaragua represents a third alternative to privatization
efforts in Czechoslovakia or Poland, where the process was linked to a de
centralized "citizen capitalism," and such efforts in Mexico or Argentina,
where the divestiture process catered to a relatively small number of elite
economic groups.
Restraints on Repression
The regime also differentiated itself from other neoliberal regimes in
Latin America, particularly the military version in Chile and Argentina
in the 1970s, by forgoing an extensive capability for mass repression. By
allowing the leadership of the military and police force to remain in the
hands of those who held these posts during the f s l n era, the Chamorro
government obtained the cooperation and even loyalty of these organiza
tions. But it did so by accepting a policy of exceptional restraint in the
face of mass mobilizations.
In the July 1990 general strike, for example, soldiers and police did not
take forceful action against protesters who closed the capital for over a
week by breaking up the streets to build barricades. Recurring strikes in
the public sector in 1990 and 1991 were rarely confronted by the police or
armed forces. The periodic takeover of private farms during crucial mo
ments in the agricultural cycles in 1990 and 1991 was not effectively chal
lenged by the authorities. In these kinds of events, strikers and protesters
would typically disperse when the police or soldiers approached but re-
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turn as soon as the police departed. Both protesters and troops shared
a mutual commitment to avoiding outright confrontation. This relative
softening of the forces of repression in the Nicaraguan case gave freer
reign to regime opponents. It also reduced the gap between the Chamorro
government and the f s l n , facilitating more extensive consultation and
agreement.
The September 1992 replacement of Sandinista police chief Rene Vivas
following the suspension of U.S. aid, and Chamorro's announcement in
September 1993, following another aid suspension, that Humberto Ortega
would be retired in 1994, could begin to alter this pattern. Since this
shake-up was presumably insisted upon with an eye to reducing f s l n
power and increasing protection of property claims, the remodeled mili
tary forces may become more confrontational with strikers or those in
volved in land invasions. They are unlikely to undergo a full metamor
phosis, however, since Sandinista stalwarts in the leadership of both the
police and the military are several layers thick. Replacement at the top
only leads to the promotion of other Sandinista affiliates who move up
from the lower ranks. The kind of repression that accompanied the neo
liberal transformation in Chile is unlikely to be replayed in Nicaragua, at
least during this phase of the transition.
Eased Public Sector Contraction
Recognizing the political and economic difficulty of laying off thou
sands of public sector employees, many of whom were diehard f s l n sup
porters, the government devised an "occupational conversion" plan that
cushioned this process. Voluntary retirement from the government pay
rolls would earn state workers a bonus of up to 10,000 cordobas oro
($2,000), with which they could make the transition to the private sector.
The initial program, designed for those employed directly by the central
government, was expanded to include workers laid off due to liquida
tions or transfers of parastate companies. Financed by the u s a id mission,
this early retirement program reportedly cost $47.5 million by mid-1992
(u s a id 1992, 1).
The payments failed by much to cover the costs of moving into the
private sector, and with the enduring economic crisis the program has
worsened the glut of unemployed professionals. However, the vast ma
jority of state workers were retained, leaving much of the public sector
with proreform sentiments, however tinged they may be by weariness and
disillusion. Unlike in other postrevolutionary settings, where state cut-
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backs were accompanied with political purges or abrupt amputations of
ministries, Nicaraguan functionaries were generally allowed to choose be
tween retirement with a substantial severance allowance or remaining in
public employ. This approach buffered the transition of public employees
into the private sector and allowed the regime to avoid a fierce political
backlash.
Consultation with the Opposition
President Chamorro noted repeatedly in 1990, "We won an election,
not a war." Her political adversaries were not required to sign an uncon
ditional surrender. Quite to the contrary, the new regime was willing to
extend protections and resources to the f s l n . Beginning with the Proto
col of Transition prior to the inauguration of the Chamorro government,
the new regime made a series of agreements with the f s l n in the name of
stability and reconciliation. Because of its own precarious political posi
tion presiding over a fractious and quickly disintegrating coalition, the
Chamorro government made repeated overtures to the f s l n in the 199093 period. The regime resisted recurring internal pressures to divest f s l n
leaders of the residential properties they had acquired during the era of
their control; it was desultory in reviewing the land and property titles
that had been extended during the pinata, preferring that the f s l n police
itself and sanction members who had illicitly grabbed state resources; it
allowed the military high command to use its own criteria in reducing
the size of the officer corp instead of forcing a political purge; and except
in top positions, it did not force f s l n party members to surrender their
government offices.
The regime participated in regular consultations with top f s l n leaders,
informing them of pending economic moves and involving them in inter
national campaigns for foreign financing (interviews, Luis Carrion Cruz,
March 20,1991; Daniel Ortega, June 29,1992).45 This process both damp
ened the neoliberal character of the regime's economic policy and co
opted key elements of the f s l n 's leadership. Unable to devise a clear
economic alternative, and having moved, in the 1988-90 period, down
the road toward the restoration of the market principles, the f s l n was
hard-pressed to resist the Chamorro government's overtures, f s l n leaders
and the Chamorro government officials now collectively and publicly em
braced a modified version of the neoliberal model that buffered key con
stituents of the f s l n . In early 1993 this cooperation even brought several
prominent Sandinista party members back into government in second tier
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ministerial positions, raising the charge of co-gobierno (cogovernment)
between the Chamorro administration and the f s l n .
The Bourgeoisie’s Responses to the New Economic Direction

As had been the case, to a greater or lesser degree, throughout the revo
lutionary period, the Nicaraguan private elite remained divided. To the
established fissures were added new divisions, as emerging and return
ing elites took their place in the bourgeoisie. Within two years of the
postrevolutionary transition, the economic elite arguably was arrayed in
four clusters. Although there was some overlap among these groups, they
differed from each other in the way they combined their political styles,
investment strategies, and alliance tendencies. At the apex of the eco
nomic elite stood two groups: the antirevolutionary politicos, who force
fully criticized the Chamorro government, and the hegemonic returnees,
who generally preferred quiet negotiation and tacit support. Beneath these
leading groups were two other business sectors: the disoriented agricul
tural elites, who foundered economically during the economic reform and
became politically disaffected, and the new entrepreneurs, who moved
quickly to identify emerging opportunities.
Antirevolutionary Politicos
Antirevolutionary politicos continued to dominate the c o s e p and
national leadership in the postrevolutionary period. By this point,
the political orientation of c o s e p had taken on a life of its own. The pri
mary goal of these leaders had never been to determine what views and
opinions prevailed among private producers and to reflect those views.
Instead, leaders were chosen by a small group of insiders who elevated
to power the most articulate defenders of the organization's preestab
lished position.46 Those who were most drawn to c o s e p and who tended
to rise within the organization were those who found its strident hos
tility to the Sandinistas to be most congenial. As Chapter 5 demonstrated,
national-level leaders of c o s e p and u pa n ic were drawn heavily from the
moral-political opponents of the regime.
After 1990 the ranks of these organizations were resupplied by a net
work of new volunteers who were perhaps even more stridently antiSandinista than those they replaced. To the old core of leaders were now
added several expatriates who returned to Nicaragua to reclaim their ex
propriated properties. The inability or unwillingness of the Chamorro govu pa n ic
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ernment to dispose quickly of their claims, to halt ongoing land invasions,
and to restore the traditional social relations to the countryside led many
c o s e p and u pa n ic leaders to sharply criticize the new government.47
The resignations of two c o s e p leaders from the Chamorro govern
ment on the day it was inaugurated, the refusal of c o s e p representatives
to sign either of the two concertacion agreements, c o s e p 's support for
the new Association of the Expropriateds (Asociaciones de Confiscados),
and the links between the u pa n ic leadership and the right-wing pl c re
flected the enduring alienation of this elite sector from the government,
in spite of the adoption of the neoliberal reforms by the Chamorro govern
ment.48 The stridency of the c o s e p opposition, in view of the adoption
of these reforms, suggests that the political culture of the organization
had been frozen in place. Organizations have stylistic propensities that
are forged during defining periods and subsequently become difficult to
change, c o s e p 's formative experiences during the hard, early years of the
Sandinista government had inclined it toward confrontational politics.
That style, which had, in some ways, served the broad political interests
of c o s e p leaders, became an organizational trademark that it could not
surrender.
Hegemonic Returnees
Because of its long history leading the opposition to the f s l n gov
ernment, c o s e p was widely regarded as the primary political agent of
the bourgeoisie. Its preeminence, however, was not universally accepted.
One important challenger was drawn from the elite families that histori
cally headed the major economic groups in the prerevolutionary period.
Many members of the hegemonic families of the pre-1979 era fled the
country in 1978 as the insurrection heated up. They generally took up
residence abroad, typically in the United States. A handful of these elites
had accumulated extensive additional resources during the period of their
self-exile; others had survived and prospered after making a tough ad
justment. Drawn back to Nicaragua once the Sandinistas were ousted,
members of this group and their descendants now began to reestablish
their dominance over core activities like banking and export trade.
Unlike c o s e p leaders, members of these prerevolutionary elite fami
lies were more likely to make investments and start new projects during
this transition period. Three of the new banks were established by old,
elite families, who could draw on foreign financing and international con
nections. Eduardo Montealegre, son of the founder and long-term presi-
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dent of b a n ic , returned as cofounder and manager of the Banco de Credito Centroamericano in 1991,• his cousin Haroldo Montealegre became
a founder and the general manager of the Banco Mercantil; Carlos Pellas,
son of Alfredo Pellas of the b a n a m e r group, negotiated both the return of
the is a and the creation of the Banco de America Central, a third private
bank.49 Unlike c o s e p , which was locked into a confrontational stance,
several members of this group of hegemonic returnees tended to adopt a
low political profile, in some ways similar to the one their families em
ployed during the Somoza regime. When they did surface politically, they
generally adopted a conciliatory approach toward the government.50 Less
overtly ideological and more concerned about practical consequences, less
inclined to scrappy political infighting and more skilled at negotiation,
less mired in old battles and more willing to start afresh, this prime elite
differentiated itself from the c o s e p leadership.
c o s e p leaders, many of whom had logged years in hard political
struggle and had experienced tremendous economic decline during the
Sandinista period, resented the return of a relatively unscathed traditional
elite. These competitors came back with extensive international connec
tions and investment skills that those who remained in Nicaragua "fight
ing the good fight" had not acquired. Those who stayed were dependent
on antiquated and deteriorated technologies in an era of FAXes and con
ference calls. As returning elites reasserted their positions in banking and
export trade, those who had remained behind found their own ambitions
frustrated. The unwillingness of prerevolutionary leaders to toe the c o s e p
political line challenged the latter's political prominence and deepened
the elite divide.
Disoriented Agricultural Elite
Producers at the local and regional level who had risen to prominence
in the prerevolutionary period as agroexporters and large-scale staples
producers, and who had generally stayed in Nicaragua during the San
dinista era, emerged in the neoliberal economy as victims of economic
displacement. Cotton producers who expected a return to the heady days
of the 1970s were confronted with tremendously increased costs and de
clining real prices for cotton. Stimulated by temporary access to state
bank credit in 1990 and generous restructuring arrangements for the un
paid loans in 1991, cotton production in 1991 increased 21 percent over
1990 (c e pa l 1992b, 28). But Nicaraguan cotton, heavily dependent on
multiple pesticide applications, had ceased being profitable at world mar-
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ket prices (c a r a n a Corporation and Sparks Companies 1991, 79-84). By
1992, production plummeted and the value of cotton exports declined a
reported 41 percent between 1991 and 1992 (f id e g , Observador econo
mico 12 [December 1992]: 14). Although cotton growers particularly had
been favored in the first years, ultimately their loss of competitiveness
and the pesticide contamination of their soils spelled disaster.
Other producers of traditional crops had similar problems. Coffee pro
ducers faced a return to the market just as the international coffee orga
nization collapsed; prices in 1992 for Central America's mild Arabica
coffee were at their lowest point in 17 years.51 Sorghum producers, accus
tomed to price supports from the Empresa Nicaragiiense de Alimentos
Basicos (e n a b a s ), were now hit with reduced internal demand and heavy
competition from more efficient regional competitors. Cotton and coffee
producers faced financial ruin; cattle breeders resisted the importation of
competing breeds; industrialists feared the onslaught of cheap imports
(author's observation of meetings of Asociacion de Caficultores de Mana
gua, May 16, 1990, and a c b n , August 6,1991; La Prensa, August 8,1991;
ih c a i992d, 36; interview, c a d in , June 26,1992).
The combined loss of subsidies and increased international compe
tition spelled rising economic difficulties and political disaffection for
much of the business elite. The traditional vagaries, such as drought,
merged with new policy constraints, like more restrictive bank credit,
to make economic life difficult for this sector. The new government's
efforts to cut taxes, stabilize the currency, and provide moral support did
not replace the guaranteed profits and hefty subsidies that many tradi
tional producers had become accustomed to during the f s l n period. Low
prices, a credit squeeze, and production problems meant declining export
earnings; average earnings for traditional agricultural exports fell 23 per
cent between 1990 and 1991. The drop was most acute for coffee and beef
producers, whose export earnings declined 47.9 percent and 52.7 percent,
respectively, during that period (c e pa l 1992b, 36).
As in other Latin American countries that had undertaken neoliberal
reforms, substantial sectors of the local bourgeoisie were actually hurt
by the policy, even when they had been adamant proponents of market
reforms. They became disoriented by the changes, unsure of how to pro
ceed, averse to new beginnings, and disillusioned with political outcomes
they themselves had supported. Surveys completed by 413 producers dur
ing five daylong seminars organized by c o s e p , m e d e , and in c a e in May
and June 1992 suggested the pessimism and disaffection that prevailed
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among those respondents. Fifty-eight percent of these producers classified
the government's treatment of producers as negative; 42 percent indicated
that they were pessimistic about the future (c o s e p et al. 1992, 78,125)52
Although some policies were evaluated more positively than others,53 only
7 percent indicated that they would vote for either Violeta Chamorro or
Antonio Lacayo for president.54
Given the stresses of economic and political transition, some even re
membered the Sandinista era with nostalgia. As a former president of the
sorghum association a n pr o s o r explained,
[Then b c n president] Mayorga says that Nicaraguan producers are
going to be paid the price prevailing in Central America. But I say
back to him, when I'm watching him on TV, the prices may be Cen
tral American prices but the costs here are higher than they are
[elsewhere] in Central America. . . . Under the Sandinistas, we had a
guaranteed profit margin. We would propose to them that the profit
margin be 50 percent and they gave us that. We earned much more
then than now. . . . We should have a guaranteed price, not supply and
demand. (Interview, October 18,1990)
New Entrepreneurs
In the period following the Sandinista defeat, a small but important
segment of producers continued the search for new economic opportu
nities. Less preoccupied with the political debate or more satisfied with
the postrevolutionary outcomes, and more agile in their response to eco
nomic crisis, these elites emerged as the new entrepreneurs. They in
cluded sectors as varied as irrigated rice producers interested in nontradi
tional exports, large-scale industrialists exploring new capital ventures,
u n a g leaders attempting to link forward from the production process,
and former state functionaries from the Sandinista government eager to
prosper under the new rules.
One key area for development was nontraditional agricultural exports.
Most of the Central American countries had moved forcefully in this
direction in the 1980s. Nicaragua, under the Sandinistas, had been the
regional laggard. As U.S.-Nicaraguan relations normalized, the opportu
nities provided by the Caribbean Basin Initiative were now available to
Nicaraguan producers and served as a stimulus to production changes.
Only weeks after the Chamorro government was elected, a group of agri
cultural producers who had begun to experiment on a small scale with
nontraditional crops met to discuss new opportunities for export to the

Postrevolutionary Nicaragua

United States. At the close of this session, the group formed a new orga
nization, a pe n n .55 Not affiliated formally with any other private sector
organization, the association pulled together a small group of relatively
elite producers, primarily from u pa n ic , who were willing to undertake
some state-supported experimentation, a pe n n cultivated linkages with
U.S. suppliers and distributors. Financial support from u s a id , which
covered a pe n n 's operating expenses, allowed the organization to develop
technical and informational services and increase its membership.56 Funds
channeled through the state investment fund, f n i , provided start-up capi
tal at low interest rates, and the Export Promotion Law provided massive
tax reductions on nontraditional export earnings.
With this kind of institutional support, nontraditional exports like
honeydew melons began to compete for entry into the U.S. market. Melon
production more than doubled between 1990-91 and 1991-92, and export
earnings rose from $1.6 to $7.4 million (interview, James Johnson, a pe n n ,
Departamento de Transferencia de Tecnologia, June 24, 1992). Although
far behind the other Central American countries, and faced with massive
problems (erratic electricity, a deteriorated and war-damaged transporta
tion system, clogged international telecommunications), a small network
of Nicaraguan entrepreneurs now moved to catch up.
A second group that displayed a willingness to take on new invest
ments was found among u n a g leaders. Unlike some business elites who
seemed immobilized as they awaited the return of the prerevolutionary
era, u n a g leaders were eager to work within the social and political
framework that emerged from the revolution. Building on their relatively
positive relations with labor, their funding ties to past benefactors like the
Scandinavian countries, and their easy access to the consultants among
unemployed Sandinista technocrats,57 these producers sought new oppor
tunities.
Evaluations were made of investments in processing facilities, export
trade, and banking. Taking advantage of the new opening for private ex
porters, u n a g 's supply and distribution affiliate, e c o d e pa , set up its own
coffee-processing and marketing facilities in Regions IV and VI. Building
on a solidarity network that sold Nicaraguan coffee in European markets
during the economic embargo imposed by the Reagan administration,
e c o d e pa marketed 15 percent of Nicaragua's coffee exports in 1991-92.58
u n a g leaders also figured prominently in the plan to privatize c a r n ic ,
a Managua slaughterhouse that had been confiscated from the Somoza
family. Under the c a r n ic privatization agreement, the slaughterhouse
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was to be jointly acquired by its workers and a group of cattle ranchers,
with u n a g leader Juan Tijerino serving as president of the newly re
organized corporation (interviews, Ivan Saballos, c o r n a p , June 24, 1992;
Bayardo Matamoros, Secretaria de Finanzas, Cooperativa Nuevo c a r n ic ,
R.L., June 24,1992; u n a g 1993,18). Finally, u n a g moved gradually toward
the creation of its own bank, the Banco del Campo, to circumvent the
credit crunch that emerged in the postrevolutionary period.59
A third group of new entrepreneurs was composed of Sandinistas-cumbusinesspeople. This sector included ex-officials in the Sandinista govern
ment who now directly entered the economic competition as private pro
ducers. Some of these Sandinista entrepreneurs had been wealthy prior to
the revolution and now reclaimed old properties that they had neglected
or tendered to the state during the 1980s. Others acquired properties in
the final stages of the revolution in the period of the pinata. Some drew
on professional and managerial skills acquired in government to set up
new business operations. Unlike much of the traditional economic elite,
the Sandinista bourgeoisie moved rapidly to launch new ventures and ex
pand their activities. The presence of these elites in private businesses
deepened the confusion about what businesses were owned and operated
by the f s l n as a party and what operations were owned and managed
by individuals who had been prominent government officials during the
f s l n era.60
The high profile of many of these new enterprises, in an economy that
was badly depressed, also exacerbated tensions within the f s l n . Party
members and supporters who were slipping into deeper economic decline
resented more prosperous members (derisively labeled the nueva burguesia sandinista or n b s ) who were expanding their economic activities;
Sandinistas who now managed their own business operations ran into
conflict with workers who threatened strikes or land invasions. Defenders
of the "revolutionary bourgeoisie," however, argued that Sandinista busi
ness leaders were becoming the "patriotic producers" that the revolution
had so long mythologized. This revolutionary elite, it was hoped, would
continue the breakup of an anachronistic social order in the fields and fac
tories, contribute to the modernization of production, and exert pressure
on the Chamorro government to moderate the neoliberal formula. Indeed,
the participation of the Sandinista elite in the private sector even won
approval in some corners of the government and the business elite. One
c a d in leader observed, "It is better to have them on the inside, dealing
with the problems that we face in business, than to have them on the
outside causing trouble" (interview, c a d in , June 26,1992,.
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In sum, not all producers were equally cautious about the new eco
nomic and political configuration.61 During the 1990-93 transition, a di
verse collection of private sector elites began to explore new activities.
Investment in nontraditional production, export marketing, and the finan
cial sector suggested various areas for economic expansion. This invest
ment trend was modest. It fell far short of providing a foundation for a
new economic strategy; it could not even generate short-term economic
growth. The "new entrepreneurs" did, however, begin to hint at some of
the possible features of postrevolutionary development.
Conclusions

In spite of some positive trends, the obstacles to economic reactivation
and restructuring in Nicaragua remained massive. An unfavorable inter
national market for traditional products, entrenched local hostilities, and
the elusiveness of a new social and economic consensus all impeded eco
nomic renewal. Even after three years only a small portion of the capital
flight of the 1970s and 1980s had been reversed, and a large portion of the
new investment going on was centered around short-term commercial ac
tivities. The pervasiveness of grinding poverty and a brutally low standard
of living for the majority provided a weak foundation on which to restart
the economy.62 The push for nontraditional exports brought its own set of
problems and seemed unlikely to offer any quick or clear remedy.63 The
inability of the postrevolutionary state to play a catalytic role impeded
corrective action. Even the f s l n , which had directed a decade-long social
revolution, was unable to articulate any alternative. Nicaragua became
mired in the economic quagmire, with economic production continuing
to decline in the period following the revolution.
But the Sandinista period had introduced notable changes in the Nica
raguan social order. First, the revolution deeply politicized the bourgeoi
sie. Economic elites who, for decades, had remained politically passive
and had consigned the political world to the Somoza family were drawn
into the political wranglings of the times. Business leaders emerged as
central political figures in the 1980s and 1990s. Among c o s e p leaders,
a common refrain ran, "As the Sandinistas put the government into the
economy, so the private producers were pushed to enter into politics."
One result has been a hyperpoliticized business leadership dominating
the major national business association.
Second, the Sandinista era reshuffled the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie. The
traditional economic groups that had been so prominent in the prerevolu

187

188

Postrevolutionary Nicaragua

tionary period were broken apart during the revolution. The departure of
central figures in the old elite families created space for the rise of a new
set of economic heavyweights. The experience of revolution, then, set the
groundwork for even more decentralization of the economic elite than
had prevailed in the Somoza era. Instead of the three economic groups
that predominated in the prerevolutionary era, five or six may emerge in
the postrevolutionary period, including some involving u n a g leaders or
Sandinista producers, who were not previously part of these networks.
The decentralization of elite resources is, of course, quite different
from a full redistribution of national wealth or the significant inclusion of
the peasantry in an integrated development model—the purported goals
of the revolution. The rise of some and the fall of others does, however,
reflect a certain democratization of the bourgeoisie.
Third, the revolution dispersed the economic elite internationally, as
private producers sent their children abroad, attempting to shield them
from the violence and ideological shake-up that was taking place in their
country. Whereas many of the parents had gone abroad for a few years as
young adults to complete their educations, their children were dispersed
through the United States and Latin America at younger ages and for
much longer periods of time. Even after the f s l n 's electoral defeat, many
did not return. Those who did return had extensive linkages to other re
gions, setting the groundwork for a less distinctively Nicaraguan, more
internationalized elite culture.
Finally, some elements of the Nicaraguan elite became less antagonis
tic to discussions of workers' rights and the needs of the nation's poor.
Not only did a significant group of elites come to align itself with the
revolution, but others who remained opposed came to accept some of
the revolution's social goals. After decades under the Somoza dynasty,
in which unions and mass organizations hardly existed, many Nicara
guan producers were forced to the bargaining table with their workers. In
the process, many elites became accustomed to this form of interaction;
some came to regard it as constructive. After years of agrarian reform and
debate about property rights, many economic elites began to accept the
idea of worker ownership of state properties and shareholding in privately
owned businesses. These transformations would not have come easily out
of Somoza's Nicaragua. For many Nicaraguan elites who lived through
the Sandinista era, an improved capacity for dialogue with workers and
peasants may constitute part of the lingering legacy of revolution.

chapter

The Nicaraguan Revolution in
Comparative Perspective

revolutionary regimes leave the local economic elite in place,
they run inevitable risks. If the regime pushes forcefully for struc
tural change, the business sector can use its considerable resources to
retaliate. Broadly disseminated denunciations, brisk capital flight, and
coup plotting can undercut the revolution and lead to its reversal. On the
other hand, if the regime attempts to assuage business fears by responding
favorably to their concerns and incorporating their leaders, the revolution
can be coopted. Unable to push for structural transformation, the revolu
tion loses momentum and fails. The bourgeoisie question—that is, how
to negotiate capital's accommodation to change—is one of the central
dilemmas of social revolution.
In Latin America, regimes committed to structural change have not
been highly successful at achieving their goals. Various forces impede
transition; the resistance of the local bourgeoisie is a crucial element. Not
all business elites are identical, however, and some revolutionary regimes
have maneuvered for their cooperation more successfully than others.
This book explores that variation by analyzing four historical cases and
the recent Nicaraguan experience. These cases point to five factors that
shape state-capital relations. (See Table 7.1.)
The first component focuses on inherited oligarchical tendencies in
the bourgeoisie. If the elite evolved from an oligarchical family network
without a fundamental rupture in the general historical pattern of domi
nance, then it is more likely to maintain its unity and be propelled force
fully into combat. Conversely, a more fragmented bourgeoisie is likely to
emerge when there is no segment that, for reasons of tradition and eco
nomic domination, can exercise a hegemonic function and provide politi
cal leadership for the class as a whole. A weak oligarchical profile is more
probable when the economy is diversified, with multiple, competing eco-
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Table 7.1

Configuration of State-Capital Characteristics and Bargaining
Tendencies

Hegemonic force of traditional
oligarchy
Business organizational autonomy
Perception of class threat
Institutionalized political
capacity of the regime
Economic viability of the
regime

Confrontation

Accommodation

high
high
high

low
low
low

low

high

low

high

nomic groups vying for resources and crisscrossed with strong regional
traditions and hostilities. Conversely, oligarchical control is more likely
when the economy is centered on agroexport production and economic
diversification is less pronounced.
The unity or the fragmentation of the elite is further conditioned by
its organizational characteristics. The capacity to organize autonomously
without extensive control on the part of the state facilitates the coordina
tion of a common elite strategy. If business organizations expand laterally,
to absorb much of the private sector, and vertically, to create a powerful
peak association, then they can become formidable opponents of a reform
regime. On the other hand, if private sector organizations are sparse and
frail, leaving much of the elite unorganized, or if they depend heavily
on the state for financing and legal recognition, then they may be more
susceptible to control by the regime.
The third factor that shapes the interaction is the degree to which
the elite perceives the regime as a threat to its fundamental interests.
When capitalists of all sizes come to believe that private accumulation
and social stratification themselves are in jeopardy and that the risks of
loss are ubiquitous, elite fusion and confrontation with the regime are
highly likely. Conversely, if these elites regard the risks as problematic
for only a discrete subset of the capitalist class, and particularly an issue
for foreign as opposed to domestic firms, then highly divergent responses,
including strategic accommodation, may follow.
Fourth, the degree to which the revolution achieves political institu
tionalization is also critical. If the state is too fragile, internally divided,
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or fails to mobilize a broad popular base, then economic elites will have
little incentive to enter a bargaining process with political leaders. They
may instead, often in coalition with powerful external actors, push to
have the regime ousted, clearing the way for counterrevolution. However,
if the regime succeeds in institutionalizing the reform by consolidating
its political resources and embedding these changes in a new legal order,
then it becomes a worthy foe. Without the easy option of eliminating the
regime, private elites may be drawn into negotiations.
Finally, the state must not only display notable political capabilities but
it must also resolve the complex problem of constructing an alternative
economic model. If the state lacks the economic resources to carry out
reform, or depends exclusively on the private sector for their generation,
then private elites are empowered to collectively undermine the revolu
tion. Sharp patterns of economic decline coupled with hyperinflation are
particularly likely to elicit private sector hostility, in turn accelerating
economic deterioration. In contrast, if the regime can design an economic
model that carries the promise of future return and general growth, then
the elites may succumb to the inevitability of the transition and begin
looking for their niche in the new order.
In sum, certain combinations of characteristics (weak oligarchical con
trol, an organizational void in the private sector, relatively low threat
perceptions among local propertied classes, firm political consolidation of
the regime, and sustained economic growth) make it easier for the regime
to negotiate with economic elites, even as it pursues redistributive re
form. On the other hand, the converse conditions (continued oligarchical
hegemony, broad and autonomous private sector organization, a relatively
acute perception of threat to local property owners, weak political institu
tionalization, and marked economic instability) foster a harsh and unified
elite response that can produce a forceful counterrevolutionary backlash.
This chapter focuses on these five issues in terms of the four historical
cases analyzed in Chapter 1 and the more recent Nicaraguan case. Each
section first explores the conditions that favor elite unity and confronta
tion with the revolutionary state, and then turns to an analysis of those
that foster business fragmentation and accommodation with the regime.
The concluding part of each section places the Nicaraguan case into this
general framework.
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Oligarchichal Tendencies

The Persistence of Oligarchy and the Habit of Command
If a relatively small cluster of notable families traditionally dominated
the central core of the economy and key institutions of government,
and its dominance was not broken by the rise of competing working- or
middle-class actors, then the bourgeoisie may still be characterized by
what Conaghan (1991, 37) calls a "seignorial cultural style," or what I have
called here the "habit of command." This tradition may give the dominant
core of the elite both the perceived moral authority and the predilection
to speak on behalf of the whole private sector. To the extent that this
tradition is historically and culturally sanctified, political power may be
heavily concentrated in the oligarchical segment of the private sector.
Historically, this elite's authority was related to its considerable con
trol over land. To survive deep into the twentieth century, however, a
traditional elite must fan out from its original core activities. The exten
sion of the coffee elite of El Salvador from coffee production into coffee
processing, banking, cotton production, and, finally, industry illustrates
the process. An overlapping, interpenetrated ownership pattern tended to
bind different sectors of the traditional elite together and produce a com
mon bargaining strategy within the Salvadoran bourgeoisie. Thus land
reform or bank nationalizations that affected large landowners or bank
stockholders triggered broader elite opposition, even among commercial
leaders and industrialists who were not specifically affected by the re
forms.
Because of the extensive resources dominated by this land-based elite,
private producers that emerge subsequently tend to develop as subordinate
actors. They depend on the dominant group for financing, subcontracts, or
political protection, and they too benefit from a system that the oligarchs
can take responsibility for creating. These characteristics serve to fore
stall the development of an alternative, independent perspective in the
nonhegemonic elite. Again, the Salvadoran case is instructive. Not only
were a n e p leaders successful in preventing any subsector of their associa
tion from sustaining serious negotiations with the Christian Democratic
government; they were also successful in organizing a sweeping bour
geois coalition against the reform. The Alianza Productiva included even
small business associations and professional/managerial organizations; it
became an important electoral force opposing the reform regime.
The power of a traditional economic elite is generally diminished by
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political emancipation and mass mobilization. In several Latin American
cases, however, the process of democratization did not extend very far.
The franchise was effectively denied to a significant portion of the popula
tion (such as illiterates in Ecuador); unions and other mass organizations
remained small and weak; political parties functioned only intermittently
or only in the urban areas,- and electoral results that threatened the estab
lished order were nullified or altered (Malloy and Seligson 1987; Booth
and Seligson 1989).
Under these circumstances an oligarchical elite has fewer problems
preserving a relatively high level of unity. It need not seek out nonelite
coalition partners or accept extensive compromises. The cultural style
and views of the traditional elite continue to frame the discourse of the
political leadership. Issues like land reform can be kept off the political
agenda in spite of the continued importance of the land question to the
bulk of the population.
In these cases, even relatively mild or carefully delimited reform pro
posals can be met with harsh resistance. Processes that are commonly
associated with modern capitalism, such as unionization, profit sharing,
or income taxes, may be viewed with extreme alarm by elites for whom
these ideas are an unthinkable violation of a long-established social order.
Moderate reformers from center or center-left political parties or even
officials from conservative U.S. administrations like the Reagan adminis
tration may, as in El Salvador, be regarded by prominent sectors of the local
elite as harboring secret sympathies for socialism or local revolutionaries
because they support agrarian reform.
Where the traditional elite's assumptions about its rights and privileges
have never been seriously challenged, the bourgeoisie will tend to respond
in a forceful, unified way, even to relatively modest efforts to alter the
social order. It may even, as in Salvador in 1988, retain enough resources
(social authority, control over the media, economic leverage, capacity for
violence) to reaffirm its political prominence through electoral politics.
The Absence of Hegemony and Elite Porousness
In contrast, sectors of the bourgeoisie are more likely to pursue con
ciliation with the revolutionary state when traditional oligarchical net
works have been fractured. The bourgeoisie is then more readily divided
into disconnected, even competing, segments that may be played against
each other by revolutionary leaders.
Various processes have undermined oligarchical power in Latin
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America. In both Mexico and Peru, revolutions led to a disintegration
and displacement of the traditional oligarchy. In neither case were landed
elites and their descendants entirely stripped of their assets; these elites
did, however, experience a major erosion in their wealth, a collapse of
their social status, and a revocation of their political authority. Indus
trialization, particularly that promoted by recent immigrants, may also
increase the complexity and sectoral differentiation of the bourgeoisie and
further undermine the preeminence of any one group, making oligarchical
hegemony more difficult.
When the oligarchy disintegrates, other business elites, who are less
accustomed to playing a direct political role, may not be prepared to
unite into a cohesive front. Without a clear internal leadership norm, the
bourgeoisie more readily fragments into a series of competing groups and
sectors. Even family ties or shared class interests may not be sufficiently
strong to forge full unity during periods of transition and change. The
factionalization of the elite makes it possible for sectors to emerge who
weigh their interests differently and make divergent strategic choices.
The particular sectors that were most likely to negotiate with state
reformers varied from country to country. In Velasco's Peru as well as
Jamaica during the first Manley government, exporters who were just
emerging depended heavily on the state for financial support and assis
tance in opening markets and establishing trade connections. In these
two cases, the exporters' associations a d e x and j e a tended to have more
positive relations with the Velasco and Manley governments, respectively,
than did most other associations of private producers.
In some countries, small industrialists became regime allies; in others,
stronger ties were forged with larger industrialists. In Mexico, for ex
ample, small industrialists were singled out for special support during the
Cardenas era; their state-sponsored association, c a n a c in t r a , became a
progovernment stalwart in the years that followed. In other countries,
like Peru, larger industrialists, many of whom were also interested in ex
port promotion, had more cordial ties with the government, and smalland medium-sized industrialists were more antagonistic to the Velasco
regime. Under the latter's leadership, the industrialists' association s n i
became the leading private sector critic of the Velasco government—a
stance for which the organization paid dearly. In Chile as well, small- and
medium-sized business owners became vociferous critics of the Allende
regime and provided the public leadership of the bourgeois opposition.
This occurred in spite of the government's official commitment to a sup
portive alliance with this nonhegemonic elite.
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In contrast to theories suggesting that smaller industrialists producing
for domestic consumption might be more supportive of a developmentalist and redistributive state, the case studies analyzed here demonstrate
more varied alliance patterns. Much depends on the particular dynamics
of the case, such as the previous experiences of various sectors with state
intervention, the particular programs and policies adopted by the revolu
tionary state, the foreign exchange and financial constraints faced by the
government, and the skill of state leaders in cultivating connections with
different groups. This variation suggests that the characteristics and deci
sions of the state leadership play a crucial role in determining the degree
to which an alliance with the bourgeoisie is formed, a point to which we
will return below.
The Failure of Ontological Givens: Class Division in Nicaragua
Nicaragua lacked a national oligarchy capable of providing hegemonic
leadership for the bourgeoisie. The country was strewn with deep re
gional divisions,- oligarchs, such as they were, tended to be local in nature
and fiercely competitive among themselves. No one production sector or
social group emerged to dominate the nation. Elites in Granada hewing
to the Conservative banner vied with elites from Leon who endorsed the
Liberal cause. Nineteenth-century wars between these groups spilled over
into the twentieth century. Enmity was suppressed but not eradicated by
the long dictatorship of the Somoza family. With the banking system and
much of foreign trade under the control of foreigners or the Somoza dy
nasty, no one sector of the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie was able to consolidate
economic power by diversifying into these strategic enterprises. With the
political system controlled first by the U.S. occupation and later by the
Somoza family, economic elites also had little opportunity to experience
direct political control.
Although the Nicaraguan business sector began to move into banking
and foreign trade and to coalesce into economic groups in the 1950s, this
process was quite limited. The key economic groups remained competi
tive among themselves,- none provided a political challenge to the Somoza
regime. Lacking a hegemonic center, the Nicaraguan private sector in
the prerevolutionary period tended to be known for its regionalism, frag
mentation, and, aside from the political escapades of a handful of Young
Turks, political passivity. The small size of the country and of the wealthy
class in Nicaragua meant that many in the elite knew each other per
sonally; important segments were bound by friendship and marriage ties.
In spite of this, no sector of this group was capable of exercising class
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hegemony. Continued regional and economic competition, political acqui
escence to the regime, and the inability to project broad social authority
in the society spelled political debility for the elite.
With the insurrection, much of the top business elite fled the country.
The takeover of the collapsed banking system and export trade by the f s l n
government effectively decapitated the disintegrating Nicaraguan bour
geoisie; the remainder of the class was even less cohesive. Several leading
business figures joined the revolution; others moved increasingly into the
opposition. Without a long history of collective action and political con
vergence, the Nicaraguan elite was unable to construct and maintain a
common front under the Sandinistas. Within u pa n ic , for example, divi
sions soon surfaced. A harsh, ideological critique of the government was
launched by larger producers from more prestigious social backgrounds
who commanded the national c o s e p /u pa n ic front. Regional leaders,
with generally less prestigious school ties and more modest holdings, on
the other hand, offered a more modulated critique and were more will
ing to negotiate with the regime. Other producers, generally still lower
on the social hierarchy, even joined the rival association, u n a g , and tied
themselves organizationally to the revolution.
The Nicaraguan case differs significantly from that of its regional
neighbor, El Salvador, where a much more moderate reform regime was
confronted with a much more fully united and fiercely opposed national
elite. In this area, the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie may have more in com
mon with that found in the reformist era in Peru, where the elite failed to
form a united front. As in that case, the absence of a powerful oligarchical
elite after the revolution left a segmented private sector that responded
in divergent ways to the regime.
Organizational Characteristics

Private Sector Organizational Autonomy from the State
The private sector is more likely to confront the regime if its orga
nizations have emerged as authentic representatives responding to ini
tiatives of the elite itself. If the juridical protections provided for these
groups are strong enough so that the state cannot easily dissolve them,
and their financial base is independent of the regime, then these organi
zations should be less vulnerable to state pressure. Generally these con
ditions prevail when the organizations are created through autonomous
interactions rather than state decree and where participation is voluntary
rather than mandated by the state.1
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Business associations are likely to be stronger if they emerge in every
major sector of the economy, thus filling the available space for elite orga
nization and preempting state-sponsored competitors, rather than being
spottily organized in a few sectors or regions of the country. The forma
tion of a peak association that brings together business representatives
from across the nation also fosters intra-elite cohesion and cooperation.
Finally, organizational autonomy allows the elite to develop its own, in
dependent means of communication, including newspapers and radio or
television stations, that can extend the reach of the elite into other social
sectors. This power, defended in the name of political pluralism, can help
the elite to check the organizational efforts of nonelites and extend its
power beyond its class base.
Of the cases we have explored, Chile had the most autonomous and
durable form of private sector organization. Four powerful associations
date back to the 1800s. The six most prominent associations had formed
one of the region's oldest peak associations, c o pr o c o , in 1935. Even
small- and medium-sized businesses had a firm set of associations estab
lished decades before the democratic socialist transition was attempted.2
Business groups had privileged access to state policymaking boards, but
their associations remained relatively free of government controls. Sev
eral of these organizations had thick links to right-wing political parties.
Partisan connections intensified their resistance to government appeals
when the government was in the hands of political opponents.
Whereas the more overtly authoritarian Velasco regime was able to
simply dissolve, restructure, and rename private sector organizations, the
reform regimes of Allende, Duarte, and Manley, which emerged in more
pluralistic settings, could not. Leaders of s o f o f a , a n e p , and the Jamai
can Chamber of Commerce proved skillful and adaptable opponents. In
Chile, El Salvador, and Jamaica, where the media remained a branch of pri
vate enterprise and the government was obligated to give it free rein, the
fiercely antirevolutionary major daily newspapers [El Mercurio, the Diario
de Hoy, and the Daily Gleaner, respectively) led a steady, hyperbolic, and
often hysterical attack on the regime. The norms of press freedom and
political pluralism gave private sector leaders mouthpieces with which to
exert broad influence over public political discussion, uniting opponents,
persuading doubters, and subverting the revolution. If the revolutionary
regime is not capable of circumscribing business's organizational power
or stimulating the rapid growth of popular sector alternatives to counter
balance it, then the autonomy of elite organizations may lead to effective
oppositional collaboration and the defeat of revolution.
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Independence from the regime should not be equated with indifference
to all external influence. Indeed, several private sector organizations that
were institutionally autonomous vis-a-vis the state were openly influ
enced by their connections to foreign actors. CIA funding for the bosses'
strike in Chile in 1972, for example, encouraged the consolidation of the
Chilean bourgeoisie, im f pressure for economic policy changes bolstered
the internal critics who were hostile to the reformers in Peru and Jamaica.
Powerful external actors like the U.S. government or the im f , therefore,
can serve as an alternative reference point, encouraging the local bour
geoisie to fuse and reject the options offered to it by state reformers.3
Controlled Organization and Muted Responses
It is difficult for the state to establish institutional and organizational
controls over the business sector the way it sometimes has over labor
and peasant associations. By definition, economic elites have resources
(wealth, social status, influence over their workers, technical knowledge,
control over investment, international connections) that make it hard for
the state to control their activities. The state, however, can exercise in
fluence and promote accommodation, particularly when private sector
organizations are not fully developed. When there are few strong business
groups, or their membership is very restricted, the state can sponsor the
creation of new organizations that incorporate those elites who have been
historically excluded.
This process was, of course, relatively easy for the Mexican government
when it created the Confederations of the Chambers of Industry and of
Commerce in 1917 in the wake of the revolution and before such organi
zations had emerged spontaneously from within the private sector. When
a segment of the business elite later moved to create its own organization,
c o pa r m e x , the Mexican regime responded by fusing its two confedera
tions into one organization and mandating the participation of all (except
very small firms) in the state-sponsored association. A few years later,
the Mexican state divided the industrial and commercial chambers again,
to prevent them from becoming too powerful, and created an additional
organization, c a n a c in t r a , that steadily backed regime initiatives. State
intervention in Mexico produced a controlled fragmentation of business
organizations that delimited their bargaining capabilities.
The process was more complex in Peru, where the organizational ter
rain of the private sector was relatively full by the time of the revolu
tion in the late 1960s. In that case as well, however, the regime was able
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to affect the setting by dissolving the agricultural association (s n a ) and
withdrawing legal recognition from the industrialists' association (s n i ),
while simultaneously approving legal status for the more accommodating
exporters' association (a d e x ). In this way the regime could fill the orga
nizational landscape with less oppositional associations. A revolutionary
regime may be more successful at deflecting bourgeois opposition if it
mobilizes private producers who have not been previously organized and
establishes quasi-corporatist links with business associations.
A similar logic applies to the media. In the Mexican case, the govern
ment had a series of tools with which to influence the media, including
control over newsprint, advertising, and the ability to restrict access to
political leaders and to periodically reshuffle owners and editors. In Peru,
the 1974 press law expropriated daily newspapers and turned them over to
selected social actors. As a result, in these two cases the private sector's
ability to undercut the government through its control over the media was
limited. Without a media mechanism to disseminate its views, the busi
ness elite finds it more difficult to enforce unanimity within the private
sector and build a mass base for its position.
The Mix of Autonomy and Dependence in
Revolutionary Nicaragua
The Nicaraguan private sector associations never achieved the extraor
dinary political autonomy found historically in Chile or El Salvador. They
were, however, somewhat more independent of the regime than core busi
ness groups operating in Mexico in the 1930s and 1940s. The closest paral
lel for the Nicaraguan case may be found in Peru, where some established
organizations had relatively autonomous histories but other organizations
were more dependent on the regime.
Several factors contributed to the organizational weaknesses of the
Nicaraguan elite. First, even in important economic sectors like coffee
cultivation, Nicaraguan elite organizations tended to be both regional and
ephemeral. Those that became a permanent part of the political landscape
were generally heavily influenced by the government either through quasicorporatist linkages with government boards, the direct participation of
Somoza family members in their administration, or a dense network of
clientelism. In their dealings with the Somoza regime, private elites re
sorted heavily to particularistic bargaining to advance their individual
claims. As a result, they lacked a solid institutional legacy that might
have strengthened their hand in dealing with the Sandinista regime.
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Private sector organizations did, rather belatedly, gather momentum
and turn hostile to the Somoza dynasty. Goaded by urban elites affili
ated with a USAID-funded in d e , Nicaraguan business finally founded a
peak association (c o s ip , later c o s e p ) in 1972.This national organization
pulled together business leaders from an array of sectors to challenge the
corruption and weak developmentalism of the dynasty. However, com
pared with that in Chile or even regional rival El Salvador, private sector
coalescence was late and frail in Nicaragua.
The 1970s mobilizations did provide the elite with some training in
political confrontation and autonomy from the regime. The revolutionary
era began with the lateral proliferation of private sector organizations and
the vertical consolidation of the peak association, c o s e p soon became
a potent opposition force, complete with a media arm [La Prensa). For
political reasons the Sandinista regime was unable to destroy c o s e p , even
though the government never granted it a legal charter and did censor and
periodically close La Prensa. In some ways the existence of c o s e p served
the interests of the f s l n . c o s e p 's continued strident opposition demon
strated how the regime kept faith with its commitment to pluralism, even
when provoked. A steady diet of vituperation from an organization of
the wealthy also helped to validate the regime's credentials as a defender
of the poor. Nonetheless, the internal denunciations and external lobby
ing of c o s e p did pose a challenge to the regime. Instead of eliminating
this opposition group, the Sandinistas attempted to curb its influence by
periodic harassment and, later, cooptation.
Much like the Peruvian and Mexican cases, the Nicaraguan govern
ment also moved to create an alternative organizational pole for economic
elites. By 1984 u n a g had metamorphosed into a broad producer associa
tion that welcomed even medium- and large-sized producers. This statesponsored association was closely linked to and dependent on the regime.
A full quarter of its budget came from the f s l n ; one of its most effective
recruiting ploys was the implicit pledge to intervene on behalf of members
in the event of expropriation,- and many of its top leaders were prominent
members of the f s l n . Although u n a g became more critical of the San
dinista government performance over time, it remained a close ally and
supporter of the revolution.
The Sandinista regime was unable to redesign the organizational infra
structure of business in Nicaragua. It did, however, alter this terrain by
interposing an organization of its creation and cultivating regional and
sectoral organizations that were less ideologically hostile to the revolu-
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tion.4 Political parallels may be drawn with Peru, where adversarial elite
organizations from the prerevolutionary era were forced to make room for
some newer, supportive organizations that emerged in the wake of that
revolution. On the other hand, Nicaragua's peak association remained as
stridently antiregime, as did the parallel organizations in Chile or Salva
dor. Like them, it drew on a powerful oppositional newspaper to challenge
the revolution.
Perception of Threat

Classwide Threats and Elite Fusion
In none of the cases examined in this book was the existence of the pri
vate sector threatened. In each case, there was space, both in the general
conceptual model that guided the restructuring and in actual practice,
for continued private ownership and private accumulation, at least for
the bulk of the private sector. But the perception of a classwide threat
of annihilation became pervasive in several cases. The Chilean case is
instructive.
Although some elements of the Chilean private sector panicked when
Allende was elected and began organizing in opposition, others initially
searched for some accommodation with the regime and expressed a tenta
tive willingness to cooperate. The bourgeoisie swung en masse into the
opposition only after the u p government began a campaign of expropria
tions and interventions that seemed ill defined and uncontrolled. The u p
government provided no meaningful guarantees to private producers as
it lurched from intervention to intervention. Perhaps most important,
expropriation was directed against local capitalists as well as foreigners.
Although direct comparisons are difficult, expropriation of local capi
talists was probably more extensive in Chile than in Mexico or Peru. The
agrarian reform program affected approximately the same proportion of
agricultural land in Chile as in Mexico and Peru (McClintock 1981, 61),
but state expropriations in the urban, industrial sector were more exten
sive. Whereas state expansion in the Mexican and Peruvian cases tended
to occur through the creation of new industries that would presumably
benefit even private producers or through benign takeovers of bankrupt
private firms, state expansion in the Allende period tended to rely on the
forced transfer of existing resources from the private to the public sectors.
Family networks that extended across key sectors in the top stratum of
the elite, such as those identified by Zeitlin and Ratcliff (1988, in Chile and
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by Colindres (1977) in El Salvador, facilitated a unified hostile response.
The crucial blow came in the Chilean case, however, when even producers
outside those top networks—the small- and medium-sized entrepreneurs,
shopkeepers, the self-employed, and neighborhood businesses—moved
forcefully into the opposition. Movements to expand the state-controlled
"social area" on multiple fronts (banking, agriculture, extraction, manu
facturing), to expropriate small and medium enterprises as well as large,
and to take over local as well as foreign operations proved too sweeping
and indiscriminate for the Chilean private sector.
From the perspective of the Chilean elites, two conclusions about the
expropriation pattern were possible. Either the governing coalition had
lost control of the state and state erosion of the private sector was proceed
ing according to some unofficial agenda controlled by extremist sectors
outside the formal government, or the government remained in charge but
was duplicitous about its actual intentions since it continued to violate
its own commitments to protect the small- and medium-sized producers.
In either case, formal guarantees provided by the government carried little
weight for these groups. Even regulatory actions that were consistent
with modern capitalism were seen as a prelude to further erosion of pri
vate ownership. Because the u p 's efforts to restructure the economy were
judged to follow a class logic, rather than a more inclusive national one,
the private sector overcame its segmental tendencies, and a palpable class
identity emerged.
The ideological ascendance of socialist theory in Chile was much
sharper than in the other cases. Decades of intense ideological discus
sion within the parties of the left in Chile produced a clearer repudiation
of capitalist principles there, and the forceful involvement of unions and
popular organizations made it harder for the u p government to diverge
from more radical prescriptions. The political base of the Chilean regime,
therefore, pushed the state to expand the socialized sector more quickly
by expropriating more heavily. Fears of full-scale state control, fanned by
El Mercurio, affected even elites not specifically targeted.
Even in cases where the regime is not formed by theoretically sophis
ticated leftist parties and militant labor, the private sector can still panic.
Reform moves in El Salvador, for example, triggered extreme fears in the
Salvadoran bourgeoisie in spite of the reformers' moderate views and poor
mobilizational skills. The simultaneous targeting of three key economic
sectors (agriculture, banking, and export), the emphasis on expropriation
of local rather than foreign firms, and the sharp discontinuity between the
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impunity enjoyed by the elite before and its circumscription after 1980 all
fed a sweeping and intense elite opposition that seemed out of proportion
with the objective threat that it faced.5 As in the Chilean case, this factor
deepened the state-capital divide and fueled sharp retaliation.
Moderate Threats and Class Division
If the state is seen as ultimately developmentalist and committed to
national advancement rather than fundamentally anticapitalist, then class
loyalties and fears will not be invoked as fully. Some elite sectors may
be open to the idea of a tactical alliance. This pattern is more likely to
occur when expropriation focuses on foreign-owned operations and local
businesses are largely exempt. Selective expropriation of foreign firms
can build a national consensus, whereas extensive and indiscriminate
takeovers of local firms feed bourgeois panic and retaliation.
To avoid arousing generalized elite hostility, any expropriations of local
capital should be carefully targeted with a clear set of rules guiding the
process. Of course, discretionary expropriation, where takeovers are more
random and individual bargaining occurs, may draw more producers into
the negotiation process as each one individually attempts to bargain to
retain property. This style of expropriation, however, breeds deeper re
sentment, since no business owner has an enduring protection from an
arbitrary state. In the long run, overly discretionary expropriations seem
likely to generate more hostility than accommodation.
In the Mexican and Peruvian cases, emphasis was placed on the ex
propriation of foreign rather than domestic capital; even foreign holdings
were expropriated only selectively. In Mexico, Peru, Jamaica, and even
Chile, the state takeover of foreign corporations did not alienate local
business elites, and in several cases it was actually applauded. Outside
the agricultural sector, expropriation of local capital in Mexico and Peru
tended to be quite restricted. When it occurred, it was often prompted
by the bankruptcy of a local firm rather than state targeting. The pace of
state expansion was relatively slow, and small- and medium-sized firms
were largely exempt. Indeed, in Mexico these enterprises became favored
allies during the 1930s and 1940s.
In their study of democratic socialism, Stephens and Stephens (1986)
suggest that the state sector should be formed essentially through the
construction of new enterprises rather than through the expropriation of
existing ones. Space should be carved out for those elements of the pri
vate sector that can contribute to the new model, and their medium- and
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even long-term existence needs to be guaranteed. The state must dem
onstrate through its actions that important portions of the private sector
will be respected. This kind of carefully delimited revolutionary vision
may foster accommodation on the part of strategic economic elites.
Symbolic communication may also assuage elite fears. Like most politi
cal communication, the interaction between political and economic elites
draws on coded messages and signals. Cardenas's decision to reenact the
confrontational speech to the Monterrey business elite three years later in
Saltillo, this time with an emphasis on the constructive role that business
can play, served as an important signal to the disaffected bourgeoisie.6The
use of interlocutors who elicit trust at both ends, such as Central Bank
president Montes de Oca during the revolutionary transition in Mexico
(Hamilton 1982,130-31) or the former president of the Chamber of Com
merce in Velasco's Peru (Bamat 1978, 216), also facilitates communication
and successful negotiation. The creation of privileged communication
channels for top business leaders or for leaders of priority economic sec
tors, such as c a n a c in t r a in Mexico or a d e x in Peru, conveys a capacity
for inclusiveness that could bring economic elites to vie for these oppor
tunities. Such gestures lower the perception of generalized threat and tend
to divide entrepreneurs into competitive factions seeking access to these
resources.
Threat Perception and Expropriation Policy in Nicaragua
Although the f s l n was viewed with suspicion by some private elites
during the insurrection, those who stayed generally made common cause
with the revolutionaries to oust the Somoza regime. Business leaders
were wary, but most did not regard the f s l n as an intolerable menace
at that point. Nor were the initial expropriations cause for alarm. Early
confiscations in Nicaragua focused on the properties of somocistas and
the bankrupt banking system. These opening confiscations were clearly
circumscribed and directed against political outsiders. As such, they were
accepted consensually by the rest of the elite.
The Sandinistas did not target foreign enterprises for takeover. Indeed,
the Nicaraguan revolution was quite extraordinary in its careful avoid
ance of the expropriation of multinational corporations. Coming to power
at the end of the 1970s, when the era of such expropriation had passed
and the belief that foreign investment was destructive had waned, and
unwilling to rouse further the hostility of foreign governments, the f s l n
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left foreign holdings largely untouched. In any case, foreign ownership
was modest in Nicaragua and would have provided limited resources. Not
taking the route of foreign expropriation, the Sandinistas turned more
toward their own domestic elite.
When new rounds of expropriation began in 1981 that affected the prop
erties of non-somocistas, elite fears surged. Although initially targeting
large estates that were underutilized or decapitalized, the agrarian reform
process occasionally entailed the takeover of medium and small prop
erties that bordered on state farms. Medium-sized farms lost any legal
protection with the 1986 reform of the agrarian reform law. Even highly
productive estates could be taken on the imprecisely defined grounds of
social utility. Hundreds of influential producers lost properties between
1981 and 1989.
Although expropriation policy focused heavily on the agrarian sector,
industries and commercial establishments like s a im s a and is a were also
taken. During the period of most extreme control, even small producers
and petty traders faced the loss of their inventory when they attempted to
transport food across regional lines.
The Sandinista government tried to mute private sector opposition
with a sectoralized approach that separated the "patriotic" from the "un
patriotic" bourgeoisie. They publicly favored productive elites over unpro
ductive ones, small- and medium-sized producers over large producers,
staples producers over agroexporters, and the chapiolla bourgeoisie over
those who were more internationalized. These distinctions attempted to
differentiate between those who would be incorporated into the revolu
tionary model and those who would not. Private elites had a number of
mechanisms they could use to buffer themselves against expropriation,
including downsizing, intensifying production, changing crops, manipu
lating family or friendship ties, joining u n a g , and improving relations
with workers. But the generally negative image of the bourgeoisie that
prevailed in the early years and the latitude for expropriation allowed in
the law were sweeping enough to generate widespread fear in the Nicara
guan elite.
This concern was attenuated somewhat after the 1988 reforms. The bigsplash introduction of a concertacion process, the elevation of moderate
Martinez Cuenca to the s pp , and the creation of a series of national agri
cultural commissions with the prominent participation of leading private
producers all signaled a reorientation of the economic model. Informal
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socializing between top comandantes like m id in r a chief Jaime Whee
lock and private sector leaders altered the nature of the communication
process, thereby reducing tensions.
In spite of these adjustments, the prior experience with expropriation
and extensive controls, combined with erratic takeovers even into 1989,
made much of the private sector distrustful of the regime. Egged on by
antirevolutionary media sources like La Prensa and Radio Catolica, and
having dispersed their children abroad to prevent them from being con
verted to the cause or seized in the draft, many elites regarded the regime
as a threat to the survival of their way of life. In this sense, elite threat
perceptions in Nicaragua were probably more like those found in Chile or
El Salvador than those that prevailed in Mexico or Peru. Alarmed and on
guard, much of the elite rallied, implicitly or explicitly, to the opposition.
Political Institutionalization

Weak Political Capacity and the State-Capital Standoff
Two aspects of institutionalization are important for this analysis. The
first concerns the political capacity of the state, that is, the internal cohe
sion of the state itself and the consolidation of its mass base. The second
focuses on the economic capacity of the regime, that is, the ability of the
regime to generate a viable economic model through which growth can
be maintained.7
One key indicator of low political institutionalization is chronic divi
sion and infighting in the upper echelons of the state apparatus. The fail
ure to consolidate the state leadership leaves the regime open to ready
challenge by economic elites. The division of the state into competing
camps makes it easy for business opponents to identify prospective gov
ernment allies and to penetrate the sectors of the state under their control.
Linkages can then be struck between economic elites and internal
state dissidents. Two examples illustrate the point. In both Chile and
El Salvador, the reform regimes were unable to assert control over their
militaries. This dissonance in the state structure allowed conservative
business groups to cultivate an alliance with right-wing military officers
in opposition to the reform. Overtly, through a military coup in Chile,
or covertly, through violence and terror in Salvador, the military upended
the reform process. Another institution that may run counter to reform
is the court system, particularly those judicial appointees from a prior
era. The ability of coffee elites to get the constitutionality of in c a f e re-
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jected by the Salvadoran courts, for example, shows how fissures in the
state apparatus may encourage continued, multiple challenges by private
elites.8
Institutionalization of the new order can also be limited if the revolu
tionary government is perched precariously on a slim plurality of support,
if its alternative ideology fails to make inroads into a densely organized
oppositional terrain, or if the revolutionary state fails to create a broad,
durable mass base. Again, in both Chile and El Salvador, the electoral
weakness of the reform regime invited continued business opposition.
The Allende government was gaining momentum, with its electoral base
expanding from 36.2 percent in the 1970 national election to 48.6 percent
in the 1971 municipal elections (Valenzuela 1978, 40, 54). But even at its
peak it still appealed to far less than the sweeping majorities that might
have quieted elite opposition. Likewise in El Salvador, the reformers had
great difficulty securing broad electoral support, losing the constituent
assembly contest in 1982 and winning the presidency in 1984 only with
massive financial backing and campaign support from the United States.
Curiously, revolutionary regimes can have problems establishing a
solid political base even among beneficiaries. Land reform beneficiaries
in Chile during the Allende period, for example, remained supportive of
the oppositional Christian Democrats who had authored the agrarian re
form law, even when they received land through the efforts of the u p
government (de Vylder 1976, 204-6). The failure to consolidate a solid
mass base and to mobilize a stable constituency for the revolution allows
political opponents and economic elites to invade that terrain and attempt
to recruit support, a r e n a , for example, campaigned heavily among lowincome groups, using electoral propaganda that blamed grinding poverty
in El Salvador on the failures not of the traditional elite but of the short
lived Christian Democratic government. Since the Christian Democrats
had not developed a solid political base among the low-income sectors,
a r e n a was able to make inroads into that population. Without electoral
support from this sector of society, the right-wing would not have been
able to win in the 1988-89 elections.
When the regime fails to institutionalize politically, it leaves itself vul
nerable to electoral or military reversals. Recognizing their power under
these conditions, private elites are less likely to enter into serious negotia
tion with the regime. In El Salvador, for example, the low level of institu
tionalization of the reform regime (the absence of hegemonic acceptance
of the regime by either the left or the right, the executive's inability to
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control the military or the courts, weakness of electoral institutions and
fragility of electoral victories) made it an unattractive ally. Any private
sector organizations or leaders that aligned with it stood to gain very little
and to lose heavily when the government collapsed. Under these circum
stances, the state would have great difficulty building support anywhere,
but particularly with the economic elite.
The Institutionalized State and Worthy Foes
Conversely, a state that has achieved a high degree of institutionaliza
tion through internal coherence and the consolidation of a strong mass
base is more likely to secure compliance from the private sector. If eco
nomic elites do not emigrate, they will be pressured to cooperate.
To minimize infighting and internal cleavages, revolutionaries must
develop a framework that brings them together while imposing order on
their interactions. This involves tough decisions about how to dispose of
disagreements within the political leadership without provoking defec
tions, and how to solve the succession problem through a leadership selec
tion system. The clockworklike change in the occupant of the Mexican
presidency, for example, has contributed significantly to the coherence of
the Mexican political elite (Smith 1979,159-87).
Congruence between the military and the reformers, or at least in
stitutional subordination, is necessary to undercut counterrevolutionary
pressures from a military-private elite alliance. The Peruvian model, in
which the military itself initiated the reform process, can assure at least
some degree of institutional coherence. Even then, the divisions within
the military between "bourgeois liberals," "progressives," and "the Mis
sion" (McClintock 1981) undercut state unity and ultimately contributed
to the Morales Bermudez countercoup.
Successful negotiation with economic elites is promoted when the
state is backed by a broad mass base. Positions proposed by the regime
then seem less the whimsical propositions of today's officials and more an
evolving social consensus about the new rules of the game. Ironically, eco
nomic elites may be more drawn to negotiation with a powerful adversary,
where their success is not assured and serious negotiation is necessary,
than with a weak, ephemeral one. Ideally, this mass support should not
be overly effervescent; it should be channeled through some durable in
stitutions and organizations. Again, the creation of a dominant party in
Mexico and its successful incorporation of mass organizations during the
Cardenas era is instructive.
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Mass mobilization and sweeping popular indulgence may be easier to
obtain when the state leadership emerges from a national, revolutionary
struggle against a repressive regime as in Mexico and, as we shall see,
Nicaragua. Emerging victorious from a revolution confers immense legiti
macy on the winners as well as providing a powerful set of symbols to use
in appealing for continued support. This kind of durable popular base may
be harder to extract from conventional politics, such as elections or mili
tary coups, where victory is tied to the electoral clock or the population
is less mobilized.
Political Capacity in Revolutionary Nicaragua
The Sandinista government developed a high degree of political insti
tutionalization during its decade in power. Although the original j g r n
represented a compromise and included non-Sandinista members, a politi
cal shake-up in December 1979 gave the major cabinet positions to San
dinista stalwarts and consolidated f s l n control. Not only did the f s l n
dominate the executive by controlling three of five junta positions and
the cabinet, it controlled the military and the police, a clear majority in
the Consejo de Estado, the banks, the courts, and a substantial part of the
media. The remarkable internal cohesion of the f s l n national directorate
and the institutional sweep of government positions by f s l n affiliates
meant that this revolutionary government was able to govern without the
division and infighting that plagued most transformation efforts.
The Nicaraguan regime was also successful in cultivating a broad mass
following. Before the insurrection reached its final months, the f s l n
was actively mobilizing mass organizations. Associations of workers,
peasants, agricultural laborers, women, young people, and neighborhood
groups gave the government a broad national support base (T. Walker
1985; Ruchwarger 1987). This wide support allowed the f s l n to go into
the 1984 elections with strong backing and emerge with an impressive
67 percent endorsement of its presidential candidate (l a s a 1984). The new
national assembly, with 64 percent of the seats held by the Sandinista
camp, drafted a constitution that further sedimented the institutions of
the Sandinista era.
The major challenge to the regime's political authority during this era
was the contra war. In the 1984—86 period, when the war heated up, the
government felt the challenge and intensified controls (censorship, stra
tegic relocations, expropriations, harassment) to counter this pressure. By
1987, however, the f s l n military victory seemed assured. Even contra-
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backers among the private elite now resigned themselves to the inevitable.
This perception of inevitability drew the private sector leadership into
increasing dialogue in 1988 and 1989.
There was, as we now know, a silent erosion of the f s l n 's political
strength during 1985-89 (Oquist 1992). Several mass organizations were
crumbling, and the political base of the revolution was shrinking. By
1990, the Sandinistas won the endorsement of only 41 percent of the
electorate and lost the election. Even if they had been elected with that
plurality, that level of support would have encouraged elite opposition by
raising the prospect of a political knockout in the 1996 elections. In spite
of this erosion of their popular base, however, the f s l n still had a large
and powerful constituency. Only the masterful incorporation of almost all
opponents into the fourteen-party u n o coalition made the Sandinistas'
electoral defeat possible.
Compared with several other revolutions considered here, therefore,
the Sandinista variant was relatively successful in institutionalizing a
political base. Unlike military reformers in Peru and Ecuador, where
countercoups were soon followed by disabling elections, or Chile, where
the electoral process that allowed a left-wing victory was quickly abol
ished and followed by long-term military rule, the Sandinista revolution
persisted for a full decade and left a strong political party and several
important mass organizations. Although not as durable as the Mexican
regime, whose hold on political power is virtually unsurpassed in the
modern world, the f s l n may prove to have a long-term presence in Nica
raguan politics.
Economic Viability

Economic Failure and Elite Hostility
In most reform efforts, the creation of a viable economic model is an
elusive goal. The financial costs of building a new government appara
tus, creating a state sector to supplant or complement the private sector,
and promoting the social objectives of the revolution are generally high;
sources of financial support are limited. To cover the costs of its pro
grams, the regime typically runs up mounting deficits that are financed
through internal and, increasingly, external borrowing. This gap deepens
the economic crisis by fueling inflation, and the economic climate be
comes increasingly unstable.
In anticipation of, or in response to, economic uncertainty, local and
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foreign capitalists typically begin to withhold investment and engage in
capital flight. Disinvestment becomes a virtual rule of revolution. As the
economy begins to contract, a zero-sum game begins. When scarce re
sources like foreign exchange or bank credit are channeled into the state's
priority programs, the private sector often finds its access to resources
declining. New taxes or mandated wage increases erode profits, raising
fears about the long-run future of private accumulation. Even if property
and profits are not affected, restrictions on access to imported luxuries
or limits on access to hard currency for travel abroad may provoke sharp
hostility from those who are accustomed to these privileges (Stephens
and Stephens 1986, 118-24). Certainly the sharp, immediate economic
downturn following the introduction of reform in El Salvador and the un
leashing of hyperinflation in Chile undercut the new regimes' ability to
present themselves as credible alternatives.
The precariousness of the economy increases the regime's vulnerability
to pressure from local elites and outside creditors. This weakness allows
external actors like the U.S. government or the im f , with the endorse
ment of domestic business organizations, to move against the heterodox
features of the revolutionary economic model.
Because of the revolutionary state's frequent failure to institutional
ize a new economic order, the private sector is little drawn to negotiate
with or make concessions to the new regime. Why enter negotiations with
regime leaders if the fiscal viability of the state itself is in question? Why
slug through tough transactions if state collapse may be imminent? If the
state lacks the kind of durable structure that would make it a worthy
bargaining partner, then economic elites will be less committed to seri
ous consultation and alliances. Some will confront the regime directly on
these issues,- others may use the traditional tactics of weaker parties in
negotiations—foot dragging, delays, attempts to circumvent new require
ments—in the hope that the regime will soon collapse and the rules will
be reversed.9
Economic Success and Durable Bargaining
To bargain effectively with the bourgeoisie, the revolutionary state
needs to achieve some economic success, even in the face of declining
private sector investment. A temporary bubble of growth triggered by
state-decreed wage increases, as we found in the Chilean case, will prob
ably not inspire private sector confidence. If profit increases are quickly
offset by wage increases, that moment of growth will soon subside. How
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ever, when the revolutionary state can create a new source of growth and
wealth, from which even segments of the local private sector can hope
to derive some benefits, then the state may be able to secure grudging
complicity from local capitalists.
One way for the state to stimulate growth is by rechaneling foreignowned resources. In Mexico, the requirement that insurance companies
invest their reserve within the country caused foreign agencies to re
treat; this created ample space for the expansion of both state-owned and
privately owned local firms. The "bonanza development" (Becker 1983)
strategy of Peru and the petroleum boom in Ecuador allowed state leaders
to envision no-cost development financed from abroad through export
earnings. The unilateral increase in the bauxite levy in Jamaica also ex
panded state resources temporarily and eased access to foreign exchange
for the local private sector.10 In the end, of course, most of these bonanza
schemes failed to stimulate long-term growth, for a variety of reasons. To
the extent that a new development strategy succeeds, however, it can play
an important role in drawing in private sector collaborators. If the state
experiences some economic success in the first few years, then the ideas
enshrined in its development plan may appear more viable to economic
elites, and private sector withdrawal may be attenuated.
If the economy is stimulated and grows, then a positive-sum game can
emerge. Gains for the state and its working class/peasant allies will not
mean inevitable losses for the bourgeoisie. It will be possible also to pro
vide credit, concessions, or exemptions to private producers involved in
innovation and development. The inevitable tensions that emerge with
expropriation can be assuaged through adequate compensation. As private
producers in priority sectors sense that they too can win under the new
rules, they may be less inclined to repudiate the process and instead begin
searching for ways to insert themselves into the development model.
In the end, dialogue and negotiation may be enhanced when there is
some rough balance in the resources held by the state and the bourgeoisie.
If the state is too weak relative to the economic elite, due to a failure to
institutionalize or to its feeble grip on the national economy, and depends
too directly on the private sector to finance its reform agenda, the bour
geoisie will find it easy to withdraw resources and reverse the revolution.
In this sense, it can be constructive if the state has some assets of its own
through the control of profitable state enterprises and ready access to for
eign financing. By acquiring its own resource base, the state reduces its
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dependence on local capitalists and improves its capacity to engage them
in tough bargaining.
At the same time, the state should not be so strong relative to the
local bourgeoisie that it devalues the capacity of the private sector to
contribute to the nation's future. If the local bourgeoisie is too weak, in
competent, and inefficient, then the state will find little reason to provide
it with resources. Revolutionaries may be tempted toward a statist model
in which the private sector is marginalized or even, in the most extreme
case, eliminated.
Economic Crisis and Elite Resistance in Nicaragua
In the area of economic consolidation, the Nicaraguan revolution
failed. Although some economic reactivation was achieved in the three
years following the ouster of Somoza, the economy never regained its pre
revolutionary production levels and, after years of steady decline, had a
GDP equivalent to that found in the 1940s at the end of the Sandinista
era. With inflation rates that reached world records, the economic crisis
in Nicaragua made setbacks in the rest of the region look minor. Even
Allende's economic problems in 1973 appear modest by comparison.
The Sandinistas faced an exceptional obstacle: war. Only reformers in
El Salvador shared this difficulty, and even there it was not accompanied
with trade displacement, economic embargo, and foreign aid problems.
The war took a major toll, estimated by Sandinista government sources at
US$17.8 billion in an economy that produced at its peak only US$2 billion
a year (Wheelock Roman 1990, 126). The war distorted the government
budget, caused shortages of supplies and labor, destroyed production and
processing facilities, damaged transportation and communication infra
structure, and was responsible for output losses in much of the country.
Compared with the credit freezes or low-level sabotage imposed by the
United States on other revolutionary regimes, the costs of foreign pressure
in Nicaragua were extraordinary.
Economic problems associated with war were exacerbated by the devel
opment model the Sandinistas endorsed. Fundamentally a state-centered
approach, it depended heavily on the success of large-scale and long-term
development projects like the t im a l sugar mill or the Chiltepe livestock
project. Focusing so strongly on long-term projects, the regime was un
able to counter the economic downturn with measures that would stabi
lize production. In the end, the grandes proyectos proved so difficult to
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realize that most were suspended before completion, producing no eco
nomic boost.
Economic duress in the late 1980s made the regime look more warmly
at its own private sector. Private producers who were ideologically suspect
in the early years were redefined as patriots for remaining in Nicaragua
in spite of the problems. But that same economic decline further under
mined the tolerance of many business elites. Private producers, who were
faced with bottlenecks in the distribution system and who had problems,
at times, getting long-term credit for their own projects, were increasingly
skeptical of a regime that could not deliver. Even those who did not op
pose the regime on moral or ideological grounds often did so on technical
grounds, concluding that the government officials were so incompetent
and ill prepared that they could not effectively guide the nation. Elites
who might have been willing to accommodate the regime had the econ
omy not contracted so rapidly were hard pressed to accept a continuation
of the regime in the midst of a full-blown collapse.
In this area, therefore, Nicaragua is more like El Salvador, where eco
nomic decline exacerbated elite opposition, than Mexico, where the econ
omy continued to grow, creating opportunities for prioritized sectors. The
ubiquitous deterioration in Nicaragua meant there were few who pros
pered. Even the Sandinistas concluded that the model they employed was
not viable and began to reverse course by the end of the decade.
Conclusions

In moments of crisis and change, it may not be obvious to local entre
preneurs whether their interests are best served by accommodation to
revolution or by headlong confrontation. Should elites take advantage of
the moment of uncertainty to invest heavily in enterprises that can be
unloaded for a profit in more normal times? Or should they exit and safe
guard their capital abroad? Should they dig in their heels and place the
private sector organizations in the front line of the onslaught against ob
jectionable revolutionaries? Or should they proclaim themselves patriotic
producers who can accommodate the new rules, even as they attempt to
moderate them? Should they reject the revolution because it undermines
their social position, even if they are prospering? Should they accept it in
spite of their declining income because it fosters national development
and the prospects for future gain? The answers are not always obvious.
In general, the Nicaraguan elite adopted a posture of opposition. Of the
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five factors considered in this chapter, two pulled the Nicaraguan stateelite relationship toward confrontation. (See Table 7.1.) The perception
of a classwide threat was high, and the economic viability of the regime
was low. An additional factor—business organizational autonomy—was
mixed. Although some associations were closely linked to the regime,
others were highly autonomous and became stridently adversarial.
Unlike several reformist regimes in the region, the Sandinista govern
ment did not target foreign corporations for expropriation. Instead, they
concentrated on local estates and businesses, including large-, medium-,
and in some cases small-sized producers who were deemed inefficient or
obstreperous. This contributed to a wide perception of threat and undercut
elite acquiescence.
Sustained economic decline also alienated business. The inability of
the new government to stabilize the economy or generate new growth
areas in which private elites might participate fed the generalized dis
affection and encouraged capitalists7 convictions that they, unhampered,
could do much better. Unable, under the rules of political pluralism to
which the Sandinistas had a public commitment, to dissolve opposition
groups or effectively counter the opposition press, the regime had diffi
culty deflecting its opponents' attack.
The Sandinista regime did, however, secure cooperation from sectors
of the private elite—more perhaps than might be expected looking at the
sweep of the economic changes made and much of the political rheto
ric about the revolution. Two of the five factors examined in this chapter
pushed the state-elite relationship toward accommodation. (See Table 7.1.)
The hegemonic force of a traditional oligarchy was low, and the institu
tionalized political capacity of the regime was high. Again, the organiza
tional autonomy of the business sector was mixed, but several features
favored accommodation. The regime proved adept at spinning off alterna
tive private sector organizations and, in the end, constructing a political
network that drew in strategic private sector allies.
Lacking a powerful traditional oligarchical leadership with the social
authority to direct a coordinated elite response, the Nicaraguan elite
began the revolutionary era with a fractured foundation. In contrast, the
Sandinista regime moved quickly to consolidate its base. Building on the
momentum provided by a popular insurrection to oust a despised dictator
ship, the Sandinista leadership created a strong political organization that
dominated the state, most mass groups, and the 1984 elections. Unable
to effectively challenge this monolith, many economic elites sought a
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private accommodation. While not necessarily backing the regime, many
rejected the role of public opponent.
The government developed a client organization for agricultural pro
ducers, u n a g , that recruited among sectors of the bourgeoisie. This orga
nization-building effort succeeded in deepening some fissures in the elite
and mobilizing some producers who had not been previously incorpo
rated into the opposition. By providing resources and support for elites in
strategic sectors, the regime cultivated private sector toleration of reform
and even selective participation in development initiatives. By the end of
the era, the symbolic communication between the regime and the elite
fostered fuller interaction and cooperation as the revolution deradicalized
and elites began coming to terms with reform.
The result of these competing dynamics was a mixed relationship be
tween the state and the private elite in Nicaragua. Without either the
stable accommodation and mutual understanding achieved in the Mexi
can case, or the unanimity of opposition achieved in the Chilean, a highly
politicized and fragmented bourgeoisie entered the fray with the Sandi
nistas.
These complex interrelationships continue as Nicaragua enters the
postrevolutionary era. Without enough elite cooperation to consolidate a
new economic base and stabilize production until the war could be won,
the Sandinistas lost power in 1990. But the patterns of dialogue and link
ages with local capitalists established during the decade of revolution
provided a foundation for continued interaction with the reform-oriented
bourgeoisie in the postrevolutionary era. Sandinista reformers were never
as isolated and overpowered after their fall as was, for example, Allende's
coalition. The relatively complex patterns of confrontation and accom
modation that characterized state-capitalist relations in Nicaragua con
tributed to both a deradicalization of the Sandinista revolution in its final
stages and greater continuity of the Sandinista reforms in the postrevolu
tionary setting.
Much of the literature on social revolution assumes that the bourgeoi
sie must be definitively defeated in order for meaningful social change to
occur. In my judgment, however, the elimination of this class is hardly a
realistic or desirable objective. Not only would that transformation tend
to concentrate too much power in the hands of the state, it would also
deprive the society of the skills and resources of private elites and bring,
at best, international isolation. What is needed are better ways to expand
property ownership and provide the fuller inclusion of marginal sectors
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into the national economy. This complex and delicate work can be fos
tered by looking back at a range of cases to identify those circumstances
that were most propitious. This study of elite political segmentation and
state-elite bargaining suggests that variations in the inherited character
istics of the bourgeoisie and the dynamics of the bargaining process may
produce markedly differing alliance patterns. Structuralist assumptions
about elite opposition to reform require further refinement, as we work
toward more complex models of revolutionary transition.
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Methods

In 1990-91, as the Sandinista period came to a close, I conducted a series of
semistructured interviews with 91 leading private agricultural producers. The
agricultural sector was targeted because of its central role in the Nicaraguan
economy. However, respondents were commonly involved in nonagricultural
activities as well (professions, commerce, industry, etc.).
Interviewees were selected using the positional/reputational method. Ini
tial interviews were arranged with the presidents of the major agricultural
organizations at the national level and with their largest sectoral and regional
affiliates. Association presidents were then asked to recommend others who
had been particularly active and influential private sector leaders. Of the 91
producers interviewed, 72 were current or recent officers in their producer
associations. Most of the remainder were or had been representatives of the
producers on government commissions or boards.
Within the framework of the positional/reputational methodology, an
effort was made to target respondents across organizations, products, and re
gions. Because of its relatively long, central role in organizing the medium and large-sized producers, approximately three-fourths (74 percent) of those
interviewed were affiliated with u pa n ic . Most of the remainder (18 percent)
were affiliated with the Sandinista-sponsored (though increasingly indepen
dent) organization, u n a g . A relatively small group (9 percent) were not affili
ated with any organization or were leaders of associations that had chosen not
to affiliate with any national organization. Interviews were also conducted
with three members of the agrarian bourgeoisie who had been prominent
private sector spokespeople before moving into high-level positions in the
Sandinista government.
Respondents were distributed among four key sectors: 21 percent primarily
in cotton production, 26 percent primarily in coffee, 31 percent primarily in
livestock, and 14 percent primarily in basic grains (rice, sorghum, or maize).
(The remaining 8 percent were primarily in banana or sugar production or had
ceased production following expropriation.) With few exceptions, participants
were medium- or large-sized landowners.
A total of 143 interviews was conducted with 91 producers. Sixty producers
(66 percent) were interviewed only once, 24 (26 percent) were interviewed
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more than once, and 7 (8 percent) were interviewed three or more times.
Those who were approached for and agreed to multiple interviews contrib
uted more in-depth information about the social and political construction of
the Nicaraguan elite.
Because of the political and economic dominance of Managua and the
small size of the country, much of the economic elite maintains a residence
in the capital. Forty-five percent of the interviews took place in Managua. In
an effort to tap the experiences of those living outside Managua and operat
ing exclusively at the regional level, interviews were conducted in ten other
municipalities (Masaya, Masatepe, Jinotega, Granada, Juigalpa, Boaco, Mata
galpa, Jinotega, Chinandega, and Leon). Five different regions of the country
(Regions II, III, IV, V, and VI) were represented in this study.
Almost half (45 percent) of the interviews were conducted in the respon
dents' homes. Of the remainder, 34 percent were held in their association
headquarters, 16 percent in private offices outside their homes, and the re
maining 5 percent in other settings (restaurants, bank offices, etc.). On average,
the interview time per producer was 2 hours and 45 minutes, but the total
amount of time ranged at the extremes from 1 to 18 hours. In approximately
20 percent of the cases, prior interviews had been conducted with the pro
ducer between 1982 and 1987, so a basis for frank discussion was already well
established, and interview data could be compared across time.
The respondents in this study cannot be taken as typical of the Nicaraguan
bourgeoisie, since they were by definition those most actively involved in the
organizational leadership of their class. Demographic surveys and censuses
needed to draw a fuller picture of the Nicaraguan elite do not exist, so I cannot
say exactly how these respondents compare with the rest of their social class.
However, since these individuals have, in one form or another, been selected
by their peers as leaders and representatives, their responses and positions
should have special significance for the Nicaraguan private sector.
Respondents were asked a series of open- and close-ended questions con
cerning their demographic background, family economic history, personal
production history, production resources, the problems and opportunities they
encountered during the 1979-90 period, investment and expropriation experi
ences, political views and activities, organizational involvement, economic
philosophy, and policy recommendations.
Findings presented in Chapter 5 should be regarded as exploratory. There
is no well-established model of elite attitudes and behavior during revolu
tionary transitions, nor has there been much effort among social scientists to
explore political divisions within the elite using individual-level data. This
research represents a firm step in the direction of more rigorous analysis of
these issues.
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Table A.l

Agricultural Production by Crop, 1974/75-1987/88
Year

Cotton3

Coffee 3

Rice3

Sorghum b

1974-75
1975-76
1976-77
1977-78
1978-79
1979-80
1980-81
1981-82
1982-83
1983-84
1984-85
1985-86
1986-87
1987-88

7,998,400
7,282,800
8,159,900
9,152,500
8,152,400
1,244,700
4,878,590
4,080,999
5,070,136
5,690,739
4,608,645
3,349,900
3,289,037
2,200,000

890,800
1,068,200
1,102,500
1,251,200
1,263,100
1,228,100
1,284,934
1,327,969
1,568,375
1,069,694
1,115,000
768,700
942,000
839,667

1,733,500
1,268,900
838,100
1,030,600
1,175,000
1,359,000
1,376,800
1,947,000
2,134,000
2,233,033
1,942,900
1,773,700
1,725,000
1,502,400

1,127,600
1,336,400
2,113,700
930,000
1,356,200
1,379,500
1,939,519
1,951,400
1,150,588
2,224,200
2,354,400
3,346,300
3,769,200
2,408,046

Source: c ie r a (1989, 9:74, 76, 92, 94).
aQt. oro
bQt.
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Table A.2
unag

Membership Data, 1987
Members of Cooperatives3

Regions/
Zones

CAS

Region I
Region II
Region III
Region IV
Region V
Region VI
Zone I
Zone II
Zone III

8,070
4,293
2,250
5,364
2,559
4,114
298
1,082
1,092
29,122

Nation

Associate
Members b

Individual
Members0

Total

11,856
330
333
9,789
396 1,013
2,272
800
—
5,939
—
499
927
—
—
22,251 1,489
—
1,586
—
202
—
1,109
515
398
255
—

_
96
—
2,207
—
504
—
—
—

2,834
3,310
943
1,947
11,491
4,768
565
—
760

23,423
18,897
6,265
15,956
14,977
33,126
2,651
2,706
2,505

56,127 2,215 3,617

2,807

26,618

120,506

CCS

CSM

CT

Source: Luciak (forthcoming).
Acronyms: c a s Sandinista Production Cooperative
Credit and Service Cooperative
CCS
CSM Dead Fence Cooperative
CT
Work Collective
aMembers of the various cooperative organizations are affiliated with u n a g through
their base structures and as individuals.
bAssociate members are affiliated with u n a g as members of their coffee and cattle
associations.
individual members affiliate with u n a g but do not belong to any base structure.
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Table A.3

Nicaragua Economic Indicators, 1978-1992

g d p growth rate (%)
Per capita g d p growth rate (%)
Tax revenues/GDP (%)
Fiscal deficit/
government expenditures (%)
Fiscal deficit/GDP (%)
Inflation rateb (%)
Exports (goods, f o b ) (millions $)
Imports (goods, FOB) (millions $)
Trade balance (millions $)
Foreign debt (public) (millions $)
Interest due/exports
(goods and services) (%)

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

-7.2
-10.0
—

-26.4
-28.4
—

4.6
1.6
18.4

5.4
1.9
18.7

-0.8
-4.0
20.3

4.6
1.2
25.9

50.7
—
4.3
646
553
+ 93
961

36.5
13.5
70.3
616
389
+ 227
1,131

30.3
36.0
12.4
9.2
24.8
23.2
451
500
803
922
-352
-422
1,579
2,163

34.8
13.6
22.2
408
723
-315
3,139

49.1
30.0
32.9
429
819
-390
3,789

14.3

8.9

37.4

41.8

43.5

24.3

apreliminary
^consumer prices, December-December variation 1978-91; October-October variation 1992.

Sources:
and per cap. g d p growth
rates
Tax revenues/GDP
gdp

Fiscal deficit/GDP and fiscal
deficit/government
expenditures
Inflation rate
Exports, imports, balance

Foreign debt
Interest due/exports

1978

1984, 2); 1979-82 (CEPAL 1985, 2); 1983-84
1990a, 25); 1985-92 (c e pa l 1992a, 42-43).
1980-87 (Arana Sevilla 1990, 42-43); 1988-91
(c e pa l 1992b, 46).
1978 (c e pa l 1984, 2); 1979-84 (c e pa l 1986, 2): 1986-87
(Neira Cuadra and Acevedo 1992,107); 1988-92
(c e pa l 1992b, 25, 46; c e pa l 1992a, 48).
1978-83 (c e pa l 1987,17); 1984-92 (c e pa l 1992a, 45).
1978-82 (c e pa l 1984, 33); 1983-84 (c e pa l 1986, 26); 1985-86
(c e pa l 1987, 21); 1987 (c e pa l 1989, 24); 1988 (c e pa l 1990b);
1989 (c e pa l 1992b, 36, 38); 1990-92 (c e pa l 1992a, 55).
1978-81 (c e pa l 1984, 2); 1982-84 (c e pa l 1987, 23); 1985
(c e pa l 1992b, 25); 1986-1992 (c e pa l 1992a, 59).
1978-79 (c e pa l 1984, 35); 1980-83 (c e pa l 1990a, 34); 1984-92
(c e pa l 1992a, 60).
(CEPAL

(CEPAL
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Table A.3 (continued)
1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992a

-1.6
-4.8
30.7

-4.1
-6.7
27.8

-1.0
-3.5
27.7

-0.7
-3.0
24.6

-12.1
-14.2
19.2

-1.9
-4.5
21.7

-0.7
-3.7
17.7

-0.5
-4.0
19.8

0.5
-3.4
—

41.4
24.8
47.3
386
826
-440
4,362

41.9
23.4
334.3
301
830
-529
4,936

35.3
18.0
747.4
243
836
-593
5,760

37.2
16.4
1,347.2
295
734
-439
6,270

24.1
56.5
19.7
8.0
13,490.2
775.4
332
268
570
688
-420
-238
10,616 10,454

_
7.3
2.2
235
730
-495
11,200

57.9

78.3

88.5

75.6

110.4

122.4

55.7
22.2
26.6
6.7
33,547.6 1,689.1
236
290
718
615
-482
-325
7,220
9,741
96.7

62.1

58.3
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Table A.4

Strata Definitions

Basic Grains
Coffee
Cotton
Cattle

Small-sized

Medium-sized

Large-sized

0-50 mz.
0-15 mz./
0-200 qt.a
0-50 mz.
0-200 mz.

50-500 mz.
15-65 mz./
200-1,000 qt.a
50-200 mz.
200-1,000 mz.

500+ mz.
65+ mz./
1,000+ qt.a
200+ mz.
1,000+ mz.

Source: c ie r a (1981).
aas modified by Baumeister (1984b).
Table A. 5
u pa n ic

Organization
FAGANIC
FONDILAC
UNCAFENIC
CAAN
ASCANIC
ANPROSOR
ANAR

Membership and Landholding Data, 1985
Number of
Members

Mz. in
Production

3,578
1,236
820
372
180
136
75

582,000
100,000
47,000
49,850
30,000
29,846
16,000
1,550

6,397

856,246

ANPROBA

Total

Source: Unpublished c o s e p data, 1985.

notes

Preface

i. See Collier and Norden (1992) for an insightful discussion of the strategic
choice model and a review of recent literature employing this approach. For an
early illustration of strategic choice analysis developed in the 1960s to explore the
possibilities for "reformmongering," see Hirschman (1973).
Chapter 1

1. See the discussion of the Chilean Popular Unity strategy below.
2. In a fulsome critique of Eurocommunist theory as developed by the French
Communist party, Poulantzas concluded that the effort to define the non
monopoly sector as an "exploited bourgeoisie" under the heel of the monopoly
sector was fundamentally flawed. The work of imperialism theorists was reviled
for its fallacious assumption of "a supposed class solidarity between the popu
lar masses of the dependent countries and their own bourgeoisies ('the exploited
nations') against the imperialist bourgeoisies" (Poulantzas 1978, 151). Poulantzas
argued that the monopoly and non-monopoly sectors are bound together in a re
lationship of "organic interdependence" (Poulantzas 1978, 149). Far from being a
natural ally of the popular classes, the non-monopoly sector, because of its greater
competitiveness and lower profit margins, may actually be more directly conflictual and exploitative in its relations with labor than its monopoly counterpart.
Although Poulantzas delineates multiple contradictions within and between the
monopoly and non-monopoly sectors of the bourgeoisie, he concludes emphati
cally that "the relationship of exploitation is that between the bourgeoisie as a
whole and the working class and popular masses" (Poulantzas 1978, 151). Inter
preting Latin American class dynamics, Andre Gunder Frank concluded that the
internationalization of capital was "driving the entire Latin American bourgeois
class—including its comprador, bureaucratic and national segments—into ever
closer economic and political alliance with and dependence on the imperialist
metropolis" (Frank 1969, 396).
3. Zeitlin and Ratcliff's work raises provocative questions; in attempting to ex
plain the political behavior of the capitalist class, however, the family-network
framework suffers from significant limitations. Analysis of only upper echelon
elites in the largest economic operations neglects the fissure between the domi
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nant elite and the rest of the capitalist class, whose members do not occupy di
rectorships of leading national banks or industrial conglomerates. Furthermore,
the assumption that kinship is the central bond defining social relations may over
state the cohesiveness of family structures and obscure divisions within those
units. This formulation may assume too much about the collective economic pur
posefulness of the extended family and the ability of family brokers to resolve com
peting interests. Divisions within the top elite may not, in Zeitlin and Ratcliff's
words, be "ontologically real," but, in moments of crisis and social transformation,
they may be politically quite real.
4. A third type of outcome, in which a revolutionary socialist regime of the
Cuban type confronts and eliminates the bourgeoisie, was not included in this
analysis. Because that type of regime effectively eliminates the bourgeoisie, it pro
vides little information about the ongoing dynamics and complex negotiations in
the relationship between a transformative state and the dominant class.
5. My original study of this issue also included an analysis of elite resistance in
Ecuador during the period of military reform (1972-76) and complex negotiation in
Jamaica during the first Manley era (1972-80). Those cases have been summarized
in an abbreviated fashion in notes in this chapter and Chapter 7.
6. Evelyne Huber Stephens and John D. Stephens (1986, 333-36) differentiate
democratic socialism from its more moderate cousin, social democracy, based on
several criteria. Social democratic governments have tended to emerge in highly in
dustrialized countries in Western Europe where local capital is relatively dynamic
and foreign penetration is less intense. Because of these characteristics, income
redistribution and economic growth can be achieved through tax and regulatory
policy and social welfare programs, without extensive state control of the local
economy. In Third World countries, on the other hand, where foreign participation
in the economy is much deeper and aligns with local capital, they argue that more
direct state ownership is required to achieve dynamic growth and lower foreign
dependence. Thus while democratic socialism and social democracy share certain
general objectives (increased social equality and promotion of political democracy),
the role of the state and the economic logic of each is found to be distinct.
7. The industrial data are for 1969. According to de Vylder (1976, 136), there
were an estimated 35,000 industrial firms in Chile at that time.
8. As early as 1940, over one-third of the industrial work force was unionized
(Valenzuela 1978, 28). As the political contest deepened in the 1960s with the
extension of the franchise and the election of Eduardo Frei, social organization in
tensified with the growth of unions, neighborhood groups, and rural organizations.
9. According to Drake (1973, 315), economic and political elites were closely
linked. Forty percent of the leaders of the Conservative party and 34 percent of the
Liberal party leaders belonged to the s n a in 1931-33.
10. The Association of Banks and Financial Institutions was established in
1943, and the Chamber of Construction was founded in 1951. The National Mining
Society includes only Chilean mine owners and represents medium-sized mining
rather than the largest mines, which were foreign-owned prior to 1971.
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11. Bitar (1986, 208—9) notes that s o f o f a had a membership of only around
2,200 in the early 1960s. Genaro Arriagada's (1970, 116—71) study of Chilean em
ployers7 associations identified a series of features, such as the inclusion of nonelected officials on the executive councils and low leadership turnover, that tended
to increase centralized control in these associations and limit internal democracy.
12. The 1967 law allowed landowners to retain a reserva of their choosing
equivalent to eighty hectares of irrigated land in the Central Valley. Furthermore,
reformed land was allocated only to those workers currently employed on the
estate. These measures allowed the landholding elite to retain all capital and con
siderable land resources and did little to address the serious problems faced by
landless migrants and minifundistas not employed on the large estates. The u p
government did, however, accelerate the pace of implementation of that legisla
tion. Between 1965 and 1973, 5,036 large estates (fundos) were expropriated, 70
percent of them after 1970. See de Vylder (1976,176-98).
13. According to McClintock (1981, 61), the portion of agricultural land redis
tributed in Chile between 1967 and May 1973 was comparable (36 percent) to that
distributed in Mexico and Peru (36 percent in Mexico as of i960, and 35 percent
in Peru through 1977), but the portion of rural families receiving land was much
lower 19 percent in Chile versus 25 percent in Mexico and 24 percent in Peru).
14. It took the government almost a full year to specify a concrete expropriation
plan for that sector. The bill it proposed in October 1971 targeted around 250 of the
largest private stock companies for expropriation. Private stock companies with
capital valued over 14 million escudos (then about US$1.4 million) in December
1969 would either be fully expropriated and transferred to the social property area
or be partially expropriated and turned into mixed enterprises. Congressional re
sistance pushed the government to lower the target to around ninety enterprises a
few months later. In a rare exception to the general pattern, the government was
actually able to secure support for this proposal from the National Association of
Small Manufacturers, whose constituents, of course, would not be affected by the
bill (de Vylder 1976,136-37).
15. Two hundred and forty-eight were under full or partial state ownership
and 259 were intervened or requisitioned (c o r f o 1989, 226-27, 244). In the final
months of the Allende government, the number of firms taken over by their
workers increased rapidly, with the addition of around 50 small- and medium-sized
firms following an attempted coup in June 1973 (de Vylder 1976,144-45).
16. In February 1972, congress passed an amendment to the constitution that
in effect precluded further expropriations without congressional authorization.
Allende vetoed the measure and argued that a congressional override required twothirds approval, something that the opposition could not muster. The opposition
countered that constitutional reforms passed in 1970 made it possible to amend
the constitution with only a simple majority vote. Allende proceeded with ex
propriations as if the constitutional amendment were void, leading some of his
challengers to allege that his regime operated outside the law and hence deserved
to be removed by extralegal means. By the time Allende pushed a compromise
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proposal through his fractious coalition (which would give the government legal
authority to expropriate, with compensation, eighty enterprises, while requiring
specific authorization from congress for any future nationalizations), the right
wing of the Christian Democratic party had become dominant, and the Christian
Democrats refused to back the measure (see Valenzuela 1978, 75-76).
17. Arturo Matte Larrain, head of the prominent Matte family and brother-inlaw of defeated presidential candidate Jorge Alessandri, was involved in the Inter
national Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) conspiracy to prevent Allende's inaugu
ration. His nephew Benjamin Matte Guzman, who headed the s n a , vehemently
opposed even the Christian Democratic agrarian reform program and became a
clandestine leader of the far right-wing paramilitary organization Patria y Libertad. Agustin Edwards Eastman, whose family owned a controlling interest (42.75
percent) in the Bank of Edwards and 69 percent the conservative newspaper El
Mercurio, left Chile to become an international vice-president of Pepsi-Cola Cor
poration in New York. From the United States he lobbied the Nixon administration
for assistance in blocking the Allende government (see Zeitlin and Ratcliff 1988,
66, 224, 252-57).
18. This percentage decline was not simply a reflection of a rapid increase in
public investment. Stallings's data (1978, 248) show that real public investment
did increase modestly in 1973, but real private investment dropped sharply from
260 million escudos of 1965 in 1970 to approximately 93 million escudos of 1965
in 1971. This decline appears to be quicker and sharper than that in Peru, where
the private sector was still responsible for 40.8 percent of gross fixed capital for
mation in 1974 (though FitzGerald [1976, 84) estimates that only one-third of this
was from local capitalists).
19. This point is difficult to document, but it is often made in the literature on
this era. See, for example, de Vylder (1976, 62) and Bitar (1986, 204).
20. Indeed, there was some support for the u p coalition within the privileged
classes prior to 1970. According to electoral surveys by Eduardo Hamuy in Greater
Santiago, for example, 20 percent of those classified as in the bourgeoisie voted for
the Socialist/Communist coalition in 1964. This was slightly higher than the 18
percent managers/professionals and somewhat below the 27 percent petty bour
geoisie who voted for the left in that election. These figures are cited in Stallings
(1978, 244).
21. Although personally committed to restricting expropriations according to
the original plan, Allende repeatedly gave in to pressures from more radical ele
ments in order to maintain unity within the coalition and avoid breaking with his
own political party. Most graphically, in early 1973 he rejected the Millas Project,
named for the new economic minister Orlando Millas, which would have returned
fifty small- and medium-sized firms to their former owners. After the workers in
these firms, encouraged by the Socialist party and Movimiento de Accion Popular
Unitario, went out on strike, Allende authorized the retention of these firms (de
Vylder 1976, 239 n. 51). The pace of expropriations, the apparent lack of control
over the process at the top, and the fundamentally anticapitalist stance of many
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u p leaders fed deep fears within the bourgeoisie. Although few of the 35,000 busi
nesses and firms in Chile were taken, this violation of prior commitments stirred
panic throughout the bourgeoisie and brought even nonhegemonic elites into the
anti-Allende camp. In a self-criticism written following the 1973 coup, former u p
minister Sergio Bitar condemned the u p for regarding these middle strata as "tem
porary, tactical allies" rather than a "strategic element" whose interests had to be
considered seriously and responded to by the government (Bitar 1986, 211).
22. The president of c o pr o c o , the peak association of the old, elite business
organizations, proclaimed two weeks before the coup, "I don't belong to any party,
I'm not tied to any important economic group. I'm a commercial and industrial
businessman of medium importance. . . . Right now the concern of the business
organizations isn't about how to get more ... but with fighting for liberty, the
right to work . . . and the right to produce and distribute goods and services under
a regime that respects the law and individuality" (El Mercurio, September 4,1973,
as cited in Campero 1984, 86-87).
23. Key economic elites, particularly the powerful Edwards family, were able
to fan public fears about the loss of freedom and deepen the polarization of the
society through alarmist news coverage in the powerful right-wing daily El Mer
curio. Through a combination of pressure on those who wavered and ideological
leadership, the opposition press mobilized widespread opposition among the privi
leged sectors. De Vylder (1976, 47) reports that two-thirds of all television, 95
percent of radio stations, 90 percent of newspaper circulation, and almost 100 per
cent of weekly magazines were opposed to the government. One of the weekly
magazines, El Segundo, published the names of businesspeople who agreed to sell
their holdings to the state, thereby pressuring owners to reject purchase offers and
making it more difficult for the government to successfully negotiate the takeover
of private businesses.
24. For a discussion of the evolution of "notable families" in Latin America
during the 1750-1880 period, see Balmori, Voss, and Wortman (1984).
25. Ecuador may provide another example. Well into the twentieth century,
Ecuadorean business leaders tended to be well organized and participated in a
series of private sector organizations that served as social as well as economic net
works. Powerful camaras de production were set up by the state in the 1930s, and
private sector membership was legally required. Small- and medium-sized busi
nesses failed to form their own associations and generally followed the lead of
the large-scale producers (Hurtado 1980,180). Drawing on a study by the Comite
Interamericano de Desarrollo Agricola, Hurtado (1980, 53) notes that "the board
of directors of the Chamber of Agriculture of the Sierra between 1937 and 1962
contained four presidents of the Republic, fifty-one national deputies or senators,
twenty-one cabinet members, and twenty-nine others who occupied important
public posts of various types. ... In the presidential elections of 1968, two of the
five candidates, one Liberal, the other Conservative, had served on the board of
directors of agrarian associations." Unlike most Latin American bourgeoisies, the
Ecuadorean elite faced little challenge to its political preeminence, even into the
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1960s, as limits on the franchise excluded roughly half of the adult population
|Hurtado 1980, 349).
26. The matanza of 1932 wiped out close to 1 percent of the population (Ander
son 1971,135).
27. One political party, the Partido Accion Renovadora, was officially proscribed
in the 1960s for including a proposal for the expropriation of private land in its
platform (Ramirez Arango 1985,102).
28. According to de Sebastian (1986, 34), the Asociacion de Cafetaleros was also
allowed to control 36 percent of the stock in the Central Reserve Bank when it
was founded in 1934.
29. A modest process of crop diversification began in the 1940s with the intro
duction of cotton and later with sugar cane; industrialization was promoted with
1952 legislation giving tax exemptions for the import of capital goods and with the
creation of state investment institutes to finance industrial investment (Jimenez
1986, 13-14). Indeed, the average annual industrial expansion rate (5.7 percent)
outpaced agricultural growth (4.5 percent) in the 1950-62 period (Bulmer-Thomas
1987,7).
30. The powerful Asociacion de Cafetaleros de El Salvador was allowed to ac
quire 40 percent of the stock in this bank, and the Asociacion de Ganaderos de El
Salvador another 20 percent (Baloyra 1982,13).
31. See also Baloyra (1982, 25); and Dunkerley (1988, 343-49).
32. They were responsible, by one account, for 17 percent of manufacturing,
26 percent of commerce, and 31 percent of the service sector (Sevilla 1985, 18,
table 10). Drawing on data for 1978-79, Sevilla (1985, 15) defines medium-sized
as those operations with an annual production value of 1-5 million colones
(US$400,000—$2 million at the then prevailing exchange rate) in manufacturing,
gross earnings between 500,000 and 5 million colones (US$200,ooo-$2 million) in
services and commerce, or land size between 50 and 100 hectares in agriculture.
33. a n e p was composed of the Coffee Association (which claimed 40,000 mem
bers in the early 1980s), the Chamber of Commerce, the Salvadoran Industries
Association, the Banking Association, the Chamber of the Industry of Construc
tion, the Cotton Producers Cooperative, the Association of Producers of Sugar, the
Association of Processors and Exporters of Coffee, the Chamber of Tourism, and
other regional affiliates (Ramirez Arango 1985, 97-98; Crosby 1985, 26). In 1980,
it claimed 31 affiliates and a membership of over 50,000.
34. The reaction of the landed elite to the agrarian reform proposal of the
military government in 1976 indicates the breadth of the elite's control and the
intensity of its resistance to change. Proposed by military president Molina in
1976, the plan to distribute 59,000 hectares in the eastern cotton-growing region
to 12,000 peasant families would have provided ample USAID-financed compen
sation at market prices (Baloyra 1982, 56; Jung 1980, 17). a n e p , representing agri
cultural producers, industry, and commerce, responded immediately by publicly
denouncing the measure and mobilizing its membership in opposition. In a series
of newspaper announcements, a n e p carried on a hot exchange with the Molina
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government, condemning the government's "totalitarian stance" and "absolute in
transigence" and reminding them of their "obligation to listen." The government,
in its own newspaper announcements, responded that "the act of listening should
not be confused with the action of obeying" (Baloyra 1982,57-58). In spite of this
bravado, within weeks the government began backing away from the plan. To bol
ster its position, the more extreme right-wing elements in a n e p formed the Frente
Agrario de la Region Oriental, a militantly violent organization. This revived a
long tradition of right-wing elites employing violence and financing death squads
to eliminate those who challenged them.
35. Private sector leaders were not long involved. The first junta included Mario
Andino, local manager of the Philips Dodge wire company owned by the de Sola
family. Andino was viewed as an a n e p representative by Christian Democratic
party leader Jose Napoleon Duarte, who publicly demanded the exclusion of all
private sector representatives on the junta before the Christian Democrats would
agree to join the government in January 1980. A second prominent private pro
ducer, Enrique Alvarez, a large landowner and former minister of agriculture,
briefly served the new government in 1979 as the minister of agriculture before
resigning to join the leadership of the Frente Democratico Revolucionario. He was
subsequently assassinated.
36. This phase authorized the expropriation of properties over 500 hectares and
the allocation of these estates to the resident labor force in the form of coopera
tives. As in the agrarian reform program in Mexico, Peru (except in the highland
and high-jungle region), and Chile, landowners were allowed to retain a substan
tial reserve—in this case 100-150 hectares, depending on soil quality. Phase I land
was to be compensated with twenty-year bonds for inventories and land, at 6 per
cent interest, based on 1976-77 declared tax value. There is evidence to suggest
that around 10 percent of the affected landowners had overestimated the value of
their land, presumably to increase their access to bank credit. Many others, how
ever, had underestimated the land value in order to reduce their property taxes. For
them, the compensation provided was unacceptably low. The bonds themselves
were also unattractive and traded at 55-62 percent of their face value. The gov
ernment's willingness to accept the bonds in lieu of payment for some types of
taxes, however, did give them a certain worth. In the end, almost half of the Phase
I estates (238 properties) were acquired at market rates instead of rates based on
declared tax value (Strasma 1990,10).
37. According to data in Thiesenhusen (1989, 10—11) this would be more land
to a higher percentage of the rural population than any other land reform pro
gram in Latin America except that of Bolivia. Thiesenhusen's data indicate that
the Bolivian agrarian reform program affected 83.4 percent of the agricultural and
forest land of the country, and benefited 74.5 percent of the "farming families.
38. In its 1990 census, the Proyecto de Evaluacion y Planificacion Agricola of
the Salvadoran Ministry of Agriculture reported that thirty cooperatives had been
abandoned. See Strasma (1990, 25).
39. Recognizing this problem, the Duarte government modified the terms of
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repayment for land recipients in 1986, reducing interest rates from 9.5 percent to
6 percent and extending the repayment period from up to thirty years to up to fifty
years (Strasma 1990, 5, n-12).
40. Payment for the banks was made in government bonds at 9 percent inter
est with five-year maturity. Not included in the nationalization were the foreign
banks, which were now legally prohibited from accepting deposits (though in prac
tice they continued to do so), savings and loan institutions, and the Banco Hipotecario. In his study of the nationalized banking system, Valdes (1989, 792 n. 3, 806)
suggests that the latter may have been spared because it is commonly regarded as
being in the public domain already, though in fact it is still largely owned by the
coffee and livestock associations, and because of the mediation of its former presi
dent and, subsequently, Salvador's provisional president, Alvaro Magana. Initially
the state was to control the nationalized banks, but after some unspecified period
of time, 49 percent of the stock was to be sold off—20 percent to bank workers
and 29 percent to other buyers (Valdes 1989, 792). To prevent reconcentration of
ownership, individuals were allowed to buy no more than 1 percent of the stock
and could purchase stock in only one bank (Valdes 1989, 806).
41. According to Orellana's (1985,15, table 5) study, for example, shareholders
in the Banco Salvadoreno, the country's oldest and one of the largest banks, were
paid 17 percent more than face value per share and 49 percent more than the book
value established by the evaluation commission. In a few banks, however, ficti
tious loans that had been authorized to allow for capital flight were deducted from
the portfolio, and some shares were compensated at 50 percent of face value.
42. Many agrarian reform beneficiaries were still excluded from the banking
system. In 1984-85, 70 percent of Phase III land recipients received no credit, nor
did almost a quarter of the Phase I cooperatives (80 of 338) (Valdes 1989, 800-801).
43. Coffee processors, on the other hand, were paid a straight processing fee
determined by the state, and in some ways may have benefited from the new pro
gram. On the other hand, processors lost their ability to adjust their charges with
different clients or to participate directly in the lucrative export trade.
44. On income calculations by efficiency levels, see the discussion of the u s a id
report "The Coffee Situation," San Salvador, March 8, 1984, in Lopez (1986, 19).
According to Lopez's (1986, 34) calculations, in 1985, in c a f e earned the equivalent
of 350 colones per quintal in its coffee transactions and paid producers only 220
colones. When international prices soared in 1986, the gap widened still further,
with the state earning 1,000 colones per quintal and paying producers only 400
colones.
45. As early as 1984 the Salvadoran Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock esti
mated that 43 percent of the area planted to coffee had been effectively abandoned
(meaning literal abandonment or the curtailment of active production labors like
fertilizing, pruning, etc.), affecting varying amounts of the crop (from 98.7 percent
of coffee land in Morazan to 20 percent in La Union). In the crucial Santa Ana prov
ince, 47.6 percent of the coffee cultivation had been abandoned. See discussion in
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Lopez (1986, 25-26). International prices for Central America's "mild" coffee fell
from $1.35 in 1988 to $.89 in 1990 (c e pa l 1990b, 30, table 12).
46. All of the organizations affiliated with a n e p opposed the reforms. Some
were, however, more confrontational than others. The Asociacion de Cafetaleros
(formally known as the Asociacion Salvadorena de Cafe) was probably the most
ferocious opponent; the Asociacion Salvadorena de Industriales, in contrast, main
tained direct communication with Duarte in private conferences until May 1981,
when pressure from other business leaders prompted them to suspend the meet
ings. Duarte attempted to build bridges to a n e p leaders, reportedly offering to
name one of their leaders as minister of economic affairs in December 1980. In a
formal, written counterproposal, a n e p leaders refused the offer unless they were
also given a position on the junta plus the opportunity to select the ministers
of foreign trade, agriculture, treasury, and labor and the Central Bank president
(Ramirez Arango 1985,156-58). Duarte declined their request.
47. For example, Dr. Jose Antonio Rodriguez Porth, president of the Chamber of
Commerce, chaired a r e n a 's advisory council and played a major role as intellec
tual architect of the a r e n a program and as a campaign fundraiser. He was named
minister of the presidency in the Cristiani government but was assassinated soon
after, on June 8,1989.
48. Recent studies by Paige (1993) and Wolf (1992) indicate shadings of differ
ence had developed by the end of the 1980s between a r e n a "hardliners" and
"softliners." Paige notes that the election of Cristiani represents not simply the
return to power of the old coffee elite (represented by the Asociacion Salvadorena
de Cafe) but the ceding of power to the faction of the coffee elite that is most
tied to processing and industry (represented in the Association of Processors and
Exporters of Coffee), a newer, more exclusive association founded in 1961. The
leaders of the latter sector, he argues, have come in recent years to express partial
support for the concept of democracy. Based on his interviews with elites, however,
he concluded that neither sector associated democracy with social and economic
rights, suggesting an important continuity within the elite establishment.
49. The annual per capita GDP decline during the crucial 1980-82 period was
10.5 percent (1980), 9.2 percent (1981), and 6.6 percent (1982) (c e pa l 1986, 2).
50. As in El Salvador, the reform initiative in Ecuador, which was introduced
by the military during the 1972-76 oil boom, was largely stillborn. Most of Ecua
dor's large agricultural producers deftly sidestepped the agrarian reform laws. The
1973 legislation, which authorized expropriation of estates with less than 80 per
cent of their land in use, gave owners two years within which to comply. This
measure only pushed owners to increase the intensity of their land use or divide
unused lands. According to estimates by Zevallos (1989, 55), estates of more than
500 hectares occupied roughly 30 percent of agricultural land in the early 1970s
and continued to occupy 20 percent at the end of the decade. Only 9 percent of
all agricultural and forest land was affected by the various agrarian reform laws
issued, and probably only 5—6 percent of all land was actually shifted to new hands
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(as opposed to just titling land to current users), making it one of the least com
prehensive agrarian reform programs in Latin America (Thiesenhusen 1989, io;
Zevallos 1989, 50).
The reform military's efforts to trim the power of economic elites by denying
their traditional voting rights on government economic boards and mandating the
registration of unincorporated family firms triggered fierce reaction on the part
of the Ecuadorean private sector. Leading private sector organizations launched
a forceful campaign of denunciation and opposition to blunt the reformist pro
gram. A weary and divided military finally called elections. Reformers elected in
1979 were soon supplanted by a unified right, and business leader Febres Cordero
won the presidency in 1984. Much as in El Salvador, the Ecuadorean capitalists
pursued "democratization" as an alternative to reform and succeeded in blunting
the reform initiative when they returned to power. See Conaghan (1988).
51. Some analysts, such as Gary Wynia (1990), reserve the term "populist" to
describe the personalistic movements led by Brazilian president Getulio Vargas
and Argentine president Juan Peron in his early phase. Indeed, Hamilton (1982,
3:38—39) contends that the postrevolutionary development of Mexico does not fit
entirely in the populist model because the classical populist experiences of Bra
zil and Argentina did not mobilize the rural masses or include extensive agrarian
reform. Yet most analysts of Mexican politics find the populist label appropriate.
To differentiate between the Mexican and Peruvian forms of populism and their
more moderate, industrial counterparts in Argentina and Brazil, I shall use the
term "revolutionary populism" here to describe the former.
52. David W. Walker (1986, 227-28) illustrates the decline, focusing on the
Martinez del Rio family.
53. General and, subsequently, President Alvaro Obregon's landholdings, for
example, reportedly expanded from 1.5 to 3,500 hectares after the revolution
(Hamilton 1982,68). Most postrevolutionary economic elites, however, had already
acquired some significant assets during the porfiriato, though those resources cer
tainly declined. As Camp (1989) points out, the best predictor of membership in
the economic elite after 1917 is membership in that elite prior to the revolution.
54. Cardenas expropriated a total of 811,157 hectares during the 1934-40 period
compared with only 783,330 in the previous years of the revolution (Wilkie 1970,
194)5 5. Land grants were given in the form of ejidos or communal holdings, based on
a landholding pattern derived from tenancy practices of indigenous communities.
56. For example, with the reform of Article 78 of the Labor Code, a constitu
tional provision calling for payment to workers for the seventh day of the week was
implemented, automatically raising wages approximately 17 percent (Hamilton
1982, 148).
57. The Mexican regime avoided the standard plague of populist governments:
large deficits and inflation (Dornbusch and Edwards 1991). Increased government
spending to support new social programs and expanded agricultural credit con
tributed to fiscal deficits, but these were offset somewhat in the Cardenas era by
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declining military outlays. The portion of the government budget spent on agri
cultural credit soared to 9-5 percent in 1935 and then stabilized at an average of 3.5
percent for the remainder of the sexenio, whereas the military's portion declined
from between 30 and 53 percent in the 1920S-1930S to a low of 15.8 percent in 1939
(Wilkie 1970, 102, 139? 166). A modest deficit did emerge in the government bud
get in 1936 and became a recurring feature in the decades that followed (n a f in s a
1981, 304.) The deficit was financed internally by drawing overdrafts at the central
bank (Medina 1974, 269).
58. Lazaro Cardenas, Los Catorce Puntos de la Politica Obrera Presidential
(Mexico, D.F.: P[artido] N[acional] R[evolucionario], 1936), 48, as cited in Wilkie
(1970, 73). See also Martinez Nava (1984, 85).
59. Drawing on data compiled by the Confederation de Camaras de Comercio e
Industria, Medina (1974, 271) reports that capital flight increased from 46 million
pesos (US$12.8 million) in 1934 to 250 million pesos (US$69.4 million) in 1937
before tapering off in 1938. Direct foreign investment from U.S. investors dropped
over 25 percent during the 1936-40 period (Wilkie 1970, 265).
60. See also Martinez Nava (1984,113).
61. In 1936 new legislation was approved that required all firms worth more
than 500 pesos (approximately US$143) to participate in trade associations. These
organizations would be united in a single peak confederation under the jurisdic
tion of the secretary of the national economy. See Hamilton (1982, 196). In 1941,
separate chambers of industry and commerce were reestablished.
62. There is some debate about the character of c a n a c in t r a . Analyzing this
institution in the 1940s, Mosk (1954) presents it as an authentic private sector orga
nization composed of revolutionary, nationalistic entrepreneurs. Shafer (1973), on
the other hand, writing in the 1970s sees it essentially as a representative of the
state in the guise of a private sector organization.
63. See Alcazar (1970, appendix 1,106). By the 1970s, however, as the renewed
populism of the Echeverria administration triggered greater private sector hos
tility, c o pa r m e x 's membership increased, rising from 13,000 to 18,000 during the
decade (Camp 1989, 164). Heredia (1991, 78) found that the number of regional af
filiates of c o pa r m e x rose from 22 in 1978 to 64 (including 6 in Mexico City) in
1990. See also Bravo Mena (1987).
64. A 1982 public opinion poll conducted by the pr i concluded that only 17
percent of industrialists and 22 percent of company presidents professed member
ship in some political party. In contrast, 30 percent of the general public identified
themselves as members of a political party. See Camp (1989,139).
65. See the discussion in Camp (1989, 157). Camp acknowledged that it is hard
to know what representational bias emerged in these business associations, but
he found frequent allegations in his interviews with business leaders that leader
ship in these organizations tended to be weighted in favor of representatives of the
largest firms. Unlike other Latin American countries such as Peru, where leading
capitalists did not seek leadership positions in large business associations (Durand
1988b, 274), in Mexico they often did. See also Luna (199:2, 4).
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66. According to Lomnitz and Perez-Lizaur (1987), Pablo Gomez broke with
family tradition to invite a prominent general to become his daughter's godfather
in 1939 (p. 39). Political alliances of this type allowed his branch of the family to
prosper during this era. The two industrial concerns he inherited in 1925 were ex
panded into a complex of thirty-six factories by the time he died in the early 1960s
(p. 109) His branch of the family continued to maintain friendships with politi
cal leaders, establishing social relationships and regular contact with subsequent
Presidents Aleman, Lopez Mateos, and Diaz Ordaz (pp. 200-201).
67. The Monterrey group emerged under the leadership of Isaac Garza and Fran
cisco G. Sada. Starting with a brewery founded in 1890, their descendants expanded
into glass, steel, packing, chemical production, and banking. For a detailed history
of the Monterrey group from 1890 to 1940, see Saragoza (1988). Periodic tensions
between this group and the government erupted even though personal friendships
sometimes emerged, as in the case of Eugenio Garza Sada and Luis Echeverria (see
Saragoza 1988; Basanez 1990,105).
68. Debate about the role of the bourgeoisie in Peru's revolution has been in
tense. Some analysts argued that the revolution was directed by the industrial
bourgeoisie and foreign capital and was designed to serve their interests (Dore and
Weeks 1977). Others, like FitzGerald (1976, 93-102), interpreted the revolution as
an exercise in state capitalism in which the state attempted to counter the foreign
and domestic bourgeoisie by becoming the central national entrepreneur itself.
Stepan (1978, 290-317) viewed it as a failed effort to institutionalize a relatively
autonomous state that would promote national development.
69. For nonirrigated land the maximum was set at 300 hectares for the coastal
region and the amount of land necessary to maintain 5,000 sheep (or their equiva
lent in other species) in the highland or high-jungle region. See McClintock (1981,
60 n 34).
70. Thiesenhusen's (1989,10-11) figures differ modestly. He found that 39 per
cent of the agricultural and forest land was transferred, between 1969 and 1982, to
30 percent of the farming families.
71. See also Becker's (1983, 187-89) analysis of the directorships of mid-size
mining operations and their linkages with individuals from the agrarian oligarchy.
72. In a 1968-69 survey of 179 industrialists in medium- and large-sized firms,
Wils (1975, 148) found 52 percent were descendants of first or second generation
immigrants. Even in the largest firms, only 31 percent of the owners were from
oligarchical families (p. 145).
73. According to data obtained by McClintock (1981, 47 n 16), fewer than 5 per
cent of the bonds were reinvested in this fashion. Bamat (1978,140) points out that
between 1969 and March 1976, investments approved for finance with the agrarian
reform bonds amounted to only 4.4 percent of the total value of the bonds, and nine
of the nineteen projects approved were actually for hotel construction rather than
industrial activities. The prime beneficiary of this program was the Grupo Romero,
which lost cultivated land on five large estates but was able to substantially expand
its industrial and financial holdings. According to Reano and Vasquez Huaman
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(1988, ±01) 61 percent of the funds administered in the Fondo de Financiamiento y
Promocion de Empresas Industrials went to the Romero group.
74. According to FitzGerald (1976, 87), there were 3,000 state development
projects under way in 1973; I5° were major, involving programmed investments
of over 50 million soles.
75. Foreign capital's shares were to be reduced to a maximum of 49 percent by
1986. Following the August 1975 countercoup of Morales Bermudez, these require
ments were relaxed. The revised Industrial Communities Law adopted in late 1976
reduced the portion of the industry to be given to workers to 33 percent and gave
the shares directly to the individual workers instead of the industrial communi
ties. Foreign owners were given some options that included the retention of their
stock if they chose not to participate in the benefits of the Andean market (Stepan
1978, 276-77). Peru eventually agreed to pay $150 million in compensation for
U.S. firms that had been expropriated (Stepan 1978, 259).
The Peruvian private sector was also affected by these reforms, but much less
so. A few local firms were shifted into the state sector, and major daily newspapers
were turned over to groups representing different social sectors. But in many cases
these changes were the result of bankruptcy, not expropriation. Only one big local
capital group, the Prado consortium, lost its assets, and a series of Prado enter
prises shifted under state control, including the Banco Popular and textile, paper,
fertilizer, and cement factories (FitzGerald 1976, 33). This group went bankrupt,
partly as a result of the crash of the fishing industry following overfishing and
changing ocean currents.
76. Although some foreign firms were expropriated or had losses, others pros
pered. Becker's (1983, 97-165) account of the Peruvian mining sector, for example,
contrasts the histories of two major mining companies. Cerro de Pasco was an in
ternally divided foreign-owned operation that dominated the mining sector. When
it decided to use Peruvian profits to expand operations in Chile, Peru's traditional
rival, the company was expropriated. In contrast, Southern Peru Copper devised
an expansionary investment plan that converged with the state's nationalist de
velopment program. In the latter case, the state not only refrained from expropria
tion but supported the negotiation of an international loan package to finance the
expansion of the company.
77. Becker's (1983) work analyzes the development of a "new bourgeoisie" in
Peru that supported the new state policy. This reform-oriented bourgeoisie was
composed of managers and administrative personnel who were "knowledge-based"
rather than "ownership-based" (p. 238). Becker's study may overemphasize the
power of a managerial elite, since the lack of ownership limits this sector's ability
to direct the industry over the long run. This work does, however, highlight pro
reform commitments even among relatively privileged members of that society.
78. The word national was dropped from its name. Other forms of pressure used
against the association included forcing the society's stridently oppositional presi
dent to remain in exile for a year following a trip abroad. See Stepan (1978,12,1)79. In 1974 the s n i pushed for the creation of a United Front for the Defense of
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Private Property to coordinate an industrywide response to the nationalization of
the fishing industry. Fearful of the regime's response, leaders soon backed off, and
this effort fizzled. Three years later, seven private sector organizations succeeded
in creating the Union de Empresarios Privados del Peru, but the association lasted
only six months before it was dissolved (Durand 1991,5-6).
80. According to Durand (1988b, 271-73), at the top of the pyramid are found a
small number of "family clans" who attained prominence with the destruction of
the oligarchy and whose position was fortified by the military regime's nationalis
tic policies. These top economic groups had investments in multiple sectors of the
economy, including the country's major banks, and generally had some associa
tive link with foreign capital. Beneath this group was a second layer of large- and
medium-sized capitalists who, unlike the first group, were generally involved in
only one or two economic sectors. Since their economic base was narrower, they
were more vulnerable to shifts in state policy and more hostile to the reforms.
81. The state portion of gross fixed capital formation rose from 30 percent in
the 1964-68 period to 50 percent in 1974-76 (FitzGerald 1979,150). Private invest
ment, already low at 10.8 percent of GDP in 1964-68, now dipped to 8 percent
of GDP in 1969-76, and FitzGerald (1979, 151-52) estimates that foreign capital
provided two-thirds of that amount.
82. Many of the reforms were substantially reduced in 1976 following the
Morales Bermudez countercoup in 1975 and ended altogether following the 1980
election and return to power of President Belaunde Terry.
83. The willingness of the Peruvian bourgeoisie to support unorthodox eco
nomic measures was demonstrated again during the early years of the Alan Garcia
presidency (1985-86), when they rallied to his side and supported his economic re
activation plan. That approval collapsed with the subsequent bank nationalization
in July 1987 (Durand 1988b).
84. This kind of mutual accommodation is not found exclusively in revolu
tionary populist regimes. Considerable segmentation and partial accommodation
of the bourgeoisie were also found in Jamaica during the early years of the first
Michael Manley government (1972-80). As with the other cases we have explored,
much of the initial reform in Jamaica was directed against foreign capital. The
target was the foreign-owned bauxite industry, where a unilateral increase in the
bauxite levy raised state revenues from bauxite sevenfold. This measure was popu
lar even with Jamaican capitalists, in part because of the foreign exchange windfall
it produced (Stephens and Stephens 1986, 79). When expropriation of local elites
occurred, it was generally in the form of a state takeover of failing businesses, such
as the collapsing sugar estates and hotel industry. The government was constrained
in its agrarian reform efforts by a constitutional requirement of full compensation
at market rates for expropriated landowners. As a consequence, its land reform
efforts were also modest.
Although the evidence is not conclusive, the Jamaican commercial sector orga
nized in the Chamber of Commerce, whose economic interests and opportunities
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were most sharply and immediately curtailed by the Manley government's import
restrictions, may have gone most quickly into the opposition (Keith and Keith
1985, 94-96; Stephens and Stephens 1986, 98, 350). Exporters affiliated with the
j e a , on the other hand, were relatively favored by a government that was chroni
cally strapped for foreign exchange. As in the Peruvian case, this sector tended
to be more supportive of the new government and at times formally endorsed
government initiatives (Stephens and Stephens 1986,194).
By 1976, however, the various segments of the private sector were beginning to
converge in opposition to the regime. A new peak organization, the Private Sector
Organization of Jamaica, was founded to allow the private sector to confront the
regime more effectively. Although the state-business relationship deteriorated in
the final years, established divisions within the Jamaican elite and the Manley gov
ernment's alliance strategy made the defection of the bourgeoisie a more gradual
process in Jamaica than it had been in either Chile or El Salvador.
Chapter 2

1. The first law to support coffee cultivation was actually passed in 1835 but was
not implemented during those turbulent years. Additional legislation was passed
in 1847 exempting producers with more than 2,000 trees from taxes and both
owners and workers on coffee estates from being pressed into military service. See
Burns (1991, 232).
2. This legislation was passed in 1877 but was implemented more vigorously in
the 1880s and 1890s. Vogl Baldizon (1985,15-19, 355—60) describes how his father,
a German immigrant who had come to Nicaragua in 1888 to manage a German
import house, accepted the offer and built a farm in Matagalpa, where he met and
married his Nicaraguan wife. Vogl reports that around 200 foreigners, mostly of
German and U.S. origin, settled in the Matagalpa region at this time.
3. The Nicaraguan banking system emerged relatively late, by regional stan
dards, and was largely foreign controlled. The Banco Nacional de Nicaragua (b n n )
was founded by the Nicaraguan government in 1912, but foreign investment
bankers Brown Bros, and J. and V. Seligman & Co. exercised their option to buy
51 percent of bank stock during debt negotiations the following year. The bank,
which functioned as Nicaragua's central bank, was incorporated in the state of
Connecticut; the majority of the bank's directors were from the United States.
Control over the bank was not returned to the Nicaraguan government until 1940.
See Hill (1933); Walter (1993,12—13); and Wheelock Roman (1980b). Coffee export
was monopolized by the Compania Mercantil de Ultramar, which was jointly held
by the b n n and some of its principal stockholders (Paige 1989, 102).
4. Nicaragua remained a poor country, even by regional standards. As late as
1950, real per capita income in Nicaragua was ranked second-lowest in Latin
America, with only Haiti falling below it (Bulmer-Thomas 199T 249)• hi terms of
its GDP, Nicaragua was clearly the regional laggard, steadily falling behind the
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rest of Central America through the 1920-60 period (see Bulmer-Thomas 1987,
308-9). Only in the 1960s, when the growth rate in Honduras fell behind that of
Nicaragua, did Nicaragua move out of the region's production basement.
5. The degree of state involvement in the Nicaraguan economy during the
Somoza period has been a matter of dispute. Some analysts see the Nicaraguan
state as primarily passive, nondevelopmental, and largely inactive in economic
management. Gary Wynia's (1972) study of planning policy in the 1950s and 1960s,
for example, emphasizes the regime's fundamental economic conservatism. Jose
Luis Medal's (1985) study of central bank policy during this era also adopts this
interpretation, finding the regime's credit, monetary, and balance of payments
policies were left in the hands of conservative central bankers. Bill Gibson, ana
lyzing fiscal and monetary policy during the Somoza era, labels state policies as
"classically liberal" (1987, 27). According to these analysts, the state generated
only modest revenues, took on a limited number of development tasks, lacked
a coherent planning capacity, and largely turned the economy over to the forces
of the international market. Its passivity was striking even by regional standards
and won the praise of the most orthodox economic analysts in the international
lending agencies.
Yet, the Nicaraguan state was not inert during this period, and several analysts
(Biderman 1982; Walter 1993) have called attention to the regime's strategic inter
ventions into the economy. These analysts have argued that the regime's economic
involvement reflected ambitions that extended beyond mere personal enrichment
and had an impact on the overall direction of national economic development.
According to Jaime Biderman, by the 1950s the state played an important role
in escalating the pace of capitalist development in Nicaragua, particularly in the
cotton, beef, sugar, tobacco, rice, and banana sectors (1982, 80-127). Knut Walter
(1993) takes this argument a step further, arguing that the capacity and resilience of
the Somoza state have been seriously underestimated. He claims that, while other
Central American dictatorships were toppling in the 1940s and 1950s, the Somoza
dynasty proved politically agile and developmentally competent, consolidating its
political base while it promoted infrastructural development that fostered rapid
capitalist development in the subsequent decades.
6. The expansion in cotton land came primarily through the reduction in un
improved pastureland used for traditional cattle grazing in the Pacific coastal plain
(Baumeister 1983). In addition, economically and legally vulnerable peasant staples
producers were displaced from estate lands to which they had traditionally had
access. With the rising profitability of cotton, owners now put these lands into
more intensive cultivation. Gould's (1990, 85-181) study of rural mobilization in
the Chinandega region (1912-79) documents the multiple ways in which peasant
access to land was reduced.
7. The state supported the takeoff of the cotton sector in other ways as well. In
the 1950s, these included funding of port facilities in "El Tamarindo" (La Gaceta,
Decree #154, January 10, 1956); the classification of the vegetable oil industry as
a "First Category Industry," thereby providing tax and tariff concessions for the
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cottonseed, oil sector (La Gaceta, Decree #16, March 3, 1956); and an increase in
the exchange rate received by cotton exporters from C$6.6o:$i to C$7:1 as long
as prices remained below US$31.50 (La Gaceta, Decree #18, November 21,1956).
See Navas Mendoza et al. (n.d.[a], 4-5).
8. Occupational information about the ninety-four founding members of
a n s c a , for example, shows that forty of these members (43 percent) listed an
urban profession (lawyer, industrialist, etc.) as their primary occupation (a n s c a
n.d., 31-33)9. Baumeister (1984b, 8, 32) reports that in El Salvador in the early 1960s 34
percent of the coffee and 52 percent of the cotton were produced on “large multi
family estates," whereas in Nicaragua estates of that size were responsible for only
20 percent and 31 percent, respectively, of production. The percent of cotton land
held in medium-sized estates in Nicaragua (defined here as 50-500 mz.) surged
from 26 percent in 1952 to 60 percent in 1963 and remained over 50 percent in the
early 1970s. See also Bulmer-Thomas (1987, 354 n 18).
10. Whereas coffee yields in El Salvador in 1950 averaged 640 kg./hectare, Nica
raguan yields averaged 275 kg./hectare (Bulmer-Thomas 1987, 154, 156-57). See
also Warnken (1975,14).
11. Foreign loans for the development of the livestock (beef and milk products)
sector came primarily from the World Bank and the id b . These loans included
$3.25 million from the World Bank in the 1950s to purchase agricultural equip
ment, open new lands, improve pastures, and acquire breeding stock. In the 1960s
the id b took over this financing, providing $1.1 million to acquire breeding stock
and $9.1 million for the expansion of pastureland; the construction of fences,
wells, troughs, drinking pools, silos, corrals, and dipping facilities; and programs
to improve livestock health (Williams 1986, 97). Local banks also supported this
effort. In 1962 the b n n became a development bank, and its credit gradually began
to shift toward long-term (more than eighteen months) loans, many of which
were for cattle development. The bank's first project as a development bank was a
1965-67 cattle-raising program (Lethander 1968, 358).
12. The cattle sector focused primarily on beef exportation, but a secondary
interest in milk production developed. A 1959 f a o study concluded that Nicaragua
had the greatest capacity in Central America for exporting milk due to the abun
dance of land in the interior that, for reasons of topography, was ill-suited to other
crop cultivation (f a g a n ic 1982, 6).To promote this idea, the regime launched Plan
Camabocho, a three-year campaign to build 450 km. of feeder roads in Matagalpa,
Boaco, and Chontales. In September 1969 pr o l a c s a , a joint venture between the
Swiss company Nestle and the Somoza government, was initiated. This firm be
came a major milk processor and eventually exported powdered milk (f a g a n ic
1982, 6b).
13. The number of cotton gins increased to twenty-six, and their capacity ex
panded notably. Secondary industries were created for processing vegetable oil and
balanced animal feed from cottonseed. New export houses sprang up to channel
Nicaraguan cotton into the international market. By 1974 seventeen export houses
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purchased Nicaraguan cotton. Fifteen were agents of international cotton firms
and two were Nicaraguan-based firms (Baumeister 1983, 46-50).
14. Concessions were provided for industrialists on the importation of con
struction materials, capital goods, energy, maintenance equipment, and raw ma
terials, and taxes were reduced 50-100 percent. The law developed a priority
system in which new industries received more concessions than old, and those
categorized as "fundamental" received more relief than those labeled "useful"
[convenientes).
15. At the beginning of the 1950s several Central American ministers of econ
omy approached e c l a with a request for information about regional integration.
They were invited by e c l a to form an economic cooperation committee to study
the issue. Five meetings were held between 1952 and 1957 to review studies on
regional integration and draft regional treaties. This work culminated at the end
of the decade in the approval of the Multilateral Treaty of Free Trade and Cen
tral American Economic Integration in 1959. This treaty, approved by all Central
American countries except Costa Rica, established a list of 200 items to be traded
without restrictions in the region and set integration goals for the next ten years
(Wynia 1972, 45-46). These developments laid the foundation for the c a c m . Under
the rules of the c a c m , import duties were cut sharply to facilitate regional trade.
Gary Wynia (1972, 89) found that import duties dropped quickly in most of the
region, declining from 20 percent of import value in i960 to 12 percent in 1966 for
the region as a whole. Nicaragua's drop was even sharper, falling from 20 percent
in i960 to 10 percent in 1966.
16. a id , Report to Congress, FY 1965, p. 45, as cited in Dosal (1985, 91). Dis
appointed by the collapse of cotton and coffee prices in the late 1950s, the regime
began searching for an alternative economic strategy. The U.S. government agreed
to finance a study of the economic options Nicaragua might pursue and contracted
a report from the International Cooperation Administration. This report included
a number of recommendations that were designed to foster industrial develop
ment. Perhaps the most important was the proposal that an industrial investment
corporation be formed to provide long-term loans for industry (Lindeman 1961,
2-3). Several u s a id projects also helped provide infrastructure needed for indus
trialization. For example, u s a id supported the expansion of e n a l u f by offering
financing for U.S.-made generating plants. This program was designed to expand
access to electrical energy in rural areas, but the growth of e n a l u f facilitated
industrial growth as well. The e n a l u f rate structure favored industrial clients,
providing them with electricity at less than one-third the rate charged rural resi
dential customers (Dosal 1985, 85).
17. See also Brundenius (1987, 85-92); Rosenthal (1982, 21-26).
18. The b a n a m e r group grew out of a series of enterprises associated with
the Ingenio San Antonio, then Central America's largest sugar mill, and its par
ent company, Nicaragua Sugar Estates, Ltd. The company was founded in 1890
by Italian merchant F. Alfredo Pellas in conjunction with several elite families
from Granada and was backed by English investment. Favored with a liquor mo
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nopoly during the Zelaya presidency, the firm expanded rapidly. See Nicaragua
Sugar Estates (1953); Gould (1990, 22—45). The bank was founded in 1952 under the
leadership of Silvio F. Pellas |Strachen 1976, 9-10).
19- b a n ic was founded in 1953 by a group of Leon and Chinandega investors
under the leadership of Eduardo Montealegre. To prevent the concentration of re
sources and control, b a n ic was designed so that no one investor could hold more
than 10 percent of the stock. See Strachen (1976,11,16).
20. Strachen s (1976, 27) business respondents identified a total of twenty-one
firms in the b a n a m e r group and sixteen in the b a n ic group.
21. For a fuller discussion of Somoza family assets as of 1978, see ih c a (1978,
1:319-24).
22. Strachen (1976, 13—14), for example, finds only one prominent entrepre
neur, Manuel I. Lacayo, involved in business ventures with both b a n ic and the
BANAMER group.

23. I would label this system quasi-corporatist because it deviates in several
respects from the conventional corporatist arrangements. (See Schmitter 1974 on
the concept of corporatism). For one, the typical tripartite structure was not em
ployed, since there was no counterpart labor organization; labor representatives
generally did not participate in these deliberations. Furthermore, because the pri
vate sector organizations were late to develop and often ephemeral in Nicaragua,
no one organization emerged with an effective representational monopoly.
24. Three of the fifteen founding members were generals. Walter (1993, 107)
notes that tensions with cattle ranchers in Chontales and Boaco led Somoza to end
the subsidy to the association in 1940 and reassign some of its functions to the
Ministry of Agriculture.
25. Three private sector organizations (a s g a n ic , the Camara Nacional de Co
mercio e Industria de Managua, and a coffee growers' association, the Asociacion
Agricola de Nicaragua) were authorized to recommend representatives for the
seven-person board (La Gaceta, October 29, 1940). Each of these associations was
entitled to submit a list of seven candidates for its position on the board, and
Nicaragua's president then made the final selections.
26. The regime's institutional partners in in f o n a c were vaguely defined, giving
Somoza Garcia the greatest flexibility in selecting his private sector allies. One
representative was to be drawn from agricultural and the other from industrial
activities. Both were to be chosen by the president from a list submitted by "repre
sentative national associations," or, failing that, at the president's own discretion.
27. Following World War II, during a period in which he was attempting to cling
to power despite substantial domestic and U.S. opposition, Somoza first cozied up
with labor, passing progressive labor legislation and cultivating labor support. In
spite of this, the regime had to resort to massive fraud to win the 1947 election.
Since the labor strategy had certain costs and limited payoff, Somoza shifted again
to favor capital by the late 1940s. See Gould (1990, 46-64) for further discussion.
28. Two of the seven representatives were to be chosen from a list drawn up
by the Asociacion de Industrials de Nicaragua. This association emerged from
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a 1957 split in the Camara de Comercio de Nicaragua. As momentum began to
build for industrial expansion in the 1950s, a number of industrialists decided that
they needed a separate association to address their specific concerns. A group of
twelve industrialists founded the organization and quickly began to recruit more
members. In spite of the opposition of the Camara de Comercio, the group had
secured enough support by the early 1960s so that congress reformed the 1934 Ley
General de Camaras de Comercio and granted legal status to the new association
in 1965 (c a d in 1975, 2-3).
29. Torres-Rivas (1989, 9,128) offers this characterization of the Somoza regime,
sketching parallels between the Somozas and a "grand vizier" who gives resources
to court favorites in order to solidify their loyalty. Drawing on Max Weber's work,
Paige (1989, 107) defines this sultanic system as one in which "public authority"
is construed as "private prerogative."
30. The Somoza family members or the managers of their properties were also
among the top officials in the Camara Nicaraguense de la Industria Pesquera, the
Asociacion de Productores de Arroz de Nicaragua, and the Cooperativa Arrocera,
S.A. See in d e (1975) for a directory of officials in these organizations, and Austin
(1972, 4:14-20) for a discussion of the rice sector.
31. At the 1959 meeting of the a s g a n ic general assembly, for example, rep
resentatives of b n n , b a n ic , b a n a m e r , and the Bank of London were present
(Minutes of the meeting, February 26,1959).
32. The rest of the beef slaughterhouse industry was also largely controlled by
the Somoza family. By the 1970s three of the other six export quality slaughter
houses were controlled either by Somoza (through companies such as c a r n ic )
or close family members (through Amerrisque, for example, in which his sis
ter, Lilian Somoza de Sevilla Sacasa was a prominent member) (Ballard 1985, 30,•
Interview, f a g a n ic , August 14, 1987).
33. In a rare exception to the rule, a coalition of groups across several sectors
formed the Comite de Accion Civica in 1959 to pressure the government to provide
an emergency response following a sharp economic downturn. This organizational
effort was particularly successful in the cotton sector, where meetings drew over
1,000 planters (Fiallos Oyanguren 1968, 160). In response the regime granted a
number of concessions to cotton producers, including an eight-year suspension,
with no interest payments, of their loan obligations (La Gaceta, Decree #440,
August 28, 1959) and a special C$40 per mz. subsidy. These emergency measures
prevented the collapse of both cotton production and the Nicaraguan banking
system.
34. Concerns about their economic erosion, for example, helped to galvanize
the cotton growers in Leon to form a n s c a in 1962. This growers' cooperative was
designed to be an alternative source of agricultural inputs, the preferred processing
and ginning agent, and the negotiator for the export of the fiber. See a n s c a (n.d.).
Cotton growers in other regions soon followed suit, establishing cotton coopera
tives in Managua, Chinandega, Masaya, and Nueva Segovia.
35. Through the first half of the 1970s the portion of the internal beef price re
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ceived by producers dropped steadily. By 1975 producers received only 47 percent
of the final price, whereas processors and intermediaries retained the remainder
(Ballard 1985, 32).
36. A peak association is a national-level organization, made up of regional and
sectoral associations, that assumes the role of representing that whole segment of
society.
37- Acuna (1991) and Weyland (1992), for example, see the size and heteroge
neity of business as a surmountable barrier if the other conditions are propitious,
and point to the successful establishment of a peak association in Mexico, where
the bourgeoisie was highly heterogeneous, to demonstrate the point. It should be
noted, however, that the Mexican bourgeoisie continued to be highly fragmented
and politically divided in spite of the creation of a peak organization, the Con
sejo Coordinador Empresarial, in 1975. See Luna et al. (1987) for discussion of the
continuing political cleavages in the Mexican elite.
38. According to in d e 's second Informe general de actividades (1966?, 5), 45
percent of its members were in commerce, 25 percent were in industry, and the
remaining 30 percent were in financial institutions, services, professions, etc. The
organization began with forty members in 1963 and grew to seventy-six in 1965
mainly through personal recruiting by existing members.
39. In the 1972-78 period, in d e received an average of 60 percent of its funding
from international donations (calculated from in d e , Informe anual, various years).
40. in d e 's activities included ideological orientation, promoting education and
training, conducting planning studies, and lobbying the Nicaraguan government.
In 1964 it distributed radio and TV programs from other Latin American coun
tries on the evils of communism. With in d e 's support, in c a e , an affiliate of the
Harvard Business School, was persuaded to locate its main campus in Nicaragua.
in d e 's Fondo de Prestamos para Universitarios provided funds to send Nicaraguan
students to study at in c a e , the u c a , and the u n a n , as well as to attend confer
ences abroad. The organization also promoted worker vocational training centers
and training in "nonpolitical" unionism. Several of these early initiatives were
later formalized through the creation of special programs under in d e manage
ment, including Educredito (founded in 1966), which provided scholarships, and
the Fundacion Nicaraguense de Desarrollo (founded in 1969), which sponsored
basic community development projects and rural cooperatives. See in d e (1965,
1966?, 1975).
41. in d e provided a training ground for Nicaragua's future political-economic
leadership. The Consejos Ejecutivos of in d e and its affiliates, the Fundacion Nica
raguense de Desarrollo and Educredito, included representatives who would be
come prominent political actors in the 1980s. Some became Sandinista officials,
like Dionisio Marenco, Sandinista minister of s pp , and Pedro Antonio Blandon,
director of the Fondo Internacional de Reconstruccion. Others, including Alfonso
Robelo and Adolfo Calero, followed more circuitous routes, first taking positions
within the Sandinista government and later becoming prominent contra leaders.
42. Affiliated organizations and the number of members in each are as fol
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(140); Asociacion de Distribuidores de Vehiculos Automotores (18);
(500); Asociacion de Instituciones Bancarias de Nicaragua (7); Asocia
cion de Productores de Arroz de Nicaragua (45); Camara de Comercio (330); c a d in
(338); Camara Nicaragiiense de la Construccion (76); Camara Nicaragiiense de la
Industria Pesquera (15); in d e (89); Sociedad Cooperativa Anonima de Algodoneros
(226); and Sociedad Cooperativa Anonima de Cafeteros (2,000). See in d e (1975)
and c a d in (1975).
43. In the report on the associations that founded co s ip , three organizations
(in d e , c a d in , and the Asociacion de Distribuidores de Vehiculos Automotores)
noted that they had no representation on any government board or agency. In con
trast, a c b n and the Camara de Comercio reported having representation in two
or more government agencies, and a s g a n ic and the Camara Nicaragiiense de
la Industria Pesquera reported having general access to government officials. See
"Directorio del c o s ip ," in in d e (1975,1-20).
44. Until c o s e p 's bylaws were modified in 1988, in d e 's president automati
cally became the president of c o s ip /c o s e p .
45. After years of low prices that caused heavy losses for producers, cotton
prices began to rise in the early 1970s. Nicaraguan producers were presented with
offers to buy the 1973-74 harvest at the startling price of US$3O-4O per qt. oro.
Unaccustomed to such high offers, growers moved quickly to sign futures con
tracts. In the months that followed, Nicaraguan producers watched while the high
profits they had anticipated were steadily eroded as many of their costs more than
doubled. International prices continued to climb far above the prices growers had
accepted early in 1973, reaching US$80 per qt. oro in September. According to Bau
meister (1983, 67,, the earnings of a grower with 500 mz. of cotton could vary by
over US$200,000, depending on the month of 1973-74 in which he or she sold the
crop. When growers turned to the Somoza government for support in renegotiation
of the contracts, they were rebuffed,- instead of deciding in favor of Nicaraguan
producers, Somoza aligned himself with foreign intermediaries. In March 1974
he issued a decree requiring producers to hand over at least 70 percent of the
contracted cotton at the contracted price (Cruz and Hoadley 1975).
46. Following protests by independent cattle producers, Somoza finally pushed
a s g a n ic to open its membership and revise its statutes. At a dramatic meeting of
the association's general assembly in 1975 that was attended by its honorary presi
dent, Anastasio Somoza Debayle, a s g a n ic president and Somoza relative Oscar
Sevilla Sacasa presided over an internal reorganization of the association (Minutes
from April 9,1975, meeting). The reorganization expanded the Junta Directiva from
nine to twelve members, creating three new positions that were filled by reformoriented members. In spite of these changes, a s g a n ic remained an exclusive, elite
association.
47. Somoza agreed to send a delegate to participate in this church-mediated dia
logue, but only if it were postponed until after the local elections in February 1978.
in d e leaders accepted this delay, but members of Los Doce rejected the proposal.
48. Los Doce included Emilio Baltodano Pallais (manager of Cafe Soluble,
a c bn

a s g a n ic
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Inc.), Fernando Cardenal (Jesuit priest and professor at the u c a ), Ernesto Castillo
Martinez (lawyer and bookstore owner), Ricardo Coronel Kautz (director of the
livestock division of the Ingenio San Antonio and agricultural engineer), Arturo
Cruz (economist with the id b in Washington, D.C.), Joaquin Cuadra Chamorro
(lawyer with b a n a m e r and Nicaraguan Sugar Estates, Ltd.), Miguel D'Escoto
(Maryknoll priest and then communications secretary for the World Council
of Churches), Carlos Gutierrez Sotelo (dental surgeon), Felipe Mantica Abaunza
(member of the board of directors of b a n a m e r and manager of a supermarket
chain, who subsequently withdrew from the group), Sergio Ramirez Mercado
(prominent writer and f s l n activist), Casimiro Sotelo F. (architect), and Carlos
Tunnerman Bernheim (former rector of un a n ).
49. See Edmisten (1990). u d e l was formed in 1974 by a coalition of parties
that were boycotting the September elections in which Somoza's presidency was
renewed for seven more years.
50. The signatories of a February 4, 1978, communique supporting the con
tinuing strike were in d e ,- c a d in ,- the Camara de Comercio de Nicaragua; the
Camara Nicaraguense de la Construction,- the Camara de Agentes Aduaneros,
Almacenadores y Embarcadores de Nicaragua,- the Cooperativa de Algodoneros de
Managua; the Organization Nicaraguense de Agencias de Publicidad,- the Asocia
cion de Distribuidores de Vehfculos Automotores; the Asociacion de Ferreteros de
Nicaragua; the Asociacion Nicaraguense de Ingenieros y Arquitectos; the Sociedad Cooperativa Anonima de Cafetaleros de Nicaragua; the Asociacion Nacional
de Anunciantes de Nicaragua,- a c b n ; Federation de Sociedades Medicas de Nica
ragua; Camara de Ingenieros y Arquitectos Consultores; and the Asociacion Nica
raguense de Distribuidores de Petroleo (in d e 1978).
51. Although the f a o contained members closely aligned with the f s l n , it gen
erally represented an establishment reform movement. The twenty-one signatories
of its founding program included such figures as Rafael Cordova Rivas of u d e l ,
Adolfo Calero Portocarrero of the Partido Conservador Autentico, Sergio Ramirez
Mercado of Los Doce, and Alfonso Robelo Callejas of the m d n . The f a o 's program
called for the reorganization of the military; an end to corruption; the termination
of human rights abuses; the release of political prisoners; freedom of expression
and organization; profit sharing; agrarian reform; improvements in health care,
housing, and public transportation,- price controls; the adoption of a literacy plan;
tax reform,- local government autonomy; and free elections. See f a o , "Programa
Democratico del Gobierno Nacional del Frente Amplio Opositor," in ih c a (1978).
52. The three original sectors in u pa n ic were given the greatest representation,
but all affiliates secured some voting strength. The u pa n ic board of directors was
composed of c a a n (6 members), f a g a n ic (6), u n c a f e n ic (6), a n a r (2), a n pr o b a
(2), a n pr o s o r (2), a s c a n ic (2), and f o n d il a c (2) (u pa n ic n.d.).
53. Two members of the Junta Directiva broke off and formed a new association.
Headed by Ernesto Salazar, one of the reformers who had joined a s g a n ic during
the 1975 reorganization, a new Federacion de Asociaciones de Ganaderos de Nica
ragua (f a g a n ic ), was established (Minutes of a s g a n ic 's meeting, May n, 1979)-
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f a g a n ic was set up by the a c b n , the dissident wing of the a s g a n ic , and regional
representatives from Boaco, Camoapa, Chontales, Granada, Jinotega, Matagalpa,
Rivas and Zelaya. See La Gaceta, August 21,1980.

Chapter 3

1. On the argument linking high-ranking Sandinistas to the traditional elite
families, see Stone (1990, 37-40); Vilas (1992).
2. See also the amplification in Decree #38 issued August 8,1979 (c ie r a 1989,
8:251-53).
3. State trade monopolies were established for cotton, coffee, sugar, banana,
beef, and nontraditional exports.
4. See Brinton's (1938) classic work on the stages of revolution and the internal
divisions that shape the process.
5. In 1975 the f s l n leaders divided and three factions emerged: the Guerra
Popular Prolongada tendency, led by Tomas Borge, Henry Ruiz, and Bayardo Arce,the Tendencia Proletaria, led by Jaime Wheelock, Luis Carrion, and Carlos Nunez;
and the Tendencia Insurreccional, or Terceristas, led by Daniel Ortega, Humberto
Ortega, and Victor Tirado. Each faction inclined toward a different insurrectional
strategy. The Terceristas, who were most eclectic in their tactics, least ideological
in their recruiting strategy, and most optimistic about the prospects for immediate
success, built the largest following drawing on spontaneous support that arose in
the wake of national guard abuses. The three factions reunited in March 1979. See
FSLN (1990a).
6. Four of the nine members of the f s l n national directorate assumed minis
terial responsibilities: Humberto Ortega was minister of defense; Tomas Borge was
minister of the interior; Jaime Wheelock added the Ministry of Agriculture to his
portfolio as director of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform; and Henry Ruiz became
minister of planning. The number of seats in the Consejo de Estado was increased
from 33 to 47; 12 of the 14 new slots were assigned to pro-FSLN organizations
(Booth 1985a, 191).
7. The "Analisis de la Coyuntura y Tareas de la Revolucion Popular Sandinista,"
popularly known as the 72-Hour Document, summarized the conclusions of the
September 21-23, 1979/ meeting by naming the "sell-out bourgeoisie" as "the main
instrument of the counterrevolution" (f s l n 1990b, 91).
8. On the f s l n internal structure, see Gilbert (1988, 41-78).
9. Under the leadership of Jorge Salazar, u pa n ic attempted to recruit among
small producers, particularly cafetaleros in the Matagalpa region. According to
records of the Asociacion de Cafetaleros de Matagalpa, this effort raised member
ship in their association (then named the Cooperativa de Cafetaleros) to over 7,000
in 1980 (interview, Asociacion de Cafetaleros de Matagalpa, August 16, 1986; see
also Christian 1986, 202). Following Salazar's death, u pa n ic 's recruitment efforts
among small producers fizzled.
10. Expropriated under Decreto #759 were Santa Monica, S.A.; Inversiones
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Comerciales, S.A.; Corporacion Plaza Espana, S.A.; Constructora Habitacional,
S.A.; Sociedad General de Inversiones Urbanos, S.A.; Promotora Terramica, S.A.;
Valle Gothel, S.A.; Sociedad General de Turismo, S.A.; Museo y Cultura, S.A.;
a m c a s a ,- Jaboneria Prego, S.A.,- Fabrica de Productos Lacteos "La Perfecta",- Fabrica
de Helados "La Perfecta," S.A.,- Industrial Ganadera de Oriente, S.A.,- and Mata
dero San Martin. This group included two of Managua's most important shopping
complexes as well as several large family-owned industries.
11. The government agreed to compensate expropriated land with payments in
bonds based on declared tax value for the last three years. Compensation, however,
was not required if the land had been abandoned (although in practice compensa
tion was sometimes provided if the finding in the case was "administrative aban
donment," i.e., the estate was no longer being administered productively but the
owner had not departed the country) (interview, Mireya Molina, former director,
m id in r a , Tenencia de la Tierra, October i, 1990). Land that was sharecropped or
given out in a service-for-labor arrangement could be expropriated if the estate was
larger than 50 mz. in the Pacific region or 100 mz. elsewhere. (See c ie r a 1989,
vol. 8; Deere et al. 1985; Mayorga 1990.)
12. See ih c a (1981). Some of the signatories who were out of the country or
who fled into embassies for protection avoided prison sentences, but three were
convicted and sentenced to 210 days in prison. All were released within four
months, a concession not granted to leaders of the left-wing Frente Obrero who
were convicted on a similar charge during this time period.
13. Over time, the campesinistas divided into two camps: those who favored
collective cooperatives (c a s ) and those who, following the preferences of most
peasants themselves, endorsed individual land ownership and, at most, the credit
and service cooperatives (ccs). (See Deere et al. 1985.) As the contra war escalated,
the latter group gained some political leverage. Programs of land titling, which
gave legal title to squatters in the agricultural frontier, and for land redistribution
to individual recipients, which gave land without the requirement that recipients
participate in cooperatives, increased the number of individuals receiving land and
other benefits in Nicaragua's agrarian reform program (Mayorga 1990). For much
of the period, including even the later years, however, the general trend among
campesinistas and in the distribution of land and credit was to favor the c a s over
the ccs and individual claimants.
14. The Cuban government ultimately forgave Nicaraguan debt obligations
(valued at an estimated $73.8 million) for the construction of the sugar mill, Vic
toria de Julio. (See Brundenius 1987,103.)
15. Ricardo and Manuel Coronel Kautz, m id in r a vice-ministers and twin
brothers who had been educated in agricultural programs in the United States
and Europe and had spent decades as top administrators at the is a , were ardent
defenders of the state-centered, high-tech model. See M. Coronel Kautz (1984);
R. Coronel Kautz (1984); interviews, Ricardo Coronel Kautz, October 30 and
November 2,1990.
16. These included a rum manufacturing and distribution network, both a
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national (b a n a m e r ) and an offshore (b a c International Credit Corporation, bank,
a national auto and auto parts distributorship, and a large cattle ranch. Information
on the Grupo Pellas holdings comes from the m id in r a cedula de notification
that accompanied the 1988 expropriation of is a and its subsidiaries, and from
interview, Nicaragua Sugar Estates, Ltd., September 21,1990.
17. The state took over 264,448 mz. between October 1981 and December 1982
but redistributed only 134,234 mz. (Cardenal Downing 1988, 48).
18. For discussion of this issue, see Deere et al. (1985); see also Wheelock's
speech to 400 directors of a pp operations, reported in Barricada, March 7,1985.
19. Twenty-four percent of the divested land was "idle" or "fallow" land, 19
percent was forested, 19 percent was unimproved pasture, and 9 percent was land
designated as inappropriate for agricultural use. See Cardenal Downing (1988,178).
20. Data on land use patterns on a pp farms are consistent with this interpre
tation. During the period when a pp lands were being transferred, the percent of
land on a pp farms that was idle dropped from 19 percent in 1981 to 14 percent in
1986 (c ie r a 1989,1:298).
21. Indeed, studies of sectoral production patterns indicate that the percent of
national production that came from the state farm sector actually increased mar
ginally between 1981-82 and 1986-87 from 21 percent of the total to 22 percent,
even though the percent of the farmland held by this sector was dropping sharply
(Baumeister 1988, 30; c ie r a 1989,1:332).
22. One of the country's main supporters of the large-scale state projects ex
plained: "After 1983, our views became the central theme. It was like in an orches
tra where there are several musical themes being played at the same time but
there's one central one. That was ours" (interview, November 2,1990).
23. This was the label applied disparagingly by critics like Martinez Cuenca
(1990) to m id in r a 's large-scale agroindustrial projects.
24. See the discussion of development and investment planning in Kleiterp
1988; see also Arguello Huper and Kleiterp 1985.
25. m id in r a 's Direccion Superior (1984, 23) reported to the j g r n in early 1984
that 61 percent of m id in r a 's investment funds had gone to the state farm sec
tor whereas coops and individuals had received 39 percent. Hard currency capital
goods imports were even more narrowly targeted to the state sector, c ie r a direc
tor Orlando Nunez Soto (1987, 142) found that 89 percent of the foreign exchange
spent to import capital goods for the agricultural sector in the 1980-84 period
went to the a pp ; 64 percent of these funds went to the sugar sector for the Victoria
de Julio sugar mill.
26. Note that Baumeister's (1991, 15) estimates about land distribution by sec
tor for 1988 deviate modestly from that published in c ie r a (1989,9:115), presented
here as Table 3.2. The main difference is in the calculation about land held in large,
private estates, which Baumeister estimates at 13.5 percent of agricultural land in
1988 instead of 7.5 percent.
27. Data in Table 3.3 cover only land acquired through the application of
agrarian reform laws and not that obtained through Somoza expropriations, dona
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tions, or sales. Approximately 62 percent of the reformed land was acquired in
the early confiscations that centered on the expropriation of the landholdings of
the Somoza family and its allies. Roughly 31 percent of the reformed land was ac
quired through the subsequent expropriation of non-somocist# landowners under
agrarian reform legislation (interview, Mireya Molina Torres, former director of
m id in r a 's Tenencia de la Tierra division, October 1,1990).
28. Nunez Soto (1991, 392-402) concludes that this strategy was counterpro
ductive, especially in the cattle region where muted class divisions made even
small producers resent expropriations of elites.
29. See Wheelock interview, Barricada, April 25,1986, and m id in r a , Division
de Comunicaciones (1986, 4). According to Mireya Molina, around 100 of these
confiscations (roughly 7 percent of the total) were reversed or partially reversed
under appeal, and around 80,000 mz. were returned to former owners (interview,
October 1, 1990).
30. See also Luciak (1987) for discussion of this negotiation process and how it
fit into the agrarian reform initiatives of 1985.
31. The government's response varied from case to case and included increasing
the payment, suspending the purchase, returning the property, agreeing to only
lease the land, or declaring the deal closed as it was originally agreed upon. This
wide variation in government responses contributed to the view among private
producers that there was no consistent or principled policy being followed, and
that everything depended on the particularities of the negotiation process (personal
connections, bribes, political animosities, etc.,.
32. Banks loans increased from C$2,522 million in 1978 to C$4,308 million in
1981 (c ie r a /pa n /c id a 1984, 41).
33. Medium- and large-sized producers are defined here as those with more than
50 mz. Land data are from Table 3.2.
34. Data presented in the Arguello Huper and Kleiterp investment study (1985,
68-69) show that private investment accounted for an average of 61 percent of all
investment in the 1960-78 period. It dropped, after the revolution, to only 39 per
cent of the total in 1981-83. An open question here is whether or not the private
sector, skittish about expropriation, even wanted to undertake serious long-term
investments. Clearly part of the reduction in investment responded to the pro
ducers' unwillingness to take on these obligations or design projects that might
win bank support. As the gap between the interest rates and the rate of inflation
widened, however, and bank loans became virtual gifts, resistance to borrowing on
the part of producers dissipated. See the discussion of this issue in the following
chapter.
35. Credito bancario clients and a pp were charged the highest interest rates on
their loans. For example, in the 1981-84 period, the standard interest rate charged
to a pp and medium- and large-sized producers was 17 percent, whereas individual
peasant producers in the credito rural program paid 13 percent, ccs members paid
10 percent, and c a s members were charged a low 8 percent (c ie r a 1989, 1.261).
Since the inflation rate was much higher than any of these interest rates (ranging
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from 22 to 50 percent during this period), all bank clients received subsidies (c e pa l
1985,2).
36. According to one rough calculation of the loan recuperation rate, repayment
in the 1981-84 period averaged 56 percent in the small producer/coop program,
55 percent in the a pp sector, and 90 percent in the regular bank program for the
private sector (Enriquez and Spalding 1987,117).
37. In this work, Baumeister defines medium- and large-sized producers as those
private producers who were enrolled in the regular bank credit program. Large
producers are those receiving bank credit for the cultivation of more than 100 mz.
in agricultural products or more than 1,000 mz. for livestock. The remainder are
classified as medium-sized producers.
38. Middle-sized is defined here as 50-500 mz. for cotton production, 200-1,000
qt. for coffee, and 200-1,000 mz. for cattle ranches (Baumeister 1984b, 12).
39. Thus Wheelock could describe with enthusiasm the sustained erosion of
properties larger than 500 mz. In his introduction to c ie r a 's nine-volume sum
mary work, La reforma agraria en Nicaragua, 1979-1989, Wheelock looks back
on the decade of reform and observes, “Between the time of the triumph of the
Revolution and the present, almost all of the agricultural production [units] with
more than 500 mz., and a considerable portion of the cattle ranches of that size,
have been expropriated for purposes of agrarian reform." He notes that only in
Region V, the country's main cattle ranching area, did large properties continue
to exist. In that region, 18 percent of the land was still held in properties larger
than 500 mz. In the Pacific region and in the northern interior, however, only 5
percent and 4 percent, respectively, were still held in these large estates (c ie r a
1989,1:29-30).
40. More of the estates were expropriated for reasons of abandonment in 1986
than had been the case previously. In 1981-84, only 20 percent of the cases were
charged with abandonment; 61 percent of the expropriations resulted from the
charge that the land was idle or inefficiently used (Cardenal Downing 1988, 46).
In 35 percent of the 1986 cases, however, abandonment was listed as the sole or
first cause given for the expropriation. That the land was inefficiently used or idle
was charged in 27 percent of the cases. In 14 percent of the cases, the owners were
found to have illegally arranged a sharecropping or labor-for-service agreement
with local peasants. The remainder of the cases (24 percent) were expropriated for
reasons of public utility or for use in an agricultural development zone (m id in r a ,
Direccion de Tenencia de la Tierra 1987).
41. According to his calculations, 53 percent of the land that was handed out
came from state farms, and another 39 percent came from private estates larger
than 500 mz.
42. The guaranteed price for rice rose from 55 cordobas per qt. (granz) in 1979/
80 to 164 cordobas in 1981/82, while that for coffee remained static at 1,000 cor
dobas per qt. oro and that for cotton rose only from 600 cordobas per qt. oro to 840
(c ie r a 1989, 1:268).
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43. Reasons for this are complex. Rice production had developed rapidly in the
1960s and 1970s, and the private producers, some of whom were trained as engi
neers, had a strong commitment to maximize productivity. These producers tended
to use their land fully and efficiently, unlike cattle ranchers or coffee producers,
who often left much of their land idle. Furthermore, the type of soil appropriate
for rice production was inappropriate for most other crops, so rice tended to be
produced in regions where peasant land pressure was not high. Finally, this sec
tor was ably led. Unlike many private sector organizations in Nicaragua, it did
not adopt a highly confrontational strategy toward the Sandinistas. According to
a comparative study of private sector organizations in Central America by Julio
Sergio Ramirez Arango (1985, 364—78), a n a r adopted a "limited stakes strategy"
in dealing with the government, taking a low public profile, emphasizing technical
arguments, and taking a long-term view of the situation. This approach made it
more effective in its negotiations with the regime than the six other Nicaraguan
private sector organizations evaluated in that study.
44. Private rice producers affiliated with a n a r were also able, after some oppo
sition from the government, to secure long-term investment credits with which
to finance 50 percent of the costs of building a new rice seed plant. Furthermore,
the proscriptions on private exporting were lifted for a n a r affiliates, who were
allowed to market their own semolina (rice bran) in Costa Rica and retain the
hard currency earnings thus generated (interviews, Mario Hanon, August 23,1986;
May 3,1990).
45. Spoor and Mendoza (1988, 31) argue that large sorghum producers often had
investments in the cattle or poultry sectors and also benefited from being able to
use unsold portions of the sorghum crop in these related activities.
46. Indeed, even those producing export crops were able to take advantage of
the government-run pricing system, especially when the export crop was also an
input for the domestic food system, as in the case of cottonseed. When interna
tional cotton prices fell in the 1980s, the government provided subsidies that kept
cotton production alive in Nicaragua. Trevor Evans (1987, 14) found that cotton
production levels in El Salvador and Guatemala in 1984 were only 43 percent and
54 percent, respectively, of the production levels obtained in 1974-76. In Nica
ragua, although cotton output had certainly declined, the 1984 production level
was noticeably higher, reaching 67 percent of the 1974-76 level. Even when the
evidence mounted that the cotton subsidies took a toll on the rest of the economy
(Evans 1987,19), the Sandinista government was slow to suspend them.
47. The term is derived from the verb chapear, meaning to clear or prepare the
land for use. Baumeister (1988, 31) defines the term as a synonym for plebeian.
48. Nunez was a rough-hewn cattle rancher whose experiences as a revolution
ary Christian led him into conflict with the Somoza government that resulted
in his imprisonment and torture. He was released from prison as part of the ex
change negotiated by the f s l n following the Christmas kidnapping of a group of
local notables in 1974. After the revolution, he donated his property to the govern
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ment and became the m id in r a regional delegate in the coffee-growing region of
Matagalpa and Jinotega. In 1984 he formally left the government to take over the
leadership of u n a g (interview, Daniel Nunez, May 6,1990).
49. See the full page discussion of the meeting, with special inserts on the role
of large producers, in the f s l n newspaper, Barricada, July 9,1984.
Chapter 4

1. Arguello Huper and Kleiterp (1985, 60-65) also found that these projects
overemphasized agroindustrial investment (especially the cattle sector) relative to
the rest of the economy, used and produced little that was supplied by or absorbed
into the rest of the economy, focused too heavily on exports, were launched with
out feasibility studies, and continued unchanged even after the evidence of their
negative impact mounted.
2. Tax pressure (tax revenues as a percent of GDP) had risen from n percent
in 1977 (FitzGerald 1984a, 5) to 18.4 percent in 1980. (See Appendix 2, Table A.3.)
With the imposition of new taxes, the tax pressure continued rising to 30.7 percent
of GDP in 1984 before the soaring inflation rates and delayed tax payments started
to erode the revenues collected. See Lance Taylor et al. (1989,15) for discussion of
the "Olivera-Tanzi effect" and its impact in Nicaragua.
3. For example, authorized imports could be acquired in January 1988 for
an average exchange rate of C$536:US$i whereas exports earned, on average,
C$6,84o :US$i (Hernandez 1990, 5).
4. According to Arana Sevilla et al. (1987, 49), in 1986 35 percent of imports
were raw materials and intermediate goods, with petroleum representing another
17 percent. Consumer goods, which were more restricted, represented 19 per
cent. Capital goods imports, so emphasized in the development model, composed
another 20 percent of the total.
5. By 1985 84 percent of official external financing was provided by socialist
countries (Stahler-Sholk 1987,162).
6. In his 1990 book reflecting on this period, Martinez Cuenca reports repeated
clashes with both Ruiz and m id in r a head Jaime Wheelock. He describes what he
viewed as the "distrust some f s l n leaders had of me and of the project that we
pushed for from the Ministry of Foreign Trade" (Martinez Cuenca 1990, 99). In a
subsequent interview, he described pressures he faced in meetings with members
of the f s l n national directorate. After presenting his ideas for budgetary cuts or
reallocations, he reported that he would be told, "You can proceed with that plan,
or you can understand that we are at war" (interview, August 16,1991,.
7. For discussion of the 1985 measures, see Pizarro (1987); ih c a (1986).
8. See c ie r a (1988, 302-19); ih c a (1988c, 16); Latin American Economic Re
port, 88-02 (February 29, 1988), 16.
9. For example, the price of gasoline increased by a factor of twelve and, as a
result, interurban transportation prices were multiplied by six. See ih c a (1988c).
10. Indeed, costs did rise more rapidly for producers using "modern" technolo
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gies than those using traditional approaches. Utting found, for example, that maize
producers whose production was mechanized had the lowest per-unit production
costs among the different types of maize producers in 1983-84. Following price
adjustments in 1988-89, however, this modern group had one of the highest such
cost ratios. Their production costs in February 1990 surpassed official producer
prices by 19 percent. Nonetheless, the production costs for maize rose quickly for
all groups and were higher in February 1990 than official prices regardless of the
type of technology employed. Of the three major staples analyzed by Utting, only
beans and traditional (rainfed) rice production were profitable in early 1990 (Utting
1991, 28-30).
11. In December 1987, prior to the 1988 reforms, the top salary on the officially
approved salary scale was eight times that at the bottom. Following the February
1988 reform, the top salary was fifteen times that at the bottom (Gutierrez 1989,
177; Hernandez 1990, 5).
12. See ih c a (1988c, 28-42; 1989, 48); Zalkin (1990, 60-61).
13. In 1984 only 16,000 mz. were transferred to individuals under the agrarian
reform program. In 1985 and 1986 this increased to 143,000 and 138,000 mz., re
spectively. Although the amount of land transferred to cooperatives continued to
surpass that transferred to individuals (coops received 180,000 and 199,000 mz.,
respectively, in 1985 and 1986), individual petitioners were less disadvantaged in
those two years than they were in either the 1980-84 period or afterward in 1987
(when they received only 6,000 mz. compared with 172,000 mz. for the coopera
tives). (See Cardenal Downing 1988; Mayorga 1991, 38).
14. For example, in the Valle de Sebaco vegetable processing plant project, co
operatives were integrated as producers of vegetables for processing, o a s project
director Daniel Slutzky reported that eleven of the twenty ongoing projects incor
porated cooperative production in their plans for 1987. (See discussion in c ie r a
1989,1:346-47-)
15. See interview with Ramiro Gurdian, Nuevo Diario, June 18,1988, following
the second round of structural adjustments. Some of the enthusiasm of this sector
declined a few weeks later when Mario Alegria, director of in ie s e p , c o s e p 's eco
nomic research arm, was arrested and convicted on charges of selling government
economic data to the U.S. Embassy in Managua.
16. The data for 1988 do not include the case of the is a , since that expropriation
was subsequently converted into a sale. See details below.
17. Data for 1989 were provided by the Direccion de Politicas Agrarias, Instituto
Nicaragiiense de Reforma Agraria, August 1991.
18. See Decreto #333, "Ley Creadora de las Comisiones Consultativas de Politica Agropecuaria," approved by the j g r n , February 29,1980, in c ie r a 1989,8.13033. This decree created commissions for producers of cotton, beef, milk, chicken
and pork, rice, bananas, sugar, coffee, and basic grains. These commissions were
to be composed of representatives of five government agencies (the Ministry of
Agricultural Development, the Ministry of Planning, the Agrarian Reform Insti
tute, either the Foreign Trade Ministry or the Internal Trade Ministry, and the
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Ministry of Labor) plus a representative from the producers' association affiliated
with u pa n ic to speak for large producers, a representative of small producers, a
representative of the Sandinista-backed a t c for rural laborers, and a second union
representative from an unspecified labor organization.
19. See, for example, the minutes of the March 23,1984, meeting of the "Comite
de Cosecha" for cotton producers in Region II, and the "Convenio Salarial Relativo
a las Actividades de la Rama del Desmote de Algodon," signed February 1,1984.
20. In my sample, two members of the economic elite who were first cousins of
Sandinista ministers, for example, noted that they had broken all communication
with those ministers and refused to attend family functions at which the minis
ters were present. In the Nicaraguan case, one should not assume automatically
that family connections imply privileged treatment or political affinity.
21. According to the m id in r a official responsible for overseeing the commis
sions, industrialists were less inclined than agricultural producers to reject gov
ernment attempts at technical consultation. The industrialists' greater experience
in negotiating with the government for licenses and permits in the prerevolution
ary period, plus their heavy consumption of imports requiring scarce foreign ex
change, made them somewhat more accommodating (interview, Mary Jane Mulli
gan, directora de politicas economicas del m id in r a , August 22, 1986; see also
Dijkstra 1992).
22. The government did begin, in 1986, to supply some of the u pa n ic associa
tions with items needed for production. Since the dues collected by these organi
zations were often inadequate to meet their rising costs, these associations stayed
afloat by selling government-supplied production inputs to their members. Curi
ously, at the time when the government and c o s e p affiliates were most at odds,
the government distribution policy helped these associations to both cover their
costs and hold on to their membership. See Spalding (1988).
23. Decreto #347, April 18,1988, reprinted in c ie r a 1989, 8:181-87. Five com
missions were set up, but the commissions for rice and for sorghum were later
combined. The composition of the commissions varied slightly, but they all in
cluded an executive president named by Wheelock and representatives of the b n d ,
the rural labor association a t c , and relevant state corporations (such as the Cor
poracion Nicaraguense de la Carne and the Corporacion Nicaraguense de la Leche
in the Livestock Commission). See c n g (1989). The private sector was represented
usually by four delegates from u pa n ic affiliates and four delegates from u n a g , as
well as relevant private processors (such as the owner of a top private cotton gin in
the National Cotton Commission). Although Jaime Wheelock ultimately named
those who would participate in these commissions, most were nominated by their
respective associations. Even some prominent critics of the regime (like Matagal
pan cafetalero Jaime Cuadra, who refused to attend the meetings) were named to
these commissions.
24. Interviews, executive presidents of the National Coffee Commission,
May 5, 1990; the National Cotton Commission, June 6, 1990; the National Live
stock Commission, September 10,1990; and the National Rice and Sorghum Com
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mission, May 7,1990. See also the Foro Socio-Economico section, Barricada, Janu
ary 15, 1990. Three of the four executive presidents were linked by family ties to
large cotton families of Leon, helping the government to make connections with
the agrarian elite.
25. Like most analysts, O'Donnell and Schmitter differentiate between politi
cal and economic concertacion. Political concertacion or pact making produced
agreements governing the transition to pluralistic democracy in much of Latin
America as the military began to withdraw from control over the executive. Social
and economic concertacion was often also attempted, sometimes as part of the
drafting of a new constitution. O'Donnell and Schmitter argue that the latter was
more difficult to achieve, given the economic disarray that was often part of the
military's legacy and the absence of peak associations that could orchestrate the
construction and enforcement of these pacts (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 4547).
26. Unionization reportedly increased from n percent of the salaried workforce
in 1979 to 56 percent in 1986 (Stahler-Sholk 1992, 4).
27. Thirty key representatives participated, including Antonio Lacayo, the
newly restored general manager of g r a c s a , and Carlos Mantica, who managed
3,500 mz. of family cotton production and was one of the largest producers in the
country. See Barricada, January 27,1989.
28. See Nuevo Diario, January 26,1989, and Barricada, February 4,1989.
29. The assembly divided producers into eight groups, based on their primary
product, m id in r a vice-minister Salvador Mayorga nominated secretaries for each
of the groups, alternately selecting between u pa n ic and u n a g representatives.
Delegates from u pa n ic were named to head the cotton, cattle, and rice commit
tees,- u n a g delegates were selected for the coffee, basic grains, and sorghum com
mittees. Each group drafted a series of recommendations and requests, which the
government responded to on the second day of the conference (Barricada, April 21,
1989,- interview, Mario Hanon, August 26,1989).
30. According to Vilas (1990), some of the concessions made to cotton producers
had not even been requested.
31. See "Gobierno responde a los productores," Barricada, April 21, 1989, and
"Estimulo y garantia: jjjTodos a producir!!!," Nuevo Diario, April 21,1989.
32. Ortega asked private growers to join the state in setting aside land for a
national land bank for the landless, but this was to be done on a voluntary basis
(Nuevo Diario, April 21, 1989).
33. See Barricada, May 23, 1989. Most members of the delegation were either
affiliated with u n a g or were not affiliated with any organization. Two officials
from u pa n ic 's dairy association, f o n d il a c , however, accompanied the delega
tion, including the association's president.
34. See discussion of the media coverage in ih c a (1989,50).
35. In my sample of ninety-one private sector leaders, forty-six (50.5 percent)
noted that at least one member of their immediate family (spouse or children) had
gone abroad to live at some point during the Sandinista period.

259

260

Notes to Pages 114-15

36. By the mid-1980s, a policy of exempting one son from active service for the
families of medium- and large-sized agricultural producers was formalized, replac
ing a system of ad-hoc exemptions. The fear that overzealous military recruiters
might spirit their sons off to war in one of the periodic roundups that occurred,
however, prompted even many of those eligible for exemptions to send their sons
out of the country.
37. In contrast with other hegemonic elites from the prerevolutionary period,
the Pellas family had reached a modus vivendi with the Sandinista government,
continuing in the early years to make investments and requesting in 1983, in
correspondence with then U.S. ambassador Anthony Quainton, that the U.S. gov
ernment's decision to cut off the Nicaraguan sugar quota be reversed. (See Nuevo
Diario, May 11, 1983.) Although the government claimed that the production
drop and unstanched decapitalization going on at the mill in 1988 mandated state
intervention, the perception grew among private elites that the Sandinistas were
unreliable even in dealings with their friends in the bourgeoisie.
38. This group was composed of Arnoldo Aleman, president of u n c a f e n ic ;
Nicolas Bolanos, former president of u n c a f e n ic and brother of former c o s e p
president Enrique Bolanos; and Jaime Cuadra, long-term president of the Aso
ciacion de Cafetaleros de Matagalpa. At a public meeting of coffee producers in
Matagalpa in June 1989, these producers, among others, orchestrated a ringing cri
tique of the regime and announced the withdrawal of u pa n ic affiliates from the
newly created national coffee commission, c o n c a f e . Within days their estates
were taken over by the regime on the grounds that they had conspired to orga
nize an act of economic sabotage by urging coffee producers to halt production.
See "Cafetaleros se retiran de c o n c a f e ," La Prensa, June 19, 1989; "Respuesta a
saboteadores," Barricada, June 22, 1989.
39. A contract was signed with is a owners in January 1989 in which the gov
ernment agreed to pay $637,000 for the land surrounding the mill and $12 million
for the is a itself, making payments of $1 million a year for twelve years. The gov
ernment failed to meet the payment schedule, and the Pellas family challenged
the contract in 1990 after the u n o government was elected (interview, Nicaraguan
Sugar Estates, Ltd., September 21,1990).
40. The three affected producers refused the offer, not wanting to further the
regime's electoral chances by allowing it to undo the damage it had done. These
estates were finally returned to their former owners in the period of transition
after the February 25, 1990, electoral defeat of the Sandinistas and before the
April 25,1990, inauguration of the u n o government (interviews, Nicolas Bolanos,
August 25, 1989, and October 15, 1990; La Prensa, March 23, 1990).
41. By its own regulations, u pa n ic could not technically expel representatives
of constituent associations, and f o n d il a c officers rejected the push to oust Lopez
from the presidency. Lopez remained a member of the u pa n ic directorate, but in
practice his association was subsequently represented by his alternate (interview,
Juan Diego Lopez, February 20, 1990).
42. See "Ocho gremios se retiran de Comisiones Nacionales," La Prensa,
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June 23, 1989; "Cafetaleros de Jinotega se mantienen en c o n c a f e ," Barricada,
June 22, 1989.
43. See "Se reintegran a comisiones desobedeciendo al c o s e p ," Nuevo Diario,
July 14, 1989.
44August 7,1987? the presidents of the Central American countries signed
the Central American Accord, widely known as Esquipulas II or the Arias Plan.
This agreement prohibited support for irregular forces attempting to destabilize
regional governments, called for the restoration of civil and political rights, and
committed all five governments to democratic electoral processes.
45. Nicaraguan members were Dreyfus and Mayorga along with Orlando
Nunez, director of c ie r a , and Xabier Gorostiaga, director of c r ie s .
46. The commission recommended a substantially increased flow of develop
ment assistance: $2.5 billion over a three-year period for the displaced and poor,
and another $2 billion per year in general financial assistance for the next five years
(Comision Internacional para la Recuperacion y el Desarrollo de Centroamerica
1989, 5).
47. See c o r d e n ic (1988). In addition to Dreyfus and Mayorga, the group in
cluded business leaders Felipe Mantica, Pablo Ayon, Filadelfo Chamorro, Carlos
Reynaldo Facayo, Antonio Lacayo, and Jose Francisco Rosales.
48. c o s e p wags promptly labeled c o r d e n ic "cosEP-Heroes y Martires" (a
takeoff on the name used by the Sandinista-aligned coNAPRO-Heroes y Martires),
implying a political affinity between c o r d e n ic and the f s l n .
49. According to biographical information attached to the c o r d e n ic mission
statement and released at the press conference announcing the formation of the
group, members included graduates of McGill, Georgetown, m it , Harvard, Yale,
and the Sorbonne. Three were members of university advisory boards in Nicara
gua, and four had at some point been full- or part-time university professors. They
owned or were major stockholders in some of the country's largest commercial
houses, distributorships, import-export businesses, and agroindustrial complexes.
See c o r d e n ic (1988, Anexo 1).
50. In interviews in 1990, several of the private sector leaders affiliated with
u pa n ic organizations described participating in social gatherings with f s l n
leaders in the last years of the Sandinista government. These informal interactions
were generally viewed as a breakthrough that allowed producers to speak honestly
and reduced their fear of the regime.
51. In 1984 c o s e p leaders had been the prime force behind the creation of
the anti-Sandinista Coordinadora Democratica, a coalition of c o s e p plus several
small unions and political parties. After naming their presidential candidate, id b
functionary Arturo Cruz, and mounting an unofficial campaign, the Coordinadora
declined to formally register Cruz in the race, claiming that the conditions for a
free and fair election were missing. According to Cruz, business leaders in c o s e p
were responsible for the decision to pull him from the contest (interview with
Arturo Cruz, December 9,1987; see also Gutman 1988).
52. For a fuller discussion of that election, see l a s a (1984). Observer teams
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were also sent from the British Houses of Commons and Lords, the Irish Parlia
ment, the Dutch government, and Socialist International; their conclusions about
the elections were generally positive. The abstention rate of 25 percent, however,
suggested that some element of popular dissatisfaction was already present. See
Oquist (1992).
53. After several rounds of balloting, Chamorro reportedly secured 6 votes from
the 14 assembled party representatives in the coalition, passing Bolanos and Godoy,
who received 4 each. In the final round of voting on the first day, Chamorro's vote
had climbed to 7 but fell short of the required 10 votes for nomination. In the sec
ond day of meetings, representatives voted on alternative tickets, with Chamorro
paired with either Bolanos or Godoy, and the second combination secured majority
support (Taylor 1989).
54. The rift with Bolanos supporters and c o s e p was smoothed over, but not
eliminated, during the campaign when c o s e p president Gilberto Cuadra was
named to the inner circle of her personal advisers [La Prensa, November 24,1989).
55. See "Sin Concertacion no habra estabilidad," La Cronica, January 3-10,1990.
56. See Barricada international 9, no. 302 (October 14, 1989), for the report on
the f s l n convention.
57. See Barricada, February 20, 1990, for example. The Nicaraguan electoral
system used a party list system and proportional representation. Parties and coali
tions presented candidates and alternates ranked in order of priority for each slot
they contested. Although the inclusion of private producers in the f s l n list was
prominently advertised, most of these candidates were alternates (13 of the 24 ad
vertised in the above ad) or were ranked in the bottom half of their lists. Only 6 of
these 24 producers on the f s l n slate were actually elected.
58. According to leaders of f a g a n ic , the Sandinistas committed themselves to
hand over if a g a n , formerly the largest slaughterhouse in the nation, to f a g a n ic .
When the Somoza regime was toppled, some of a s g a n ic 's property had been
transferred to f a g a n ic , but the slaughterhouse had been retained by the state
(interviews, f a g a n ic , September 18, 1990).
59. In an article titled, "Productores reconocen al f s l n como unica alternativa," Barricada (February n, 1990) reported conversations with a series of other
producers who had recently had expropriated land returned to them.
60. The reliquidation program had been a source of discontent in the sector.
The June 1989 meeting at which u pa n ic coffee leaders declared their withdrawal
from c o n c a f e was nominally called to allow a full discussion of this matter.
61. See, for example, Vilas (1990); Petras and Morley (1992, 128-37).
62. Two other, small parties, the Partido Social Cristiano and the Movimiento
Unido Revolucionario, won one seat each.
Chapter 5

1. Respondents' views were coded on a five-point scale based on their answers
to three questions: What is your opinion of the Sandinista government? What
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would you say were the most positive aspects of the Sandinista government? What
would you say were the most negative aspects of the Sandinista government?
2. See Anthony Downs (1957) and Gordon Tullock (1979) for pathbreaking work
in the rational choice school.
3. Indeed, the motivations of elites in the other categories also reflect consider
ations beyond simple self-interest as well. Moral-political opponents who baited
the regime, for example, were sometimes targeted for expropriation and harass
ment by police and security forces. Self-interest in those cases might call them
to moderate their critique or adopt a lower profile. They eschewed that approach
in favor of strident opposition that reflected complex political and philosophical
commitments.
4. Of the ninety-one elite leaders I interviewed, twenty-four (26 percent) spon
taneously described ways in which they had contributed to the insurrection and
the support they had provided to the f s l n during the late 1970s.
5. Postelection survey findings reported by Paul Oquist (1992,14) estimate that
only 10 percent of those classified as owners and proprietors voted for the f s l n
in the 1990 election. If this is taken as a baseline, private sector supporters of
the f s l n would then be overrepresented in this study. Oversampling in this case
may be justified as a way of gathering additional information about a particularly
complex and anomalous subsector of the leadership population.
6. Because of these considerations, a purely statistical analysis of the data in
this chapter may be problematic. Participants in this study are not a true random
sample of the economic elite, but a carefully targeted population of private sec
tor leaders. The contrasts among them are often subtle, and the numbers found in
some categories are small. Pearson chi-square statistics are presented here for each
table, but these figures should be evaluated with these considerations in mind.
7. Twenty of the respondents (22 percent) participated actively in the 1990 f s l n
campaign. Five were f s l n candidates in the election, and another fifteen were in
volved as f s l n party activists. Reflecting the greater preponderance of opponents
to the government among the respondents, forty of those interviewed (44 percent)
became actively involved in the u n o campaign, six as candidates.
8. There is ongoing debate in Nicaragua about how to define a middle-sized
and a large-sized producer, and no clear consensus has emerged (Molina and Que
zada 1990). Ideally, classification schemes should include reference not only to
the amount of land held but to the size of the workforce, land quality, type of
technology employed, and other such variables. Unfortunately, in a country where
there has been no national census for over two decades, such detailed information
is not available. Even looking at a single criterion—size of landholding there has
been disagreement about how the parameters should be set.
The most exhaustive work on this topic was done by m id in r a 's research arm,
c ie r a (c ie r a 1981). Recognizing the widely varying levels of return and com
plexity for different types of subsectors, strata definitions have generally been
product specific. (See Appendix 2, Table A.4.)
c ie r a definitions were used as a guide in determining strata classifications
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for the respondents in this survey. In actual practice, however, most of these re
spondents were engaged in several economic activities simultaneously, making it
difficult to classify them by size. It was common, for example, for producers to
combine agricultural production and cattle ranching, or to have an urban profes
sion as well as an agricultural enterprise. As a result, a producer could be both
a small coffee producer and a medium-sized rancher, or be a lawyer, a medium
cotton producer, and a large cattle rancher. These concepts become even more
problematic when producers had varying levels of participation in several farms. A
producer might be the sole owner of one farm but one of three partners in another.
Because of the endless kinds of combinations that emerged in practice, summary
classifications here represent careful estimates.
9. The Pearson chi-square value for Table 5.1 is 3.02, and the observed signifi
cance level is only .93, indicating that the null hypothesis (producer strata and
views on the f s l n government are independent) cannot be rejected.
10. Whereas 38 percent of the full sample were strongly opposed to the f s l n
government, 55 percent of those with an immigrant history fell into that category.
Sixty-seven percent of the full sample were large producers, whereas 80 percent of
those who noted a recent immigration experience in their family history were so
classified.

11. At the secondary level, prestigious Nicaraguan boarding schools such as the
Jesuit-run Colegio Centroamerica were preferred by the elite, although a handful
of the most prosperous participants in this study also completed their high school
education in the United States.
12. The long history of semicolonial status and the trade and aid linkages in
the Somoza era made economic elites highly attuned to the United States. Other
countries where several respondents received their final degrees included Mexico,
Spain, and other Central American nations.
13. In addition to those who received their highest educational degree in the
United States, many others spent some time studying and working there. In this
sample, a remarkable 42 percent reported living or studying in the United States at
some point in their lives. Over one-third lived in the United States for more than a
year; 18 percent of the respondents lived there for five or more years. In this sense,
analysts like John Weeks (1987), who allege a strong cultural dependence on the
United States by the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie, have some empirical basis for their
claims.
14. Among university graduates, 100 percent of those educated in the United
States were large producers at the end of the 1970s, whereas only 61 percent of
those who graduated from Nicaraguan universities were in that category.
15. There was also a connection between being educated in the United States
and support for a pure free-market economic model. Whereas only 29 percent of
those educated in Nicaragua selected a pure-capitalism economic model when
asked about their philosophical preferences, 42 percent of those educated in the
United States did so.
16. The Pearson chi-square value for Table s -2 is 7.79, and the significance level
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is only .45. The Pearson chi-square value for Table 5.3 is 472, with a significance
level of only .31. In neither case can the null hypothesis be rejected. A purely
statistical analysis of these data can, however, be problematic, since the measure
of association depends, to some degree, on how the variables are defined. If the
statistical analysis in Table 5.3 is confined to only those private sector leaders
with university educations who were either strongly or moderately opposed to the
regime, for example, then the contrast between those educated at home and abroad
appears more sharply. The Pearson chi-square value for this more focused analysis
is 3.44, with a significance level of .06.
17. u pa n ic leaders often charged that their affiliate associations were suffer
ing a conscious erosion at the hands of the f s l n . Indeed, the Sandinista state did
provide significant support for u n a g and encouraged producers to choose this
alternative. Among other forms of state support given to u n a g , Luciak (forthcom
ing, chap. 3) reports that 25 percent of un a g 's budget came from f s l n donations.
On the other hand, the government also provided some organizational support for
u pa n ic affiliates. It channeled goods like tires and special authorizations (asignaciones] to purchase jeeps or tractors through these groups as well, although not on
a priority basis. The state trade monopsonies also served as the collection agency
for membership dues of f a g a n ic and c a a n , transferring a percentage of their
members' earnings from the cattle slaughter and cotton export to these associa
tions.
18. The Pearson chi-square value for this table is 54.09, with a significance level
of less than .01, indicating that we can reject the null hypothesis (producer organi
zation and views on the f s l n government are independent) at the 99 percent level
of confidence.
19. c o s e p reported a relatively modest membership in its agricultural affili
ate in 1985, with 75 percent of the members in one of two livestock associations
(f a g a n ic or f o n d il a c ). (See Appendix 2, Table A.5.) The harsh exchanges be
tween c o s e p /u pa n ic leaders and government officials, the general contraction of
the large producer class, plus the confiscation of the properties of u pa n ic presi
dent Ramiro Gurdian and c o s e p president Enrique Bolanos, had a negative effect
on c o s e p 's ability to recruit and retain members.
20. u n a g 's membership reportedly rose to a total of 120,506 in 1987. (See
Appendix 2, Table A.2.) Membership figures for both u n a g and u pa n ic are sub
ject to some question, since both organizations may have inflated these numbers
in order to appear more representative of agricultural producers. Since over onefifth of u n a g 's members in 1987 were individual members who did not belong to
any base structure, cooperative, or u n a g association, it is hard to know exactly
what their affiliation in this organization entailed.
21. The u n a g leaders who had lived in the United States had also done so for
a shorter period of time than their u pa n ic counterparts. Whereas only 25 percent
of the u n a g leaders who had lived in the United States had done so for more than
one year, 94 percent of the u pa n ic leaders who had lived in the United States had
spent more than one year there.
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22. Some producers, seeking maximum political advantage, joined both u n a g
and the local u pa n ic affiliate. Regional leaders sometimes turned a blind eye to
the practice, seeing it as necessary in order to survive under the difficult circum
stances that prevailed during the era. In general, however, such double affiliation
was frowned upon, both for ideological reasons and because of the dangers of infil
tration by political opponents (interview, u pa n ic , June 21,1990; interview, u n a g ,
May 6, 1990).
23. In some areas, local u n a g leaders worked so hard to persuade their mem
bers to accept their military draft responsibilities, for example, that u n a g was
perceived as an extension of the military. This perception contributed to a ten
dency among producers in these zones to avoid contact with u n a g (interview,
UNAG-Matagalpa, June 25,1992).
24. Several members of the UPANic-affiliated a d a l , for example, were support
ers of the revolution and ran as f s l n candidates in the 1990 election. One f s l n
candidate for the Leon municipal slate had been an officer in a d a l and its rep
resentative in the u pa n ic directorate in 1988-89, and two a d a l members were
f s l n candidates for the national assembly, a d a l was exceptional, however, among
u pa n ic regional associations in its relative tolerance for Sandinista supporters in
its ranks. Leon was one of the few municipalities where f s l n support continued to
be strong throughout the decade and where the f s l n won the 1990 elections. The
broader base of f s l n support in Leon and the absence of a war front there fostered
relative tolerance for those with Sandinista sympathies, even in u pa n ic affiliates.
25. Although the patterns in Table 5.5 are notable, the contrasts between
national and regional leaders are not stark or absolute enough to rule out the
possibility of a random occurrence, especially for the u n a g leaders. The Pearson
chi-square value was 7.2 with a significance level of .13 for c o s e p leaders and 1.9
with a significance level of only .6 for u n a g leaders.
26. Members of u n a g received a number of benefits and resources. One u n a g
leader from Masaya told of a time in 1986 when his land was invaded and he faced
expropriation. With a letter from the head of his departmental u n a g office con
firming his status as a activist in the association, he was able to stave off the
expropriation bid and reclaim his land, u n a g also helped its membership to ac
quire basic agricultural implements (boots, machetes, barbed wire, etc.| at a time
when these were scarce.
Some of this support, however, was contingent on the f s l n remaining in power
and responding to u n a g requests, u n a g regional leaders throughout the coun
try reported, in the months following the inauguration of the u n o government, a
sharp drop in membership and activity. Indeed, a u n a g report on its membership
in 1993 indicates that the total had fallen from 120,506 in 1987 (see Appendix 2,
Table A.2) to 101,500 (u n a g 1993, 8). Medium- and large-sized individual pro
ducers were particularly likely to jump ship, leading one frustrated u n a g leader
in Jinotega to conclude that they had only been "glued with spit" to u n a g .
27. This group includes those who appealed the process and eventually received
some or all of the land back, who were eventually given a permuta or land ex
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change, or who were never formally expropriated but who lost some land in land
invasions that were not checked by state action.
28. As with other factors discussed above, expropriation was not an isolated
variable, unrelated to other considerations. Those who were expropriated were
more likely, for example, to have been large producers in the late 1970s and to have
been leaders of u pa n ic organizations. A full 44 percent of those in this study who
were large producers in the late 1970s underwent an expropriation, and most of
these expropriations were hard (26 percent vs. 18 percent soft). For those who were
medium-sized or small, however, only 16 percent and 20 percent, respectively,
were expropriated, and all of these were of the soft variety.
Forty percent of the u pa n ic leaders interviewed in this study were expropri
ated, and a relatively higher percentage of those expropriations were of the hard
variety (24 percent hard and 16 percent soft). Only 19 percent of the u n a g leaders,
on the other hand, were expropriated, and all of these were of the soft variety, with
some or all of the land eventually returned or a land swap arranged.
These patterns suggest a complex interaction among the variables, in which the
growing opposition of the most privileged elites combined with their marginal
ization from the Sandinista development model and contributed to expropriation
decisions that in turn deepened their hostility to the regime. Conversely, more co
operative, "patriotic" producers who had smaller estates or supported u n a g were
less likely to fall under the expropriation ax. This relatively favorable treatment in
turn encouraged them to adopt a less negative appraisal of the regime.
29. The Pearson chi-square value for Table 5.6 is 6.2, with a significance level of
only .63, indicating that we are unable to reject the null hypothesis (expropriation
experience and views on the f s l n government are independent).
30. See Utting (1991) for a discussion of the sharp price decline experienced
by Nicaraguan food producers following structural adjustment at the end of the
f s l n era. According to Utting, the large producers, who were heavily dependent
on irrigation and imported machinery, were even more negatively affected by cost
increases associated with post-1987 adjustment measures than were peasant pro
ducers. In addition to the problems of rising costs as subsidies were eliminated,
rice producers complained heartily about Soviet rice donations in 1987 and 1988,
which undercut prices for domestically produced rice (interviews, July 26, 1989;
June 23,1990).
31. The percent registering either moderate or strong support for the regime
was 8 percent for those private sector leaders whose primary product at the end
of the 1980s was coffee, 23 percent for grains (rice, maize, or sorghum), and 29
percent for livestock (beef and dairy).
32. Major investments were defined as long-term investments in acquiring
new land, building new infrastructure (roads, workers' housing, irrigation sys
tems, etc.,, acquiring purebred cattle for breeding, and making major machinery
purchases. Minor investments referred to routine investments needed to main
tain existing production levels (erecting fencing, maintaining terraces, purchasing
steers for fattening, meeting traditionally established standards for aerial fumiga
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tion or crop fertilization,. "No investments" was reported by those who made no
long-term investments during the period and whose short-term investments fell
substantially below their prerevolutionary norms.
33. The Pearson chi-square value for Table 5.7 is 9.5, with a significance level
of .05, indicating that we can reject the null hypothesis (views on the f s l n govern
ment and investment level are independent) with a 95 percent level of confidence.
34. Prospective buyers had to secure permission from m id in r a to purchase
land before the sale could be completed. This policy was designed to prevent
owners who had been informed of a pending expropriation from trying to sell the
land to unsuspecting buyers. It also allowed the state to monitor and channel land
acquisition patterns.
35. According to one producer who bought land regularly during this period,
prices for range land in 1984 were one-tenth what they had been before the revo
lution or came to be again in 1990.
36. In contrast, strong supporters had a relatively low land purchase rate (only
23 percent did so,. In most cases their workload in the government or their asso
ciation left them little time to attend to production on the land they currently
held; in one case, a strong supporter received land through an agrarian reform land
grant, making additional land purchases unnecessary.
37. It is, of course, remarkable that any of the opponents acquired additional
properties. This curious pattern is the result of several forces. For one, land pur
chase is not always a purely economic calculation. Faced with the prospect that
family lands would be sold to outsiders following the death or emigration of a rela
tive, even regime opponents might buy the land in an effort to keep it in the family.
Furthermore, opposition leaders sometimes bought land in the early years of the
revolution, before they became as virulently opposed as they were at the end. In
one case, a private sector opponent bought land and invested heavily in its develop
ment, anticipating a contra overthrow of the Sandinistas. (In two additional cases
not included in this calculation, private sector leaders reported purchasing land,
but in Costa Rica and Venezuela, as these producers prepared for the possibility of
emigration.,
38. A holding company called pm a managed the assets of the three major stock
holders, the two foreign investors who founded g r a c s a (U.S. textile executive
Philip Lehner and Salvadoran business leader Mauricio Borgonovo) and the com
pany's first general manager (Alfonso Robelo). Robelo sold his interest in the com
pany before leaving the country and joining the leadership of the contra forces, but
his prior involvement triggered the initial state intervention in g r a c s a in 1982.
The company was subsequently retained by the state for reasons of "social utility,"
because of its central role in national oilseed production. After the supreme court
decided in its favor, ownership of g r a c s a was returned to pm a (which had held
51 percent of the stock, in 1988, and Antonio Lacayo returned as general manager.
39. In all, twelve new companies were added to the g r a c s a group during
the 1979-90 period. These included a balanced feed industry, two cattle ranches,
chicken and pork production facilities, soybean and African palm projects, a
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shrimp farm, a peanut export and processing firm, a transportation firm, a heavy
construction agency, and a machine maintenance shop (interviews, g r a c s a , Sep
tember 4, October 3,11, 25, November 1,1990, August 9,1991; Spalding 1991).
40. Respondents were asked to compare their overall production levels in the
1986-89 period with those of the 1976-79 period. Percentage shifts were calcu
lated from the data they provided. Changes were classified as an increase when
production rose by over 25 percent and a decrease when it fell by more than 25
percent. Production levels were considered stable if they did not change by more
than 25 percent.
41. The Pearson chi-square value for Table 5.8 is 10.7 with a significance level
of .03, indicating that we can reject the null hypothesis (views on the f s l n gov
ernment and production level change are independent) with a 97 percent level of
confidence.
Chapter 6

1. The U.S. Congress authorized US$9 million to support a "democratic" elec
tion in Nicaragua in 1990. Most of these funds went to UNO-allied civic organi
zations and, indirectly, to the u n o campaign. See l a s a (1990); Robinson (1992,
60-89).
2. On the role of u s a id in neoliberal restructuring in Costa Rica, see So jo
(1991,, and in Nicaragua, see Saldomando (1992).
3. The recent shift toward neoliberalism in Latin American nations undergoing
a process of democratization suggests that the regime need not be formally authori
tarian to undertake this economic change. Haggard and Kaufman (1992b, 278-80)
argue, however, that the more fragmented and polarized democratic regimes, in
which the governing coalition is continually shifting, find it more difficult to
successfully implement neoliberal reforms.
4. See Przeworski (1991, chap. 4) on the dynamics of economic transition, which
he argues apply to both the Latin American and the Eastern European reform
efforts.
5. On the tension between neoliberal politics and democratic politics, see Sheahan (1991, 65-72).
6. Campero (1984, 298-320) traces the rise of the Consejo de la Produccion, el
Transporte, y el Comercio, a new peak association for small- and medium-sized
businesspeople who were protesting the losses they suffered under the Pinochet
regime in the early 1980s.
7. After eight years of warfare and general economic decline, the country had
massive foreign aid needs. For 1991, the government required an infusion of $1
billion just to meet the arrears on its foreign debt and cover the balance of pay
ments gap (Enriquez et al. 1991, 20-21). U.S. aid fell far short of what was needed
to stimulate reactivation.
8. Of the amount programmed for 1992, an estimated $576 million was report
edly disbursed (Larson with Nitlapan-ucA 1993/ 7, 9)-
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9. Whereas loans from multilateral organizations represented 21 percent of
the total foreign aid package in 1991, loans from these organizations were ex
pected to reach 39 percent of the total in 1992 (b c n , Nicaragua Economic Report,
November-December 1991,15).
10. Helms demanded a series of policy changes by the Nicaraguan government
including the return of properties to Nicaraguans who had become U.S. citizens,
the removal of high Sandinista officials from the police and intelligence agencies,
and judicial reform. See the text of Helms's letter of June 22 to u s a id Director,
reprinted in La Prensa, June 27, 1992, and Republican Staff Report (1992). After a
U.S. g a o report (1992) sharply questioned the State Department's finding that the
Chamorro government was making progress in dealing with the property claims
of 155 U.S. citizens, the State Department reversed its position on aid suspension
and also began pressuring the Chamorro government for further reforms.
11. The head of the Sandinista police, Rene Vivas, was retired from command
along with eleven other high-ranking officers. He was replaced by Fernando Cal
dera, previously a National Police commander and also a Sandinista. Responsi
bility for the police force was reassigned to a new Vice-Ministry for Citizens'
Security in the Interior Ministry under civilian appointee and Sandinista critic
Ronald Aviles. See "Nicaragua Leader Ousts Some Sandinista Police," Chicago Tri
bune, September 6,1992; Shirley Christian, "Managua Seesaw," New York Times,
September 8,1992.
In addition to these reforms, the Chamorro government reestablished a program
to review property claims (Decrees #46-92, #47-92, #48-92, and Presidential Ac
cord #248-92) and initiated an indemnization process (Decrees #51-92 and #5292) that offered payment in twenty-year bonds at 3 percent interest to those whose
properties could not be returned. These bonds could also be used to purchase stock
in profitable state enterprises (the telephone, water, and electric companies, the
Montelimar resort, etc.) (w o l a 1992, 23-25; Larson with Nitlapan-ucA 1993, 41).
12. U.S. aid was suspended again following the May 1993 discovery of an arms
cache in Managua that belonged to a supposedly disarmed faction of the Salvadoran
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front.
13. In addition to Lacayo, c o r d e n ic members included Francisco Mayorga,
who briefly served as president of the b c n ,- Enrique Dreyfus, who served for a
year and a half as foreign minister; and Francisco Rosales, who became minister
of labor.
14. in c a e had been founded in 1964 by Central American business leaders with
financial support from u s a id and technical assistance from the Harvard Univer
sity Business School. By 1990, in c a e 's various Central American campuses had
graduated 1,432 students with advanced degrees in business administration, had
2,937 graduates of its four-week training program for business executives, and
had enrolled 66,333 participants in its executive seminars. See in c a e (1990?!.
15. This group included Alfredo Cesar, who had joined the Sandinistas in 1977
while he was general administrator for Nicaraguan Sugar Estates, Inc. Among his
various posts, Cesar had been president of the b c n in the early Sandinista period
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before leaving in 1982 for Costa Rica. In 1985 he was one of six founding mem
bers of the Southern Opposition Bloc, the contra force operating out of Costa Rica.
He became a director of the Nicaraguan resistance in May 1987 and returned to
Nicaragua in 1989 to help run the Chamorro presidential campaign.
16. Chamorro took on the title minister of defense herself but allowed Hum
berto Ortega to remain in charge of the armed forces and, until September 1992,
Rene Vivas to remain as head of the Sandinista police force.
17. These actors were not entirely isolated from the Nicaraguan political ter
rain. Several had prior ties to c o s e p affiliates like c a d in . Some had, through
c o r d e n ic , been involved in orchestrating a national dialogue since April 1988.
in c a e 's role in training m id in r a personnel in management techniques had linked
much of its staff directly to the policy process for several years. Some cabinet
members, such as Minister of the Presidency Antonio Lacayo, had gone through
long years of negotiations with the Sandinista regime (see Chapter 4). The ten
dency of the new economic team toward insularity, therefore, was reduced by the
prior involvement of several members in the political bargaining process during
the Sandinista era. Compared, however, with many other political contenders,
these actors were relatively removed from the traditional rough and tumble of
Nicaraguan politics.
18. See ih c a (1990) for a comparison of the "Azul y Blanco" program advanced
by Bolanos and the final u n o program.
19. Mayorga was a Yale-trained economist who had worked at the b c n in the
1970s. He participated in the drafting of the Sandinista government's first Pro
grama de Gobierno de Reconstruccion Nacional and did consulting work for the
Ministry of Planning in the early years of the revolution. He left that position in
1982 and served as director of the Central American Bank of Economic Integration
until 1985; he subsequently became a professor and administrator at in c a e .
20. In some cases, when the f s l n bench was not united or when opposition
parties resisted, the f s l n government did withdraw or modify a piece of draft
legislation. In general, however, the f s l n government either circumvented the
legislature or relied on its solid legislative majority to assure passage of important
measures. See Booth (1985b).
21. Early presidential decrees are compiled in Republica de Nicaragua (1990?b).
On the use of presidential decrees for economic policymaking, see the interview
with Finance Minister Emilio Pereira (1991, 4). On the conflict between Chamorro
and Cesar, and the continued use of presidential decrees, see Flakoll Alegria (199T
4—5Vickers and Spence (1992).
22. Note, for example, the low level of strike activity in the late 1980s, even
though real wages in 1988 had fallen by one estimate to only 5 percent of what
they had been in 1980 (Neira Cuadra and Acevedo 1992, 87). See also Luciak (forth
coming) on the relationship between the a t c and the f s l n . For a contrasting point
of view on labor autonomy in the Sandinista era, see Stahler-Sholk (1992.).
25. Foreign Minister Dreyfus was a past president of c o s e p and Minister of the
Presidency Lacayo had been a member of the board of directors of c a d in . Minis
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ter of Agriculture Roberto Rondon was one of the country's largest cattle ranchers
and former president of f a g a n ic . At his first meeting with u pa n ic members
after the inauguration, Rondon began his comments by noting that he was still a
member of the board of directors of u pa n ic and had been secretary of f a g a n ic
until only two weeks before (observation of meeting of economic ministers and
u pa n ic , May io, 1990).
24. Of the forty producers interviewed in my study who were active partici
pants in the u n o campaign, fifteen (38 percent) gave mixed or negative evaluations
of the u n o government within seven months after the inauguration.
25. According to Wheelock Roman (1991,18), 80 percent of the agrarian reform
titles extended by the Sandinista government before February 25, 1990, were only
provisional. See also w o l a (1992); Enriquez (1991a, 47-48). In my interviews with
producers, several mentioned returning for visits to their former farms and dis
cussing the formation of joint ventures with the cooperative members who now
held title to the land.
26. The Sandinista government reportedly extended 9,404 land titles between
August 1989 and April 25, 1990, most of which were granted between the time of
their electoral defeat in February and the inauguration of the u n o government in
April. In his response to widespread allegations of corruption and abuse of power
during the lame duck period, Wheelock Roman (1991, m-12) argues that only
292 of these titles represented entirely new grants. The rest were characterized as
titles that had been granted previously but not formally issued, or as previously
arranged land swaps (permutas) for properties that had been expropriated under
agrarian reform laws.
The most controversial of the new titles were those for large tracts of land given
to individuals closely tied to the Sandinista government. According to a Barri
cada study (Guillermo Cortes, "Resurge el latifundismo," Barricada, July 8, 1991)
18,000 mz. were titled to five families in the last days of the f s l n period, includ
ing two former m id in r a vice-ministers. Some of the land titled in this fashion
was area that pro-Sandinista producers had previously donated to the revolution
and were now reclaiming. In other cases, however, the legal basis of the claim was
weaker; following a public outcry and f s l n internal pressure, some of the land
thus acquired was subsequently handed on to other claimants (interview, Jaime
Wheelock, June 27,1992,- interview, Ricardo Coronel Kautz, June 30,1992). See also
Hernandez (1991, 23-24) and "Destapan pinata agraria," La Prensa, June 25, 1991.
27. See also Enriquez (1991a, 48); Barricada, May 15,1991; Cuadra (1992,19-20).
28. c o r n a p uses the term privatization to refer to any action that shifts re
sponsibility for the firm out of its jurisdiction. The liquidation of fifty-one com
panies and the transfer of twenty-eight others (such as telecommunications and
the airport) over to other state agencies are both classified in c o r n a p data as
privatizations.
29. See Gabriela Selser, "New Reduction for e ps ," Barricada international 10,
no. 330 (December 1,1990), 14-15; Lt. Col. Oswaldo Lacayo's report to the national
assembly's budget commission, summarized in Barricada international 13, no. 360
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(April 1993), 7• Among those released in December 1990 were 5,000 officers who
were granted severance pay equal to six months to one year of salary, urban lots
for building houses, and access to technical training.
30. In addition to layoffs in the privatized state enterprises, by the end of 1991
5,700 civilian, central government employees had enrolled in this plan, including
3,000 from the state banking system and 2,700 from public services like education
and health (c e pa l 1992b, 22).
31. The total civilian public sector workforce prior to this reduction, includ
ing the central government (68,390) and public enterprises (78,000), was 146,390
(Government of Nicaragua 1992,17; c o r n a p 1991, 6).
32. The new banks authorized were the Banco Mercantil, b a n pr o , Banco de
America Central, the Banco de Credito Centroamericano, the Banco de Prestamos,
the Banco Intercontinental, and the Banco de la Exportacion (interviews, Alejan
dro Martinez Cuenca, July 1,1992; Eduardo Montealegre, Gerente General, Banco
de Credito Centroamericano, June 26, 1992; Haroldo Montealegre, Gerente Gen
eral, Banco Mercantil, June 22, 1992; Chale Espinoza, Gerente General, Banco de
la Produccion, June 29,1992,- and Francisco Sanabanda, Gerente General, Banco de
Prestamos, June 29,1992). See also Saldomando (1992, 82-94).
33. See Decree-Law #37-91, Decreto de Promotion de Exportaciones, issued
August 21,1991, and the subsequent Reglamento del Decreto de Promotion de Ex
portaciones, published in La Gaceta, April 2,1992. The income tax exemption for
nontraditional exporters began at 80 percent in 1992 and was scheduled to gradu
ally decline to 60 percent in 1997 before ending in 1998. In addition, nontraditional
exporters were also granted a negotiable and transferable tax benefit certificate for
a six-year period (interview, Juan Fernando Ramirez, Director, Departamento de
Promotion de Exportaciones, m e d e , July 2,1992; Larios and Cordero 1992).
34. See the Ley de Inversiones Extranjeras, #27, June 19, 1991, and the Regla
mento de la Ley de Inversiones Extranjeras, Decreto #30-92, June 10, 1992. To
encourage the repatriation of flight capital, Nicaraguan investors who imported
capital and registered it with the b c n received the same benefits as foreign in
vestors (Government of Nicaragua 1992,14). To encourage investment in offshore
assembly, the president also issued the Decreto de Zonas Francas Industriales de
Exportacion on November 13, 1991, followed by its enabling legislation [regla
mento] on June 10,1992.
35. The maximum income tax rate dropped from 45 percent to 35 percent in
1991 and then was lowered further to 30 percent in 1992. See b c n , Nicaragua
Economic Report, November—December 1991,15.The vast majority of Nicaraguan
workers were not required to pay income taxes since those with annual incomes
of less than C$25,000 ($5,000) were exempt. This reform, therefore, benefited the
relatively prosperous. See the detailed analysis of the changes in the tax code in
Huper (1992, 13—22). In addition to these tax rate reductions, a capital gains tax, a
wealth transfer tax, and a bequest tax were eliminated (Government of Nicaragua
1992,12).
36. See f id e g , Observador economico 16 (April 1993): 9; Hiiper (1992,13)- Ac
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cording to f id e g , 54 percent of tax revenues were generated from taxes on fiscal
products in 1991. See Observador economico 8 (August 1992): 6.
37. c o s e p itself was not invited to participate, nominally because the govern
ment wished to involve direct producers and employers rather than association
officials. The government may also have feared, correctly, that c o s e p 's periodic
denunciations of the government's performance would make it less open to gov
ernment sponsored negotiations and less likely to support the final agreement.
38. For statements of the bargaining positions of the government and the f s l n aligned labor groups, see Barricada, October 22,1990.
39. This figure was negotiated in hard bargaining. The representatives of f s l n allied groups called for the distribution to workers of 50 percent of the assets in
the remaining firms that were undergoing privatization. cosEP-allied employers
called for a limit of 10 percent worker ownership in these enterprises. The govern
ment, attempting to strike a balance between the two, called for an arrangement
in which workers would be given concessionary terms allowing them to acquire
15-20 percent of the assets of enterprises in their sectors. See Barricada, August 6,
1991; c ipr e s (1991).
40. In what was quickly becoming a pattern, c o s e p organizations ultimately
refused to sign the Concertacion II agreement as well. From the standpoint of
c o s e p leaders, the second agreement failed to deal adequately with the return of
property illegally distributed by Sandinista leaders. See c o s e p 's full page ad in La
Prensa, August 15,1991. This session reopened the issue of urban and rural proper
ties acquired by Sandinista loyalists during the pinata period between the electoral
defeat and the inauguration. During this period, urban and rural properties, and
even office equipment and vehicles in particular ministries, were dispersed among
political loyalists. Following the Concertacion II agreement, the anti-Sandinista
majority in the assembly attempted to set up a review and payment requirement
for these properties, but the combustibility of the issue and commitments made
to the f s l n during the preinauguration negotiations led the president to intervene
and veto the measure.
41. See "Year in Review 1991" in Barricada international 12, no. 345 (January
1992), 22-24; Stahler-Sholk (1992, 45).
42. Neoliberal regimes typically establish some poverty abatement program
that, though not entirely consistent with the classical liberal ideology, is designed
to attenuate economic dislocations and the resulting political opposition. The
Chamorro regime adopted several such social programs. The government created,
with u s a id financing, small employment programs and public aid services for
low-income urban dwellers (Government of Nicaragua 1992,18-19). The most im
portant of these programs, the Emergency Social Investment Fund (Fondo de Inver
siones Sociales de Emergencia, f is e ) was created in November 1990 by presidential
decree (Ministerio de la Presidencia 1991, 40-41). f is e was a five-year public works
program designed to put under- and unemployed people to work in community
infrastructural development projects. According to the u s a id program director
in Nicaragua, Janet Ballantyne, this program had created 35,000 short-term jobs
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by mid-1992 (interview, July 1,1992). Given the extremity of the economic crisis
in Nicaragua, however, this program had only a marginal impact, f is e became
controversial because of allegations that it gave the UNO-dominated municipal
governments access to patronage positions that could be traded for political sup
port.
43- In addition to these industries, in the mining sector, workers opted to buy
100 percent control of four of the mines and form a holding company that all
interested mineworkers, regardless of the mine they worked in, could buy into.
Sugar workers negotiated participation ranging from 25 percent to 70 percent in
four of the mills. Banana workers obtained 25 percent participation in the adminis
tration and marketing operations of b a n a n ic (interviews with f n t legal adviser,
Alejandro Martinez Cuenca, July 1, 1992,- f n t Secretary General Lucio Jimenez,
June 23,1992; Ramiro Gurdian, c o s e p president, June 30,1992). See also Barricada,
June 26, 1992,- Soza (1992, 39); Larson with Nitlapan-ucA (1993, 43).
44. In the cattle sector, for example, those who chose to accept this benefit
were given ten-year loans at 6 percent interest with one year of grace. In the indus
trial sector, the government offered similar terms but a two-year grace period
(interviews, Ricardo Coronel Kautz, former president of h a t o n ic , June 30,1992;
Ivan Saballos, c o r n a p, June 24, 1992,. See also c o r n a p (1991, 18),• Gobierno de
Nicaragua-cs t , Acuerdo, February 2,1993.
45. Sergio Ramirez accompanied the Chamorro government delegation to the
Donors' Conference in Rome in June 1990, and Daniel Ortega accompanied the
delegation to Washington, D.C., in March 1992 to support the government's bid
for new foreign assistance.
46. The seven-person Junta Directiva of u pa n ic , for example, was elected bi
annually by the members of the organization's Directorio. The Directorio in turn
was composed of twenty-eight representatives of the organizations that made up
the association, modestly weighted to give more voice to the larger or more eco
nomically powerful organizations. See Chapter 2, n. 52.
47. u pa n ic took this opposition furthest when it published a communique en
dorsing the June 1992 suspension of U.S. aid to Nicaragua. (See its comunicado of
June 11,1992, published in La Prensa, June 21,1992.) It took this step even though
u pa n ic 's own members were to be one of the primary beneficiaries of the funds,
which included $50 million in medium- and long-term credit for private producers
in agriculture and industry, c o s e p did not publicly endorse the suspension of the
aid. It did, however, publicly and privately denounce the government following a
series of land invasions and transportation stoppages in April 1992. See c o s e p 's
"Comunicado de prensa" of April 30,1992 (c o s e p 1992a), and its unpublished but
distributed "Posicion de c o s e p ante gobierno," May 4,1992 (c o s e p 1992b).
48. Several prominent u pa n ic leaders were affiliates of the pl c , including
former u n c a f e n ic president and u n o mayor of Managua, Arnoldo Aleman;
former president of u n c a f e n ic and member of the national assembly on the u n o
slate, Nicolas Bolanos; and Arges Sequeira, former representative to c o s e p for
u pa n ic and president of both u pa n ic and the Asociacion de Confiscados until his
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murder in November 1992. Although a participant in the u n o coalition, the pl c
took issue with the Chamorro government on major social and economic issues
and sought to drive the f s l n further from power.
49. A fourth bank authorized in 1992, the Banco de la Exportacion, was being
organized under the leadership of Ernesto Fernandez Holmann, former general
manager of b a n a m e r .
50. Even in this group, however, political accommodation was not uniform.
Haroldo Montealegre, for example, who played a prominent role in pushing
through the concertacion accords, drafting the Chamorro government's economic
policy proposals in late 1990 and 1991, and representing the government in nego
tiations with the World Bank and the im f during this period, broke ranks in mid1992 when he launched a campaign against the state bank system. As president
of one of the fledgling private banks, Montealegre has been particularly vehement
in his denunciations of the b n d , the state bank competitor. See his article "An
Economic Policy Nicaraguans Can Bank On," Wall Street Journal, April 24, 1992,
and an interview with him in Vistazo economico, #481 (June 19, 1992): 1-4.
51. See "U.S. Support Is Sought for Coffee Limits," New York Times, March 26,
1992. See also the u s a id consultant's report by c a r a n a Corporations and Sparks
Companies (1991, 55—59).
52. Percentages presented here include only those who actually responded to
the question, in c a e 's data output from this survey includes only frequencies, and
so it is not possible to determine which subsectors responded in what way. c o s e p 's
prominent role in organizing these seminars may have attracted more disaffected
producers and contributed to the widespread negative appraisals of the government
found in the responses.
53. These producers, over half of whom were in the cattle, coffee, and cotton
sectors, gave a positive assessment of the exchange rate stability (66 percent posi
tive), selective tax reductions (52 percent positive on the reduction of the sales
tax and 42 percent on customs tax reductions), and the Export Promotion Law (56
percent expected to benefit).
54. Favored responses on the presidential preference question were "There's no
one to vote for" (27 percent), Arnoldo Aleman (16 percent), Enrique Bolanos (16
percent), and Alfredo Cesar (9 percent).
55. See a pe n n (1991, 1-3); La Prensa, May 22, 1990; interviews, Samuel Man
sell, president of a pe n n , May 6, June 23,1990, and June 24,1992.
56. Membership rose from the initial 40 in May 1990 to 192 in June 1992.
Although expanding, a pe n n remained a highly selective organization. Selection
criteria included the requirement that members have access to irrigation, an agri
cultural technician on their staff, financial ability to assume the risks, and a record
of "labor discipline" on their farms (interview, Samuel Mansell, June 24, 1992).
57. These included Miguel Barrios, who had been director of m id in r a in Re
gions I, VI, and II before taking over the management of the is a after its 1988
expropriation; Pedro Antonio Blandon, who had been director of the Fondo Inter
nacional para la Reconstruccion and of the Programa Alimentario Nicaraguense;
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and Joaquin Cuadra, former president of the b c n . Barrios became the director of
ECODEPA; the others served as project consultants for u n a g .
58. See Barrios Johanning I1992); interview, Circles Robinson, consultant, Relaciones Internacionales y Proyectos, u n a g , Matagalpa, June 25, 1992,- Fernandez
Ampie (1992).
59. The idea of a u n a g bank pitted u n a g members against each other. The
sharp cutback in state bank credit to small producers and cooperatives made the
idea attractive to some u n a g leaders, but the problems of having to restrict u n a g
bank loans and force repayment by economically precarious members raised prob
lems that others were reluctant to take on. By 1993, however, u n a g leaders secured
international financial backing and began this project. See u n a g (n.d.).
60. After their electoral defeat, f s l n leaders established a series of party-owned
enterprises that were designed to provide employment and revenues for the party
(La Prensa, July 16, 1990). These operations included several highly visible ven
tures like a new airline, the Central American Airline. Public outcry about how
the f s l n had enriched itself in power, and the stunning failure of the new air
line, soon precipitated a reconsideration of party-owned enterprises. Although the
f s l n did retain a small number of businesses, such as a newspaper and radio sta
tions, the plan to found a series of prominent enterprises had reportedly been
largely abandoned by 1991 (interview, Jaime Wheelock, June 27, 1992). In spite of
this shift, two of the new banks authorized by the Chamorro government, the
Banco de Prestamos and the Banco Intercontinental, which were partly owned by
former high-ranking f s l n government officials or allies, were commonly referred
to as Sandinista banks, even though they were not actually owned by the f s l n
party. Likewise, businesses that bought advertising space in Barricada were also
commonly labeled Sandinista enterprises.
61. In addition to the sectors noted above, several other pockets of investment
could be found. Some of the producers who flourished during the Sandinista era
because of the boldness of their investment strategy or the privileges they received
from the government used their accumulated resources as a springboard for di
versification and expansion in the 1990s. The o c a l s a group, for example, moved
quickly to build a supermarket chain and acquire a fast-food franchise. By mid1991 its investments extended to twenty-five companies in the import-export,
distribution, and manufacturing sectors (b c n , Nicaragua Economic Report, June
1991, 3, 6-7).
Another entrepreneurial venture centered around b a n pr o . b a n pr o was orga
nized by a politically and economically illustrious list of investors, some of whom
were linked to Minister of the Presidency Antonio Lacayo. Bank president Pablo
Ayon Garcia had participated with Lacayo in c o r d e n ic ,- junta member Alfredo
Marin worked with Lacayo at g r a c s a and replaced him as g r a c s a s general man
ager when Lacayo resigned to direct the Chamorro campaign. Bank vice-president
Ernesto Balladares was also vice-president of c o r n a p; junta member Pablo Vijil
was minister of communication; and junta member Rafael Martinez was executive
president of the c n g . Two critics of the government, c o s e p president Ramiro Gur

277

278

Notes to Pages 187-98

dian and former c o s e p president Gilberto Cuadra, were also on the Junta Directiva
of this bank. This broad-based bank marshaled the resources of 105 producer/share
owners. Recognizing the historical importance of bank ownership to group devel
opment in Nicaragua, these investors were unwilling to depend on either the banks
organized by the returning elite, the old state banks, or those being set up with the
participation of prominent allies of the f s l n . Drawing on relatively modest indi
vidual investments, this group moved briskly to raise the mandatory $2 million
required to apply for permission to open a private bank.
62. c e pa l (1992b, 4) estimates for 1990 classified 75 percent of the Nicaraguan
population as poor and 42 percent as extremely poor. Un- and underemployment,
which had risen to 39.9 percent in 1989, continued to climb, reaching 53.5 percent
in 1991 (c e pa l 1992b, 33).
63. According to a careful study of the nontraditional export strategy in Latin
America by Barham et al. (1992), common problems include environmental degra
dation, declining terms of trade for primary products, multinationalization of the
export sector, and concentration of benefits in the hands of a small group. Ques
tions have also been raised in the Costa Rican case about whether the amount of
the subsidies provided to nontraditional exporters by the government exceeds the
increased economic return they generate.
Chapter 7

1. See Schmitter (1974). It is possible, however, for strong, independent busi
ness associations to emerge even when they are set up by state decree if the state
is essentially under the control of the economic elite. In that case, the distinction
between state-created and elite-created associations is blurred.
2. Ironically, spontaneous organizational forms for the private sector may, on
one hand, contribute to private sector capacity for confrontation with the state but
also complicate the process of achieving class unity. In the Chilean case, co pr o co
represented the six top private sector organizations, but the small- and medium
sized producers or those producers in less prominent sectors were excluded from
this alliance. The sense that the top elite is preoccupied with protecting its own
privileges, while nonhegemonic capitalists in the rest of the private sector were
not admitted into those hallowed chambers, could actually contribute to disunity
in the class. Organizational autonomy that produces rigid divisions by sector, firm
size, or region may, therefore, undermine private sector cohesion. In this sense,
state intervention may actually foster class unification, whereas spontaneous orga
nization may not. Indeed, the 1972-73 fusion of the private sector proved transitory
in Chile. Disgruntled by the economic hardships they faced under the military dic
tatorship in Chile relative to the top elites, medium- and small-sized businesses
split off and formed their own peak association, the Consejo de la Produccion, el
Transporte, y el Comercio, in 1983. See Campero (1984).
3. The role of outside agents can be overstated. It seems unlikely that the Nixon
administration's subsidies to El Mercurio or the October 1972 bosses' strike in
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Chile, for example, could have forged a united private sector opposition if the
domestic capitalist class did not see opposition to be in its interest. The image of
Latin American bourgeoisie as a dangling puppet responding jerkily to every tug
from the United States shows little insight into the character of the local elite.
On the other hand, concerted foreign intervention can help local entrepreneurs to
coordinate their efforts and sustain their own confrontation with the state. In that
more limited sense, the U.S. government can help to forge and maintain a business
consensus, as can the im f when it adds external validation and the promise of
resources to local elites' efforts to quash reform. At the same time, the U.S. govern
ment can also contribute to internal tension in a relatively cohesive bourgeoisie,
as it did in El Salvador by supporting the Duarte government and refusing to confer
legitimacy on the more reactionary D'Aubuisson faction of the Salvadoran right.
4. The regime also welcomed the 1988 formation of an alternative elite orga
nization, c o r d e n ic , which differentiated its approach from the confrontational
style of c o s e p and looked for new forms of dialogue.
5. In some cases, such as Jamaica during the first Manley government, the use
of class-based rhetoric and attacks on the bourgeoisie triggered a rise of the elite's
threat perception, even though the actual reforms introduced by the government
were modest and domestic property holders were little affected by expropriation.
See Stephens and Stephens (1986,.
6. The Manley government's decision to grant the Order of Jamaica award to
the president of the Private Sector Organization of Jamaica in August 1978 served
that purpose as well. See Stephens and Stephens (1986, 211).
7. Stepan's (1978, 292) relatively comprehensive definition of institutionaliza
tion combines both aspects. Institutionalization, he concludes, "implies that a
regime has consolidated the new political patterns of succession, control and par
ticipation, has managed a viable pattern of economic accumulation, has forged
extensive constituencies for its rule, and has created a significant degree of Gramscian 'hegemonic acceptance' in civil society." I have divided the concept into two
parts, since institutionalization may not occur simultaneously in both areas. In
deed, there may be a tension between the two. Steps taken to assure a broad,
stable mass constituency, for example, may pose a serious challenge to economic
accumulation.
8. Even in the Mexican case, which is our most successful example of political
institutionalization, the problems of interelite consolidation were enormous. The
1934 confrontation between outgoing jeje maximo Calles and incoming President
Cardenas over who would actually govern was resolved only after ten months of
dispute and Calles's forcible expulsion from the country. Furthermore, the 1940
presidential election was characterized by violent confrontations with electoral
competitors and allegations of extensive electoral fraud. See Cornelius (1973) on
the process of regime consolidation in Mexico.
9. Scott (1989, 5) developed this idea to describe the "prosaic or first resort
techniques of resistance by the peasantry, but the analysis may be extended to
economic elites when these elites are in the (relatively rare) position of being
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politically subordinate. Of course, the business elite has a much larger arsenal of
weapons to choose from than the peasantry.
io. Nationalist development projects can, of course, have the reverse effect and
alienate the local producers. Conaghan (1988), for example, argues that the exten
sive penetration of local businesses by foreign capital in Ecuador fed intense local
business opposition to the Andean Pact's decision to restrict ownership and profit
repatriation by foreign firms.

bibliography

Abugattas, Luis. 1986. "Crisis de transicion, asociaciones empresariales y partidos
politicos: El caso peruano." Paper presented at the International Congress of
the Latin American Studies Association, Boston, October.
Acuna, Carlos H. 1991. "Intereses empresarios, dictadura y democracia en la Argen
tina actual (O, sobre porque la burguesia abandona estrategias autoritarias y
opta por la estabilidad democratica)." Paper presented at the Conference on
Business Elites and Democracy in Latin America, Kellogg Institute for Interna
tional Studies, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Ind., May 3-5.
Alcazar, Marco Antonio. 1970. Las agrupaciones patronales en Mexico. Mexico,
D.F.: El Colegio de Mexico.
Allahar, Anton L. 1990. "The Evolution of the Latin American Bourgeoisie: An
Historical-Comparative Study." International Journal of Comparative Soci
ology (Netherlands) 31, nos. 3-4 (September-December,: 222-36.
Anderson, Thomas P. 1971. Matanza: El Salvador’s Communist Revolt of 1932.
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
a n s c a . n.d. Memoria 1960-63. Managua: Editorial Aurora.
a pe n n . 1991. Boletm informativo, November-December.
Arana Sevilla, Mario. 1990. "Nicaragua: Estabilizacion, ajuste y estrategia econo
mica, 1988-89." Cuadernos de pensamiento propio, serie ensayos 18 (March):
9-62.
Arana Sevilla, Mario, Richard Stahler-Sholk, Gerardo Timossi D. and Carmen
Lopez G. 1987. "Deuda, estabilizacion y ajuste: La transformacion en Nicara
gua, 1979-1986." Cuadernos de pensamiento propio, serie ensayos 15 (Novem
ber).
Arguello Huper, Alejandro, and Nanno Kleiterp. 1985. Analisis del proceso inversionista nicaragiiense de 1979 a 1983. Managua: Fondo Nicaragiiense de
Inversion, October.
Arriagada, Genaro. 1970. La oligarquia patronal chilena. Santiago, Chile: Ediciones Nueva Universidad.
Arriola, Carlos. 1976. "Los grupos empresariales frente al estado (i973_I975)-,/ hi
Las fronteras del control del estado mexicano, by Centro de Estudios Internacionales, 33-82. Mexico, D.F.: El Colegio de Mexico.
a s g a n ic . 1975. "Informe a la Confederacion Interamericana de Ganaderos
(c ia g a )." Paper presented at c ia g a meeting, Toronto, Canada, November
12-15.
281

282

Bibliography

Austin, James E. 1972. Marketing Adjustment to Production Modernization.
Montefresco, Nicaragua: in c a e .
Ballard, Patricia. 1985. "The Insertion of Nicaragua into the World Market for
Beef: A Summary." Report presented at I Congreso Nacional Cientifico Agrope
cuario, Managua, June.
Balmori, Diana, Stuart F. Voss, and Miles Wortman. 1984. Notable Family Net
works in Latin America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Baloyra, Enrique. 1982. El Salvador in Transition. Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press.
Bamat, Thomas. 1978. "From Plan Inca to Plan Tupac Amaru: The Recomposition
of the Peruvian Power Bloc, 1968-1977." Ph.D. diss., Rutgers University.
Banco Nacional de Nicaragua (b n n ,- after 1979, Banco Nacional de Desarrollo
[b n d ]). Habilitados [Algodon, Cafe, Ganaderia, and Granos Basicos). Vari
ous years.
Barahona, Amaru. 1989. Estudio sobre la historia de Nicaragua. Managua: in ie s .
Barham, Bradford, Mary Clark, Elizabeth Katz, and Rachel Schurman. 1992. "Non
traditional Agricultural Exports in Latin America." Latin American Research
Review 27, no. 2: 43-82.
Barrios Johanning, Miguel. 1992. "Que la rentabilidad sea la base: Informe para la
Asamblea General e c o d e pa |io abril 1992)." Productores 13 (April): 19-22.
Barry, Tom. 1990. El Salvador: A Country Guide. Albuquerque: Inter-Hemispheric
Education Resource Center.
Bartell, Ernest. 1991. "Business Perceptions and the Transition to Democracy in
Chile." Paper presented at the Conference on Business Elites and Democracy in
Latin America, Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre
Dame, Notre Dame, Ind., May 3-5.
Basanez, Miguel. 1990. La lucha por la hegemonia en Mexico 1968-1990. 8th ed.,
expanded. Mexico, D.F.: Siglo Veintiuno.
Baumeister, Eduardo. 1983. El subsistema del algodon. Managua: in ie s .
------- . 1984a. "Estructura y reforma agraria en el proceso sandinista." Desarrollo
economico 24, no. 94 (July-September): 187-202.
------- . 1984b. "La importancia de los medianos productores en la agricultura nica
raguense." Paper presented at the Latin American Studies Center, Cambridge
University, Cambridge, England, September.
------- . 1988. "Desarrollistas y campesinistas." Pensamientopropio 6, no. 52 (JulyAugust): 26-31.
------- . 1989. "El problema agrario y los sujetos del desarrollo nicaraguense." In El
debate sobre la reforma agraria en Nicaragua, edited by Raul Ruben and Jan P.
de Grott, 129-54. Managua: Editorial Ciencias Sociales.
------- .1991. "Estado y campesinado en el gobierno sandinista." Paper presented at
the International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Wash
ington, D.C., April 4-6.
Baumeister, Eduardo, and Oscar Neira Cuadra. 1986. "The Making of a Mixed
Economy: Class Struggle and State Policy in the Nicaraguan Transition." In
Transition and Development, edited by Richard R. Fagen et al., 171-91. New
York: Monthly Review Press.

Bibliography
b c n . 1979. Indicadores economicos 5, nos. 1 and 2 (December).
------- . 1981? Informe anual 1978. Managua: b c n .
------- . 1990. Informe economico 1989. Managua: b c n .
------- . 1992. Indicadores de actividad economica 2, no. 4 (May).
------- . Nicaragua Economic Report. Various issues.
Becker, David G. 1983. The New Bourgeoisie and the Limits of Dependency.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Belli, Pedro. 1968. "An Inquiry Concerning the Growth of Cotton Farming in Nica
ragua." Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley.
------- • 1975- "Prolegomeno para una historia economica de Nicaragua de 1905
a 1966." Revista conservadora del pensamiento centroamericano 30, no. 146:
2-30.
Bendana, Alejandro. 1991. Una tragedia campesina: Testimonios dela resistencia.
Managua: Editora de Arte, S.A. y Centro de Estudios Internacionales.
Biderman, Jaime M. 1982. "Class Structure, the State and Capitalist Development
in Nicaraguan Agriculture." Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley.
Biondi-Morra, Brizio N. 1990. Revolucion y politica alimentaria: Un analisis critico de Nicaragua. Mexico, D.F.: Siglo Veintiuno.
Bitar, Sergio. 1986. Chile: Experiment in Democracy. Philadelphia: Institute for
the Study of Human Issues.
Booth, John A. 1985a. The End and the Beginning: The Nicaraguan Revolution. 2d
ed. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
------- . 1985b. "The National Governmental System." In Nicaragua: The First Five
Years, edited by Thomas W. Walker, 29-44. New York: Praeger.
Booth, John A., and Mitchell A. Seligson. 1989. Elections and Democracy in Cen
tral America. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Borge, Tomas. 1982. "The Second Anniversary of the Sandinista Revolution." In
Sandinistas Speak, by Tomas Borge, Carlos Fonseca, Daniel Ortega, Humberto
Ortega, and Jaime Wheelock, 127-40. Edited by Bruce Marcus. New York: Path
finder Press.
Bottomore, Tom, and Robert J. Brym. 1989. The Capitalist Class: An International
Study. New York: New York University Press.
Bourricaud, Francois. 1966. "Structure and Function of the Peruvian Oligarchy."
Studies in Comparative International Development 2, no. 2: 17-31.
------- . 1970. Power and Society in Contemporary Peru. Translated by Paul Steven
son. New York: Praeger.
Bravo Mena, Luis Felipe. 1987. "c o pa r m e x and Mexican Politics." In Government
and Private Sector in Contemporary Mexico, edited by Sylvia Maxfield and
Ricardo Anzaldua Montoya, 89-104. La Jolla: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies,
University of California, San Diego.
Brinton, Crane. 1938. The Anatomy of Revolution. New York: Vintage.
Brockett, Charles D. 1990. Land, Power, and Poverty: Agrarian Transformation
and Political Conflict in Central America. Boston: Unwin Hyman.
Brundenius, Claes. 1987. "Industrial Development Strategies in Revolutionary
Nicaragua." In The Political Economy of Revolutionary Nicaragua, edited by
Rose J. Spalding, 85-104. Boston: Allen & Unwin.

283

284

Bibliography

Buchanan, Paul G., and Betts Putnam. 1992. "The Reconstruction of Bourgeois
Hegemony in the Southern Cone: A Microfoundational Analysis." Unpublished
manuscript, September.
Bugajski, Janusz. 1990. Sandinista Communism and Rural Nicaragua. New York:
Praeger.
Bulmer-Thomas, Victor. 1987. The Political Economy of Central America since
1920. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
------- . 1991. "Nicaragua since 1930." In Central America since Independence,
edited by Leslie Bethell, 227-76. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Burns, E. Bradford. 1991. Patriarch and Folk: The Emergence of Nicaragua, 1798—
1858. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
c a d in . 1975. "Evolucion historica, organizacion y actividades de la camara de in
dustrias de Nicaragua." Paper presented at the Mesa Redonda sobre el Papel de
las Organizaciones de Empleadores en America Latina, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,
July 14-22.
Camara de Comercio de Leon. n.d. Untitled collection of laws. Leon, Nicaragua:
n.p.
Camp, Roderic A. 1989. Entrepreneurs and Politics in Twentieth-Century Mexico.
New York and London: Oxford University Press.
Campero, Guillermo. 1984. Los gremios empresariales en el periodo 1970-1983:
Comportamiento sociopolitico y orientaciones ideologicas. Santiago, Chile:
Instituto Latinoamericano de Estudios Transnacionales.
------- . 1988. "Los empresarios ante la alternativa democratica." In Empresarios
y estado en America Latina, edited by Celso Garrido N., 245-66. Mexico,
D.F.: Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economica, a.c., Fundacion Fried
rich Ebert, UNAM-Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales, Universidad Autonoma
Metropolitana-Unidad Azcapotzalco.
------- . 1991. "Entrepreneurs under the Military Regime." In The Struggle for
Democracy in Chile, 1982-1990, edited by Paul W. Drake and Ivan Jaksic, 12858. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
c a r a n a Corporation and Sparks Companies. 1991. Framework for an Agribusi
ness Strategy in Nicaragua. Vol. 2. Report for usAiD/Nicaragua, October.
Cardenal Downing, Gloria. 1988. "Desarrollo y transformaciones en el agro nicaraguense (1979-1987)." M.A. thesis, Universidad Catolica de Lovaine.
Cardoso, Fernando Henrique. 1967. "The Industrial Elite." In Elites in Latin
America, edited by Seymour Martin Lipset and Aldo Solari, 94-116. New York
and London: Oxford University Press.
------- . 1972. Ideologlas de la burguesia industrial en sociedades dependientes
(Argentina y Brasil). 2d ed. Mexico, D.F.: Siglo Veintiuno.
Castillo Aramburu, Melba. 1988. "El papel de los empresarios industriales en la
economia nicaragiiense." In Empresarios y estado en America Latina, edited
by Celso Garrido N., 97-120. Mexico, D.F.: Centro de Investigacion y Docencia
Economica, a.c., Fundacion Friedrich Ebert, UNAM-Instituto de Investigaciones
Sociales, Universidad Autonoma Metropolitana-Unidad Azcapotzalco.
Castillo Ochoa, Manuel. 1988. "^La formacion de una clase?: Empresarios, politica
y estado en el Peru de 1987." In Empresarios y estado en America Latina, edited

Bibliography

by Celso Garrido N., 185-206. Mexico, D.F.: Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economica, a.c., Fundacion Friedrich Ebert, UNAM-Instituto de Investiga
ciones Sociales, Universidad Autonoma Metropolitana-Unidad Azcapotzalco.
Castro, Vanessa, and Gary Prevost, eds. 1992. The 1990 Elections in Nicaragua and
Their Aftermath. Lanham, Md.: Rowman a Littlefield.
c e pa l . 1984. Notas para el estudio economico de America Latina y el Caribe,
1983: Nicaragua. Mexico, D.F.: c e pa l .
------- . 1985. Notas para el estudio economico de America Latina y el Caribe,
1984: Nicaragua. Mexico, D.F.: c e pa l .
------- . 1986. Notas para el estudio economico de America Latina y el Caribe,
1985: El Salvador. Mexico, D.F.: c e pa l .
------- . 1987. "Balance preliminar de la Economia Latinoamericana 1987." Notas
sobre la economia y el desarrollo, nos. 455/456 (December).
------- . 1989. "Balance preliminar de la Economia Latinoamericana 1989." Notas
sobre la economia y el desarrollo, nos. 485/486 (December).
------- . 1990a. Notas para el estudio economico de America Latina y el Caribe,
1989: Nicaragua. Mexico, D.F.: c e pa l .
------- . 1990b. "Preliminary Overview of the Economy of Latin America and
the Caribbean, 1990." Notas sobre la economia y el desarrollo, nos. 500-501
(December).
------- . 1991. "Balance preliminar de la Economia de America Latina y el Caribe
1991. " Notas sobre la economia y el desarrollo, nos. 519/520 (December).
------- . 1992a. "Balance preliminar de la Economia de America Latina y el Caribe
1992. " Notas sobre la economia y el desarrollo, nos. 537/538 (December).
------- . 1992b. Nicaragua: Evolution economica durante 1991. Mexico, D.F.:
CEPAL.

Chamorro, Amalia, Francisco Navarrete, and David Dye. 1983. Untitled manu
script. Paper presented at in ie s workshop, Managua, Nicaragua, June 10.
Christian, Shirley. 1986. Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family. New York: Vintage.
c ie r a . 1981. "Las clases sociales en el agro." Managua: Mimeo.
------- . 1988. "La reforma monetaria de 1988: Operacion 'Martires de Quilali.'" In
El debate sobre la reforma economica, 302-19. Managua: c ie r a .
------- . 1989. La reforma agraria en Nicaragua, 1979-1989. Vols. 1-9. Managua:
CIERA.

ciERA/Programa Alimentario Nicaraguense (pa n (/Canadian International Devel
opment Agency (c id a ). 1984. Informe final del Proyecto Estrategia Alimentaria. Vol. 3, Directorio de politicas alimentarias. Managua: c ie r a .
c ipr e s . 1991. "El area propiedad de los trabajadores: Una nueva forma de propiedad
social en Nicaragua." Cuadernos del c ipr e s , no. 10, special issue (December).
c n g . 1989. Memoria: fulio 1983-September 1989. Managua: c n g .
Colburn, Forrest D. 1986. Post-Revolutionary Nicaragua: State, Class, and the
Dilemmas of Agrarian Policy. Berkeley: University of California Press.
------- . 1990. Managing the Commanding Heights: Nicaragua s State Enterprises.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Colburn, Forrest D., and Silvio De Franco. 1985. "Privilege, Production, and Revo
lution: The Case of Nicaragua." Comparative Politics 17, no. 3 (April). 277-90.

285

286

Bibliography

Coleman, William, and Wyn Grant. 1988. "The Organizational Cohesion and
Political Access of Business: A Study of Comprehensive Associations." Euro
pean Journal of Political Research 16, no. 5 (September): 467-87.
Colindres, Eduardo. 1976. "La tenencia de la tierra en El Salvador." Estudios centroamericanos 31, nos. 335-36 (September-October): 463-72.
------- . 1977. Fundamentos economicos de la burguesia salvadoreha. San Salva
dor: Universidad Centroamericana Editores.
Collier, David, and Deborah L. Norden. 1992. "Strategic Choice Models of Political
Change in Latin America." Comparative Politics 24, no. 2 (January): 229-43.
Comision Internacional para la Recuperacion y el Desarrollo de Centroamerica.
1989. Pobreza, conflicto y esperanza: Un momento critico para Centroamerica.
Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.
Comite Economico del Gobierno de El Salvador. 1990. "El plan economico de
a r e n a ." Estudios centroamericanos 45, nos. 495-96 (January-February): 10911.
Conaghan, Catherine M. 1988. Restructuring Domination: Industrialists and the
State in Ecuador. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
------- . 1991. "Hot Money and Hegemony." Paper presented at the Conference on
Business Elites and Democracy in Latin America, Kellogg Institute for Interna
tional Studies, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Ind., May 3-5.
Conaghan, Catherine M., James M. Malloy, and Luis A. Abugattas. 1990. "Busi
ness and the 'Boys': The Politics of Neoliberalism in the Central Andes." Latin
American Research Review 25, no. 2: 3-30.
Conroy, Michael E. 1984. "False Polarization?: Alternative Perspectives on the
Economic Strategies of Post-Revolutionary Nicaragua." Paper presented at
the Twenty-fifth Annual Convention of the International Studies Association,
Atlanta, March 29.
------- . 1990. "The Political Economy of the 1990 Nicaraguan Elections." Interna
tional Journal of Political Economy 20, no. 3 (Fall): 5-33.
Conroy, Michael E., and Manuel Pastor, Jr. 1988. "The Nicaraguan Experiment:
Characteristics of a New Economic Model." In Crisis in Central America,
edited by Nora Hamilton et al., 207-26. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
Contreras, Ariel Jose. 1990. Mexico 1940: Industrialization y crisis politica. 2d ed.
Mexico, D.F.: Siglo Veintiuno.
c o r d e n ic . 1988. "Mision y programa de actividades." Managua: Mimeo.
------- . 1990. "Informe de actividades 1988-1990." Managua: Mimeo.
c o r f o . 1989. 50 ahos de realizaciones 1939-1989. Santiago, Chile: c o r f o .
c o r n a p . 1991. "Estrategia de privatization del gobierno de Nicaragua." Unpub
lished document, November.
------- . 1993. "La privatization en Nicaragua: Resumen de ejecutoria y perspectivas." Unpublished document, March 9.
Cornelius, Wayne A. 1973. "Nation Building, Participation, and Distribution: The
Politics of Social Reform under Cardenas." In Crisis, Choice, and Change: His
torical Studies of Political Development, edited by Gabriel A. Almond, Scott C.
Flanagan, and Robert J. Mundt, 392-498. Boston: Little, Brown.
Coronel Kautz, Manuel. 1984. "Una estrategia para superar la dependencia y subdesarrollo." Revolucion y desarrollo 2 (July-September): 9-15.

Bibliography

Coronel Kautz, Ricardo. 1984. "La normacion del trabajo y el salario y la dificil
situation de nuestras empresas estatales." Revolucion y desarrollo 2 (JulySeptember): 25-26.
c o s e p . 1987a. "Breve narracion de reunion de 10 de julio de 1987 m id in r a y
Ganaderos (f a g a n ic y u n a g )." Memorandum de la presidencia, no. 19, July 30.
------- . 1987b. Press release. April 29.
------- .1990. "Pronunciamiento." October 24.
------- . 1991. "Comunicado." January 23.
------- . 1992a. "Comunicado de prensa." April 30.
------- . 1992b. "Posicion de c o s e p ante gobierno." May 4.
------- . Memorandum de la presidencia. Various issues.
c o s e p /in c a e /m e d e . 1992. "Encuesta nacional a empresarios privados: Algunos
resultados preliminares." Unpublished document, May-June.
c o s ip . 1974. "Conclusiones sobre el tema: Estrategia de desarrollo socioeconomico para la decada de los 70." Managua: Mimeo.
Crosby, Benjamin L. 1985. "Divided We Stand, Divided We Fall: Public-Private Sec
tor Relations in Central America." Occasional Papers Series, no. 10. Miami:
Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University, April.
Cruz, Ernesto. 1974. "Estrategia de desarrollo para los anos 70." Paper presented at
the First Convention of c o s ip , Managua, Nicaragua, March 1.
Cruz, Ernesto, and Kenneth L. Hoadley. 1975. Necesidad de una politica oficial
sobre comercializacion del algodon: El caso de Nicaragua. Managua: in c a e .
Cuadra, Scarlet. 1992. "Worker's Property in Nicaragua: New Dilemmas Every
Day." Barricada international 12, no. 349 (May): 19-21.
Cuadra Pasos, Carlos. 1967. "Los Cuadra: Una hebra en el tejido de la historia de
Nicaragua." Revista conservadora del pensamiento centroamericano 17, no. 83
(supplement,: 1-26.
Deere, Carmen Diana, Peter Marchetti, S.J., and Nola Reinhardt. 1985. "The Peas
antry and the Development of Sandinista Agrarian Policy, 1979-1984." Latin
American Research Review 20, no. 3: 75-110.
De Franco, Silvio, and Emilio Pereira. 1989. "Como perciben los gerentes el entorno
centroamericano." Revista in c a e 3, no. 1: 27-36.
de Janvry, Alain. 1981. The Agrarian Question and Reformism in Latin America.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Del Campo, Santiago, et al. 1973. "The Clans of Chile." In The Chilean Road to
Socialism, edited by Dale L. Johnson, 395-409. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor,
de Sebastian, Luis. 1979. "El camino hacia la democracia." Estudios centroamericanos 35, nos. 372-73: 947-60.
------- . 1986. "Consideraciones politico-economicas sobre la oligarquia en El Sal
vador." In El Salvador: Estado oligarquico y desarrollo economico-social, 19451979, edited by the Centro de Investigacion y Accion Social, 28—48. Mexico,
D.F.: Centro de Investigacion y Accion Social, Cuaderno de Trabajo no. 6.
de Vylder, Stefan. 1976. Allende’s Chile: The Political Economy of the Rise and
Fall of the Unidad Popular. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dijkstra, Geske. 1992. Industrialization in Sandinista Nicaragua: Policy and Prac
tice in a Mixed Economy. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
Diskin, Martin. 1989. "El Salvador: Reform Prevents Change." In Searching for

287

288

Bibliography

Agrarian Reform in Latin America, edited by William C. Thiesenhusen, 42950. Boston: Unwin Hyman.
Dore, Elizabeth, and John Weeks. 1976. "The Intensification of the Assault against
the Working Class in 'Revolutionary' Peru." Latin American Perspectives 3,
no. 2 (Spring): 55-83.
------- . 1977. "Class Alliances and Class Struggle in Peru." Latin American Per
spectives 4, no. 3 (Summer): 4-17. Special issue: Peru: Bourgeois Revolution
and Class Struggle.
Dornbusch, Rudiger, and Sebastian Edwards, eds. 1991. The Macroeconomics of
Populism in Latin America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Dosal, Paul J. 1985. "Accelerating Dependent Development and Revolution: Nica
ragua and the Alliance for Progress." Inter-American Economic Affairs 38, no. 4
(Spring): 75-96.
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper
and Row.
Drake, Paul. 1973. "The Political Response of the Chilean Upper Class to the Great
Depression and the Threat of Socialism." In The Rich, the Well Born and the
Powerful: Elites and Upper Classes in History, edited by Frederic Cople Jaher,
304-37. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Dresser, Denise. 1991. Neopopulist Solutions to Neoliberal Problems: Mexico’s
National Solidarity Program. La Jolla: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, Uni
versity of California, San Diego.
Dubois, Alfonso, et al. 1983. El subsistema del azucar en Nicaragua. Managua:
in ie s -c r ie s .

Dunkerley, James. 1988. Power in the Isthmus: A Political History of Modern
Central America. London: Verso.
Durand, Francisco. 1982. La decada frustrada: Los industriales y elpoder, 1970-80.
Lima: Centro de Estudios y Promocion del Desarrollo-DESCO.
------- . 1988a. La burguesia peruana: Los primeros industriales, Alan Garcia ylos
empresarios. Lima: Centro de Estudios y Promocion del Desarrollo.
------- . 1988b. "Empresarios y politica en el Peru: De la concertacion a la estatizacion de la banca." In Empresarios y estado en America Latina, edited by
Celso Garrido N., 267-86. Mexico, D.F.: Centro de Investigacion y Docencia
Economica, a.c., Fundacion Friedrich Ebert, UNAM-Instituto de Investigaciones
Sociales, Universidad Autonoma Metropolitana-Unidad Azcapotzalco.
------- . 1991. "Business Peak Associations in Latin America: The Case of Peru."
Paper presented at the Conference on Business Elites and Democracy in Latin
America, Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame,
Notre Dame, Ind., May 3-5.
Eckstein, Shlomo, et al. 1978. Land Reform in Latin America: Bolivia, Chile,
Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. World Bank Staff Working Paper, no. 275. Wash
ington, D.C.: World Bank.
e c l a . 1951. Theoretical and Practical Problems of Economic Growth. Santiago,
Chile: e c l a .
Edmisten, Patricia Taylor. 1990. Nicaragua Divided: La Prensa and the Chamorro
Legacy. Pensacola: University of West Florida Press.

Bibliography

Emmanuel, Arghiri. 1972. Unequal Exchange: A Study of the Imperialism of
Trade. New York: Monthly Review Press.
Enriquez, Laura J. 1991a. "Agrarian Reform in Nicaragua: Its Past and Its Future."
Paper presented at the Sixteenth International Congress of the Latin American
Studies Association, Washington, D.C., April 4-6.
. 1991b. Harvesting Change. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press.
Enriquez, Laura J., and Rose J. Spalding. 1987. "Banking Systems and Revolution
ary Change: The Politics of Agricultural Credit in Nicaragua." In The Political
Economy of Revolutionary Nicaragua, edited by Rose J. Spalding, 105-26. Bos
ton: Allen & Unwin.
Enriquez, Laura J., et al. I991- Nicaragua: Reconciliation Awaiting Recover/.Wash
ington, D.C.: Washington Office on Latin America.
Evans, Peter, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds. 1985. Bringing the
State Back In. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Evans, Trevor. 1987. "El algodon: Un cultivo de debate." Cuadernos de pensa
miento propio, April.
f a g a n ic . 1982. "Guia para informe de ganaderia." Managua: Mimeo, August 4.
f a o . 1978. "Programa democratico del gobierno nacional." In Nicaragua: Reforma
o revolucion, by ih c a . Vol. 2. N.p.
Fernandez Ampie, Guillermo. 1992. "A Silent War." Barricada international 12,
no. 347 (March): 11-13.
Fiallos Oyanguren, Mariano. 1968. "The Nicaraguan Political System: The Flow of
Demands and the Reaction of the Regime." Ph.D. diss., University of Kansas.
f id a . 1980. Informe de la mision especial de programacion a Nicaragua. Rome:
FIDA.

1993. "Diagnostico de empresas privatizadas a favor de trabajadores." Ob
servador economico 19 (July): 22-26.
------- . Boletln informativo. Various issues.
------- . Observador economico. Various issues.
FitzGerald, E. V. K. 1976. State and Economic Development: Peru since 1968. Cam
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
------- . 1979. The Political Economy of Peru, 1956-78: Economic Development
and the Restructuring of Capital. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
------- . 1984a. "Problems in Financing a Revolution: The Case of Nicaragua 19791984." Working paper—Sub-Series on Money, Finance and Development, no. 14.
Paper presented at Institute for Social Studies Workshop, The Hague, Decem
ber 3-14.
------- . 1984b. Stabilization and Economic Justice: The Case of Nicaragua. Notre
Dame, Ind.: Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre
Dame.
------- . 1989. Financing Economic Development: A Structural Approach to Mone
tary Policy. Brookfield, Vt.: Gower.
Flakoll Alegria, Daniel. 1991. "Cesar Legislates Instability." Barricada interna
tional 11, no. 341 (September): 4-6.
Fonseca, Roberto. 1989. "El derecho a quien lo tiene." Analisis, no. 3 (November).
27-29.
f id e g .

289

290

Bibliography

Font, Mauricio. 1990. Coffee, Contention and Change. London: Basil Blackwell.
Foxley, Alejandro. 1986. "The Neoconservative Economic Experiment in Chile." In
Military Rule in Chile, edited by J. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela,
13-50. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Frank, Andre Gunder. 1969. Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution.
New York: Monthly Review Press.
f s l n . 1990a. "Acuerdos de Unidad (1979)." In Sandinistas: Key Documents/Docu
ments Claves, edited by Dennis Gilbert and David Block, 68-73. Ithaca, N.Y.:
Latin American Studies Program, Cornell University.
------- . 1990b. "Analisis de la Coyuntura y Tareas de la Revolucion Popular Sandi
nista." In Sandinistas: Key Documents/Documentos Claves, edited by Dennis
Gilbert and David Block, 74-110. Ithaca, N.Y.: Latin American Studies Pro
gram, Cornell University.
Furtado, Celso. 1976. Economic Development of Latin America. Cambridge: Cam
bridge University Press.
Gallardo, Maria Eugenia, and Jose Roberto Lopez. 1986. Centroamerica: La crisis
en cifras. San Jose, Costa Rica: Instituto Interamericano de Cooperacion para
la Agricultura and la Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales.
Gariazzo, Alicia, et al. 1983. El subsistema del cafe en Nicaragua. Managua:
in ie s -c r ie s .

Gibson, Bill. 1987. "A Structural Overview of the Nicaraguan Economy." In The
Political Economy of Revolutionary Nicaragua, edited by Rose J. Spalding,
15-42. Boston: Allen 81 Unwin.
------- . 1991. "The Nicaraguan Economy in the Medium Run." Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 33, no. 2 (Summer,: 23-52.
Gilbert, Dennis. 1977. The Oligarchy and the Old Regime in Peru. Ithaca, N.Y.:
Dissertation Series, Latin American Studies Program, Cornell University.
------- . 1980. "The End of the Peruvian Revolution: A Class Analysis." Studies in
Comparative International Development 15 (Spring,: 15-37.
------- . 1985. "The Bourgeoisie." In Nicaragua: The First Five Years, edited by
Thomas W. Walker, 183-99. New York: Praeger.
------- . 1988. Sandinistas: The Party and the Revolution. London: Basil Blackwell.
Glade, William, ed. 1991. Privatization of Public Enterprises in Latin America.
San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies.
Gobat, Michel. 1991. "Soldiers into Capitalists: The Rise of a Military Bourgeoisie
in Pre-Revolutionary Nicaragua (1956-67)." Unpublished manuscript, April 1.
Gobierno de Nicaragua-c s t . 1993. Acuerdo. February 2.
Gonsalves, Ralph. 1977. "The Trade Union Movement in Jamaica: Its Growth and
Some Resultant Problems." In Essays on Power and Change in Jamaica, edited
by Carl Stone and Aggrey Brown, 89-105. Kingston: Jamaica Publishing House.
Gould, Jeffrey L. 1990. To Lead as Equals: Rural Protest and Political Conscious
ness in Chinandega, Nicaragua, 1912-1979. Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press.
Government of Nicaragua. 1992. "Nicaragua: Medium-Term Development Strat
egy, 1992-1996." Document presented at the Consultative Group Meeting,
Washington, D.C., March 26.

Bibliography

Gudmundson, Lowell. 1983. "Costa Rica before Coffee: Occupational Distribu
tion, Wealth Inequality and Elite Society in the Village Economy of the 1840s."
Journal of Latin American Studies 15 (November): 427-52.
Gutierrez, Roberto. 1989. Los aspectos financieros del paquete de medidas de la
reforma economica." In Politica economica y transformacion social, edited by
c ie r a , 157-94. Managua: c ie r a .
Gutman, Roy. 1988. "Nicaraguan Turning Point: How the 1984 Vote Was Sabo
taged." Nation, May 7, 642-45.
Haggard, Stephen, and Robert R. Kaufman. 1992a. "Institutions and Economic Ad
justment." In The Politics of Economic Adjustment, edited by Stephen Haggard
and Robert R. Kaufman, 3—40. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
------- . 1992b. "The Political Economy of Inflation and Stabilization in MiddleIncome Countries." In The Politics of Economic Adjustment, edited by Stephen
Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, 270-318. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Hamilton, Nora. 1982. The Limits of State Autonomy: Post-Revolutionary Mexico.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Haugaard, Lisa. 1991. "With and Against the State: Organizing Dilemmas for
Grassroots Movements in Nicaragua." Conference Paper, no. 54. New York:
Columbia University-New York University Consortium.
Heredia, Blanca. 1991. "Can Rational Profit Maximizers Be Democratic?: Busi
nessmen and Democracy in Mexico." Revised version. Paper presented at the
Conference on Business Elites and Democracy in Latin America, Kellogg Insti
tute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Ind.,
May 3-5.
------- . n.d. "Ideas vs. Interests?: The Mexican Business Community in the 1980s."
Conference Paper, no. 26. New York: Columbia University-New York Univer
sity Consortium.
Hernandez, Julio Ricardo. 1990. "El rol de los subsidios a la produccion agrope
cuaria durante el programa de ajustes 1988-1990 en Nicaragua." Unpublished
manuscript.
------- . 1991. "Evaluacion de la reforma agraria nicaragiiense y caracterizacion de la
nueva demanda campesina de tierra." Managua: Report for the Regional Office
of the Food and Agriculture Organization, July.
Hill, Roscoe R. 1933. Fiscal Intervention in Nicaragua. New York: Paul Maisal.
Hirschman, Albert 0.1973. Journeys toward Progress. New York: Norton.
Hodges, Donald C. 1986. Intellectual Foundations of the Nicaraguan Revolution.
Austin: University of Texas Press.
Huper A., William. 1992. "Balance de las medidas fiscales 1992/' Observador eco
nomico 3 (March): 13-22.
Hurtado, Osvaldo. 1980. Political Power in Ecuador. Translated by Nick D. Mills, Jr.
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
Ianni, Octavio. 1975. La formacion del estado populista en America Latina.
Mexico, D.F.: Ediciones Era.
ib r d . 1953. The Economic Development of Nicaragua. Baltimore. Johns Hopkins
University Press.

291

292

Bibliography

------- . 1981. Nicaragua: The Challenge of Reconstruction. Washington, D.C.:
IBRD.

1983. Informe economico: Nicaragua. Washington, D.C.: id b .
. 1978. Nicaragua: Reforma o revolution. Vote. 1-3. N.p.
------- . 1981. "The Case Regarding c o s e p and c a u s Members." Envio, no. 6
(November 15).
------- . 1986. "Slow Motion toward a Survival Economy." Envio 5, no. 63 (Septem
ber): 13-38.
------- . 1987. "Private Enterprise—Alive and Kicking in Nicaragua." Envio 6,
no. 70 (April): 30-39.
------- . 1988a. "Economic Reform: Taking It to the Streets." Envio 7, no. 82 (May):
12-33------- . 1988b. "More on the Economy—And More Needs to be Done." Envio 7,
no. 88 (November): 19-24.
------- . 1988c. "The New Economic Package—Will a Popular Model Emerge?"
Envio 7, no. 86 (September): 14-42.
------- . 1989. "Nicaragua: From a Mixed Up Economy toward a Socialist Mixed
Economy." Envio 8, no. 94 (May): 33-54.
------- . 1990. "Two Faces of u n o ." Envio 9, no. 108 (July): 24-37.
------- . 1991a. "The Economic Plan's Feet of Clay." Envio 10, no. 125 (December):
22- 25.
------- . 1991b. "How to Get Foreign Aid: Making the Poor Pay Isn't Enough." Envio
10, no. 118 (May): 29-38.
------- . 1991c. "Labor: Rural Workers Fight to Become Owners." Envio 10, no. 118
(May): 16-19.
------- . i99id. "Privatization: Left, Right and Center." Envio 10, no. 124 (November): 20-34.
------- . i99ie. "Property: Inside the Property Debate." Envio io, no. 121 (August):
23- 27------- . 1992a. "Economic Takeoff: The Little Train that Couldn't." Envio 11,
no. 135 (October): 18-24.
------- . 1992b. "The Foreign Debt: Lengthening the Chain?" Envio 11, no. 129
(April): 15-21.
------- . 1992c. "The FSLN-Government Balancing Act." Envio 11, no. 131 (June):
3-9------- . i992d. "The Urban Recession." Envio 11, no. 128 (March): 36.
in c a e . 1990? "Reseria Historica." Brochure.
in d e . 1965. Informe general de actividades, informe economico. Managua: in d e .
------- . 1966? Informe general de actividades, informe financiero, anexos 1965-66.
Managua: in d e .
------- . 1975. Informe anual de in d e y sus programas f u n d e y e d u c r e d it o 1974.
Managua: in d e .
------- . 1977. Informe anual de in d e y su s programas f u n d e y e d u c r e d it o 1976.
Managua: in d e .
------- . 1978. Informe anual 1977. Managua: in d e .
------- . 1979- El sector privado en la insurrection 1979. Managua: c o s e p .
id b .

ih c a

Bibliography

------- . 1980. Informe anual 1979. Managua: in d e .
in ie s . 1987. Plan economico 1987. Managua: in ie s .
in ie s e p . Cuadernos empresariales. Various issues.
Irvin, George. 1983- Nicaragua: Establishing the State as the Centre of Accumu
lation." Cambridge Journal of Economics 7:125-39.
Jarvis, Lovell S. 1989. "The Unraveling of Chile's Agrarian Reform, 1973-1986."
In Searching for Agrarian Reform in Latin America, edited by William C.
Thiesenhusen, 240-75. Boston: Unwin Hyman.
j g r n . 1983. "Economic Policy Guidelines 1983-1988." Managua: Mimeo.
Jimenez, C. Edgar. 1986. "El estado, la industrializacion y la oligarquia en El Salva
dor." In El Salvador: Estado oligarquico y desarrollo economico-social, 19451979, edited by the Centro de Investigacion y Accion Social, 3-28. Mexico, D.F.:
Centro de Investigacion y Accion Social, Cuaderno de Trabajo no. 6.
Jiron, Manuel. 1986. iQuien es quien en Nicaragua! San Jose, Costa Rica: Ediciones
Radio Amor.
Johnson, Dale L. 1968-69. "The National and Progressive Bourgeoisie in Chile."
In Dependence and Underdevelopment, edited by James D. Cockroft, Andre
Gunder Frank, and Dale L. Johnson, 165-217. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor.
Jung, Harald. 1980. "Class Struggles in El Salvador." New Left Review, no. 122
(July-August): 3-25.
Kahler, Miles. 1992. "External Influence, Conditionality, and the Politics of Ad
justment." In The Politics of Economic Adjustment, edited by Stephen Haggard
and Robert R. Kaufman, 89-138. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kaimowitz, David. 1989. "The Role of Decentralization in the Recent Nicaraguan
Agrarian Reform." In Searching for Agrarian Reform in Latin America, edited
by William C. Thiesenhusen, 384-407. Boston: Unwin Hyman.
Kaufman, Robert R., and Barbara Stallings. 1991. "The Political Economy of Latin
American Populism." In The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America,
edited by Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards, 15-44- Chicago: Univer
sity of Chicago Press.
Keith, Novella Zett, and Nelson W. Keith. 1985. "The Rise of the Middle Class in
Jamaica." In Middle Classes in Dependent Countries, edited by Dale L. John
son, 67-106. Beverly Hills: Sage.
Kleiterp, Nanno. 1988. "Implementing a New Model of Accumulation: The Case
of Nicaragua." Paper presented at the Forty-sixth International Congress of
Americanists, Amsterdam, Holland, July 4-8.
Kolko, Gabriel. 1963. The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of Ameri
can History, 1900-I9r6. Glencoe, N.Y.: Free Press.
Larios, Francisco, and Manolo Cordero. 1992. Nicaragua: La reforma tributaria
de 1992 y la reestructuracion de los incentivos para la inversion. Managua.
INCAE.

Larson, Anne. 1993. "Nicaragua's Real Property Debate." Envio 12, no. 138 (JanuaryMarch): 39-52.
Larson, Anne, with Nitlapan-ucA. 1993. "Foreign Aid: Where Have All the Dollars
Gone?" Envio 12, no. 143 (June): 4-10.
l a s a . 1984. The Electoral Process in Nicaragua: Domestic and International In-

293

294

Bibliography

fluences. Report of the l a s a Delegation to Observe the Nicaraguan General
Elections of November 4. Austin: l a s a .
------- . 1990. Electoral Democracy under International Pressure. Report of the
l a s a Commission to Observe the 1990 Nicaraguan Election. Pittsburgh: l a s a .
Leff, Nathaniel H. 1976. ''Capital Markets in the Less Developed Countries: The
Group Principle." In Money and Finance in Economic Growth and Develop
ment, edited by Ronald I. McKinnon, 97-122. New York: Marcel Dekker.
------- . 1978. "Industrial Organization and Entrepreneurship in the Develop
ing Countries: The Economic Groups." Economic Development and Cultural
Change 26, no. 4 (July): 661-75.
Lethander, Richard W. O. 1968. "The Economy of Nicaragua." Ph.D. diss., Duke
University.
Lindeman, John. 1961. Incentives to Private Industry in Nicaragua (Report to the
International Cooperation Administration /k ;a //Washington, D.C.: ic a .
Lomnitz, Larissa Adler, and Marisol Perez-Lizaur. 1987. A Mexican Elite Family,
1820—1980. Translated by Cinna Lomnitz. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Lopez, Roberto. 1986. "The Nationalization of Foreign Trade in El Salvador: The
Myths and Realities of Coffee." Occasional Papers Series, no. 16. Miami: Latin
American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University.
Lopez Vallecillos, Italo. 1979. "Fuerzas sociales y cambio social en El Salvador."
Estudios centroamericanos 34, nos. 369-70 (July-August): 557-90.
Loveman, Brian. 1976. "The Transformation of the Chilean Countryside." In Chile:
Politics and Society, edited by Arturo Valenzuela and J. Samuel Valenzuela,
238-96. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books.
Lowenthal, Abraham F., ed. 1975. The Peruvian Experiment: Continuity and
Change under Military Rule. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Luciak, Ilja A. 1987. "National Unity and Popular Hegemony: The Dialectics of
Sandinista Agrarian Reform Policies, 1979-1986." Journal of Latin American
Studies 19, part 1 (May): 113-40.
------- . 1988. "Grassroots Movements in Nicaragua: A Comparative Analysis of
the Rural Workers (a t c ) and Small Farmers (u n a g ) Associations." Paper pre
sented at the Fourteenth International Congress of the Latin American Studies
Association, New Orleans, March 17-19.
------- . (Forthcoming). The Political Economy of Transition: The Sandinista
Legacy. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
Luna, Matilde. 1992. "Las asociaciones empresariales mexicanas y la apertura ex
terna." Paper presented at the Seventeenth International Congress of the Latin
American Studies Association, Los Angeles, September 24-27.
Luna, Matilde, Ricardo Tirado, and Francisco Valdes. 1987. "Businessmen and Poli
tics in Mexico, 1982-1986." In Government and Private Sector in Contempo
rary Mexico, edited by Sylvia Maxfield and Ricardo Anzaldua Montoya, 13-44.
Monograph series no. 20. La Jolla: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University
of California, San Diego.
McClintock, Cynthia. 1981. Peasant Cooperatives and Political Change in Peru.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Bibliography

Malloy, James M., and Mitchell A. Seligson, eds. 1987. Authoritarians and Demo
crats: Regime Transition in Latin America. Pittsburgh: University of Pitts
burgh Press.
Malpica Silva Santisteban, Carlos. 1974. Los duenos del Peru. 6th ed., rev. Lima:
Ediciones Peisa.
------- . 1989. El poder economico en el Peru. Lima: Mosca Azul Editores.
Mansbridge, Jane J., ed. 1990. Beyond Self-Interest. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Marchetti, Peter. 1989. Semejanzas y diferencias en dos debates sobre el campesinado." Encuentro, nos. 37/38 (July-December): 35-46.
Martinez, Javier, and Eugenio Tironi. 1985. Las clases sociales en Chile: Cambio
y estratificacion, 1970-1980. Santiago, Chile: Ediciones Sur.
Martinez, Julia E. 1989. "La politica de reforma agraria de a r e n a ." Estudios centro
americanos 44, no. 492 (October): 843-46.
Martinez, Julia E., and Aquiles Montoya. 1990. "Un ano de politica economica de
a r e n a ." Estudios centroamericanos 45, nos. 500-501 (June-July): 427-38.
Martinez Cuenca, Alejandro. 1988. "Medidas para domar una economia desbocada."
Pensamiento propio 6, no. 52 (July/August): 19-23.
------- . 1990. Nicaragua: Una decada deretos. Managua: Editorial Nueva Nicara
gua.
------- . 1992. "The State and the Market: The Case of Nicaragua." Unpublished
manuscript, June.
Martinez Nava, Juan M. 1984. Conflicto estado-empresarios en los gobiernos de
Cardenas, Lopez Mateos y Echeverria. Mexico, D.F.: Editorial Nueva Imagen.
Maxfield, Sylvia. 1987. "Introduction." In Government and Private Sector in Con
temporary Mexico, edited by Sylvia Maxfield and Ricardo Anzaldua Montoya,
1-12. Monograph series no. 20. La Jolla: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, Uni
versity of California, San Diego.
Mayorga, Salvador. 1990. "1980-1990: Land Reform and Human Development in
Nicaragua." Mimeo.
------- . 1991. "1980-1990: Agriculture in Nicaragua." Mimeo.
Medal, Jose Luis. 1985. La revolucion nicaraguense: Balance economico y alternativas futuras. Managua: Centro de Investigaciones y Asesoria Socio-Economica
(c in a s e ).
me d e .

1991a. National Export and Investment Promotion Program. Managua:

MEDE.

------- . [1991 ]b. Nicaragua: Basic Information for the Investor. Managua: m e d e .
Medina, Luis. 1974. "Origen y circunstancia de la idea de unidad nacional/ Foro
internacional 14, no. 3 (January-March): 265-90.
Menges, Constantine C. 1966. "Public Policy and Organized Business in Chile. A
Preliminary Analysis." Journal of International Affairs 20, no. 2: 343-65.
m id in r a . 1989. "Marco Estrategico del Desarrollo Agropecuario. In La reforma
agraria en Nicaragua, 1979-1989, by c ie r a , 1:155-231. Managua: c ie r a .
------- . Plan de trabajo. Various years.
------- , Direccion de Tenencia de la Tierra. 1987- "Consolidado general. 1986.
Unpublished data, January 14.

295

296

Bibliography

------- , Direccion Superior. 1984. “Informe de la gestion estatal del m id in r a para
la j g r n (1979-1984,." Revolucion y desarrollo 1 (April-June,: 15-37.
------- , Division de Comunicaciones. 1986. "Transformacion de la Tenencia de la
Tierra para 1986." Informaciones agropecuarias 17 (June-July,: 4.
Miles, Sara, and Bob Ostertag. 1989. "D'Aubuisson's New a r e n a ." n a c l a Report
on the Americas 23, no. 2 (July,: 14-39.
Millett, Richard. 1977. Guardians of the Dynasty. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis.
Ministerio de Cooperacion Externa. 1992. "Cooperacion externa 1991 y perspectivas 1992." Managua: Unpublished document, 13 February.
Ministerio de la Presidencia. 1991. "Programa nacional de desarrollo social y
superacion de la pobreza." Draft document. Managua: Presidencia de la Republica de Nicaragua, March.
m ipl a n . 1980. Programa de reactivation economica en beneflcio del pueblo.
Managua: f s l n .
------- . 1981. Programa economico de austeridad y eficiencia '81. Managua:
MIPLAN.

Molina, Carlos, and Freddy Quezada. 1990. "La estratificacion del agro en Nicara
gua." Managua: Mimeo.
Moore, Barrington, Jr. 1966. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Bos
ton: Beacon.
Mosk, Sanford A. 1954. Industrial Revolution in Mexico. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
n a f in s a . 1978. La economia mexicana en cifras. Mexico, D.F.: n a f in s a .
------- . 1981. La economia mexicana en cifras. Mexico, D.F.: n a f in s a .
Navas Mendoza, Azucena, Adonai Jimenez Alar, Luz Adilia Caceres Vilchez, and
Arnoldo Montiel Castillo, n.d.ja,. "Algunos elementos para un analisis de los
periodos criticos del algodon en Nicaragua." Managua: Mimeo.
------- . n.d.(b). "Elementos para un analisis de los periodos criticos del algodon de
los anos 70 en Nicaragua." Managua: Mimeo.
Neira Cuadra, Oscar, and Adolfo Acevedo V. 1992. "Nicaragua, hiperinflacion y
desestabilizacion: Analisis de la politica economica, 1988 a 1991." Cuadernos
de c r ie s , no. 21.
Nelson, Joan M., ed. 1990. Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of
Adjustment in the Third World. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Nicaragua Sugar Estates, Limited. 1953. El Ingenio San Antonio, 1890-1953. Gra
nada, Nicaragua: n.p.
Nolan, David. 1984. The Ideology of the Sandinistas and the Nicaraguan Revo
lution. Coral Gables, Fla.: Institute of Interamerican Studies, University of
Miami.
North, Liisa. 1985. Bitter Grounds: Roots of Revolt in El Salvador. 2d ed. Westport,
Conn.: Lawrence Hill.
Nunez, Daniel. 1985a (interview). "If the Peasantry Did Not Trust the Revolution,
We Would Be Through." In Nicaragua: The Sandinista People’s Revolution,
edited by Bruce Marcus, 367-74. New York: Pathfinder Press.
------- . 1985b (interview). "The Producers of this Country Support Our Revo-

Bibliography

lutionary Government." In Nicaragua: The Sandinista People’s Revolution,
edited by Bruce Marcus, 359-66. New York: Pathfinder Press.
------- . 1991 (interview). "Sin nosotros no habra desarrollo economico." Envio 10,
no. h i (February): 10-13.
Nunez Soto, Orlando. 1981. El somocismo y el modelo capitalista agroexportadora. Managua: Depto. de Ciencias Sociales, u n a n .
------- . 1987. Transition y lucha de clases en Nicaragua 1979-1986. Mexico, D.F.:
Siglo Veintiuno.
------- , ed. 1991. La guerra en Nicaragua. Managua: c ipr e s .
Ocampo, Jose Antonio. 1991. "Collapse and (Incomplete) Stabilization of the Nica
raguan Economy." In The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America,
edited by Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards, 331-68. Chicago: Univer
sity of Chicago Press.
O'Donnell, Guillermo. 1973. Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism.
Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California.
O'Donnell, Guillermo, and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1986. Transitions from Authori
tarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press.
Ogliastri-Uribe, Enrique. 1986. "Estado, empresarios, sindicatos, trabajadores, administradores: Experiencias sobre gerencia y revolucion en Nicaragua." Paper
presented at the Thirteenth International Congress of the Latin American
Studies Association, Boston, October 23.
Oquist, Paul. 1992. "Sociopolitical Dynamics of the 1990 Nicaraguan Elections."
In The 1990 Elections in Nicaragua and Their Aftermath, edited by Vanessa
Castro and Gary Prevost, 1-40. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield.
Orellana, Victor Antonio. 1985. "El Salvador: Crisis and Structural Change." Occa
sional Papers Series, no. 13. Miami: Latin American and Caribbean Center,
Florida International University.
Ortega, Marvin, and Peter Marchetti. 1986. "Campesinado, democracia y revolu
cion sandinista: Notas sobre los limites y posibilidades de la democracia en
una sociedad rural atrasada." Managua: Mimeo.
Ortega S., Daniel. 1989. Programa economico 1989. Managua: Presidencia de la
Republica.
Paige, Jeffrey M. 1987. "Coffee and Politics in Central America." In Crises in the
Caribbean Basin, edited by Richard Tardanico, 141—90. Political Economy of
the World-System Series, no. 9. Beverly Hills: Sage.
------- . 1989. "Revolution and the Agrarian Bourgeoisie in Nicaragua." In Revolu
tion in the World System, edited by Terry Boswell, 99-128. New York. Green
wood.
_____. 1993. "Coffee and Power in El Salvador." Latin American Research Review
28, no. 3: 7-40.
Pasos, Maria Isabel. 1990. "Nuevas modalidades de direction.” Analisis 5 (January).
10-14.
Pastor, Robert A. 1987. Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicara
gua. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

297

298

Bibliography

Pereira, Emilio. 1991 (interview). “Fiscal Reform Measures Reverse Economic De
cline, Spur Expansion." In b c n , Nicaragua Economic Report, 1, no. 7 (Septem
ber): 4-5.
Perez, Andres. 1992. "The f s l n after the Debacle: The Struggle for the Definition
of Sandinismo.'' Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 34, no. 1
(Spring): m-39.
Perez, Ernesto. 1992. "Comportamiento del comercio exterior de Nicaragua en
1991." Revista de economia agricola, no. 4 (March): 3-15.
Perez Pineda, Carlos. 1985. "Propuesta teorica para el estudio de la burguesia en el
subsistema ganadero nicaraguense." Paper presented at the IV Congreso Nica
raguense de Ciencias Sociales, Managua, Nicaragua, August 30-September 1.
Petras, James. 1969. Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Development. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Petras, James, and Morris Morley. 1992. Latin America in the Time of Cholera.
New York: Routledge.
Phillips, Peter. 1977. "Jamaican Elites: 1938 to Present." In Essays on Power and
Change in Jamaica, edited by Carl Stone and Aggrey Brown, 1-14. Kingston:
Jamaica Publishing House.
Pilarte D., Rene, Vilma Ubau H. and Elias Guevara. 1988. "Evolucion y resultados
de las politicas economicas en el sector agricola." Boletln socioeconomico 10
(November-December): 9-17.
Pizarro, Roberto. 1987. "New Economic Policy: A Necessary Readjustment." In
The Political Economy of Revolutionary Nicaragua, edited by Rose J. Spalding,
217-32. Boston: Allen Si Unwin.
"Popular Unity's Programme." 1973. In The Chilean Road to Socialism, edited by
J. Ann Zammit, 255-84. Sussex, England: Institute of Development Studies.
Poulantzas, Nicos. 1978. Classes in Contemporary Capitalism. Translated by
David Fernbach. London: Verso.
Pryor, Frederic L. 1991. "Third World Decollectivization: Guyana, Nicaragua, and
Vietnam." Problems of Communism 40, no. 3 (May-June): 97-108.
Przeworski, Adam. 1991. Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Re
forms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer
sity Press.
Purcell, John F. H., and Susan Kaufman [Purcell]. 1976. "El estado y la empresa
privada." Nueva politica 1, no. 2 (April-June): 229-50.
Ramirez Arango, Julio Sergio. 1985. "The Political Role of the Private Sector Asso
ciations of Central America: The Cases of El Salvador, Nicaragua and Costa
Rica." Ph.D. diss., Harvard University.
Ramirez Mercado, Sergio. 1982. "Los sobrevivientes del naufragio." In Estado y
clases sociales en Nicaragua, edited by the Asociacion Nicaraguense de Cientificos Sociales, 65-87. Managua: c ie r a .
Ratcliff, Richard Earl. 1974. "Capitalists in Crisis: The Chilean Upper Class and the
September 11 Coup." Latin American Perspectives 1, no. 2 (Summer): 78-91.

Bibliography

Reano Alvarez, German, and Enrique Vasquez Huaman. 1988. El grupo Romero:
Del algodon a la banca. Lima: Centro de Investigacion de la Universidad del
Pacifico.
Reid, Stanley. 1977- An Introductory Approach to the Concentration of Power
in the Jamaican Corporate Economy and Notes on its Origin." In Essays on
Power and Change in Jamaica, edited by Carl Stone and Aggrey Brown, 15-44.
Kingston: Jamaica Publishing House.
Reinhardt, Nola. 1989. "Contrast and Congruence in the Agrarian Reforms of El
Salvador and Nicaragua." In Searching for Agrarian Reform in Latin America,
edited by William C. Thiesenhusen, 451-82. Boston: Unwin Hyman.
Republica de Nicaragua. 1990a. Acuerdos de la concertacion economica y social y
la politica exterior del gobierno de Nicaragua. Managua: Republica de Nicara
gua.
------- . i99O?b. Leyes y decretos (25 de abril-2 de agosto). Managua: n.p.
Republican Staff Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States
Senate. 1992. Nicaragua To day. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office.
Reynolds, Clark W. 1970. The Mexican Economy: Twentieth Century Structure
and Growth. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Rivera Urrutia, Eugenio. 1986. "Foreign Debt and Financial Assistance: The Case
of Central America." Occasional Papers Series, no. 17. Miami: Latin American
and Caribbean Center, Florida International University.
Robinson, William I. 1992. A Faustian Bargain: U.S. Intervention in the Nica
raguan Elections and American Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era.
Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
Rosenthal, Gert. 1982. "Principales rasgos de la evolucion de las economias centroamericanas desde la posguerra." In Centroamerica: Crisis y politica interna
cional, edited by the Centro de Capacitacion para el Desarrollo |c e c a d e | and
Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas (c id e ), 19-38. Mexico, D.F.:
Siglo Veintiuno.
Ruben, Raul, and Jan P. deGroot, eds. 1989. El debate sobre la reforma agraria en
Nicaragua. Managua: in ie s .
Ruccio, David F. 1987. "The State and Planning in Nicaragua." In The Political
Economy of Revolutionary Nicaragua, edited by Rose J. Spalding, 61-84. Bos
ton: Allen & Unwin.
Ruchwarger, Gary. 1987. People in Power: Forging a Grassroots Democracy in
Nicaragua. South Hadley, Mass.: Bergin & Garvey.
Ruiz, Henry. 1980. El papel politico del a pp en la nueva economia sandinista.
Managua: Secretaria Nacional de Propaganda y Educacion Politica del f s l n .
Saldomando, Angel. 1992. El retorno de la a id ; El caso de Nicaragua. Managua.
CRIES.

Salgado, Rene. 1987. "Economic Pressure Groups and Policy-Making in Venezuela.
The Case of f e d e c a m a r a s ." Latin American Research Review 22, no. 3: 91105.

299

300

Bibliography

Saragoza, Alex M. 1988. The Monterrey Elite and the Mexican State, 1880-1940.
Austin: University of Texas Press.
Schmitter, Philippe C. 1974. "Still the Century of Corporatism?" In The New Cor
poratism: Social-Political Structures in the Iberian World, edited by Fredrick B.
Pike and Thomas Stritch, 85-131. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame
Press.
Schneider, Ben Ross. 1988-89. "Partly for Sale: Privatization and State Strength
in Brazil and Mexico." Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 30,
no. 4 (Winter): 89 -116.
Schoultz, Lars. 1981. Human Rights and United States Policy Toward Latin
America. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Scott, James C. 1976. The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsis
tence in Southeast Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press.
------- . 1989. "Everyday Forms of Resistance." In Everyday Forms of Peasant Re
sistance, edited by Forrest D. Colburn, 3-33. Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe.
Selser, Gabriela. 1990. "New Reduction for e ps ." Barricada international 10, no. 330
(December): 14-15.
Sen, Amartya K. 1990. "Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations
of Economic Theory." In Beyond Self-Interest, edited by Jane J. Mansbridge,
25-43. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Sequeira, Carlos Guillermo. 1981. "State and Private Marketing Arrangements in
the Agricultural Export Industries: The Case of Nicaragua's Coffee and Cot
ton." Ph.D. diss., Harvard University.
Sevilla, Manuel. 1985. "La concentracion economica en El Salvador." Cuadernos
de pensamiento propio. Managua: in ie s .
Shafer, Robert Jones. 1973. Mexican Business Organizations: History and Analy
sis. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press.
Sheahan, John. 1991. Conflict and Change in Mexican Economic Strategy. La Jolla:
Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego.
Sholk, Richard. 1984. "The National Bourgeoisie in Post-Revolutionary Nicara
gua." Comparative Politics 16, no. 3 (April): 253-76.
Silva, Eduardo. 1992. "Business Associations, Neoliberal Economic Restructuring,
and Redemocratization in Chile, 1973-1991." Paper presented at the Annual
Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September
3-6.
Silva Herzog, Jesus. 1975. Lazaro Cardenas: Su pensamiento economico, social y
politico. Mexico, D.F.: Editorial Nuestro Tiempo.
Skocpol, Theda. 1979. States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of
France, Russia and China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
------- .1980. "Political Response to Capitalist Crisis: Neo-Marxist Theories of the
State and the Case of the New Deal." Politics and Society 10, no. 2: 157-201.
Smith, Peter. 1979. Labyrinths of Power: Political Recruitment in Twentieth Cen
tury Mexico. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Sojo, Carlos. 1991. La utopia del estado mlnimo: Influencia de a id en Costa Rica
en los ahos ochenta. Managua: c r ie s .

Bibliography

Soza, Roberto. 1992. "Un nuevo sector economico de base popular." LAvispa, no. 8
(January-February): 33-44.
Spalding, Rose J., ed. 1987a. The Political Economy of Revolutionary Nicaragua.
Boston: Allen Si Unwin.
------- . 1987b. "State-Private Sector Relations in Nicaragua: The Somoza Era."
Paper presented at Midwest Latin American Studies Association Meeting, Chi
cago, November 6-7.
. 1988. "The Agricultural Bourgeoisie and the Nicaraguan Revolution."
Paper presented at the Fourteenth International Congress of the Latin Ameri
can Studies Association, New Orleans, March 17-19.
------- . 1991. "Preliminary Report on g r a c s a ." Unpublished manuscript, August.
Spoor, Max. 1987. Datos macro-economicos de Nicaragua (1960-1980). Managua:
u n a n Facultad de Ciencias Economicas, Depto. de Economia Agricola.
------- . 1989. "Reforma economica y credito rural en Nicaragua (1988-89)." Paper
prepared for the Fifteenth International Congress of the Latin American Studies
Association, San Juan, Puerto Rico, September.
Spoor, Max, and Orlando Mendoza. 1988. "Agricultural Price Policy in Transition:
The Case of Nicaragua (1979-1988)." Paper presented at the Fourteenth Inter
national Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, New Orleans,
March 17-19.
s pp . 1985a. "Bosquejo del plan economico 1986." Internal report, June.
------- . 1985b. "Evaluation y perspectivas economicas 1985." Internal report, June.
Stahler-Sholk, Richard. 1987. "Foreign Debt and Economic Stabilization Policies
in Revolutionary Nicaragua." In The Political Economy of Revolutionary Nica
ragua, edited by Rose J. Spalding, 151-68. Boston: Allen Si Unwin.
------- . 1988. "Stabilization, Destabilization, and the Popular Sector in Nicara
gua, 1979-87." Paper presented at the Fourteenth International Congress of the
Latin American Studies Association, New Orleans, March 17-19.
------- . 1990. "Stabilization Policies under Revolutionary Transition: Nicaragua,
1979-1990." Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley.
------- . 1992. "Labor/Party/State Dynamics in Nicaragua: Union Responses to
Austerity under the Sandinista and u n o Governments." Paper presented at the
Seventeenth International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association,
Los Angeles, September 24-27.
Stahler-Sholk, Richard, and Max Spoor. 1989. "Nicaragua: Las politicas macro
economicas y sus efectos en la agricultura y la seguridad alimentaria." Paper
prepared for a pa n /c a d e s c a /c e e Seminar, Managua, Nicaragua, August 2527.
Stallings, Barbara. 1978. Class Conflict and Economic Development in Chile, 1958—
1973. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
------- . 1979. "Peru and the U.S. Banks: Privatization of Financial Relations.
In Capitalism and the State in U.S.—Latin American Relations, edited by
Richard R. Fagen, 217-53. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
_____. 1989. "The Political Economy of Democratic Transition: Chile in the
1980s." In Debt and Democracy in Latin America, edited by Barbara Stallings
and Robert Kaufman, 181-200. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

301

302

Bibliography

------- . 1992. “International Influence on Economic Policy: Debt, Stabilization,
and Structural Reform." In The Politics of Economic Adjustment, edited by
Stephen Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, 41-88. Princeton: Princeton Univer
sity Press.
Stepan, Alfred. 1978. The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Stephens, Evelyne Huber, and John D. Stephens. 1986. Democratic Socialism in
Jamaica. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
------- . 1990. "Capitalists, Socialism and Democracy: An Analysis of Business
Attitudes toward Political Democracy in Jamaica." Comparative Social Re
search 12:341-79.
Stephens, John D. 1979. The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism. London:
Macmillan.
Stone, Samuel Z. 1983. "Production and Politics in Central America's Convul
sions." Journal of Latin American Studies 15, no. 2 (November,: 453-69.
------- . 1990. The Heritage of the Conquistadors: Ruling Classes in Central
America from the Conquest to the Sandinistas. Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press.
Strachen, Harry W. 1976. Family and Other Business Groups in Economic Devel
opment: The Case of Nicaragua. New York: Praeger.
Strasma, John. 1989. "Unfinished Business: Consolidating Land Reform in El Salva
dor." In Searching for Agrarian Reform in Latin America, edited by William C.
Thiesenhusen, 408-28. Boston: Unwin Hyman.
------- . 1990. "Reforming the 1980 Land Reform: An Analysis of Proposals to
Consolidate Debts and Allow Beneficiaries to Decide on Land Ownership and
Production in Land Reform Projects in El Salvador." Unpublished report to
u s a id , June.
Taylor, Chris. 1989. "In Search of the Aquino effect.'" Barricada international 9,
no. 300 (September 16,: 3-4.
Taylor, Lance, et al. 1989. "Report of an Economic Mission to the Government
of Nicaragua." Report for the Swedish International Development Authority,
April 5.
Teichman, Judith. 1981. "Interest Conflict and Entrepreneurial Support for Peron."
Latin American Research Review 16, no. 1: 144-55.
Thiesenhusen, William C. 1989. "Introduction." In Searching for Agrarian Re
form in Latin America, edited by William C. Thiesenhusen, 1-41. Boston:
Unwin Hyman.
Torres, Rosa Maria, and Jose Luis Coraggio. 1987. Transicion y crisis en Nicaragua.
San Jose, Costa Rica: Departamento Ecumenico de Investigaciones.
Torres-Rivas, Edelberto. 1989. Repression and Resistance: The Struggle for Democ
racy in Central America. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
Tullock, Gordon. 1979. "Public Choice in Practice." In Collective Decision
Making: Applications from Public Choice Theory, edited by Clifford S. Russell,
27-45. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
u n a g . 1993. "La estrategia de desarrollo agropecuario en Nicaragua: Una vision

Bibliography

desde la u n a g ." Foro sobre una Estrategia de Desarrollo Agropecuario en Nica
ragua. Managua, e s e c a -u n a n , pn u d -b id , r u t a , c o n a g r o , February 23.
. n.d. Banco del Campo, b a n c a m , S.A.: Resumen del proyecto. N.p.
---- . Productores. Various issues.
u n o . 1989. "Programa de gobierno de la Union Nacional Opositora." Managua:
Mimeo, August 24.
u pa n ic . 1985. "Acuerdo." July 2.
. 1992. "Comunicado." June n. (Published in La Prensa, June 21,1992.,
------- . n.d. "Directorio 1988-89." Unpublished document.
u s a id . 1990. "Status of the us a id /Nicaragua Program." Unpublished report, Sep
tember.
------- . 1992. "u s a id Programs in Nicaragua: A Brief Description and Current
Status." Unpublished report, June 10.
------- • 1993- "u s a id Program in Nicaragua: A Brief Description and Current
Status." Unpublished report, April 6.
U.S. Department of State. 1988. Nicaraguan Biographies: A Resource Book. Wash
ington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State.
U.S. g a o . 1991. Aid to Nicaragua: Status of U.S. Assistance to the Democratically
Elected Government. Washington, D.C.: g a o .
------- . 1992. Aid to Nicaragua: U.S. Assistance Supports Economic and Social
Development. WWashington, D.C.: g a o .
Utting, Peter. 1991. Economic Adjustment under the Sandinistas: Policy Reform,
Food Security and Livelihood in Nicaragua. Geneva: United Nations Research
Institute for Social Development.
Valdes, Mauricio. 1989. "Reformismo y guerra: Una evaluacion de la nacionalizacion bancaria de El Salvador." Estudios centroamericanos 44, no. 492 (October):
791-808.
Valenzuela, Arturo. 1978. The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile. Balti
more: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Vichas, Robert Paul. 1967. "External Financing of the Nicaraguan Development
Experiment." Ph.D. diss., University of Florida.
Vickers, George R., and Jack Spence. 1992. "Nicaragua Two Years after the Fall."
World Policy Journal 9, no. 3 (Summer): 533-62.
Vilas, Carlos M. 1986. The Sandinista Revolution. Translated by Judy Butler. New
York: Monthly Review Press.
------- . 1990. "What Went Wrong." n a c l a Report on the Americas 24, no. 1 (June):
10-18.
------- .1992. "Family Affairs: Class, Lineage and Politics in Contemporary Nica
ragua." Journal of Latin American Studies 24, no. 2 (May): 309-41.
Villanueva, Benjamin. 1985. "Changing Relations between the State and the Econ
omy in Central America." Occasional Papers Series, no. 9. Miami: Latin Ameri
can and Caribbean Center, Florida International University.
Vogl Baldizon, Alberto. 1985. Nicaragua con amor y humor. 2d ed. Managua:
Ministerio de Cultura.

303

304

Bibliography

Walker, David W. 1986. Kinship, Business, and Politics: The Martinez del Rio
Family in Mexico, 1823-1867. Austin: University of Texas Press.
Walker, Thomas W., ed. 1985. Nicaragua: The First Five Years. New York: Praeger.
Walter, Knut. 1993. The Regime of Anastasio Somoza, 1936-1936. Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press.
Warnken, Phillip F. 1975. The Agricultural Development of Nicaragua: An Analy
sis of the Production Sector. Columbia: Agricultural Experiment Section, Uni
versity of Missouri, Columbia.
Waterbury, John. 1992. "The Heart of the Matter?: Public Enterprise and the Ad
justment Process." In The Politics of Economic Adjustment, edited by Stephen
Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, 182-220. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Weeks, John. 1985. The Economies of Central America. New York: Holmes Si
Meier.
------- . 1987. "The Mixed Economy in Nicaragua: The Economic Battlefield." In
The Political Economy of Revolutionary Nicaragua, edited by Rose J. Spalding,
42-60. Boston: Allen Si Unwin.
Weyland, Kurt. 1992. "The Dispersion of Business Influence in Brazil's New
Democracy." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political
Science Association, Chicago, September 3-6.
Wheelock Roman, Jaime. 1980a. Frente sandinista: Hacia la ofensiva final. Havana,
Cuba: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.
------- . 1980b. Nicaragua: Imperialismo y dictadura. Havana, Cuba: Editorial de
Ciencias Sociales.
------- . 1983. El gran desafio. Managua: Editorial Nueva Nicaragua.
------- . 1984. "El sector agropecuario en la transformacion revolucionaria." Revo
lucion y desarrollo 1 (April-June): 5-14.
------- . 1985. Entre la crisis y la agresion: La reforma agraria sandinista. Managua:
Editorial Nueva Nicaragua.
------- . 1990. La reforma agraria sandinista. Managua: Editorial Vanguardia.
------- . 1991. La verdad sobre la pinata. Managua: Instituto para el Desarrollo de
la Democracia.
Wilkie, James W. 1970. The Mexican Revolution: Federal Expenditures and Social
Change since 1910. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Williams, Robert G. 1986. Export Agriculture and the Crisis in Central America.
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Wils, Frits C. M. 1975. Industrialists, Industrialization and the Nation State in
Peru. The Hague: Institute of Social Studies.
Winn, Peter. 1986. Weavers of Revolution: The Yarur Workers and Chile's Road to
Socialism. New York and London: Oxford University Press.
Winson, Anthony. 1985. "Nicaragua's Private Sector and the Sandinista Revolu
tion." Studies in Political Economy 7 (Summer): 71-106.
w o l a (Washington Office on Latin America). 1992. "U.S. Policy and Property
Rights in Nicaragua: Undermining the Search for Consensus." Nicaragua Issue
Brief, no. 2 (December).

Bibliography

Wolf, Daniel H. 1992. "a r e n a in the Arena: Factors in the Accommodation of
the Salvadoran Right to Pluralism and the Broadening of the Political System/'
Memorandum presented to the United Nations Observers Mission in El Salva
dor, January 20.
Wright, Thomas L. 1982. Landowners and Reform in Chile: The Sociedad Nacional
de Agricultura, 1919-1940. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Wynia, Gary. 1972. Politics and Planners: Economic Development Policy in Cen
tral America. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
------- . 1990. Politics of Latin American Development. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
"Year in Review 1991." 1992. Barricada international 12, no. 345 (January): 20-22.
Zalkin, Michael. 1990. "The Sandinista Agrarian Reform: 1979-1990." Interna
tional Journal of Political Economy 20, no. 3 (Fall): 56-68.
Zeitlin, Maurice. 1984. The Civil Wars in Chile (or the Bourgeois Revolutions
That Never Were). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Zeitlin, Maurice, and Richard Earl Ratcliff. 1988. Landlords and Capitalists: The
Dominant Class of Chile. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Zevallos L., Jose Vicente. 1989. "Agrarian Reform and Structural Change: Ecua
dor since 1964." In Searching for Agrarian Reform in Latin America, edited by
William C. Thiesenhusen, 42-69. Boston: Unwin Hyman.

305

index

(Asociacion de Algodoneros de
Chinandega), 139-40
a d a l (Asociacion de Algodoneros de
Leon), 266 (n. 24)
a d e x (Asociacion de Exportadores)
(Peru), 26,194,199, 204
Agrarian reform, 229 (n. 13); in Chile,
5, 7-8, 229 (n. 12); in El Salvador, 1415, 18, 232-33 (n. 34), 233 (n. 36); in
Mexico, 20, 236 (nn. 54, 55); in Peru, 24,
238 (n. 69); in Ecuador, 235 (n. 50); in
Jamaica, 240 (n. 84)
—in Nicaragua: laws, 66, 70, 76, 83,145,
254 (n. 40); pace of, 81, 83-84,105-6,
112,114,121, 254 (n. 39), 257 (n. 13); Tri
bunal Agrario, ii2; land titles, 166-67,
272 (n. 26); compensation, 251 (n. n)
Agroindustrial projects, 74, 79-80, 98-99,
213-14, 256 (n. 1). See also a pp; pip
Aleman, Arnoldo, 260 (n. 38), 275 (n. 48)
Allende, Salvador, 4, 5, 7-10, 229-30
(n. 16), 230-31 (n. 21). See also u p
Alliance for Progress, 39
a n a r (Asociacion Nicaraguense de Arroceros de Riego), 91, 109, 255 (nn. 43,
adach

44)
(Asociacion Nacional de la Em
presa Privada) (El Salvador), 14,17,
192,197, 232 (n. 33), 232-33 (n. 34)/ 235
(n. 46)
a n s c a (Algodoneros Nicaragiienses
Sociedad Cooperativa Anonima), 243
(n. 8), 246 (n. 34)
a pe n n (Asociacion Nicaraguense de Pro
ductores y Exportadores de Productos
No-Tradicionales), 161, 184-85, 276
(n. 56)
anep

(Area de Propiedad del Pueblo):
development model, 65-66, 74-76;
APPistas, 74; economic problems, 76,
213; resources, 76-78, 106; reorgani
zation, 103, 177, 252 (n. 20). See also
Agroindustrial projects; Credit policy;

a pp

pi p

(Alianza Republicana Nacionalista) (El Salvador), 17-18, 207, 235
(n. 48)
a s g a n i c (Asociacion de Ganaderos de
Nicaragua), 46, 60. See also f a g a n ic
Asociacion de Confiscados, 181. See also
Sequeira, Arges
a t c (Asociacion de Trabajadores del
Campo), 172, 174-76
ar ena

(Banco de America), 36, 41, 43,
69, 182, 244-45 (n. 18)
Banco Centroamericano, 42
Banco del Campo, 186, 277 (n. 59). See
also UNAG
b a n i c (Banco Nicaraguense), 36, 41, 69,
182, 245 (n. 19)
Banking systems: in Chile, 7; in El Salva
dor, 13-16,18, 234 (nn. 40, 41, 42)
—in Nicaragua: bank development,
35-36, 39, 44, 241 (n. 3); bank national
ization, 66, 85; return of private banks,
161,169, 181-82. See also b a n a me r ;
Banco del Campo; b a n ic ; b a n pr o ;
Credit policy
b a n pr o (Banco de la Produccion), 27778 (n. 61)
Bolanos, Enrique, 109,118-19, 163, 167,
262 (n. 53). See also c o s e p
Bolanos, Nicolas, 260 (n. 38), 275 (n. 48)
b a n a me r

307

308

Index

Borge, Tomas, 71, 250 (n. 6)
Bourgeoisie: unity/divisions within,
x, 1-5, 11, 19, 29-31, 132-33, 194;
"progressive," xi, 1-2; monopoly/
non-monopoly, 2, 227 (n. 2); role of
oligarchy in segmentation, 11-12, 19,
29, 189-90,192-96; role of autonomy
in segmentation, 29, 190, 196-201;
role of threat perceptions in segmen
tation, 29, 190, 201-6; role of political
institutionalization in segmentation,
29-30,190-91, 206-10; role of eco
nomic viability in segmentation, 30,
210-14; authority of, 71, 135-37; moral
vision of, 113, 127, 192; foreign control
of, 279 (n. 3). See also Economic elite,
Nicaraguan; Kinship units; Media;
Populism
Bush administration, 157, 160-61, 184,
269 jn. 1)
(Central American Common
Market), 39, 88, 244 (n. 15)
c a d e (Conferencia Anual de Empresa
rios) (Peru), 26
c a d i n (Camara de Industrias de Nicara
gua), 45, 56, 60, 246 (n. 28)
Calley Dagnell, 169
Camara de Comercio de Nicaragua,
44-45, 56-58, 60
Campesinistas, 74, 76, 103-4, 251 (n. 13)
c a n a c in t r a (Camara Nacional de la
Industria de Transformacion) (Mexico),
22-23, 194, 198, 204, 237 (n. 62)
Capital flight, 8, 20, 29, 59, 237 (n. 59)
Cardenas, Lazaro, 4, 20-21, 204
c a r n i c (Carmceria de Nicaragua), 18586. See also u n a g
Carrion, Luis, 109, 250 (n. 5)
c a s (Cooperativa Agricola Sandinista),
77, 251(n.13)
Castillo Ortiz, Marcos Antonio, 60
Cattle sector: development of, 37-38, 243
(nn. 11, 12); Somoza regime support for,
38, 46; problems in, 183
ccs (Cooperativa de Credito y Servicio),
77, 251 (n. 13)
Cesar, Alfredo, 164, 270-71 (n. 15)
cacm

Chamorro, Pedro Joaquin, 55-56
Chamorro, Violeta Barrios de: member
of j g r n , 61, 67-68; president of Nica
ragua, 119, 156, 163-65, 184, 262 (n. 53).
See also Chamorro government
Chamorro government: foreign financing
for, 161; relations with U.S. govern
ment, 161-62, 178, 270 (nn. 10, 12);
economic team, 162-63; "social mar
ket" platform, 163-64; use of executive
powers, 164, 271 (n. 21); relations with
f s l n , 164-65, 171-74,177-80,• relations
with economic elites, 165-66, 180-87,
271-72 (n. 23); economic policy, 16670, 273 (nn. 33, 34, 35); relations with
military, 168, 177-79, 270 (n. 11), 271
(n. 16); reduction of state personnel,
168-69, 172, 178-79; political base,
171; poverty programs, 274-75 (n- 42).
See also Chamorro, Violeta Barrios
de; Concertacion-, Lacayo, Antonio;
Neoliberalism; Privatization; u s a i d
Chile, 5-11; Matte and Edwards fami
lies, 8, 230 (n. 17), 231 (n. 23). See also
Kinship units
c i a (Central Intelligence Agency) (United
States), 10, 198
c i e r a (Centro de Investigaciones y Estu
dios de la Reforma Agraria), 71, 103,
263-64 (n. 8)
c i s a (Comercial Industrial, S.A.), 169
Coffee sector: in El Salvador, 12-13, 1517, 34—35, 234-35 (n. 45); in Costa Rica,
34
—in Nicaragua: development of, 34-35;
Jinotega growers, 35, 115, 122; decline
in, 100, 183; conflicts with f s l n , 114U
(Corporacion Industrial del Pueblo),
120
Colegio Centroamerica, 128, 264 (n. 11)
Comision Nacional de Revision de Confiscaciones, 167
Commissions: consultative, 108-10, 25758 (n. 18); agricultural, 110-11, 115, 205,
258 (n. 23)
c o n a l (Comision Nacional del Algo
don), 44-45
c o ip

Index
(Comision Nacional del Cafe),
260 (n. 38)
c o n c a mi n (Confederacion de Camaras
Industriales) (Mexico), 22
c o n c a n a c o (Confederacion Nacional de
Camaras de Comercio) (Mexico), 22
Concertacion, no, 259 (n. 25)
—in Nicaragua: 1989 concertacion, no12, 205, 259 (n. 29); Concertacion I,
171-73; Concertacion II, 173, 274 (nn.
39/ 40)
Consejo de Estado, 67-69
Contra war, 70, 77, 83, 98,101-2, 209-10,
213. See also Reagan administration
Cooperatives, 45, 77,104, 166-67, ^57
(n. 13). See also c a s ; c c s
Coordinadora Democratica, 261 (n. 51)
c o pa r me x (Confederacion Patronal de
la Republica Mexicana), 22, 198, 237
(n. 63)
c o pr o c o (Confederacion de la Produc
cion y el Comercio) (Chile), 6, 197, 231
(n. 22)
c o r d e n i c (Comision sobre la Recuperacion y el Desarrollo de Nicaragua),
116-17, H9/ 122, 162, 261 (nn. 47, 49).
See also Sanford Commission
c o r n a p (Corporaciones Nacionales
del Sector Publico), 167,176. See also
Privatization
Coronel Kautz, Ricardo, ix, 80, 251 (n. 15)
c o s e p (Consejo Superior de la Empresa
Privada), 30, 60, 67, 161; as peak asso
ciation, 48; forces supporting devel
opment of, 49-52; membership, 60,
247-48 (n. 42), 265 (n. 19); conflicts
With FSLN, 63, 70-71, 112, 114, 200;
divisions within, 107, 115, 142-45;
organizational style, 116,181; relations
with Chamorro government, 163, 18081, 262 (n. 53). See also cosiP; i n d e ;
concaf e

UPANIC

(Consejo Superior de la Iniciativa Privada), 52-54, 60, 200. See also

c o s ip

COSEP

Cotton sector: international prices, 36;
Somoza support for, 36, 242-43 (n. 7);
urban base of cotton bourgeoisie, 36-

37; decline in, 100, 182-83; Sandinista
subsidies for, 148-49, 255 (n. 46)
Credit policy: saneamiento, 76, 85; pri
orities, 76—77, 85, 106-7, 253-54 (n. 35);
credito rural, 77; credito bancario, 85 ■
long-term credit, 85; repayment, 86,
254 (n. 36); interest rates, 99, 107; of
Chamorro government, 170
Cristiani, Alfredo, 17
Cruz, Arturo, 261 (n. 51)
c s t (Central Sandinista de Trabajadores),
172, 176
Cuadra, Gilberto, 163, 262 (n. 54)
Cuadra, Jaime, 163, 258 (n. 23), 260 (n. 38)
Cuba, 74, 251 (n. 14)
DAubuisson, Roberto, 17
Democratic socialism, xi, 2, 5, 11, 228
(n. 6)
Development models, 65-66, 73-78,
103-5
Dreyfus, Enrique, 116, 270 (n. 13)
Duarte, Jose Napoleon, 17-18, 233 (n. 35),
235 In. 46)
(Economic Commission on Latin
America), 74-75,159
e c o d e pa (Empresa Cooperativa de Pro
ductores Agropecuarios), 169, 185. See
also UNAG
Economic elite, Nicaraguan: political
segmentation of, 30, 32, 43, 47-48/ 11321, 123-32, 153-55/ 180-87, 195-96;
early development of, 33-40; and tech
nology, 37—38, 86; economic groups,
40-43,181-82, 187; bargaining strate
gies, 43, 47, 171-74, 180-87; relations
with Somoza regime, 49-52, 54-58,
60-61, 108-9, 246 (n. 33), 248 (nn. 43,
45, 46); links to political parties, 57-58,
114,118-21, 263 (n. 7); emigration, 62,
114, 163,181,188, 259 (n. 35); participa
tion in f s l n government, 67, 112-13,
120, 262 (n. 57), 266 (n. 24); disarticu
lation, 67,196; access to land, 83-85,
105-6, 112, 114; access to credit, 8586, 106-7, 253—54 (n- 35); chapiolla,

ecl a

309

3io

Index
92-94, 122, 141, 255 (n. 47); altered
by revolution, 105, 187-88; increased
resources for, 106-7, m-12, 120-21;
relations with f s l n , 108-10, 116-18,
121, 204-6, 214, 258 (n. 21), 261 (n. 50),
263 (nn. 4, 5); ideologies, 113, 123-32;
colaboradores historicos, 127; leaders'
views of f s l n by landholdings, 133-35,
143-44; stratification of, 133-39, 26364 (n. 8); immigrants' role in, 135, 264
(n. 10); leaders' views of f s l n by edu
cation, 136-39, 143-44; leaders' views
of f s l n by experience abroad, 137-39,
264 (n. 13); links to foreign powers,
137—39/ 2^4 (n. 13), 265 (n. 21); leaders'
views of f s l n by organization, 139-42;
leaders' views of f s l n by leadership
level, 142-44; leaders' views of f s l n by
expropriation, 145-47; leaders' views
of f s l n by product, 147-49; impact of
leaders' views on investment, 150-52;
impact of leaders' views on production,
152-53; views of Chamorro govern
ment, 165—66, 180-87, 272 (n. 24), 276
(n. 53). See also Bourgeoisie; c o s e p;
Media; Private sector associations;
UNAG; UPANIC

Economic policy, Sandinista: develop
ment strategy, 65-67, 74-80, 87, 98-99,
121, 149; economic crisis, 98-102, 21314; adjustment policy, 101-2; conces
sions to elites, 105-6, m-12, 120-21.
See also Agroindustrial projects; a pp;
Contra war; f s l n
Ecuador, 193, 210, 235-36 (n. 50), 280
(n. 10)
Elections, 193; in Chile, 9, 207; in El
Salvador, 17-18, 207
—in Nicaragua: in 1984, 114, 118, 209,
261-62 (n. 52); in 1990, 118-21, 262
(nn. 57, 62)
El Salvador, 11-18; reform efforts, 12, 14,
17; death squads, 15, 233 (n. 34). See
also Coffee sector; Oligarchy
e n a l (Empresa Nicaraguense del Algo
don), 67
e ps (Ejercito Popular Sandinista). See
Military; Ortega, Humberto

Esquipulas II peace accords, 116-17, 261
(n. 44)
(Federacion de Asociaciones
Ganaderas de Nicaragua), 60, 109, 249
(n. 53), 262 (n. 58)
f a o (Frente Amplio Opositor), 58-59, 249
(n. 51)
f is e (Fondo de Inversiones Sociales de
Emergencia), 274-75 (n. 42)
f n i (Fondo Nicaraguense de Inversion),

f a g a n ic

79
(Fondo de Desarrollo de la
Industria Lactea), 109,115, 122, 259
(n. 33). See also Lopez, Juan Diego
Foreign aid, 91, 100, 103, 112, 115, 251
(n. 14), 256 (n. 5); to Chamorro govern
ment, 161-62, 269 (n. 7)
f s l n (Frente Sandinista de Liberacion
Nacional): relations with economic
elite, 30, 65, 67-68, 86-87,107-12,11718,120-22,155, 216, 261 (n. 50); weak
ness in early 1970s, 50, 54, 58; divisions
within, 59, 68, 95, 103, 250 (n. 5), 256
(n. 6); ideology, 64-65, 68-76, 86-94,
103-5; class extraction, 65, 95,117, 258
(n. 20); internal structure, 68-69, 25°
(n. 5); consolidation of power, 68-70,
209, 250 (n. 6); views on bourgeoi
sie, 69, 71, 73, 81, 87-96, 104-5, 2O5z
214; relationship with labor, h i , 165;
electoral strategy, 118-21; electoral
defeat, 121; Sandinista bourgeoisie, 134,
186-87; accords with Chamorro gov
ernment, 164,171-80, 216, 275 (n. 45);
conflicts with Chamorro government,
171; pinata, 179, 186, 272 (n. 26), 274
(n. 40); mass base, 209-10; ownership
of businesses, 277 (n. 60). See also
Economic policy, Sandinista

f o n d il a c

Godoy, Virgilio, 119, 262 (n. 53)
Gorostiaga, Xabier, 261 (n. 45)
g r a c s a (Grasas y Aceites, S.A.), 15152, 268 (n. 38), 268-69 (n. 39). See also
Lacayo, Antonio; Robelo, Alfonso
Granada, 33, 114, 122, 135
Gurdian, Ramiro, ix, 112, 115, 121

Index

Helms, Jesse, 162, 270 (n. 10)
(International Bank of Reconstruc
tion and Development). See World
Bank
i d b (Inter-American Development Bank),
36, 161
i f a g a n , 46
i h c a (Instituto Historico Centroameri
cano), 103
i mf (International Monetary Fund), 28,
157,161,198
i n c a e (Instituto Centroamericano de
Administracion de Empresas), 162, 270
(n. 14)
Incer, Roberto, 58
i n d e (Instituto Nicaraguense de Desarro
llo), 51-52, 54-55/ 60, 200, 247 (n. 41);
links to urban bourgeoisie, 51; links to
u s a id and Inter-American Foundation,
51 •, relations with Somoza, 51, 55, 58;
role in c o s ip , 52, 248 (n. 44); mem
bership, 54, 247 (n. 38); projects, 247
(n. 40). See also c o s e p; c o s ip
Industrial sector: in Chile, 5-6, 8; in El
Salvador, 14; in Mexico, 21; in Peru, 25,
238-39 (n.73)
—in Nicaragua: development of, 3839, 244 (n. 14); decline of, 88. See also
ibr d

CACM

(Instituto de Fomento Nacio
nal), 38, 44, 46
Institutionalization, 206, 279 (n. 7);
political, 29-30, 190-91, 206-10;
economic, 210-14. See also Revolution
Investments, private: in Chile, 9, 230
(n. 18); in Mexico, 23; in Peru, 25, 230
(n. 18), 240 (n. 81); in Nicaragua, 41-43,
150-52, 253 (n. 34), 268 (n. 37)
Investments, state: in Mexico, 23; in
Peru, 25; in Nicaragua, 79-81, 252
(n. 25)
i s a (Ingenio San Antonio), ix, 56, 75, 114,
167, 251-52 (n. 16), 260 (n. 39). See also
Pellas family
in f o n a c

Jamaica, 194,197, 240-41 (n. 84), 279 (nn.
5, 6)

(Jamaica Exporters' Association), 194
(Junta de Gobierno de Reconstruc
cion Nacional), 60, 67-68

j ea

jgr n

Kinship units, 3, 5, 43, 201-2, 227-28
In. 3)
Labor, 2- in Chile, 8, 202, 228 (n. 8); in
Mexico, 20; in Peru, 27; in Nicaragua,
50, 102, h i , 165,172—74, 259 (n. 26),
271 (n. 22). See also Privatization
Lacayo, Antonio, 117,119, 151, 162, 184,
259 (n. 27), 268 (n. 38). See also Chamo
rro government; g r a c s a
La Prensa, 56, 119, 200
Leon, 36, 266 (n. 24)
Liberal-Conservative warfare, 33-34, 195
Lopez, Juan Diego, 115, 117, 120, 260
(n. 41)
Los Doce, ix, 55, 58-59, 248-49 (n. 48)
Martinez Cuenca, Alejandro, 97,101-5,
205, 256 (n. 6)
Matadero Modelo, 38, 46
Mayorga, Francisco, 116, 164, 270 (n. 13),
27i(n. 19)
md n (Movimiento Democratico Nica
raguense), 57-58. See also Robelo,
Alfonso
me d a (Marco Estrategico del Desarro
llo Agropecuario), 73, 79, 83. See also
MIDINRA

Media, 29; elite control over, 11, 197, 199;
Nicaraguan elite use of, 70,141-42,
200, 206; in Chile, 231 (n. 23)
Methodology, 4; structural analysis, x,
123, 217; strategic choice analysis,
xi, 227 (n. 1); positional/reputational
method, 123,131; research design,
219-20, 263 (n. 6)
Mexico, 19-24/ *94/ 238 (n. 53)
Middle-sized producers: in Chile, 6, n,
202; in El Salvador, 14, 232 (n. 32); in
Mexico, 21
—in Nicaragua: importance of, 37, 8890, 243 (n. 9); expropriation of, 205
mi d in r a (Ministerio de Desarrollo Agro-

311

312

Index
pecuario y Reforma Agraria), 75, 79, 92,
i o i , 103-4. See also Wheelock, Jaime
Military, 29; in Chile, 10-11, 206; in El
Salvador, 12, 14-15, 17-18, 206; in Peru,
24-28, 208; in Nicaragua, 83, 98, 178,
260 (n. 36). See also Ortega, Humberto;
Vivas, Rene
Montealegre, Eduardo, 41-42, 182, 245
(n. 19). See also b a n i c
Monterrey (Mexico), 20, 22-23, 2°4z 238
(n. 67)
National assembly, 118, 164, 271 (n. 20),
274 (n. 40)
Nationalization, 29, 201-4; in Chile, 7-9,
201-3, 229 (nn. T4/ 15,16); in El Salva
dor, 15-16, 202-3; in Mexico, 21, 201,
203; in Peru, 25, 201, 203, 239 (nn. 75,
76); in Jamaica, 203, 240 (n. 84)
—in Nicaragua, 204-6, 215, 253 (n. 27);
Decrees #3 and #38, 66,120; 1981 de
cree, 70, 250-51 (n. 10); expropriation,
83—85, 146, 254 (nn. 39, 40), 267 (n. 28).
See also Agrarian reform
Neoliberalism: forces supporting, 157-60,
269 (n. 3); opposition to, 159-60
—in Nicaragua, 166-70; begun under
f s l n , 160; labor opposition to, 165;
elite's views of, 165-66,183-84; devia
tions from orthodox model, 171,17480; occupational conversion plan, 172,
178-79, 273 (n. 30). See also Chamorro
government; i mf ; u s a i d
Nunez, Daniel, 93-94, 255-56 (n. 48). See
also UNAG
Nunez, Orlando, 261 (n. 45). See also
CIERA

Obando y Bravo, Miguel, 55
o c a l s a (Organizacion Cesar Augusto
Lacayo, S.A.), i~n (n. 61)
Oligarchy, 11-12, 19, 29, 189-95; in El
Salvador, 12-14, 18, 192; in Peru, 24,
194; in Nicaragua, 32, 195; in Mexico,
194
Ortega, Daniel, 54, m-12, 118, 250 (n. 5)
Ortega, Humberto, 70, 163, 178, 250 (n. 5),
271 (n. 16). See also Military

Peak associations, 14,17, 27, 48, 54, 23940 (n. 79), 241 (n. 84), 247 (nn. 36, 37).
See also c o s e p; c o s i p
Pellas family, 114, 182, 260 (n. 37). See
also BANAMER; ISA
Peron, Juan, 2
Peru, 24-28; Grupo Romero, 25; role
of immigrants, 25, 238 (n. 72); elite
divisions in, 194, 240 (n. 80); interpre
tations of revolution, 238 (n. 68)
Pezullo, Lawrence, 68
pi p (Programa de Inversion Publica), 81,
85. See also Agroindustrial projects;
APP

(Partido Liberal Constitucionalista), 114, 118, 181, 275 (n. 48). See also
Aleman, Arnoldo
pl i (Partido Liberal Independiente), 114,
119
Populism, 236 (n. 51); role of bourgeoi
sie, xi, 2, 19, 147; ideology, 2, 19; and
restraints on foreign capital, 19; and
fiscal crisis, 19, 28, 236-37 (n. 57)
Poulantzas, Nicos, 2, 227 (n. 2)
pr i (Partido Revolucionario Institucional)
(Mexico), 24, 208
Private sector associations, 29, 278 (n. 2);
in Chile, 6, 197, 228 (n. 10), 229 (n. 11);
in El Salvador, 14, 197; in Mexico, 2122,197-98, 237 (n. 65); in Peru, 26,197,
199; in Nicaragua, 33, 44-45, 59-60,
199-201; in Ecuador, 231 (n. 25), 236
(n. 50); in Jamaica, 240-41 (n. 84). See
also c o s e p ; i n d e ; Peak associations;
pl c

UNAG; UPANIC

Privatization: in El Salvador, 18
—in Nicaragua, 120, 161, 185-86; re
turn of properties, 166-67, 175-76,
270 (n. 11); model, 167-68, 177, 272
(n. 28); worker ownership, 174-77, 274
(n. 39), 275 (n. 43); e ps and contra allo
cations, 175-76. See also Chamorro
government; c o r n a p
Ramirez, Sergio, 55, 59, 66, 120
Reagan administration, 17, 69, 193; eco
nomic embargo, 98, 185. See also
Contra war

Index

Revolution, 4, 28, 68, 121-22, 216-17;
in Mexico, 20, 208; consolidation, 97,
208, 211-13; economic problems of, 97,
210-H; outcome of, 156-57, 187-89;
mass base of, 207-9. See also f s l n
Robelo, Alfonso, 57, 61, 67-68, 268 (n. 38)
Ruiz, Henry, 65, 101, 250 (n. 5), 256 (n. 6)

n, 215; in Peru, 25-27; in Nicaragua,
30, 33. See also Chamorro government;
f s l n ; Somoza regime
State trade monopolies: in El Salvador,
14,16, 18, 234 (n. 44); in Nicaragua, 67,
121, 169, 250 (n. 3)
(Ingenio Tipitapa-Malacatoya),
74, 79, 213. See also Agroindustrial
projects; a pp

t i ma l

Saenz, Orlando, 9-10
s a i ms a (Servicio Agricola-Industrial
de Masaya, S.A.), 109,167. See also
Bolanos, Enrique
Salazar, Jorge, ix, 68-70,139, 250 (n. 9)
Sanford Commission, 116-17, 162, 261
(n. 46). See also c o r d e n i c
Schick, Rene, 45
Sequeira, Arges, 275-76 (n. 48)
s n i (Sociedad Nacional de Industrias)
(Peru), 25-27, 194, 199
s o f o f a (Sociedad de Fomento Fabril)
(Chile), 6, 9, 197, 229 (n. 11)
Somoza Debayle, Anastasio, 54-60. See
also Somoza family; Somoza regime
Somoza Debayle, Luis, 39, 45-46. See also
Somoza family; Somoza regime
Somoza family: economic group, 42;
business interests, 45-46, 50, 52, 246
(n. 32); corruption, 49-50, 52; expro
priation of, 66
Somoza Garcia, Anastasio, 35, 39, 49. See
also Somoza family; Somoza regime
Somoza regime: strategies for elite con
trol, 43-48, 199, 246 (nn. 29, 30); au
thority structures, 47, 50; conflicts
with economic elites, 49-52, 54-55,
60-61; use of violence, 50, 55; par
ticipation in dialogues, 55-59; general
strikes against, 56-60, 249 (n. 50);
development strategy, 242 (n. 5)
Staples sector, 90-92, 147-49, 256-57
(n. 10), 267 (n. 30); rice, 91; sorghum,
91-92; maize, 92. See also a n a r
State: autonomy of, x, 19; divisions
within, 206-8
State-elite relations, 196-97, 204, 278
(n. 2); in Chile, 8-9, in El Salvador,
12-13, 18; in Mexico, 20-24; role of
economic growth in, 24, 27, 30, 210-

(Universidad Centroamericana), 138
(Union Democratica de Liberacion),
56, 58, 249 (n. 49)
u n a g (Union Nacional de Agricultores
y Ganaderos), 109-11; relations with
FSLN, 64, 93-94, 140-41, 200, 266
(n. 26); recruitment of elites, 64, 9394, 140; membership, 140-41, 265
(n. 20), 266 (n. 26); leaders, 141, 143-44;
divisions within, 143-44; entrepreneurship, 185-86; funding, 200, 265 (n. 17);
benefits, 266 (n. 26). See also Banco del
Campo; CARNIC; ECODEPA; NuflCZ,
Daniel
UNAN-Leon (Universidad Nacional Auto
noma de Nicaragua), 138
u n o (Union Nacional Opositora), 118,
163, 172. See also Chamorro, Violeta
Barrios de; Chamorro government
u p (Unidad Popular) (Chile): coalition
strategy, 6-7, 230 (n. 20); expropria
tion policy, 7-8, 10, 202, 230-31 (n. 21);
bosses' strike, 10. See also Allende,
Salvador
u pa n ic (Union de Productores Agro
pecuarios de Nicaragua): formation,
59-60; divisions within, 61, 107-8, 115,
120; relations with f s l n , 70, 110-11,
114, 121, 139-40; organization, 131, 249
(n. 52), 260 (n. 41), 275 (n. 46); mem
bership, 139-40; leaders, 141, 180-81;
funding, 161, 258 (n. 22), 265 (n. 17);
relations with Chamorro government,
180-81, 275 (n. 47). See also c o s e p;
Economic elite, Nicaraguan
u s a i d (U.S. Agency for International De
velopment): 1960s programs, 36, 39, 50,
uca

udel

313

314

Index
244 (n. 16); support for neoliberalism,
157, 161-62, 178, 185. See also f i s e ;
Neoliberalism; Privatization
U.S. government: Nixon administration,
8, 230 (n. 17), 278-79 (n. 3); Carter ad
ministration, 17, 59, 68; and Somoza
regime, 35; U.S. embassy, 68, 257 (n. 15),
260 (n. 37). See also Bush administra
tion; Reagan administration

Velasco Alvarado, Juan, 4, 24-27
Vivas, Rene, 178, 270 (n. 11)
Walker, William, 34
Wheelock, Jaime, 73, 80,109, 250 (n. 5),
256 (n. 6), 258 (n. 23). See also mid i n r a
World Bank, 36-37,157,161
Zelaya, Jose Santos, 34

Sp a l d in g ’s d e t a il e d a c c o u n t in g o f t h e d e v e l o p me n t

AND EVOLUTION OF NICARAGUA’S CAPITALIST CLASS MAKES A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO THE
STUDY OF THE NlCARAGUAN REVOLUTION AND ITS AFTERMATH. THIS IS ESSENTIAL READING FOR
ANYONE WHO SEEKS TO UNDERSTAND NlCARAGUAN POLITICS.”--- JOHN A. BOOTH, UNIVER
SITY o f No r t h Te x a s
Wil l b e o f in t e r e s t t o a l l t h o s e s t u d y in g t h e p o l it ic a l

ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT AND REFORM.”--- EVELYNE HUBER, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAR
OLINA a t Ch a p e l Hil l

Jy tracing the complex relationship between the Sandinista government and the Nicaraguan business elite,
this book examines the shifting mix of alliances and
oppositions that shaped the Sandinista revolution. Rose
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that assume a high degree of class cohesion. Drawing on
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